CASCAde aims to create a new generation of security assurance, that is, a verifiable statement of security properties. It investigates to what extent one can certify an interconnected dynamically changing system in such a way that one can prove its security properties without disclosing sensitive information about the system's blueprint. For example, tenants of a shared infrastructure might expect of the provider of that infrastructure that they receive assurances that their own resources are separated from other tenants. At the same time, the provider and other tenants have an interest that data of the make-up of the infrastructure as a whole and of tenants' sub-systems stay confidential.
This is important for society because shared hosting and computing platforms are more and more common, while their security assurances can currently not yet be verified in confidence. In fact, we believe that usable confidentiality-preserving security assurance will trigger a paradigm shift in security and dependability.
The project aims at developing cryptographic tools to certify topologies and graph data structures. It seeks to bind topology certifications to the bare metal of the underlying computer systems, such that the guarantees given are assured for the actual computers in question. It aims at developing methods for certifying large-scale dynamically changing systems to keep up with the ever-expanding infrastructures. Furthermore, CASCAde investigates in an evidence-based fashion how human users relate to complex security assurance and privacy systems as proposed by us and what supports users in trusting such systems.