

The Crisis of Global Citizenship

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Introduction

The theme of this lecture is the current crisis of global citizenship and democratic responses to it.¹ The crisis is that citizens are unable to exercise effectively their civic ‘response-abilities’ in response to four major global problems. The global problems are: (1) the ecological and climate change crisis; (2) the imperial problem of inequality, exploitation and poverty of the Global South; (3) the problem of global wars and militarization; and (4) the problem of distrust and disrespect for different civilizations and peoples.

These global problems are *interconnected*. The processes of modernisation, industrialisation, western expansion, exploitation of the world’s resources and economic globalisation that are the cause of the ecological crisis are also the major cause of the inequalities between the global north and south. The primary purpose of the huge global military empire of the United States is to protect and expand the very processes of economic globalisation that are

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deeply implicated in the ecological and inequality problems. The ranking of peoples and their different ways of life as respectable or threatening are also closely related to their conformity or non-conformity to western modernization and globalization.

When global citizens try to exercise their citizen abilities in response to these four problems they find that the dominant forms of citizenship available to them are not very effective. The official institutions and channels of citizenship are limited. Moreover, the limits shield from public engagement the very processes and institutions that partly cause the four global problems. These limits lead to the *fifth global problem*, the crisis of global citizenship, and hence to the global protests by concerned yet incapacitated citizens.

I would like to investigate this global crisis in the following way. In part one I set out what I take to be the dominant *mode* of citizenship today, namely, modern citizenship.² Modern citizenship is the form of citizenship that came along with the institutions and processes of modernization. I try to describe it in such a way that we can see its self-limiting character in the face of the five global problems.

In part two, I first mention the major attempts to critique and radically transform the mode of modern citizenship in the twentieth century. I then mention critiques and reforms that have modified modern citizenship from within. Many of these derive from the Frankfurt School. They reformulate and clarify the core democratic norms within modern citizenship in a way that enables us to *detach* them from the problematic limits, processes and institutions of modernization with which they have been historically associated and which are internally

² A 'mode of citizenship' refers not only to rights and duties of a form of citizenship, but also its practices, activities, underlying institutions and historical processes of institutionalisation, as well as its normativity.

related to the global problems. Next, I introduce the critiques advanced by the citizen movements that have been unable to respond effectively to the global problems within the institutions of modern citizenship and have tried to respond to the five global problems in more direct and effective democratic ways: the ecology movements, the anti-imperial, fair trade and self-reliance movements, the non-violent peace movements, the respect for the diversity of civilizations movements, grass-roots democracy and cooperative movements, and feminists movements.³

In part three I turn to the alternative mode of citizenship that these movements have brought into being over the last 150 years in and around the interstices of modern citizenship. I believe that these separate and marginalised traditions of citizenship are starting to come together in our time and to begin to form an alternative global mode of democratic citizenship that I call cooperative citizenship. These citizens are searching for more effective ways to exercise the arts of citizenship in response to the global problems. They are also searching for a partnership with those activists and scholars who criticise and reform modern citizenship from within. I hope to suggest a possible common ground of such a partnership: namely, shared norms of democratic citizenship.

1. Modern Citizenship

Modern citizenship is the dominant mode of citizenship today. It conceives of citizenship in terms of (1) the *status* an individual has, in terms of rights and duties, (2) relative to a set of underlying legal, political and economic *institutional preconditions*, and (3) relative to a set of

³ It is more accurate to say that feminist movements have been central actors in all these movements.

historical *processes* of modernisation that bring about the preconditions. It is a modular or institutionalised form of citizenship associated with the modernization of the West and with the spread of this form of citizenship and its modern institutions of states, representative governments and capitalist markets throughout the world; first by colonization, and, since decolonization, by the policies of reconstruction and democratization of the great powers and the institutions of global governance. It is presented as a universal form of citizenship for all peoples. Other forms are represented as pre-modern or less-developed or anti-modern. It is standardly said to be the duty or mission of the western states to bring this form of citizenship to other peoples, in the name civilization, modernisation or, more recently, freedom and democracy.

Let us examine these features in more detail. Modern citizenship is understood as a *status* an individual has relative to a set of institutions. One is a citizen relative to the rule of law to which one is subject. The imposition of formal structure of law lays the groundwork for the status of citizen. The civil law ‘civilizes’, that is, creates the conditions of civilization and civility. It civilizes, or, as we say since decolonization, it *modernises*. Outside the rule of law, there is no civilization and no citizenship.

The status of modern citizenship is defined in terms of *three tiers of rights and duties*: by the underlying *institutions* in which these rights are exercised; and by the historical *processes* of institutionalisation and differentiation into separate spheres.

The *first* and most important tier of rights is the negative liberties or freedoms of modern subjects. These modern liberties consist of: the liberty of the individual or corporate person, of free speech, thought and faith, of formal equality before the law, and of the economic liberty to own private property and enter into contracts. At the centre of the first set of

rights is the modern liberty to enter into the private economic sphere, to engage in market freedoms and free trade, and to be protected from interference. This first tier of rights of modern liberty is primary; it is literally *the liberty of the moderns*.

We can see that this first tier of rights of modern citizenship presupposes not only the rule of law that underpins it, but also a set of legal and economic institutions in terms of which it makes sense. That is, for us to be able to exercise our market freedoms in the private sphere there must be capitalist markets, the dispossession of the people from other relationships to their land and resources by means of the establishment of private property, labour markets and corporations, and the corresponding systems of property, contract and labour law.

The often violent historical *processes* of modernisation that remove or restructure any existing alternative forms of economic organisation, put in place the underlying modern institutions, and then socialise or modernise subjects in them are called by various names: primitive accumulation, global enclosure movements, commodification, marketization and economic globalization. These processes of modernisation in turn presuppose the institutions of a global military network and its local dependent elites with the capacity to impose, extend and protect these institutions from the resistance of the millions who are subjected to dispossession, inequalities, exploitation and environmental degradation with little or no consent.

This first tier of modern citizenship rights – the liberties of the moderns – is paramount. It is the right not to be interfered with in these activities by the *demos*. And, it provides the major justification for the global spread of these legal and economic preconditions and for the opening of societies to free trade, that is, economic modernisation.

The *second* tier of rights of modern citizenship comprises the rights to participate in representative elections, the public sphere and civil society. Like the first tier of modern citizenship rights, participatory rights presuppose underlying institutions in which they can be exercised: that is, representative governments, political parties, public spheres and civil societies, and the differentiation between private and public spheres.

The imposition of these modern, centralised institutions presupposes the *processes* that remove the multiplicity of other forms of citizen-participation in other forms of government; and the socialisation of citizens into this modern mode of representative participation. Citizens do not exercise powers of self-government. They are said to ‘delegate’ these to representatives. Citizens exercise communicative powers in elections and public spheres, through official channels, and with the hope of influencing voting behaviour.

The rights of modern participatory freedom in the public sphere are subordinate to the first tier of rights of market freedoms in the private sphere in four ways. First, historically, rights of participation in modern representative institutions are said to come along after processes of modernisation set the underlying economic institutions of modern economic liberty in place. The processes of economic modernisation are said to require more dictatorial and despotic forms of rule initially, such as colonization, slavery, indentured labour discipline, military rule, structural adjustment, military intervention and reconstruction, and so on. Once the modern discipline of labour market competition is established, people can begin to exercise their modern participatory rights; yet under the tutelage of colonial powers, and, after decolonization, modern advisors, non-governmental organisations and the policies of democratization and constitutionalisation of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Second, the rights of modern participation are optional: one is a citizen in virtue of having the right to participate whether or not one actually exercises it. Third, the major justification for participation, especially in the liberal and neo-liberal traditions, has been to protect individuals from interference or domination by the government or the demos: namely, to protect private autonomy. Fourth, the rights of citizen participation are restricted to exercise in the public sphere; not in the private sphere (as with economy democracy).

The *third* tier of rights of modern citizenship includes social and economic rights. These are the rights that were won in response to the horrendous inequalities and exploitation of unregulated market freedoms of tier one rights and by means of participatory rights. They are not rights of citizens to exercise their social and economic powers themselves, but, rather, rights that provide basic social assistance and help to integrate the unemployed back into the market.

This modular form of modern citizenship, with its underlying military, economic, legal and political institutions of the modern state, was codified in the nineteenth century in the standard of civilization in modern international law. The modern state-form was recognized as the highest form of political organisation. It alone was recognized as sovereign under international law. Although only European states approximated this norm of human organization, it was said to be the ideal form for all peoples and societies. All other societies and their institutions were ranked historically, normatively, cognitively and institutionally as what were called 'lower stages of historical development' by the new social sciences.

It was said to be the duty of the civilized modern states to move the lower societies up through 'stages of historical development' by imposing the underlying institutions of modernization by means of colonization and various forms of indirect rule. This process

would open their resources and labour to the civilizing and modernizing effects of the rule of western property and commerce dominated by the companies of the great powers. Then, the modern societies would govern the colonial peoples so they could eventually exercise modern powers of self-government in the basic replication institutions of modern citizenship for which colonization laid the foundation. This mission was carried on in the Mandate system of the League of Nations and the trustee system of the United Nations.

When the colonies broke away from colonial rule during decolonization, the great powers were able to retain 'informal' imperial control over the new states during the violent Cold War; forcing them to keep their resources, labour and markets open to free trade and modernization. Although the former colonies had a right to self-determination, the great powers, the Bretton Woods Institutions of global governance and the US military claimed to have the responsibility to ensure that these powers are exercised in the institutional form of tier one market freedoms and tier two electoral freedoms. These are posited as the universal form of self-determination for all peoples as they ascend to modernity. The historical and normative *telos* of these processes is the modernization of all peoples in this modular form. Only then will there be world peace.

When the great powers say today that they are intervening in Iraq and Afghanistan to bring them 'freedom' and 'democracy', they mean that they are continuing this project by imposing the institutional preconditions of the market freedoms and representative participation. This is now justified by an emerging 'right to modern democracy and markets' in international law, in much the same way as the 'mission to civilize' in the earlier period.

The final feature of the mode of modern citizenship is the explanation of the *means* that drives the processes of modernization towards their telos. Many of the theorists of modern

citizenship accepted the Darwinian premise that human nature and all species of life are basically anti-social and antagonistic. Consequently, norms and structures of cooperation have to be imposed coercively on these adversarial beings. 'Might thus *makes* Right' in the Hobbesian sense that only violence can make actual the basis of a rightful order.⁴ The competitive wars and struggles of the historical processes of the imposition and defence of the institutions of modernization were seen both as a *manifestation* of this conflictual disposition and the *means* of imposing a legal structure of ordered cooperation over it.

The direct consequence of this Hobbesian and Darwinian premise are two mantras or dogmas of modernization theory: (1) democracy cannot be brought about by democratic means and (2) peace cannot be brought about by peaceful means. In both case, force is required.

As modernization progresses, the modern institutions of states, colonies and international law domesticate and channel the basic antagonistic dispositions into controlled forms of non-violent, instrumentally rational competition among the members in the various spheres of modern societies exercising their corresponding rights and duties. Violent competition is domesticated into non-violent economic competition in the private sphere, the market place of ideas in the civil sphere, and the competitive, arguing and bargaining exchange of reasons and consent in the public, educational and research spheres. These institutionalised and coordinated competitions develop specialised human capacities and thereby drive the

⁴ Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* (1859). Note the subtitle. Darwin argued that the superior species always exterminate the inferior ones in the struggles for life and this explains why so hundreds of thousands were dying in colonial Africa.

progress of humanity in the various spheres of modernity up the various stages of development.

War and military competition remain necessary at the frontier of modernity, where modern states confront less-developed peoples and those who resist modernisation, because this is, by definition, a non-ordered and non-normative sphere of antagonistic relationships. It is a state of war, anarchy, struggle for existence or Wild West that has to be ordered by the force of arms. Yet, the victory of the moderns is more or less assured precisely because they have already imposed the institutions of cooperative competition and discipline on themselves that develop the human capacities which enable them to lead and prevail over other, less-advanced forms of organisation - by various military, financial, educational, cultural and other means.

At the end of this long process, there finally will be the modern vision of world peace. It will be the peace of all the people and peoples of the world competing non-violently within the differentiated institutions and spheres of modern citizenship.

Hence, modern citizens are the free subjects of two complementary orders of institutions, normativity and historicity. (1) They freely affirm and obey the proto-universal laws and rights of the respective private and public spheres of modern societies and international law (the juridical subject). (2) And, within these spheres, they exercise their rights in accordance with the strategic and communicative rules and procedures of the competitive development of their capacities. The conduct of the moderns is governed *through* their constrained freedom of participation in these two main ways, as Michel Foucault famously argued.

Specifically, within the public sphere, they exercise their public reasons to criticise and reform existing laws and procedures of their society relative to the universal ideal. They see this set of norms and institutions as the universal form of individual and collective self-determination and they see history as the story of their gradual spread around the world. And, from the 'realist' perspective, they see this mode of modern citizenship as the most advanced means of bringing the adversarial dispositions of humans under control and socializing them into the competitive motor of modernization and progress.

2. Critiques, transformations, reforms and alternatives

As a brief transition to the alternative mode of citizenship I wish to discuss, I will mention three major critiques and attempts to transform and reform the modern mode of citizenship in the twentieth century. I believe that cooperative citizens have learned from these critiques and we can understand their alternative form of citizenship better by seeing it in this light.

The *first* kind of critique of modern citizenship is the revolutionary attempts of the Second and Third Worlds to transform radically modern citizenship and its underlying institutions. It is a critique of the privatization of the economic powers of citizens, under the first tier of the rights of the moderns. The aim is to bring the exercise of the economic capacities of citizens under collective control. For the most part, however, it did not take the form of citizens organising their economic powers democratically themselves, as in economic democracy. Rather, in a kind of mirror image of modern citizenship and representative government, it tended to take the form of the revolutionary seizing of political power by a party and the administration of the economy by the party and modern bureaucratic ministries.

Except for Cuba, these revolutions failed. Even when they temporarily succeeded, they reproduced some of the worst features of modernization under colonization, such as: rapid and violent centralization of political power and state building, the destruction or marginalisation of local forms of political and economic governance and citizenship, environmental devastation, and the subordination of democratic reforms to economic modernization.

The combined strength of the *Non Aligned Movement* of the majority of former colonies was unable to hold out against the concerted power of the former imperial powers during the Cold War and the rise to global hegemony of the United States. The great powers and the global institutions they control have been able to force the Third World into continuing, post-colonial relationships of dependency, exploitation, inequality, elite rule, low-intensity-democracy and replication development. This continues to be carried out under the rubric of modernization and of democratization-to-come, and against the democratic protests of the majority of their own people. This is the ‘tragedy of postcolonial enlightenment’ enunciated by Partha Chatterjee and David Scott.

The *second* kind of critique has been the moderate attempts to reform modern citizenship and its institutions from within. Many of these critiques have been developed by members of the Frankfurt School. Let me mention the most important. The first is surely the reformulation of modern citizenship by Jurgen Habermas from a monological form of subjectivity to a dialogical form of intersubjectivity acquired in democratic relationships of reciprocal learning. Next, Axel Honneth has reformulated the dialogical relationships of citizenisation along more Hegelian lines - as relationships of mutual recognition and respect. Third, Rainer Forst has argued that these democratic norms derive from a more fundamental *right of citizens to justification* in any relationship of governance to which they are subject. In principle, this

means that the exercise of power over any individual or collective agent in any sphere of activity cannot simply be imposed, but must pass through democratic practices of justification and negotiation of those affected in order to be legitimate.

In a complementary spirit, the basic democratic norms of political liberalism have been reformulated by Anthony Laden in terms of the exchange of public reasons among free and equal citizens over the basic structure of any form of association, without reference to coercive or institutional pre-conditions. And, in the *agonistic* or Neo-Nietzschean tradition, David Owen has argued that the *basic* relationships among humans cannot be the antagonistic struggle for existence, the master-slave dialectic, class war, the clash of civilizations or the endless play of power and domination. Rather, the countless competitive games humans play must be seen to rest on more basic cooperative relationships of reciprocal recognition and respect that such agonistic games presuppose and take for granted.

The importance of these critiques is twofold. First, they reformulate the central democratic norms of modern citizenship in terms of dialogical relationships of respect and reciprocity among the partners subject to relationships of governance. Second, they make possible the *detachment* of these democratic norms from their limited role within the particular historical processes and institutions of modernization to which they are uncritically restricted in the mainstream tradition of modern citizenship. While moderate and radical democrats disagree deeply over the specific formulations of these norms of democratic relationships and over the extent to which they have to be detached from modern institutions and imperial processes, I believe that it is correct to say that both traditions share a commitment to these

democratic norms. They are, so to speak, the intersubjective ground of the contestation among radical and moderate democrats.⁵

Such critiques thus can enable us to stand back and apply these democratic norms (under some contestable formulation) to a whole range of relationships of governance that are shielded from democratic justification within the standard module of modern citizenship, especially in the so-called private sphere of economic activity. They also enable us to see a global plurality of political and economic forms of human organisation in which these democratic norms are enacted in different ways than the particular institutional form of modern citizenship.

Despite these advances, the shared democratic norms have tended to be applied within the background limits of the modern mode of citizenship, rather than applied critically to the limits. They are associated almost wholly with deliberation in the official public sphere. This constraint is due to the self-limiting or low-intensity character of democracy under the modern mode of citizenship.

From the perspective of democratic citizens who wish to exercise their powers of democratic citizenship in the multiplicity of unjust local and global relationships of power in which they find themselves in their everyday activities, they find that they are unable to do so. These power relationships are said to be mostly in the private sphere and thus not open to democratic dialogue and negotiation. If they wish to act as citizens and exercise their participatory freedom, they are constrained to do so only in the public sphere, only through the exercise of communicative capacities, only through official channels, and only in relation to representative parties and ministries. The best that they can hope for is that they will

⁵ See *Public Philosophy in a New Key*, volume II, chapter 4 for this argument.

influence voters who will in turn elect representatives who will in turn pass legislation that will in turn 'regulate' from the outside the relationships of power that are causing and reproducing the global problems. Yet, these relationships are protected from too much regulation by the first tier of rights – the negative liberties of non-interference – as well as by the most powerful corporations in the world. Democratic citizens thus run up against the *limits* of modern citizenship we have already surveyed. They discover that modern citizenship rests on and brings with it the pyramid of underlying and *interconnected* economic, political, legal and military relationships that are protected from the exercise of democratic negotiation. Yet, it is these relationships that are implicated in producing the global problems they strive to address.

Consequently, a *third* type of critique has developed in the twentieth century oriented to exposing these background limitations to the democratization of modern citizenship and their implication in the global problems. These critiques have been advanced by democratic citizen movements that organise and respond *directly* to the global problems. For example: the ecological movements have criticised how the environment and the forms of life in it are treated as either commodities or externalities. The anti-imperial and fair trade movements have criticised how the unequal and undemocratic relationships between the global north and south are legally protected from democratic negotiation by those subject to them. The peace and non-violence movements have criticised the use of violence to extend the underlying institutions of modernization and to protect them from the endless resistances they engender. The grass-roots local and global democracy and cooperative movements have criticised the limits of democratic participation. And, the community-based and non-violent cooperative movements in the global south have criticised how institutions of modern citizenship and modern subjectivity have been imposed over their traditional political and economic practices by centralising elites or policies of global institutions. Each generation

of these movements brings to light these inconvenient truths about the limitations of modern democratic citizenship relative to global problems of our times.

These critiques thus deepen the analysis begun by Adorno and Horkheimer in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and Karl Polanyi in *The Great Transformation*. The more modernization progresses the more it reproduces its pathological effects on humans (the violence of primitive accumulation, inequality, exploitation, differentiation into higher and lower peoples) and on the ecology (the commodification and destruction of nature). Yet, in 2009 we are in a better position than they were in four crucial respects. We can learn from the failures of the radical critiques and transformations. The critiques and reforms of modern citizenship from within have reformulated what is valuable within the democratic norms of modern citizenship and made possible their detachment from the pathological processes of modernisation. The critical citizen movements, in concert with academic researchers, have delineated the relationship between the institutions and processes of modern citizenship and the global problems clearly and concisely. And, these citizen movements have experimented with and learned from *alternative* forms of citizenship that respond to the global problems more democratically and effectively. I call these alternative forms of citizenship ‘cooperative citizenship’.

3. Co-operative Citizenship

Now, let’s set aside the perspective of historical processes, institutions and rights that are the precondition of modern citizenship. I would like to move around and see citizenship from the perspective of citizens actually engaged in cooperative activities oriented to serving public goods within whatever governance relationships they find themselves. In these activities they exercise cooperatively the democratic arts of citizenship that are limited,

alienated or delegated, and disaggregated into specialised spheres in the modern mode of citizenship.

This cooperative mode of citizenship comprises a number of different forms of citizenship that have been developed by more or less separate traditions over the last 160 years. It seems to me that these different practices of citizenship are coming together, forming connections and composing a new mode of citizenship in the present, in such places as the *World Social Forum*. I will present an overview of its main features by surveying the different traditions that it brings together

Cooperative citizenship is not a status granted to citizen by a state or international legal regime and a set of private and public institutions in which its two main types of rights and duties can be exercised. To have such a status is to be a ‘member’ but not a cooperative citizen. Rather, it starts from the classical democratic premise that people become citizens by actually exercising their civic capacities or *response-abilities* by participating in civic activities with fellow citizens for the sake of public goods in the webs of relationships of governance to which they are subject. People acquire the democratic form of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, as well as the complex arts of being a citizen, by engaging in public activities.

Cooperative citizenship begins “*here and now*”, in any and all relationships of governance in which we find ourselves in our everyday activities across public and private spheres. The moment an individual or collective agent who is subject to or affected by a relationship by which their conduct is governed no longer unreflectively obeys a rule, but turns and becomes an active agent in and of the relationship, that subject/agent is on the road to becoming a citizen of the relationship.

This proto-citizen form of agency begins to transform a governance relationship from being a unilateral and monological relationship of command-obedience to an interactive and dialogical relationship in which the partners – governors and governed – recognize and relate to each other as active agents *of* the relationship.

Classically, citizenship comes into being when citizens *call into question* some aspect of a relationship that they bear (as subjects). This emergence of democratic agency can occur in almost any kind of relationship of governance: students raising a question about the pedagogical relationship in a small classroom, oppressed people calling into question a relationship of exploitation and inequality, a cultural minority calling into question the recognition aspect of a relationship, consumers or producers questioning the effects of the relationship of their activities to the environment, or a relationship to the spiritual world.

When citizens bring an aspect of a relationship of governance into question in this way, they bring an aspect of it that is ‘taken for granted’ and goes without saying out of the ‘background’ routines of everyday life and bring it into the light of the foreground – that is, into the space of public questioning. For the cooperative tradition, this, by definition, brings the questionable aspect of a relationship out of the ‘private sphere’ and into the ‘public sphere’, by the act of subjecting it to public scrutiny. Public and private spheres are not different institutions and spheres. They are different ways of relating to the relationships in which we live: as uncritically following or as questioning them *en passant*. A public sphere thus comes into being in the same movement by which subjects become democratic citizens, as Hannah Arendt taught us.

There are thus countless public spheres. The official public sphere of modern societies is one type of public sphere. But, from the perspective of the cooperative tradition, it is not constructed by the state for the use of modern citizens. Rather, generations of public-spirited cooperative citizens have created official public spheres by calling unjust and exclusionary relationships of governance into question long before they had such a right, and continuing until they gained official recognition and institutionalisation. And, they continue to call into question the official limits of any given public sphere and subject them to public scrutiny, from generation to generation.

When citizens engage in public activities, such as calling into question a governance relationship, they exercise some subset of the public capacities or public powers of the sovereign people. These are not the abstract and universalizable skill sets of the modernist tradition. Rather, the citizens' public powers or capacities of self-government are always exercised in the local arts of citizenship that are embedded in the ways and means of the social relationships in which they are exercised. How a citizen raises a question and enters into negotiations varies across relationships, cultures and civilizations. There is thus a plurality of arts of citizenship just as there is a plurality of forms of government.

By raising a question and demanding an answer from the partners in positions of power (the governors), citizens draw all the partners to the relationship into a public dialogue over the relationship and relative to the public goods they claim it should serve. This is, to use Rainer Forst's formulation, to invoke the *right to justification* of the relationship in question. For example, citizens can raise questions of the public goods or public harms of a relationship relative to the five global problems I outlined in the Introduction:

(1) Does this relationship treat us as democratic agents with the right to have a say in it, or does it treat us like a thing? This is the democratic problem.

(2) Does the relationship constrain us to interact in our producing and consuming conduct in a way that damages the environment, or in a way that cares for the environment? This is the ecological problem.

(3) Does this particular economic relationship exploit and dominate those in the global south who are subject to it, as in most free trade relationships, or is it a relationship worked up democratically by those subject to it in the north and south, as in relationships of fair trade and local self-reliance? This is the imperial problem.

(4) Is the relationship based on the force and coercion of the more powerful partners or is it based on non-violent negotiation and consent? This is the war and militarization problem.

(5) Does the relationship recognize and respect the diversity of forms of life of the partners or does it recognize and respect them only under one civilizational form, the modernist form, or some other? This is the pluralism problem.

Now, if the powers-that-be cooperate, offer a justification and enter into a dialogue over its merits, then this is a public dialogue, or the exchange of public reasons, between governors and citizens. If the justification is shown to be false, then they enter into negotiations over how to modify the relationship to serve the public good in question.

Cooperative citizens are happy to join modern citizens and delegate the tough negotiations to courts, parliaments and international human rights bodies if they are effective. However,

they are often not effective at all; and this for a whole host of reasons. For example, powerful multinational corporations are able to intimate the workers who raise the question, bypass or bribe the impoverished local government, influence elected officials and voters in the more powerful states, and invoke transnational trade laws, such as *lex mercatoria*, that are often designed to protect trade relationships from democratic scrutiny.

If, as often happen, the powers-that-be refuse to negotiate, or put on an elaborate pretence of public negotiation, then cooperative citizens re-appropriate their citizen capacities of negotiation, which they had delegated to the courts and parliaments on the condition that they would exercise them effectively. They take back their powers of self-governing citizenship and exercise them in two general ways.

The *first* way is to organise a negotiation network locally and globally around the unjustifiable relationship in question, and use non-violent means of persuasion and pressure to bring the powers-that-be to the negotiating table. These activities comprise the great *arts of non-violent citizen-based negotiation* that have emerged and flourished in the twentieth century. These arts have been developed over generations in response to the failure of modern citizenship institutions; as states, political parties and global institutions promoted neo-liberal globalisation and coercive structural adjustment, and ignored the democratic protests of the millions of people subject to these policies.

The *second* way citizens exercise their public capacities occurs when the powers-that-be refuse to enter into dialogue and negotiations, and when they are legally protected from democratic interaction with those who are subject to or affected by their relationships of governance. In such cases, cooperative citizens simply re-appropriate the capacities that they were exercising in the governance relationship that they find unjustifiable and they exercise these capacities

themselves in their own organisations. That is, they exercise some of their powers of popular sovereignty directly rather than delegating them to a private corporation or public ministry that exercises them in a way that harms public goods and evades democratic control.

This is the origin of self-governing, democratic cooperatives over the last two hundred years. Citizens re-appropriate the economic powers they conditionally entrusted to private corporations and public ministries, the capacities of health care, housing, local food production, caring for the environment, north-south trade relationships, non-violent dispute resolution, helping immigrants and refugees, education, and savings and loans cooperatives. In short, in any sphere of activity where the capacities of citizens are disaggregated and governed within specialized modern private and public institutions, and whenever the form of organisation within that institution is shown to generate or contribute to one of the global problems, citizens take back these capacities and exercise them in their own cooperative organisations.

As Robert Owen was setting up the first workers' coops in England, Schulze-Delitzsch and Raffeisen were setting up *Volk.sbank* micro-credit and agricultural coops in rural Germany, which led to the first international cooperative network by 1867. There are now literally millions of local and global cooperatives and community-based organisations that span the globe and cover every aspect of modern life, from food sovereignty, fair trade, global water justice and micro-credit coops to the return to local food production and consumption in response to the injustice and ecological damage of the privatized global food network. These citizens do not seek to reform modern citizenship or to overthrow the system. They re-appropriate the appropriate powers of popular sovereignty, which they are said to have delegated to states and corporations in modernisation theories, and exercise them in more democratic and effective ways themselves

In summary, in each of the previous cases - of questioning, dialogue, negotiation and cooperation - citizens are engaged in radically *democratising* the webs of relationships in which they are engaged from the ground up. They refuse to be governed in the way given to them. They treat the constrained freedom of participation within modern governance relationships as an opening to challenge, negotiate and transform them into partnerships under the shared democratic authority of all subject to them. They ‘co-operate’ the relationships. By bringing all those subject to a relationship into an ongoing dialogue and negotiation over it relative to public goods, and thus treating each other with democratic respect and reciprocity over time, they gradually make themselves into good interdependent governors and citizens. This is one of the oldest meanings of ‘democracy’. It is the grass-roots form of democratisation of cooperative citizenship from below.

These activities are literally the realisation of democracy by *means* of democracy. They enact relational norms of democratic participation similar to those reformulated by the moderate critics of modern citizenship, yet they apply them to the relationships that are placed beyond the limits of democracy in the modern mode of citizenship.

I want now to turn to the *ethical basis* of cooperative citizenship. The activities of cooperative citizens are the manifestation of a fundamental ethical norm. One has to ‘be the change’. That is, one should embody the change in one’s everyday relationships that one wishes to see in the larger society and argues for in the public sphere.

It is not enough to present arguments in the public sphere in hopes of influencing voters and governments, and on the assumption that it is the role of government to bring about the corresponding change. *Rather*, for a cooperative citizen, it is necessary also to practice what

one preaches, or walk the talk, in one's ethical conduct. If you argue publicly for democracy, then act democratically in relationships with others; if you advocate a stewardship relationship to the environment, then care for the environment in your everyday activities; if you preach respect and reciprocity among culturally different peoples, then interact in respectful and reciprocal ways with them; if you argue for democratic and egalitarian relationships between the global north and south, then enter only into this kind of relationship and refuse non-democratic and unequal relationships; if you argue publicly for world peace, then act peacefully and non-violently in all relationships.

In modern citizenship, what one says in public and what one does in ethics are separate. In cooperative citizenship, they are as united as they were for Socrates. A citizen's public arguments are not judged only by the cogency of the public reasoning, but also by the *ethos* of his or her way of life.⁶

As a direct result of this ethical norm of enacting the change in one's everyday activities, cooperative citizenship begin to *bring the other world of change into being* here and now, step by ethical step. They do not wait for modern governments or revolutionary parties to change the world. They actualise the change themselves. Indeed, cooperative citizens believe that this is the only way that fundamental and lasting change can be realised. It is the great changes in the ethical behaviour of citizens that move governments to enact climate change legislation or end unjust wars, not the other way round.

⁶ This whole way of linking what one says with what one does in relationships with others is the topic of Michel Foucault's (2005) *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, summarised at pp. 251-252.

The ethical norm of 'being the change' is also the expression of the relationship between *means and ends* in the cooperative citizenship tradition. For cooperative citizens, means and ends are one and the same - as the seed is to the full grown plant.

For example, the only way to bring about democracy is by treating people democratically, by relating to them as active co-agents of the relationship with them, thereby bringing them to develop the appropriate capacities of respect and reciprocity. If they are treated as a thing to be coerced and socialised, then they will never acquire a democratic mode of being in the world with others. This can be acquired only in democratic relationships of respect and reciprocity with others.

However, the greatest historical example of the ethical relationship between ends and means is the non-violent peace movement. On this view, the only path to the world peace is the way of non-violent peaceful relationships. This is the manifestation of the ethical norm of being the change and thus of uniting ends and means. Non-violent government and citizenship is thus both the means and the end. In contrast, as we have seen, for modern citizens and its radical critics ends and means are separate. Democratisation is brought about and protected by non-democratic means and world peace by war and coercion.

The first argument for peace as the means to peace is, as we have seen, ethical. One must always treat the other with respect: as a being with the capacity to resolve differences through dialogue and negotiation. Even if their initial reaction is violence, it is necessary to turn the other cheek and try to gradually bring them into a relationship of conversation, negotiation and conversion to non-violence. This ethical and religious argument was classically and influentially enunciated in the peace movement by Tolstoy, *The Kingdom of God is Within* (1900).

The second argument, as we have also seen, is that by *acting* non-violently in relationship with another we actually begin to bring that kind of relationship into being, into actuality, and thus gradually draw the recalcitrant other into this mode of being or mode of subjectivity with others. This is the ‘be the change’ argument made famous by Mahatma Gandhi. ‘Blessed is the Peace-maker’, as President Obama put it in Cairo, because, in *acting* peacefully in negotiation relations, he or she ‘*makes* peace’ in the sense of realising it in practice, even if, at often happens, a particular non-violent negotiation strategy fails.

The third argument is the converse. If we respond to violence with violence, then we simply engender more violence. We engender fear and distrust in the other, he arms himself even more, we do the same, and so on. We thus engender a spiral of global relationships of disrespect, distrust, and violence. The only way to break this spiral is to greet the other with an open hand rather than a closed fist. Might does not ‘*make* right’. It does not impose the basis of a rightful normative order. Might *makes* fear, distrust, resistance, counter-insurgency, and so on. This is Nietzsche’s argument in ‘*The Means to Real Peace*’ (1871).

All these arguments were developed by the non-violent peace and anti-imperialism movements of the nineteenth-century in response to the violent, Darwinian dogmas of modernisation and the power politics of the great imperial powers. The problem for the peace movements at the turn of the century was that these ethical and practical arguments seemed to lead to *pacifism* - a passive non-violent resistance to unjust relationships backed up by arms. William James agreed with Henry David Thoreau and the non-violent peace movement, but he argued that the movement lacked the non-violent counter-equivalent to the ‘arts of war and power politics’.⁷

⁷ W. James (1910) The moral equivalent of war, *McClure's Magazine*, 35: 463-468.

The revolutionary solution came from Mahatma Gandhi in *Hind Swaraj* (Home Self-Rule) in 1909. He developed a whole repertoire of very active non-violent arts of government and citizenship, *Satyagraha*, first in South Africa and then in confronting and helping to overthrow the most powerful empire in the world – the British empire in India. These arts of non-violent citizen self-government comprise not only the practical arts of non-cooperation, boycotts, strikes, confrontation, negotiation and transformation of unjust rulers in any kind of relationship - from relationships between individuals to global relationships of imperial exploitation and war. They also include the practical arts of cooperative non-violent government and jurisprudence in ashrams, villages, federations of self-reliant villages, and concentric circles of federal relationships of democratic governance reaching eventually to world federalism.⁸

These arts of non-violent citizen self-government are only one hundred years old this year. They are much younger than the political sciences of power politics. Yet, they have spread around the world through grass-roots movements in every imaginable kind of relationship among humans and between humans and non-human forms of life in ecological movements. From Martin Luther King Jr., Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Gene Sharpe, Petra Kelly and the velvet revolution to the millions who practice these arts today, they are now beginning to be seen by peace researchers as ‘a force more powerful’ than the violent politics of armed states and armed revolutions, and the only hope for the future of life on this small planet.⁹

⁸ M. Gandhi (1996) *Hind Swaraj and other writings*, Cambridge Texts in Modern Politics.

⁹ P. Ackerman and J. DuVall, (2000) *A Force More Powerful: a century of non-violent conflict*, London: St Martins Press/Palgrave.

The final feature of cooperative citizenship tradition is perhaps the most basic. All of the features I have mentioned are based on the premise that humans and non-human forms of life are always already in webs of relationships of cooperation or mutual aid. This is the unnoticed ground of all forms of life on the planet. If it were not the case, if conflict, struggle and antagonism were basic, then the human species and all other species would have perished long ago. Conflict always irrupts within a broader background of webs of cooperation.¹⁰

From this perspective, the modernist tradition thus misunderstands the place of cooperative normativity in human and non-human life. The world is not a *terra nullius*, full of antagonistic relationships and thus in need of the coercive imposition of some kind of normative order over a state of war. Rather, the world is a plenitude of complex webs of norms of cooperation among biologically diverse forms of life. Competition takes place and presupposes these cooperative norms of the overlapping and criss-crossing webs. When competition degenerates into conflict, then the role of the peacemaker is not to impose order, but, rather, to bring the adversaries around to see the cooperative relationships from which they departed and to which they are naturally disposed, in virtue of being grounded in them. For the cooperative tradition, this is why non-violent dispute resolution *works* in the long run. It brings the adversaries back to the ground of their being. Whereas the modernist processes of antagonism, imposition and socialisation just lead to more animosity and conflict. Cooperation is rediscovered, not created.

The classic presentation of this view for the whole cooperative citizenship tradition was made by Kropotkin in direct response to both Darwin and T.H. Huxley in *Mutual Aid: A*

¹⁰ This argument is most famously presented in M. Gandhi (1996) *Hind Swaraj*, chapter 17, but it is also present in Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid* (1902).

factor of evolution (1902). By the 1950s the basic argument had been adopted by peace, cooperative, grass-roots democracy and environmental movements. At the same time, the biological, ecological and marine sciences repudiated Darwin's premise and adopted and tested Kropotkin's hypothesis that the basis of evolution is not struggle but webs of cooperative relationships of mutual respect and reciprocity.¹¹ One of the most influential statements of this revolution was made in Frankfurt in 1932. Albert Schweitzer, in his public lecture to the good citizens of Frankfurt, argued that the basic ethical norm for all of humanity is *'the reverence for all forms of life'*.¹²

Over the last twenty years, the cooperative thesis has been accepted by the leading ecological and climate scientists in the form of the *Gaia hypothesis*. This is to say that all life-forms on earth are in a 'commonwealth' composed of webs of relationships of reciprocal cooperation and mutual aid. In this emerging synthesis, humans are thus cooperative citizens of a living ecological commonwealth of diverse forms of life in relationships of interdependency and reciprocity (Gaia). And, this view has led to a new conversation between the life sciences, the

¹¹ A. Montagu (1952) *Darwin, Competition and Cooperation*, Henry Shuman Inc, New York, It is dedicated to Kropotkin.

¹² In his multi-volume history of European philosophy, Schweitzer argued that the reverence for life is the basic ethical norm that German philosophers were attempting to articulate from Goethe, Herder and Kant to Nietzsche. It is summarised in its popular form in the epilogue to his best selling autobiography, A. Schweitzer (1933) *Out of My Life and Thought*, United States of America: Henry Holt and Company Inc. Schweitzer gave his public lecture at the same time as Albert Einstein published his famous letter on non-violence.

worldly spiritual traditions based on similar spiritual norms, and the ecological citizen movements.¹³

Conclusion

From the perspective of the cooperative citizenship we can see why modern citizenship and its underlying processes and institutions are major causes of the five great global problems today. Its representation of the world misrepresents its basic character and, as a result, acts on it in ways that damage rather than care for its cooperative relationships. In the prescient words of Karl Polanyi in 1944, a political and economic system that mistreats 'labour and land' as if they were 'commodities' destroys the social relations in which labourers are embedded and the ecological relations in which resources are embedded. If modernisation or 'market liberalism', as he called it, continues apace, it will not be the 'gravedigger' of only one class, as in Marx's Darwinian scenario, but of all life on earth. Thus, the only solution is the transition to a political and economic system that recognizes and treats labourers and the environment as living beings in interdependent relationships of respect and reciprocity.¹⁴

Fortunately for the future of life on the planet, this inconvenient truth is now widely acknowledged. And, also fortunately for us, we have two traditions from which we can draw lessons on how to act as citizens in this cooperative commonwealth of life. The first

¹³ E. Moran (2006) *People and Nature: an introduction to human ecological relations*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

¹⁴ For the application of Polanyi's analysis to the current global crisis, see P. Evans (2008) 'Is an Alternative Globalization Possible?', *Politics and Society*, 36, 2 (June 2008), pp. 271-305.

tradition is the history of cooperative citizenship practices that I have just outlined. The second is the critique and reform from within the modern tradition that I mentioned earlier. For, as I suggested, these critiques reformulate the norms of democratic relationships in ways that enable us to detach them from the incapacitating limits and problem-generating features of modern citizenship. If I am not mistaken, these norms bear a family resemblance to the radical or grass-roots democratic norms that cooperative citizens are applying in new and creative ways to the global problems. I hope that this shared ground can be the basis of a new conversation of mutual learning and cooperation between these two democratic traditions as they respond to the urgent global problems.