HISTORICAL ALLUSION AND THE NATURE OF THE HISTORICAL TEXT

The study of allusion has become so familiar a critical move in classical studies that its tacit presuppositions are rarely questioned. It is accepted that ancient texts regularly contain features that evoke other texts; it is also accepted that both the presence of the other text evoked by the similarity, and (especially) the differences that may appear from a comparison of the new text with the old, are significant for the interpretation of the alluding text. This is not to say that the process is devoid of controversy: in particular there has been a great deal of dispute over the extent to which we are required to build authorial intention into our understanding, or whether it is more appropriate to view the relationship between texts in terms of embedded linguistic connections which need not be recognised by the author himself. But although this controversy may make some difference to our interpretations in certain instances, nevertheless a large proportion of the same allusions will be identified under either theory, and the types of interpretations that result from them will likewise be fundamentally the same, even if framed in different language.

Historians, like authors in other genres, can engage in allusive practices: thus there is little surprise in finding Tacitus alluding to Virgil, or Livy to Homer; nor on the face of things is there any reason to analyse such cases differently from their counterparts in poetic texts. However, until recently it has rarely been appreciated that the distinctive ontological status of historiography—that it purports to be representing reality—means that many, perhaps most cases of allusion in the historians require the reader to take an entirely different theoretical stance towards them.

In a recent book I discussed this issue at some length, focusing in particular on two separate types of allusion. The first is the case where the historian alludes to another historical text which relates to a different historical event, and I argued that in such cases we are invited to see not merely a relationship between texts, but simultaneously a real-life connection between different events. When (as is perhaps most common) the events of the text alluded to predated the events of the alluding text, the implicit assumption is

that we can see a form of historical development and indeed direct influence between the two sets of events. There is very often the further implication that the later people are actively aware of and responding to the actions of their predecessors, treating them as models for imitation, and that likewise implies a real-life historical relationship. Even in the less common case, where the events of the later text precede the events of the earlier, a similar—and even more challenging—dynamic is assumed: the later author implies that the events he recounts at the very least prefigured, and may have influenced, the later events written about by his predecessor.3

The second case I considered is a more tightly controlled one: the case where the earlier author not merely wrote about the same events, but was actually the later writer’s source for those events—my example was of course Polybius and Livy, the best-known and most studied instance of such a relationship where both authors survive more or less intact.4 It has been traditional to treat the phenomenon of ‘sources’ as quite separate from the phenomenon of ‘allusion’ or ‘intertextuality’, but I argued that such a separation makes no sense in theory, and is manifestly false in practice. Livy not only uses Polybius as a source, but he evokes his text to the reader exactly as he does with his allusions to authors who wrote about other matters, and reworks him so as to self-consciously correct and respond to his version of history. The reworkings do not merely provide us with a window into Livy’s aesthetic preferences or political ideology, but they imply something about reality itself as Livy saw it: that Polybius in key respects misunderstood or misrepresented the events that he was describing, and that Livy will provide us with a superior account of them. My conclusion (p.162): ‘Any time that Livy uses Polybius he is effectively alluding to him. Any time that Livy changes Polybius he is effectively responding to him in an act of creative imitation.’

All of this I still believe to be true, and it provides an indication of some of the respects in which allusion and intertextuality in historians needs to be conceptualised in rather different terms from that in other genres, where there is no assumed correspondence to reality, or at best such correspondence is an incidental rather than intrinsic feature of the text. But at the same time, I now have come to the conclusion that I underplayed the extent to which allusion in historiography differs from that in other genres, and accordingly the extent to which it has to be ‘retheorised’ if we are to make sense of its role.


4 Cf. the similar arguments in relation to Ammianus put forward by G. Kelly, Ammianus Marcellinus: The Allusive Historian (Cambridge, 2008), 222-55.
Historians, as I said, believed themselves and their predecessors to be representing reality. One corollary of that is that, when using a predecessor as a source, they are far more restricted in their ability to rework that source than are their counterparts in almost all other literary genres. Admittedly their license is demonstrably far greater than one might guess from looking at more recent historical practice. The precise extent of that license is controversial, but no one doubts that historians were prepared to rewrite and invent material in a way that no reputable modern historian would feel free to do. But it is not the license given to historians, but the constraints on them, that are important for my argument here; for it is likewise the case that no scholar—even Tony Woodman, the person who has argued most systematically for the greatest license for historical invention—denies that the historians were to some significant degree constrained by their belief that there was a historical core that needed to remain unaltered. Woodman uses the phrase ‘hard-core facts’ to describe the historical substratum which no historian could plausibly change.\(^5\)

Now, it is true that on Woodman’s account, the scope of such ‘hard-core facts’ is relatively narrow, and the ‘facts’ are best conceived in relatively general terms. So an historian could not deny that (e.g.) Hannibal was defeated by Scipio at the battle of Zama, but he was not tied to any particular account of what happened at Zama, and it would be theoretically open to him to rewrite the events of the battle completely from those he found in his source, perhaps basing himself on a stereotype of the way battles (or major battles, or Roman-Carthaginian battles, or any other subset that might seem relevant) would be expected to play themselves out, rather than specific evidence that he might possess about how this battle in particular did play itself out. And (though Woodman does not make this explicit) it is clear that it is precisely the awareness that such licence was taken in the past that would justify a new historian taking the same licence; for if one was aware that the account found in a predecessor might be no more than plausible reconstruction on that historian’s part, then it would surely be legitimate to substitute an arguably more plausible reconstruction of one’s own in its place.

But the existence of such license does not mean that it was always taken: in many cases it is clear that it was not. While an historian could (in theory) completely rewrite the events of the battle of Zama, it practice no surviving historian actually did completely rewrite the events of the battle of Zama. This is not to say that all accounts are identical; for example, Appian offers a version of the battle in which Scipio and Hannibal engaged in single combat (a version which had previously appeared in the epic of Silius Italicus, though in this case the ‘Scipio’ is a phantom conjured up by Juno, in imita-

tion of the fake Turnus whom Aeneas pursues in *Aeneid* Book 10), followed by a further single combat between Hannibal and Masinissa. But even here the broad structure of the fighting and the moves of the different parts of the two armies are more or less the same. And in practice the variants are often even slighter than this, and historians stick closely to their predecessors’ accounts not only in outline, but in exact detail.

Examples of this are numerous; by way of illustration I shall pick one extremely famous instance, namely the account of Flaminius’ declaration of the freedom of Greece following the battle of Cynoscephalae. The original version is in Polybius 18.46.4-16:

> τοιαύτης δ’ οὖσης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀπορίας, ἀθροισθέντος τοῦ πλήθους ἕις τὸ στάδιον ἐπὶ τὸν ἄγωνα, προελθὼν ὁ κήρυξ καὶ κατασιωπήσαμεν τὰ πλήθη διὰ τοῦ σαλπικτοῦ τόδε τὸ κήρυγμα ἁνηγόρευσεν. “ἡ σύγκλητος ἡ Ῥωμαίων καὶ Τίτως Κόιντιος στρατηγὸς ὑπάτου, καταπολεμήσαντες βασιλεὰ Φίλεππον καὶ Μακεδόνας, ἀφιάσαν ἑλευθέρους, ἀφροιρίτους, ἀφορολογήτους, νόμους χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις, Κορινθίους, Φωκέας, Λοκρούς, Εὐβοείς, Αχαιοὺς τοὺς Φλεώτας, Μάγνητας, Θέταλους, Περραιβοὺς”. κρότον δ’ ἐν ἀρχαῖς εὐθέως ἐξαισθανόμενον γενομένον τινὲς μὲν οὐδ’ ἢκουσαν τοῦ κηρύγματος, τινὲς δὲ πάλιν ἀκούειν ἑβούλοντο. τὸ δὲ πολὺ μέρος τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαπιστούμενον καὶ δοκοῦν ὃς ἂν εἰ καθ’ ὑπὸν ἀκούειν τῶν λεγομένων διὰ τὸ παράδοξον τὸ συμβαίνοντος, πόσ τις ἐξ ἀλλῆς ὁρµῆς ἐβούλει τὸν κήρυκα καὶ τὸν σαλπικτὴν εἰς μέσον τὸ στάδιον καὶ λέγειν πάλιν ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτῶν, ὃς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, βουλομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ μόνον ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ βλέπειν τὸν λέγωντα διὰ τὴν ἀπίστια τῶν ἀναγόρευμένων. ὃς δὲ πάλιν ὁ κήρυξ, προελθὼν εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ κατασιωπήσαμεν διὰ τοῦ σαλπικτοῦ τὸν ἄγωνα, ἀνηγόρευσε ταῦτα καὶ ὁκαίτως τούς πρόσθεν, τηλικοῦτον συνέβη καταρράγειν τὸν κρότον ὡστε καὶ μὴ ῥαδίως ἂν ὑπὸ τὴν ἐννοιαν ἀγαγείν τοῖς νῦν ἀκούσαν τὸ γεγονός, ὃς δὲ ποτὲ κατέλειψεν ὁ κρότος, τῶν μὲν ἀθλητῶν ἀπλῶς οὐδεὶς οὐδένα λόγον εἶχεν ἐτί, πάντες δὲ διαλαλοῦντες, οἱ μὲν ἀλλήλοις, οἱ δὲ πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτούς, οἴον εἰ παραστατικοὶ τὰς διανοίας ἦσαν. ἡ καὶ μετὰ τὸν ἀγώνα διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς χαρᾶς μικρὸν διέφθειραν τὸν Τίτον εὐχαριστοῦντες· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀντοφθαλµῆσαι κατὰ πρόσωπον καὶ σωτήρα προσφωνῆσαι βουλόμενοι, τινὲς δὲ τῆς δεξιᾶς ἄψασθαι σπουδάζοντες, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ στεφάνους ἐπιρριπτοῦντες καὶ ληµνίσκους, παρ’ ὀλίγον διέλυσαν τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

> δοκοῦσης δὲ τῆς εὐχαριστίας ὑπερβολικῆς γενέσθαι, βαρρῶν ἂν τις ἐπὶ διότι πολύ καταδεικτέραν εἶναι συνεβαινε τοῦ τῆς πράξεως μεγέθους. θαυµαστὸν γὰρ ἂν καὶ τὸ Ῥωμαίους ἐπὶ ταύτης γενέσθαι τῆς προορέσεως καὶ τὸν ἢνοικόν αὐτῶν Τίτον, ὡστε πάσαν ὑπομείναι διαπάνω καὶ πάντα
κίνδυνον χάριν τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας· μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ δύναμιν ἀκόλουθον τῇ προαίρεσι προσενέγκασθαι· τούτων δὲ μέγιστον ἔτι τὸ μηδὲν ἐκ τῆς τύχης ἀντιπαῖσαι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἀπαντά πρὸς ἓν καιρὸν ἐκδραµεῖν, ὥστε διὰ κηρύγµατος ἑνὸς ἅπαντας καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας ὧλλοι τῆν Ἐυρώπην ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους γενέσθαι, νόµοις χρωµένους τοῖς ἰδίοις.

While people were in such a state of uncertainty, and the populace assembled in the stadium for the games, the herald came forward and, after silencing the crowd with a trumpeter, made the following proclamation: ‘The Roman Senate and Titus Quinctius proconsul, having conquered King Philip and the Macedonians, allow to go free, ungarisoned, without tribute, and following their ancestral laws, the Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Achaeans of Phthia, Magnesians, Thessalians, and Perrhaebians.’ Immediately at the beginning an extraordinary shout arose, and some could not even hear the proclamation, some wanted to hear it again. The great majority of the people could not believe it and thought that it was like listening to the words in a dream, given how unexpected it was; they all, each prompted by something different, shouted that the herald and the trumpeter should be brought into the middle of the stadium and should speak again about the same things—in my view the people were wanting not only to hear, but also to see the speaker, because they did not believe the things being proclaimed. And when the herald once again came forward into the middle and silenced the din with the trumpeter, and announced the same things in exactly the same manner as before, such a shout broke out that those hearing the story today would have difficulty imagining it. When eventually the shouting ceased, absolutely no one had any thought for the athletes, but everyone was chattering, some to each other, some to themselves, as if out of their minds. In this way after the games they virtually killed Flamininus with their exuberant expressions of gratitude. For some of them wanted to look him directly in the face and address him as Saviour, some were eager to clasp his right hand, and the majority were throwing garlands and fillets on him, so that he was almost killed.

But even if the gratitude seems excessive, one could confidently say that it was far inferior to the greatness of the event. For it was remarkable that the Romans and their general Flamininus should make such a choice, to undertake all the expense and all the danger for the sake of the freedom of the Greeks. It was furthermore a great thing that they brought into play power commensurate with their choice; and the greatest thing of all was that nothing happened by chance to thwart their ef-
forts, but absolutely everything contributed to one moment, so that through a single proclamation all the Greeks, both those settled in Asia and those in Europe, became free, ungarrisoned, without tribute, and following their own laws.

This is then, scarcely any less famously, reworked by Livy 33.32.4-33.4:

They had sat down for the show, and the herald, as is customary, came with a trumpeter into the centre of the arena, from where the practice is
to commence the games with a traditional formula. After the trumpet brought silence, he made the following proclamation: ‘The Roman Senate and the commander Titus Quinctius, having conquered King Philip and the Macedonians, orders to be free, untouched, following their own laws, the Corinthians, Phocians, and all the Locrians, and the island of Euboea, and the Magnesians, Thessalians, Perrhaebeans, and the Achaearns of Phthia’. When the voice of the herald was heard, there was greater joy than people could take in all at once: they all hardly could believe that they were hearing it, and one looked at another, marveling as if at the empty image of a dream; they could not trust their own ears, but each asked his neighbour about his individual concerns. The herald was called back, since each person was eager not only to hear but also to see the messenger of their liberty. He again made the same proclamation. Then from joy that was now assured so great a clapping and shouting arose and was repeated so often that one would readily believe that of all good things, nothing was more welcome to the crowd than liberty. Then the games then took place so rapidly that neither anyone paid a thought or a glance at the spectacle: to such an extent had one joy taken over every other sensation of pleasure. Once the show was over almost everyone rushed to the Roman commander, to the point that, with a crowd of people rushing to one individual, eager to approach him and touch his hand, and throwing garlands and fillets on him, he was in some danger. But he was around 33 years old, and both the strength of youth and the joy at achieving such outstanding glory gave him strength.

Nor was the delight that washed over them only immediate, but for many days it was renewed in grateful thoughts and conversations: there was a people in the world that at their own expense, through their own effort and danger, waged war for the sake of the freedom of others—and they did not do this for neighbouring peoples or those of the near vicinity or of the same land-mass, but they crossed the sea, so that there should not be an unjust empire in the whole world, but everywhere justice and right and law should be in control. With one voice of a herald all the cities of Greece and Asia were set free. To conceive of such a thing in hope was the mark of a bold mind; to bring it to fruition was a mark of both virtue and immense good fortune.

In some respects this fits very well the picture that I offered earlier of Livy not merely employing Polybius as a source, but self-consciously reworking him. One can note various minor changes that he has made. He glosses for his Roman audience the practice of the heraldic announcement from the arena; he removes from Polybius the dull practical reason that some people
wished the proclamation repeated (that they had not heard it the first time), and instead focuses entirely on the desire of people to see the messenger for themselves (something Polybius had offered only as his personal speculation, but which Livy turns into unchallenged fact). Livy increases the sense of detachment from the athletics, suggesting not merely (as in Polybius) that there was little attention paid to them, but that the games themselves were truncated. He also slightly downgrades the role of Flamininus, removing an explicit mention of him in the praise of the selflessness of Rome, as well as suppressing the uncomfortable adulation implicit in the address to him as σωτῆρ.

But the evocation of Polybius does more than simply allow us to mark Livy’s changes: it invites the reader to recognise the limitations of Polybius’ perspective. For Polybius the sound of the cheering after the second announcement is merely unimaginably loud; Livy gives it a more specifically political turn by using it as a sign of the Greek desire for liberty—but the allusion to Polybius also sets up an ironic dig at the Greeks, given that Polybius says that the loudness would be incomprehensible to his contemporaries, and Livy was well aware that Greece ultimately lost her liberty to Rome in Polybius’ own lifetime. And the comments on the selflessness and virtue of the Romans, which Polybius had praised in his own voice, are transferred by Livy into the mouth of the Greeks, here too indicating Polybius as an authentic representative of Greek attitudes, but—one again, with hindsight—allowing the authorial voice to remain agnostic on the superlative justness of Roman imperial power.

So it would hardly be true to suggest that Livy has reproduced Polybius inertly; but at the same time, the close overlap between his account and Polybius’ is obvious. It might indeed appear that it is too obvious to be worth discussing: clearly Livy has based himself on Polybius, but is there anything more than that to be said? I would suggest that, especially in the context of an examination of ‘allusion’, the phenomenon of one historian closely reproducing another in this way is more important than it is generally given credit for.

Modern scholars and readers—except, naturally, in the context of Quellenforschung, and in particular in the context of attempting to burrow back from a surviving historical text to its source in order to test its historical reliability—have tended to respond to the phenomenon of close historical reproduction with embarrassment. After all, if Livy spends the great bulk of

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7 Walsh (1961), 184.

8 Tränkle (1977), 166.
his account of the aftermath of Cynoscephalae reproducing Polybius, and if (as happens to be the case here) Polybius survives independently of Livy, what is the point of reading Livy at all? Hence, in the scholarly literature on such passages, the concentration (I profess myself as guilty of anyone else of this) on the relatively few points where Livy demonstrates independence of Polybius, in style and analysis if not necessary in the content of what is described, in order to show that he has the originality that one would generally require of a canonical writer. But that anxious focus on the minority of differences rather than the majority of similarities seriously misrepresents the balance of Livy’s text, and (more significantly) the literary world-view that made Livy’s reproduction of Polybius possible.

One possible line of approach to correct the balance would be to suggest that literary originality in general mattered far less in Rome than it does in modern Western literary culture, certainly when it comes to Latin writers reworking texts that were originally in Greek. Examples of the latter are well-known: Terence’s close reproductions of Greek New Comedy; the surprising eagerness of writers in the late Republic and early Empire to produce translations of Aratus’ Phaenomena; Catullus’ translations/reworkings of poems by Sappho and Callimachus, to name only the most familiar. It might be thought that these signal a different aesthetic, a willingness to see a worthwhile literary project in something that would today suggest an absence of creativity; and that we should assess Livy’s reproductions of Polybius along similar lines: that what Livy does to Polybius is no different from what Terence or Catullus did to their respective sources.

However, that answer, though seductive, does not go far towards explaining the phenomenon of historical reproduction, or indeed the distinctive anxiety it produces among modern readers. For while there may be some differences between ancient and modern aesthetics in this area, they are far more marginal than is sometimes suggested. On the ancient side, questions of originality were certainly far from alien to ancient appreciations of literature—this can be seen, for example, in various critics’ careful attempts to police the proper boundary between creative imitation and inert reproduction, or Martial’s constant concern for the proper attribution of his poems. Nor is it in fact the case that reworkings of older texts are considered problematic under modern ideas of authorship and authenticity. Were Livy merely a translation of Polybius, a simple survey of Amazon.com is enough to dispel the notion that this would be considered a problem: translation is as acceptable a literary practice nowadays as it has ever been—if anything

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the problem is in part that Livy is *not* a translation, but rather a text that incorporates elements of both translation and reproduction into its patchwork. Terence and Catullus are more closely analogous to Livy—but here too there are numerous modern poetic texts which engage in similar recreations of previous texts without appearing to violate modern sensibilities about authorship and originality: Ezra Pound’s *Homage to Sextus Propertius* is one obvious example, as are Tony Harrison’s celebrated reworkings of the *Medea*, the *Lysistrata*, and Sophocles’ *Ichneutae.*

So if (as I would suggest) we find something distinctively problematic about Livy’s practice here, it appears that it is not connected with our ideas of authorship *per se*, but is something more specific to the genre of historiography, where we—unlike the ancients—seem to regard the process as especially inappropriate. The problem appears to be that although it is accepted nowadays for poets that they can legitimately reproduce the words of their predecessors for the purposes of imaginative recreation, a similar license is not given to historians. But manifestly Livy—and other historians, as I shall discuss further below—did in fact cling closely to their sources in a way which no modern historian would, and this represents a significant difference between ancient and modern historiography which has been far less studied than the imaginative invention which has been the focus of so much scholarship. Just as the license for historians to invent something new is far greater than would be permitted today, so too was the license to produce an account which was so close to the original that nowadays it would often be vilified as plagiarism.

One possible way of handling this while still retaining the idea of authorial authenticity would be to argue that even the retention of a large portion of the original account can be seen as, effectively, an authorial choice, not unlike comparable choices in poetry. Since (it may be argued) Livy could have diverged significantly from Polybius had he wished—could, indeed, have invented a scene of his own basing himself on nothing more than his own imaginative reconstruction—one might argue that even if he happened not to do so in this particular case, but instead stuck closely to Polybius’ original, that was nevertheless his choice just as much as invention would have been, and it can accordingly be treated as if it were his own original creation.

This argument, however, assumes that the only constraint on Livy is his ideological or aesthetic choices; and that is questionable for the reasons I gave above. For even if we do not regard the Polybian account of the proclamation of Greek freedom as a ‘hard-core fact’ in Woodman’s sense, namely an event so firmly planted in the popular consciousness that it would be impossible to present an alternative version while still maintaining plau-
the very fact that Livy chose to maintain it largely intact strongly suggests that he is treating it as if it were a ‘hard-core fact’. I suggested above that Livy’s corrections of Polybius point to his belief in the greater truth of his own account over Polybius’. But it would appear to follow from this that in the places where Livy fails to correct Polybius, but instead reproduces him, he is accepting the truth of Polybius’ account, at least in that respect. Hence also there is a practical constraint that prevents him from altering the substance of Polybius, namely that he believes Polybius’ account to be true. His grounds for that belief were likely to have been different from a modern historian’s—they were presumably less strongly founded in presumptions about the evidence available to his source and the methodology which the source used. But the unchanged reproduction of Polybius’ original, while it is certainly an allusion, as I argued above, is an allusion with a distinctive ontological status: it not only references Polybius’ account, but signals acceptance of its truth. Here, then, we can see a substantial difference between the phenomenon of allusion in cases of poetic reproductions like those of Catullus or Terence, and allusion in apparently similar cases in historiography. It is hard to detach the allusion to the text of Polybius from the external reality which Livy is relaying, since the two here effectively coincide.

This then leads to a further problem about analysing this allusion according to our normal literary procedures. If Livy’s allusion to Polybius is not the product of choice on his part—or at least, is only ‘chosen’ in the sense that it is governed by his prior commitment to the truth of Polybius’ account—then in what sense can we see this as an ‘allusion’ by Livy at all? Granted that Livy has framed the Polybian material in a new analysis and has changed some details, the bulk of what we read in Livy was compelled upon him by his generic commitment, not taken on as a result of his desire to evoke and respond to Polybius in particular. The difficulty can be seen if we try to construct a historicising reading of Livy here, relating the details of his text to his position as a writer in the early Augustan period. Such historicist readings are nowadays commonplace: we often assume automatically that our task as critics is to explain our text as the product of a particular author writing at a determinate time. Yet here that is highly problematic. Nothing that Livy relays unchanged from Polybius can, it might appear, be legitimately regarded as a product of the early Augustan period, since it is a

It may however be noted that the later versions of this story (e.g. Valerius Maximus 4.8.5, Plutarch, Flamininus 10.3-11.2, Appian, Macedonica 4) do not diverge from Polybius in any more substantial respect than Livy’s does, which may imply that Polybius’ version achieved broadly canonical status. The only significant variant is the anecdote relayed by both Valerius and Plutarch, that the Greek cheers were so overwhelming that birds fell from the sky; and this represents a detachable addition to rather than a correction of Polybius’ account.
creation of a Greek writer of the middle Republic, which Livy is reproducing unchanged for no other reason than that he regards it as true.

Now, this point should not be overstated; for Livy does after all have some measure of freedom even within his acceptance of the truth of Polybius’ account—he does, as I noted above, make a number of changes at the margins, and even in the places where he felt unable to do that, he could if nothing else have abridged it considerably, and in that sense the reproduction of details from Polybius represents a choice he made. But if we move from an examination of Polybius and Livy to a consideration of other texts where the author’s freedom was still more constrained, the problem may be seen more sharply.

There survive from later antiquity, as is well known, a number of texts which are in some form an abridgement of earlier Latin texts. One of these is Florus: the manuscripts describe his text as an epitome of Livy, which appears not to be true, in as much as the text as we have it occasionally diverges from Livy’s account. But such divergences are quite uncommon; it is clear that Florus has based himself, if not directly on Livy, at least on a tradition of historiography in which Livy’s version of history has become largely canonical. Let us consider Florus’ account of Flamininus’ proclamation of the freedom of Greece (1.23):

Graeciae vero veterem statum reddidit, ut legibus viveret suis et avita libertate frueretur. quae gaudia, quae vociferationes fuerunt, cum hos forte Nemeae in theatro quinquennalibus ludis a praecoe caneretur! quo certavere plausu! quid florum in consulem profuderunt! et iterum iterumque praeconom repetere vocem illam iubebant, qua libertas Achaiae pronuntiabatur, nec aliter illa consulari sententia quam modulatissimo aliquo tibiarium aut fidium cantu fruebantur.

Indeed, he returned to Greece its former condition, so that it might live under its laws and enjoy its ancestral liberty. What joy, what shouts there were, when he had these things proclaimed by a herald in the theatre at Nemea at the quinquennial games! What applause they competed with! What flowers they poured over the consul! And again and again they ordered the herald to repeat those words by which the freedom of Achaea was announced, nor did they get less pleasure from that consular decree than from the most harmonious music of pipes and lyres.

This does not have any close linguistic overlaps with Livy, and indeed it diverges from him in certain details: the proclamation takes place at the Nemean rather than the Isthmian Games (which is perhaps simply a careless
Historical Allusion and the Nature of the Historical Text

error), and the herald is invited to repeat his pronouncement more than once. But in the context of a text where the content elsewhere largely derives from Livy, the very fact of highlighting the proclamation of the freedom of Greece—a relatively rare concentration on a single scene in a text which is generally laconic to the point of dullness—it is hard not to read this as an allusion to the same set-piece scene that we find in Livy, and which Livy himself took over from Polybius. But the problem of analysing such an allusion that we saw with Livy’s use of Polybius is here even starker; because if (as appears to be the case) the great bulk of Florus’ material derives from Livy, then it is hard to see any great significance in the fact that any particular scene in Florus evokes Livy. Nor does the fact that Florus evokes Livy who is himself evoking Polybius seem to carry the weight that comparable ‘double allusions’ are often felt to carry in poetic texts. Even more than with Livy and Polybius, the repetition of material from an earlier text, though recognisable, appears inert, a function of the presumed historicity of the material rather than any individual approach that the author takes towards the material.

There are still closer relationships between alluding text and the text alluded to; a notable example is the Periochae of Livy. In this case the presence of the prior text in the later one is overt: indeed, the later text precisely defines itself around that relationship, articulating itself as a book-by-book summary of its predecessor. Here, still more, the allusions to Livy cannot be interpreted in terms of the choices of the author, beyond of course the general decision to write a summary of Livy in the first place. Indeed, the two texts are so closely related to one another that people rarely read the Periochae as a text in its own right: it is read for what it tells us about the text of Livy (or about the subject of Livy’s narrative) rather than as an independent entity. And for the same reason it would appear that to attempt to analyse the Periochae’s summary of Livy as an ‘allusion’ to Livy is unlikely to produce a meaningful result. What the Periochae narrates is governed not by its own choices, but by the prior narration of Livy which it accepts as an unchangeable original.

Admittedly, if we do decide to read the Periochae against the grain of tradition, and consider it as an independent text rather than as a window (if an opaque window) into Livy, we can easily find places where, even within the general fidelity to Livy, the author appears to be asserting something of his own. Let us take as an example the Periochae’s handling of the same episode we have been discussing, namely Flamininus’ proclamation of the independence of Greece in Book 33:

T. Quintius Flamininus procos. cum Philippo ad Cynoscephalas in Thessalia acie victo debellavit. L. Quintius Flamininus, ille frater pro-

Titus Quinctius Flamininus, proconsul, fought in battle and defeated Philip at Cynoscephalae in Thessaly. His brother Lucius Quinctius Flamininus, proconsul, after storming the city of Leucas which is the capital of the Acarnanians, received the surrender of the Acarnanians. At Philip’s request peace was granted, with the liberation of Greece. Attalus, after crossing from Thebes to Pergamum on account of a sudden illness, died. Gaius Sempronius Tuditanus, the praetor, was killed with his army by the Celtiberians. In the consulship of Lucius Furius Purpurio and Claudius Marcellus they subjugated the Boian and Insubrian Gauls. Marcellus held a triumph. Hannibal vainly worked for war in Africa, and consequently was denounced to the Romans in letters by the leaders of the opposing party; from fear of the Romans, who had sent envoys concerning him to the Carthaginian senate, went into exile to Antiochus, king of Syria, who was preparing war against the Romans.

What in Livy, as in Polybius before him, in Florus after him, and many other writers, was an iconic and revealing scene in the history of Roman-Greek relations, is reduced to a brief subordinate participial phrase—*Graecia liberata*. Instead the *Periochae* focuses nearly half its account of the book on an episode which in Livy is (relative to the length of his text) much briefer and on the face of things less consequential, namely the flight of Hannibal from Africa to the court of Antiochus III. For a work on the scale of the *Periochae*, after all, the ‘freedom of Greece’ is not an iconic and world-changing moment, but a short-lived phenomenon which vanishes within a couple of pages. The iconic character of Hannibal is far more pertinent within the centuries of Roman history, even if his great days are now behind him; it is worth comparing *Per.* 35, more than half of which is devoted to the single scene where Scipio and Hannibal meet for the first time since Zama, and *Per.* 39, where the author makes a point of recording Hannibal’s death.

So the *Periochae* can certainly be read as a narrative in its own right; yet it would appear to make little sense to do so while ignoring the Livian text that
underlies it, which it constantly references by virtue of its entire structure. The content of the *Periochae* is to a large extent predetermined by the author’s project of summarising Livy, even if its balance and structure can to some degree be adjusted.

If, then, we ask whether we can read a meaningful narrative in the *Periochae*, we certainly can; but the meaning we read is not the product of any one author. It is a combination of two authors: Livy himself, who determines the content, and the author of the *Periochae*, who selects and adjusts within that content. But in fact even that analysis understates the various contributions; for we have already seen that Livy himself is constrained when composing certain parts of his text by his prior acceptance of the historicity of Polybius’ account—an account which the author of the *Periochae* may well not have read, but which nevertheless lies two stages behind his own narrative. Any interpretation of it as a narrative has to treat it not as free composition, nor even as one text alluding to another in the sense in which we generally analyse such allusions in works where the author is presumed to have a freer hand to select and rework his source texts. We need instead to treat the alluding text as—in effect—a collaboration, but a collaboration across time by authors who may be assumed to be unacquainted with one another.

One useful by-product of this may be to assist our understanding of texts where we lack the original source. Justin’s abridgement of Pompeius Trogus bears certain resemblances to the *Periochae* of Livy, being a book-by-book account of what appeared in Trogus’ original work. However, it is a notoriously problematic text, because it is not clear what procedure Justin used to adapt Trogus. He claims to be anthologising him rather than summarising him, and to some extent that is clearly true (the so-called *Prologues* of Trogus indicate numerous parts of the narrative which are simply omitted from Justin altogether). But a variety of considerations show that he must to a greater or lesser degree be rewording as well as selecting from Trogus’ text—but how much he is rewording is extremely difficult to determine. We could, of course, remove Trogus from consideration and simply treat Justin’s narrative as his self-contained creation, but that, while making for easier interpretation, would be highly misleading, since the stories narrated, and (by any account) the general slant that was taken in narrating them, were the product of Trogus, not Justin, and Justin’s decision to retain them is likely to have been governed not by his personal ideology, but rather by his prior commitment to representing Trogus. Rather we have to view the text as a transhistorical combination of the work of two authors writing centuries apart under different historical conditions. There are times when we can plausibly identify some authentic Trogus within the Justinian adaptation, and in those cases we can reasonably treat that material in a more historicist
fashion, as the product of a particular author of the age of Augustus;" there are some (but many fewer) occasions where we can identify a clear adaptation of Trogus by Justin, and those cases we can interpret as the individual creation of a writer of (perhaps) the 3rd century AD. But if we are seeking to understand the run of the narrative as a whole, we can make the best sense of it if, as with the Periochae of Livy, we see it as a combination of two writers neither of whom had a free choice over the final product; and the resulting text is not of one time, but of two.

Hence the problems that we had with Livy’s allusions to Polybius in the cases where he does not significantly change him, but simply reproduces him intact, are a less extreme version of the type of allusion that we find with Florus, which is in turn a less extreme version of the type of allusion in Justin and the Periochae, texts whose content is completely dependent on an earlier original. With any of these texts it can—in some contexts—make sense to discuss the allusion in the standard way, as the individual work of the adapting author. With Livy that is a procedure that will often work, though it will sometimes lead to distortions. It will work less often and less well with Florus, and least of all with Justin and the Periochae, though even there an individual reworking of the original will sometimes come through. But with all of them we need to read the later text not as a freestanding creation, but as something to which the earlier text has contributed to some degree; and our interpretations of the narrative need to treat it accordingly. If—as we should—we want to think in terms of the ideology that the text generates, we have to treat it not as the ideology of one time when the text was produced, but a dynamic ideological system across centuries of Roman history.

Such an approach to literary texts runs counter to many of our assumptions about the way in which meaning through allusion is generated. As I noted above (p.11), contemporary interpreters of ancient historiography (as of other literary texts) have tended to work from broadly historicist assumptions, whereby we abstract the contribution of each particular writer and seek to interpret it as a product of its time. But once we understand that allusion in ancient historiography can often be generated less by a decision to allude, but rather more to a prior commitment to represent the work of an earlier author (often founded in a presumption of that work’s historicity), it makes more sense to abandon that tacit historicism and adopt a broader, transhistorical approach. The story of Flamininus’ liberation of Greece be-

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gins with Polybius, but then is told across centuries of Roman history in a broadly unchanged form. The significance of that story at Rome does not lie solely in any particular author’s adaptation of it—though of course it is at various times adapted in some of its details, as I have shown; it needs to be understood as a feature of the Romans’ conception of their own history that remains constant (at least in part) across time. This is not to say, of course, that we should see it as a fixed and deterministic part of Roman culture, because even while the core of the story remains constant to be alluded to by successive authors, there is a changing penumbra; and different stories fade in and out. Nor should we assume that ‘Roman ideology’ or ‘Roman culture’ is itself a discrete and self-contained thing; to mention only the most obvious point, Greeks writing under the Roman empire, like Plutarch or Appian, may well be assumed to be working in a tradition that is partly different—it is intrinsically unlikely that Flamininus’ ‘liberation’ of Greece had the same resonance in then-liberated-but-subsequently-conquered Greece as it did in the city of Rome. But examining these historical texts in terms of transhistorical traditions, rather than attempting to abstract from their allusions to one another discrete snapshots of particular places and particular times, is more likely to be the process that will illuminate the actual nature of the texts, and the role they played in Roman culture.