

HERODOTUS—THE MOST HOMERIC HISTORIAN?

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HERODOTUS—THE MOST  
HOMERIC HISTORIAN?



Edited by  
IVAN MATIJAŠIĆ

*HISTOS* SUPPLEMENT 14

2022

Oxford • Edmonton • Tallahassee

Published by

HISTOS

ISSN (Online): 2046-5963 (Print): 2046-5955

[www.histos.org](http://www.histos.org)

Published online 22 February 2022

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## PREFACE

This book explores the relationship between Herodotus and Homer and the reason why Herodotus was considered Homeric in antiquity. It stems from a conference at the School of History, Classics and Archaeology of Newcastle University which took place in March 2019, where most of the chapters that make up the book were presented. The conference was funded by the Research Committee of the School of History, Classics and Archaeology at Newcastle, and by the Institute of Classical Studies in London. I wish to express my gratitude to both institutions for their generous support, to the speakers for accepting my invitation to Newcastle, to the other numerous participants for a successful and fruitful discussion during the event, and to the chairs of each session: Federico Santangelo, Rowland Smith, Christopher Tuplin, and Jaap Wisse.

I also wish to thank the *Histos* editors, Rhiannon Ash and Timothy Rood, for accepting this edited book for publication in the journal's Supplements, and especially the supervisory editor of the Supplements, John Marincola, for the extremely helpful guidance and valuable assistance in the final stages of the publication process.

Each chapter is autonomous and includes a self-standing bibliography, but all have benefitted from discussion during the conference and from subsequent exchanges of emails and texts. The Covid-19 pandemic has certainly made our work more challenging, especially because of limited access to libraries, but we hope that our efforts have produced something that will benefit Herodotean and Homeric scholars. If the book manages to stimulate further thoughts or provoke some constructive reaction, it will have accomplished its principal objective.

I. M.

*Siena, October 2021*





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## POET AND HISTORIAN: THE IMPACT OF HOMER IN HERODOTUS' *HISTORIES*\*

Christopher J. Tuplin

This volume is devoted to the relationship between Herodotus and Homer. Since it is obvious that Herodotus refers to Homer and self-evidently reasonable to feel that the entire Herodotean enterprise has a Homeric quality, it is not easy to address the topic without fairly rapidly starting to engage in quite detailed commentary on Herodotus' text, and this is exemplified by the other essays that appear in the present publication. The essays by Barker and Donelli offer new implicit intertextual connections between Homer and Herodotus, while that by Fragoulaki comments on an absent intertext or an intertext that consists in absence. Tribulato deals with what turns out to be the elusive issue of the version of Ionian dialect found in (the manuscripts of) Homer and Herodotus—a different sort of implicit intertextual relationship between the two writers. Harrison considers Herodotus' remarks on the role of Homer (and Hesiod) in creating the familiar image of Greek gods, while Haywood examines the wider category of which those remarks are an example (i.e., explicit Herodotean allusions to Homer). All of these essays have methodological elements, of course, but only that by Pelling comes close to making methodological comment a central focus. And yet it would perhaps be misleading to characterise it too strongly in such epistemologically heavy terms. What it does is pose a series of practical questions about the manner and significance of (allusive) intertextuality, and these are as much the analytical result of the practice of intertext-searching as a road map or model for that enterprise: the discussion is persistently open-ended and non-prescriptive, and the conclusion looks forward to the rest of the volume for answers. So, here too, illumination of

\* Ivan Matijašić was kind enough to invite me to provide some closing remarks at the end of the Newcastle conference, but the notes I made for that purpose went missing shortly afterwards, and there is therefore no recoverable intertextual connection between those remarks and the present chapter. Translations in what follows are my own.

the Homer–Herodotus relationship comes precisely from examining the details of Herodotus text.

The present essay is resolutely in the same tradition. I start in §§1–2 with some comments on ancient responses to the relationship between Homer and Herodotus (something also touched on by Tribulato) and on Herodotus’ explicit references to Homer (the topic of Harrison and Haywood), but the bulk of the essay (§3) deals with allusive intertexts (like Barker, Donelli, Fragoulaki and Tribulato). In this section I have attempted to bring within a single expository framework a wide variety of such intertexts—some relatively visible in the existing literature (including other parts of this volume), some less so or not all.<sup>1</sup> §4 attempts a summary.

### 1. Ancient Reception

The Homeric character of Herodotus’ *Histories* is a topic that engaged the interest of some ancient literary critics and grammarians, and it is proper to consider what they made of it. But their comments turn out to be of limited value.

1. There is nothing unique about Herodotus’ Homeric quality. One can readily assemble a dozen other authors who are sometimes spoken of as having Homeric qualities. Were some more Homeric than others? Well, Pseudo-Longinus famously calls Herodotus ‘Ὀμηρικώτατος, but he does so in a question: was Herodotus alone ‘Ὀμηρικώτατος? The answer is no: one must also consider Stesichorus, Archilochus, and, above all, Plato. So although the question attests a view that Herodotus was very Homeric, its answer attests that not everyone thought that he was exceptionally so. And in laying particular stress on Plato Pseudo-Longinus was not alone. For Cassius Longinus (fr. 15 Prickard (Excerpta 9)) wrote that Plato was ‘the first who excelled in transferring Homeric grandeur (ὄγκος) to prose’ (ὁ πρῶτος ἄριστα πρὸς τὴν πέζην λέξι τὸν Ὀμηρικὸν ὄγκον μετενεγκῶν)—which may mean that all earlier Ὀμηρικοί such as Herodotus were simply less successfully Homeric, and certainly means that none of them could self-evidently claim to be the best at being Homeric.

<sup>1</sup> My survey will certainly have missed items that are already in the literature, not least because this essay was entirely produced during the Covid-19 pandemic and with only patchy access to publications not available digitally: the digital reach of the University of Liverpool library is good, but not all-embracing.

2. The reasons for assigning Homeric quality to Herodotus or other authors are of rather a general nature, when they exist at all.

Having insisted upon the point, Pseudo-Longinus actually provides no precise explanation of what it was that made Plato so specially Homeric. In the preceding lines Plato exemplifies the road to sublimity through imitation of (indeed inspiration by) earlier prose and poetic writers. Elsewhere the author speaks of Plato's ὄγκος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆς σεμνότης (12.3), says that he is clever at σχήματα (though sometimes uses them inappositely, 29.1), and puts him alongside other top writers (Homer, Demosthenes, and others unnamed) as one whose faults are tiny in comparison with their virtues (36). There is no clear demonstration that these virtues are Homeric. In 13, the Homeric borrowings that Ammonius listed are unexemplified, and we are merely told that competition with Homer benefitted Plato's philosophic dogmas and conferred a poetic quality. Archilochus is an author who can blaze with unruly brilliance and divine inspiration but also fall flat (33.5): he is thus better than the poets who write impeccably—a characteristic he shares with Homer (who makes mistakes: 33.4). So perhaps being Homeric simply means being an exceptionally good writer—in fact, one capable of the sublime? It is, after all, to Homer, Plato, and Demosthenes that the aspirational writer should look as models for the sublime (14), and Herodotus is, of course, capable of that quality (18.2), though Pseudo-Longinus generally cites him for use of specific (and entirely normal) stylistic tropes that are normally done well despite some lapses of judgement<sup>2</sup>—another great author with occasional faults.

Meanwhile to say Herodotus is a prose Homer (Salmacis inscription: *SEG* 48.1330) or Sappho a female one (*Anthologia Palatina* 1.65) or Sophocles the Homer of Tragedy (Diog. Laert. 4.3) tells us nothing. To say Homer and Archilochus are the best poets, but write different sorts of poetry also tells us nothing (Dio Chrys. 33.11; Philostr. *VS* 6.620 is no better). To associate Stesichorus, Alcaeus, Sophocles, Herodotus, Demosthenes, Democritus, Plato and Aristotle with Homer because of shared stylistic μεσότης (D.H. *Comp.* 24) is to speak very generally, to declare Herodotus and Plato the best imitators of Homer's μικτὴ ἁρμονία (half way between ἀύστηρὰ and ἡδέϊα ἁρμονία) and cite Herodotus 7.8 (Xerxes' speech proposing the war against Greece) as an example is only slightly better (D.H. *Dem.* 41). More detailed

<sup>2</sup> Herodotus can make poor choices of words ([Long.] *Subl.* 4.7, 43.1) but he is cited for good examples of rhetorical questions (18.2), word order (22.1–2), vividness (26.2: saying 'you go to ...', not 'one goes to ...'), periphrasis (28.3), expressively vulgar vocabulary (31.2), and hyperbole (38.4–5).

are the propositions that Thucydides imitated Homer in *οἰκονομία*, choice of vocabulary, *ἡ περὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν ἀκρίβεια*, force, beauty, and speedy narrative (Marcel. *Vit. Thuc.* 35) and that Sophocles achieved Homeric charm through character-drawing, variation, and skilful use of *ἐπινοήματα* (*Vit. Soph.*)—yet almost too detailed, since in the end these passages simply say that the authors were globally stylistically similar. More modestly Empedocles was Homeric in diction (especially metaphor and poetic usage) (Arist. *Poet.* fr. 70 = Diog. Laert. 8.57) and Hippocrates in producing clear expression of thought through use of ordinary language (Erotian 31.1).

In many of these cases, of course, a fuller and more nuanced scholarship *may* underlie the surviving banal summaries. But, when we are looking at fully preserved original texts and at comments specifically about Herodotus (as with Dionysius), things are not much different. We are told that Herodotus ‘wished to provide variety within his text, being an emulator of Homer’ (*ποικίλην ἐβουλήθη ποιῆσαι τὴν γραφὴν Ὀμήρου ζηλωτῆς γενόμενος*, D.H. *Pomp.* 3), something he (like Plato and Demosthenes: Homer is not mentioned here) did in terms of periods, clauses, rhythms, figures, and accents (*Comp.* 19), that Herodotus (who is attractive and beautiful: *Comp.* 9) excelled in choice of words, in *σύνθεσις*, and variety of *σχηματίσματα*, and made prose resemble *τῇ κρατίστη ποιήσει* (which might include Homer, though that is not said) on account of persuasiveness, charm, and extreme pleasure (*Thuc.* 23), and that Homer and Herodotus share an ability to make simple vocabulary effective by correct *σύνθεσις* (*Comp.* 3, and cf. 12).

We thus have a rather bland overall message: Herodotus avoids monotony and obscurity, puts text together nicely, and produces something persuasive, charming, and pleasant to read that has something of the quality of poetry<sup>3</sup>—and in this he is Homeric. As before there is the feeling that being a Homeric writer is simply being a good writer and that the judgements on display here are more to do with the special canonical status of Homer in Greek literary history than with the distinctive characteristics of Herodotus or any of the other putatively Homeric authors. The ancient commentators do not, of course, think all of their putatively Homeric authors are interchangeable: the *ὄγκος* of Plato and force-of-nature quality of Archilochus (both implicitly or explicitly Homeric in Pseudo-Longinus

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Heracleodorus, F 10 (Herodotus produced a *ποίημα* because his work is enchanting to hear) and Hermog. *Id.* 2.4.15 (Ionic has a poetic flavour, and Herodotus’ use of it—albeit in mixed form—gives ‘sweetness’). Amidst all the praise of Herodotus there is something almost refreshing about Aristotle’s judgment that *λέξις εἰρομένη* is ugly (*ἀηδής*): Arist. *Rh.* 1409a27–31.



and Cassius Longinus) are not features of Herodotus and, indeed, feel rather inconsistent with the blanket association of Homeric authors with *μεσότης* in Dionysius. But the real problem is this. Most of us would surely say that, among all the authors canvassed here, the one who provides a reading experience most obviously like Homer is Herodotus: but this is something that the ancient commentators entirely fail to convey.

One further observation. The Homeric qualities under discussion in the ancient literary critical tradition are to do with style rather than content. A rare specific exception is the claim in Heraclitus, *Allegoriae* 18.1 that Plato took aspects of his description of the parts of the soul 'as it were from the spring of Homeric epic': so, for example, the hypocardiac position of the *thumos* comes from *Od.* 20.17, though quite what it has to do with Odysseus' words (*τέτλαθι δῆ, κραδίη*) is not immediately apparent. The general perception that both Homer and Herodotus told lies must also count as a comment about content—a topic I shall not pursue here.<sup>4</sup> Rather I stress that there is no sign of a perception among ancient commentators of the sort of allusive intertextuality that modern commentators take for granted. Perhaps they were just acting in the spirit of Aristotle's criticism of Homeric scholars, who see minor similarities but overlook important ones (*Arist. Metaphys.* 1093a27), and so ignored things they considered trivial compared with the business of rhetorical pedagogy that is the real basis of ancient literary criticism. But unless we are completely deluding ourselves in this matter, we have to say that their reactions to the Homeric Herodotus are seriously deficient.

## 2. Explicit Reference to Homer and the Trojan War

Ancient commentators surely did notice that Herodotus sometimes cites Homer (and even makes in-text characters do so), and it is a phenomenon we have to assess, even if they appear uninterested. This might be approached from various perspectives, but the salient thing here is how Herodotus judged Homer in relation to the enterprise he himself was engaged in. The principal issue is the inter-relation of truth, lies, and rational utility. Since ancient commentators did remark on Homer's lies, this is a topic that has some overlap with their concerns.

<sup>4</sup> But note that some saw that it was not all lies: Strabo 1.2.9–10, 17 (citing Polybius).

Homer found the name Ocean and introduced it into poetry (*ποίησις*: 2.23).<sup>5</sup> But Ocean is something for which there is no evidence (4.8), which is laughable (4.36), and which cannot be used in discussion of the origins of the Nile: anyone (e.g., Hecataeus?) who explains the Nile in terms of Ocean ‘has linked his tale to obscurity and cannot be refuted’ (*ἐς ἀφανὲς τὸν μῦθον ἀνενείκας οὐκ ἔχει ἔλεγχον*: 2.23). Whether or not Ocean actually exists (in this passage Herodotus merely affirms that he does not know that it does), it cannot be deployed in geographical speculation. In this case, then, Homer is not cogent evidence for the existence of Ocean and what he says cannot, therefore, be used in rational debate.

But this is a unique example. For the most part Homer is a perfectly usable resource for rational argument. This is even so (in a rather special sense) when he positively lies about the past. The claim that Helen was at Troy is untrue and implausible, and only adopted because judged more seemly for epic poetry (2.112–30).<sup>6</sup> But the discussion of this matter, which is unlike anything else in *Histories*, does supply Herodotus with an excellent object with which to display rational analysis, if also (at the end) moral comment.<sup>7</sup> More normally, Homeric material is a tool to use on other subject matter. Sometimes what Homer says is presumed to be true, as with the information about Libyan sheep (4.29; cf. Hom. *Od.* 4.85) from which Herodotus draws an inference about Scythia.<sup>8</sup> Sometimes it is affirmed to be

<sup>5</sup> Herodotus says ‘Homer or one of the earlier (*πρότερον γενομένων*) poets’. But for Herodotus there are no poets before Homer. Ocean is in Homer and Hesiod who are jointly the first poets. *Ποίησις* (for poetry) recurs at 2.82, in reference apparently to Hes. *Op.* 765–828. Heraclitus attacked Hesiod’s scheme of days (Plut. *Cam.* 19), saying all days are the same, but Herodotus expresses no view and it is not clear that being in *poiēsis* is *eo ipso* damning. For the disconnect between name and substantive existence cf. immediately below (gods, Eridanus).

<sup>6</sup> *Εὐπρεπής* has overtones of niceness of appearance, so seemly or decent, not just suitable? Compare 2.47.3: a *logos* that it is not *εὐπρεπής* to report—ethically, not just intellectually, wrong. The story may be more attractive (Marincola (2006) 22), but can one translate *ἐς τὴν ἐποποιίην εὐπρεπής* (Hdt. 2.116.3) in that way?

<sup>7</sup> Unlike anything in Herodotus: E. Bowie (2018a) 55. For other comments on this passage see Haywood, above, pp. 61–72 and Donelli, above, pp. 226–7. A comprehensive discussion of the Helen passage (2.116–7) and of that about the gods mentioned below (2.53) now appears in Currie (2021).

<sup>8</sup> Matijašić (above, p. 8) compares Thucydides citing Homer’s Ἑλληνες. — The fecundity of Libyan sheep is thematically linked with the Helen–Menelaus–Egypt topic. It is as if it is something that stuck in Herodotus’ mind when reading what Homer said about Homeric heroes in Egypt in pursuit of the argument in 2.113–20.

true: that Paris went to Sidon (2.116; cf. Hom. *Il.* 6.289–92) is validated by the Egyptian priests' information about Helen. Sometimes truth is marked as uncertain: the deaths of Priam's sons can be used in an argument about Helen's absence (2.120.3), even though the fact is qualified with *εἰ χρή τι τοῖσι ἐποποιοῖσι χρεώμενον λέγειν*.<sup>9</sup> Sometime truth is immaterial. This is relatively banally the case in 2.117 or 4.29: in the former a passage in *Cypria* is cited that proves the author is not Homer (so Herodotus believes Homer is self-consistent),<sup>10</sup> in the latter the fact that Homer (in *Epigonoι*) and Hesiod mention the Hyperboreans is an indication of their existence (even though the attribution of *Epigonoι* is queried),<sup>11</sup> but nothing more specific is said about the Hyperboreans that could raise issues of truth or falsehood.<sup>12</sup> More interesting is 2.53, the famous passage about Homer, Hesiod, and the gods.<sup>13</sup> But it is only more interesting because the subject matter is more important. The fundamental situation is the same. Homer and Hesiod made a *θεογονίη* for the Greeks,<sup>14</sup> gave the gods *ἑπωνυμῖαι*, distributed their *τιμαί* and *τέχνη*

<sup>9</sup> The *εποποιοῖ* must include Homer (in whom, at least rhetorically, all fifty died: *Il.* 24.493–502). The comment is not a response to perceived tension between using Homer's information and a whole element of his Trojan War story (Helen's presence at Troy) being false, merely a small display of judiciousness in a discourse about sceptical reading of sources. (The same trick occurs in 7.20 on the numbers of the Trojan War expedition *kata ta legomena*.)

<sup>10</sup> Not a view shared by all readers.

<sup>11</sup> Their report is stronger evidence than the silence of Scythians and Issedonians. Herodotus is not worried that Hyperborean is a patently Greek name, presumably created by a Greek source: contrast the Eridanus (see below, n. 14). Yet in both cases there is ancillary evidence from the actual arrival of material objects from far-off places.

<sup>12</sup> Is the post-Trojan Wars birth of Pan (2.145) deduced from the *absence* of reference to him in Homer?

<sup>13</sup> See Harrison, above, pp. 91–103; Haywood, above, pp. 72–4.

<sup>14</sup> What is the force of *ποίησαντες θεογονίην*? In 3.115.2 the name of Eridanus is Greek, not barbarian, *ὑπὸ ποιητέω δέ τινος ποιηθέν* and this casts doubt on (*κατηγορέει*) claims that there is an Eridanus that flows into the northern sea. The name is created by a Greek poet and is not reliable evidence that the thing exists, because the Greek poet may have created it for no good reason. (In the same way when Homer 'found' the name Ocean, there was no guarantee that whoever originally made it did it for good reason.) But the uncertainty is not inherent in the verb *ποιεῖν*. Nor is being in *ποίησις* inherently a proof of untruth (see above, n. 5). Nothing else about the terminology here demands that Homer and Hesiod just randomly invented their data out of thin air. The gods are already there, so to say, with names imported from Egypt (and used by Pelasgians). Homer and Hesiod provide further information about them, potentially because they have inspired knowledge—which is *prima facie* what Hesiod says at the start of *Theogony*.

and indicated their *εἰδέα*. Whether or not the information they provided was true, Herodotus knows that many people take it to be true (and not only in literary contexts) and, for the purposes of his chronological and developmental analysis, that is sufficient to make the information relevant.<sup>15</sup> It is the presence of the information in the poetic texts and its relationship to later behaviour that matters. This neither demands nor precludes that it is true,<sup>16</sup> but either way Homer (and Hesiod) can inform rational discussion.

Herodotus' assumption that Homer provides processable information is shared by characters within his text. Sometimes such characters find the information unpalatable (Cleisthenes of Sicyon's attitude to Homer's praise of Argives)<sup>17</sup> or profess to find it irrelevant (the Athenians at 9.28). But both they and others assume that Homer (and the wider Trojan War tradition) can have contemporary impact,<sup>18</sup> whether they are alluding to Homer's text as text<sup>19</sup> or adducing the information that he or other epic poets provided.<sup>20</sup> Most of these cases figure in the discussion of allusive intertextuality later in this essay<sup>21</sup>—inevitably since those characters who do name Homer provide a context for those who do not, and those who do not are certainly engaging in an intertextual activity of some sort in their own name and/or as figures manipulated by the author. When information is involved, the presumption of the in-text characters is evidently that the information is true or will be accepted by others as true.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>15</sup> The same principle applies to use of the Trojan War as a chronological marker to establish that Greece is young compared with Egypt (2.145). The combination of 2.53 and 2.145 places Homer 400 years after the Trojan War. See Haywood, above, pp. 73–4, and below, p. 347.

<sup>16</sup> Harrison, above, p. 93, rightly argues that 2.53 does not require Herodotus to be adopting a radically sceptical view about traditional Greek religion.

<sup>17</sup> 5.67. Hornblower (2013) 200 is surely right that Homer is in question here.

<sup>18</sup> The Cleisthenes passage specifically thematises the impact of (rhapsodic) performance.

<sup>19</sup> E.g., 6.11 and 7.159 (see below, pp. 333, 337).

<sup>20</sup> Pelling, above, pp. 45, 48, notes the distinction. The Athenian ambassadors in 7.161 do both. Deployment of other Homeric or Trojan War cycle information: 1.3–4; 5.65, 67, 94; 7.43, 171; 9.26–8, 116. A special subset is the assertion of epic-era origins by ethnic groups in 4.191 and 5.13 (and cf. 5.122 and 7.91 for similar Herodotean assertions about the post-Trojan War diaspora). An interesting by-product is 6.52: the Spartans, 'agreeing with no poet' claim Aristodemus (not his sons) brought Spartans to Sparta. Poets are natural historical sources.

<sup>21</sup> See below, pp. 300, 304, 306, 307–8, 315, 324, 333–4, 337–8, 344, 366.

<sup>22</sup> The Athenians set aside Trojan War evidence as less relevant than Marathon, not necessarily less true. On this see below, p. 340. Their position is analogous to that of

Is Herodotus' position on the matter theoretically distinct? Herodotus himself does not think truth necessarily matters (see above) when one is deploying Homer, so he cannot rationally think that his in-text characters think otherwise: they might deploy Homer's facts thinking them not true if they think that doing so will work. But in choosing to report that someone deployed Homer in a political argument, he also opens up an intertextual proposition for his reader. How does the issue of truth-value play in that context?

One might say that Herodotus is seeking to contextualise the in-text situation by trading on the status of the Homeric text rather than on the truth of its contents. That is a distinction that is perhaps in principle *à propos*. The case of Archidice (see below, pp. 316–17) suggests this, since it involves an intertext with the Helen of *Il.* 6.356–8 who, according to Herodotus in 2.113–120, did not actually exist. So an intertext can exist with what is mere epic-genre story-telling. But it is a rather playful piece of intertextuality (albeit on a relatively serious topic), and one could maintain that Helen's non-existence is part of the joke.<sup>23</sup> What about other cases? What exactly is Herodotus trying to do by creating an evocation of Homer through an in-text character—or indeed in any context? Is there (sometimes) a claim that our take on something that happens in the time-frame of *Histories* is affected by the fact that something similar happened earlier? That would require the truth value of the Homeric item to be comparable with that of the more recent one, and be part of a strategy for justifying the *accuracy* of the story in *Histories* (and therefore the status of *Histories* itself). Or is it just that the more recent event is more interesting/special because it realises or riffs on what was previously a story (true or not) in a culturally high-status source? That is indifferent on truth value, and is part of a strategy for justifying the *importance* of the story in *Histories* (and therefore, again, the status of *Histories* itself).

But in the end how much does accuracy actually matter? As we shall see, the opening of *Histories* thematises what the historian (claims he) knows as against what Persians say emerges from stories about a more distant past, but he also assimilates himself to Odysseus (which may make one wonder about some of the newer stories) and does not affirm that the old stories are not true, only that he does not have a certain grasp on them. Moreover, he

Herodotus in 1.1–5: he prefers what he *knows* to be a start of injustice over instances that are historiographically more vulnerable (but not affirmed to be false). See variously Flower–Marincola (2002) 156; Haywood, above, pp. 79–80.

<sup>23</sup> And perhaps her wish in the *Iliad* passage that she could not be *αοίδιμος* has some impact on the idea of not really being at Troy in the first place?

only affirms that he knows Croesus was the first source of harm. He makes no general programmatic statement about searching for historical truth as we might see it.

So the answer may be that accuracy is negotiable and that, from Herodotus' point of view, intertexting with Homer is not predicated on Homer being imagined as providing an entirely truthful report about the past. That would be in line with the cases where in-text persons appeal explicitly to Homer or Trojan Wars, and there is no reason to imagine that when such persons engage in allusive intertextuality the presuppositions are any different.

In short: Herodotus knows perfectly well that the stories and information found in Homer (and other epic poets) may not be true, that other people quite possibly share this knowledge (even if he can identify examples that most people have not noticed), and that neither he nor they need necessarily worry about this fact when using Homer to construct an argument. Homer is there and it is perfectly fair to deploy him. Whether it is always prudent to do so is (as we shall see) another matter.

### 3. Allusive Intertextuality

#### 3.1. Homer at the Start of *Histories*

The opening of *Histories* makes clear allusions to Homer. There is a structural analogy in the way that both Herodotus and Homer begin with prefatory lines which pose a question about causes of strife that are answered immediately at the start of the main text; and there is a lexical connection in the wish to prevent human activities from being ἀκλεᾶ: κλέος is a Homeric concept that is only evoked in deliberately limited contexts in Herodotus (see below) and clearly carries a special charge. Moreover, the work is Herodotus' ἀπόδεξις and the deeds that are not to be ἀκλεᾶ are τὰ μὲν Ἑλλῆσι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα. There is an overlap between author and subject and an implicit claim to κλέος for the author.<sup>24</sup> There is no such explicit claim by Homer in the *Iliad* proem, and Homer is generally an invisible entity by comparison with the ever-present Herodotean *ego*. But *Iliad* and *Odyssey* do contain some incitements to reflect upon the potential fame of Homer,<sup>25</sup> and we are entitled to see the implicit incitement to think about Herodotus' fame in that light.

<sup>24</sup> This is true whatever one makes of the subtleties in Nagy (1987).

<sup>25</sup> De Jong (2006): some arguments are not quite logically compelling but the overall contention seems sustainable.

But the more we see *apodexis* in terms of the competitive performance culture of fifth-century intellectuals, the more we realise that Herodotus' fame may not only be a Homeric issue. And this is not the only un-Homeric element in 1.0–1.<sup>26</sup> The cause of strife does not lie with the gods in Herodotus (even though Herodotus does not in general write about a world from which gods are absent), the *Iliad* proem itself has nothing about *kleos* (rather it highlights suffering and death), while Herodotus' proem also speaks of human actions not being τῶ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα (non-Homeric language<sup>27</sup>), refers to Greeks and barbarians (in the *Iliad* opening it is just the Achaeans' sufferings that are highlighted: elsewhere, of course, it is another matter), speaks of *erga* whose ambit will turn out to be quite wide (and not purely martial), and, of course, has no Muse,<sup>28</sup> only human *historiē* carried out by the proudly and un-Homerically named Herodotus of Halicarnassus—which is why the authorial *ego* is so much more on show.<sup>29</sup> If *aklea* and the 'what was the cause/the cause was' structure do evoke Homer, the effect is nonetheless to mark distance and claim distinctive status for Herodotus as author. The conflict (*eris*) highlighted in the *Iliad* proemium resulted (via the working out of that *eris* in the actions of Achilles and others) in the *Iliad*, which also preserves the κλέος ἄφθιτον of the likes of Achilles. The cause of Greek–barbarian warfare highlighted in the *Histories* proem resulted (via the working out of that conflict in the actions of very many people) in *Histories*, which also preserves the *kleos* of the *erga* of men. But though these are parallel enterprises and indeed connected ones (since some people think the events of the *Iliad* are part of the cause of the events of the *Histories*), they are also distinct ones.

A couple of pages further on, Homer reappears in a clear echo of the opening of *Odyssey*—clearer even than the echo of *Iliad* 1.1–7 in Hdt. 1.0–1, since a precise phrase is reproduced (1.5.3). As he passes through the cities of

<sup>26</sup> I use 1.0 to refer to the proem, whose separation from the book-chapter scheme is as irritating as the insistence that a speech can only occupy a single numbered chapter (Hornblower (2013) 2).

<sup>27</sup> Nagy argued that it was semantically equivalent. Moles (1999) 51 mooted an image from the non-epic world of inscriptions (cf. Hornblower–Pelling (2017) 8), but preferred the idea of families dying out (cf. Moles (2007) 267), which *is* an epic possibility.

<sup>28</sup> That the books came to be named after Muses is ironic: see Matijašić, above, p. 4.

<sup>29</sup> 1,086 times according to Dewald (1987), albeit often to create alternative voices to the narrator's.

men, Herodotus is an actual and virtual traveller like Odysseus (who both travels and produces narration of travel) and perhaps shares his fame.

But as before, there is difference: Herodotus does not suffer pains (*ἄλγεα*) or fail to preserve his *hetairoi*.<sup>30</sup> Instead the *peripeteiai* of the hero are displaced onto the historian's subject matter<sup>31</sup>—and the displacement claims an important status for the topic: his knowledge of the mutability of *ἀνθρωπίνη εὐδαιμονία* means his Odyssean traverse of cities covers *σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄσπεα*. His journey is arguably more wide-ranging (for all that Odysseus saw the cities of many men) and his experience is more structured. The fact that he knows about human happiness both corresponds to and differs from Odysseus' knowledge of *πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ... νόον*, and one might sense that his journey ('journey') transcends that of Odysseus. The importance of the theme is visible in the fact that it has already been trailed in 1.1–4: when Io was stolen, Argos was the leading city of Greece—still true in the *Iliad* (where the Greeks are often Ἄργεῖοι) but not true in Herodotus' time, even if Argos had not become as negligible as Mycenae (an ancillary point that might strike some readers, given Thucydides' highlighting of it). And this links with what may be seen as another distinction between Herodotus and Homer (and Odysseus): although cities change status in the Homeric world (Troy anyway) and the contrast between earlier and current heroic generations is a Nestorian trope, Herodotus arguably lays claim to a longer chronological and historical perspective than occurs in the Homeric world. (Nestor, after all, recalls a world that was in his own lifetime.)

Another question then arises. Odysseus is a slippery character (*πολύτροπον* is foregrounded in *Odyssey* 1.1) and knows how to tell plausible lies.<sup>32</sup> Does this have a bearing on our reaction to Herodotus-Odysseus? Should we expect him not always to be straightforward—perhaps to tell us things that are not really true without providing direct markers of scepticism? One's attention is certainly drawn to the fact that no part of 1.0–5 explicitly thematises truth-telling.<sup>33</sup> Reporting true things may seem implicit in the insistence on what *he knows* about the first harmer-of-Greeks and on the

<sup>30</sup> The stories of political activity and exile in the biographical tradition are precisely *not* in *Histories*.

<sup>31</sup> Marincola (2007) 38.

<sup>32</sup> And 8.8.3 is a sign Herodotus is aware of this (below pp. 306–7), should we need one.

<sup>33</sup> Another thing not overtly thematised is the provision of pleasure. But that is perhaps implicit in the posture of being a poet, for poets do enchant (*Od.* 1.337), and there is pleasure in tales of suffering, at least when it is over (*Od.* 4.100–3, 594–8; 15.398–401; 23.306–9).



preservation of the fame of human *erga*. But 'what I know' is a solipsistic version of 'truth' and the analogy between Herodotus' fame-preserving enterprise and Homer does raise questions about truth even aside from the Odyssean angle. Both ancient and modern readers have considered Homer a liar or an unreliable narrator,<sup>34</sup> and Herodotus himself (2.112–20) identifies a big untruth in the *Iliad*. Later Herodotus will explicitly say that his reporting something does not entail his belief that it is true, and his deployment of explicitly identified Homeric material makes no assumptions about truth (above, §2). Odysseus told lies to disguise himself, to entertain (but also instruct) the Phaeacians, and for sheer devilment (Laertes: *Od.* 24.235–314), Homer picked versions of the past for genre suitability. So what is Herodotus' motivation in this area? The question is left open, but we realise that the reasons for *apodexis* and *historiē* stated in 1.0 may not exhaustively explain what Herodotus is up to.<sup>35</sup> But there is another more positive angle too. Odysseus' mendacity is an aspect of his problem-solving capacity: that is important in *Odyssey* 1.1–10, where it stands in contrast to the hero's eventual failure to save his *hetairoi* or secure a good *nostos*—even the 'versatile' Odysseus was worsted. How does this play in Herodotus? If Herodotus will tell tales, is his unravelling of evidence and application of *gnōmē* actually also supposed to be Odyssean?<sup>36</sup>

Herodotus, then, is *alter Homerus* and *alter Odysseus*. He is a poet who is not a poet (or, as 1.1–5 might be said to show, a *logios* who is not a *logios*—at least not one like other *logioi*<sup>37</sup>) but who claims authority to do the sort of things Homer did on a different (and human) basis—and perhaps the fame that Homer earned by it. He is a traveller who displaces the personal experience of reversal from himself onto the story he tells. He both associates and detaches himself from Odysseus: his text-Odysseus travels intelligently through an extraordinary range of men, his understanding of *eudaimoniē* resembles and extends Odysseus' understanding of the *noos* of men—and truth may be what he chooses to assert that it is. At a first reading of *Histories* 1.0–1.5 one cannot imagine all the places, real and metaphorical, the work is going to go to, but intertextual Homeric links have been used to frame

<sup>34</sup> Arist. *Poet.* 1460a18–19; Pind. *Nem.* 7.21–3; Baragwanath (2007) 48, 51; Irwin (2014).

<sup>35</sup> Baragwanath's perception that Herodotus particularly follows the manner of Homeric in-text narrators rather than the primary narrator (Baragwanath (2008) 49–51), and is always inclined to indicate non-omniscience, is worth reflecting on here.

<sup>36</sup> For another question provoked by 1.5.3–4 (*nostos*) see below, pp. 303–4, 309–10.

<sup>37</sup> Contrast Nagy (1987). Pindar (*Pyth.* 1.92–4; *Nem.* 6.28–30, 45–7) effectively makes *aidoi* and *logioi* parallel: Herodotus transcends both.

important programmatic points and offer the reader a prospectus that will be validated in the books that follow.

### 3.2. Preliminaries to an Extended Search

Those books in turn contain many more examples of allusive intertextuality. Before turning to them, some preliminary observations.

1. We are interested in things that go beyond the general Homerisation implicit in the contents of 1.0 and 1.5.3–4. One can expect Homeric flavour almost anywhere; the question is where this phenomenon acquires greater substance. One is looking for things that do something more (reinforcing, dissonant, question-provoking, or whatever) than simply feed the default linguistic and compositional quasi-Homeric nature of the enterprise—and one is looking for things that it is reasonable to think the author meant or hoped that we would see.<sup>38</sup> But it is difficult to decide *a priori* whether, e.g., verbal things that are a little special, perhaps because they involve *hapax legomena*, are likely to be significant markers in themselves, and investigation suggests that some are and some are not—though the latter may still occur in contexts that have other intertextual markers. It is certainly true that intertexts can be created by different sorts of feature. It is also true that the theoretically separate questions (is there any intertext? if so, what does it signify?) are not always separable in practice, and that the role of consonance and dissonance in making an intertext work can be quite variable.

2. When an intertext consists solely in the use of Homeric language, there may be no distance between target and receiving text, and the effect is simply to colour the receiving text. But that need not be the case even with language-based cases, because the language may evoke a particular Homeric context and there will necessarily be some distance between that context and the receiving context; and that principle will apply to all intertextual cases that, for whatever reason, evoke the content of Homeric text(s). The force of the intertext in such cases (the majority) depends on how the distance between the two contexts plays to the reader. It may reinforce how we would otherwise read the receiving text (accentuating the message of the text or

<sup>38</sup> On that issue see Pelling, above, p. 43. Matijašić, above, p. 15, defines intertexts as ‘verbal echoes, metrical sounding, similarities of subject matter, parallels in narrative structures and so on, that an author employs to *intentionally* evoke another passage or series of passage from a previous author, without however involving explicit references’ (my italics). Among important broader features of the interaction between Homer and Herodotean historiography not directly explored here are the concern with causation (Pelling 2020a) and the prevalence of *oratio recta*.

simply adding colour or grandeur) or it may disrupt that reading (e.g., by problematising the message or creating a mismatch between epic colour or grandeur and the receiving context) or it may do a bit of both.<sup>39</sup> The effects (and scale) of reinforcement or (especially) disruption and the mechanism by which they are achieved may come in various forms (they may, e.g., focus rather narrowly on the target and receiving passages or involve wider contexts in one or other author), but one should perhaps avoid over-analysing or over-categorising the process as something existing in its own right: each case should in the first instance be seen on its own merits, even though there may also be an intratextual relationship between different cases that is of importance.

3. Homeric colour, whether relatively intense because of a specific allusion or intertext, or generic because of the overall flavour of epic narrative, co-exists with un-Homeric manner. 7.219–22 has a strong quasi-Homeric assertion about Leonidas and *kleos* at its heart (see below, pp. 315–6, 354) but it is written as a discussion of which version about the departure of non-Spartans from Thermopylae one should believe. That has little or no resonance with Homeric manner.<sup>40</sup> The passage is an exemplary amalgamation of analytical historian and epic poet. This sort of thing goes on all the time.

4. The Homeric allusions of 1.0 and 1.5.3–4 are in the historian's voice. But elsewhere intertexting sometimes occurs in the voice of in-text characters, and sometimes at least in circumstances in which allusion to a Homeric text is something we can imagine the in-text character actually doing.<sup>41</sup> We have seen that the validity of allusive intertexting is not

<sup>39</sup> The importance of dissonance is noted by Harrison, above, p. 96.

<sup>40</sup> Homer does not quote sources or openly wrestle with their divergence. Hom. *Od.* 12.389–90, where Odysseus quotes a specific source (Calypso told me this having heard it from Hermes), is unusual: passages such as *Il.* 4.374–5, 6.151, 9.524, *Od.* 3.211–3, 4.200–2 (in-text characters alluding to anonymous *on dit* sources) are not really the same. (E. Bowie (2018a) 66 thinks other poetic narrators had source citation on the rather uncertain strength of Mimnermus, fr. 14 *IEG*<sup>2</sup>: *τοῖον ἐμ<έο> προτέρων πεύθομαι*.) Of course Herodotus mostly tells his story as unmediatedly as does Homer, though he is certainly not an omniscient narrator (cf. Baragwanath (2007) 49–51).

<sup>41</sup> Any Greek might theoretically riff on Homer. Did Herodotus want us to imagine any particular ones doing it deliberately? That he did is necessary in the special case of the Greek name for Masistius (below, p. 324). One might judge it fairly certain with Syagrus (below, p. 337), likely with Hippias (below, p. 344), plausible with Dionysius (below, pp. 333–4) and (perhaps) Socles (below, pp. 341–3), and possible for the Athenians in Books 8 and 9 (above, p. 334), the Spartans in Book 8 (n. 149), Pausanias (below, pp. 361–2), and the Coan woman (below, pp. 360–1). It will not be true with Histiaeus, where Herodotus is also playing

undermined *in se* by doubts about Homeric truthfulness (see §2). But might it be problematised by the way in which it is done? If in-text characters offer intertexts that are self-undermining (i.e., have unintentional implications), and especially if it is historically plausible that the in-text character might have alluded to Homer, does that raise doubts about the practice in general or the historian's practice in particular? Does Herodotus want us not just to enjoy the intertexts he creates in his own voice but also to worry about them? Is the practice of intertexting (not just the content of some intertexts) intrinsically dissonant? Do we assume that the historian at least always knows how to intertext without creating unintentional dissonances? Or do we recall that the *alter Odysseus* of 1.5.3–4 may not be a wholly straightforward traveller through the sea of text? The unpredictability of intertextuality is more specifically illustrated by the next point.

5. The opening of *Histories* inscribes a Trojan War/Persian War comparison into the work: the Persian War (as an event) is a continuation of the Trojan War, with Persians as Trojans fighting Greeks as Achaeans, and the idea recurs at 7.43 and 9.116–20 (in the latter case prefigured in 7.33). And the Persian War (as narrative) is insistently given an allure of the Trojan War (as narrative) by the various explicit and implicit connections that exist between Herodotus' text and Homer. It is moreover clear that deployment of the analogy reflects something found in fifth-century public discourse. Two questions arise.

First, what is the comparative stature of the two wars? 7.20 (on the size of forces involved) is the closest approach to an explicit comparison, but it is anything but clearly stated, and indeed seems to shy away from the issue. Implicitly the sheer geographical extent of 7.61–99 probably more than compensates and makes the new Trojan War much grander. For Herodotus' stature as a historian, of course, the Trojan War is only part of the issue. The opening pages of *Histories* present an author who embraces both *Iliad* and

intratextual games (below, pp. 335–6). Thersander's report of conversation with a Persian is tricky: is the intertext plain enough *in se* for us to judge that Thersander is using Homer to give weight to his report? I suspect not: this is Herodotus constructing a Homeric scene out of Thersander's information: see below, pp. 312–3, 355, 362. And we should probably not even ask whether the Persian was supposed to be deliberately alluding to Homer. That *is* a question we might at least ask about other non-Greek figures, but there is no reason to answer it affirmatively. Mardonius doubtless knew of Sparta's reputation, but it is Herodotus who makes him use the significant word *kleos* and I cannot see it mattered to the historian that we might imagine Mardonius actually used it (below, p. 357), and that surely applies elsewhere as well. — The distinction between narrator and in-text character is noted by Pelling, above, pp. 45, 48.

*Odyssey*—and it is plain fact that *Histories* is not *only* a treatment of the new Trojan War, even if its *ostensible* range is not War and Aftermath, as in the two Homeric poems, but Background and War. But the *real* range is a more complicated question, and the combination of 5.97.3 and 6.98 (see below, pp. 346–7) arguably shows that Herodotus claims the new Trojan War to be greater (and longer-lasting) than the old, just as Thucydides claimed the Peloponnesian War to be greater than both the Trojan and Persian Wars.<sup>42</sup>

But, second, is comparing the two wars a valid or sensible activity? There are grounds for uncertainty.

The fact that Persians are represented as using the analogy does not in itself damage its validity for Greeks. It is true that their use is not marked very positively<sup>43</sup> and that their right retrospectively to lay claim to pre-Persian Asia and a duty to avenge its sufferings is weak compared with the Greeks' right retrospectively to lay claim to pre-modern Greece and a right to resist Asian aggression. But if the Persians choose to cast themselves as losers (and perpetrators of injustice), that in fact tends to reinforce Greek entitlement to use the analogy to cast themselves as winners (and victims of injustice). But there are other counter-indications.

(a) Many victorious Achaeans suffered difficult or disastrous *nostoi*. If the opening of *Histories* marks Herodotus' text as both *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the reader cannot ignore this perspective. The most visible bad *nostos* within the *Histories* story-line is that of Xerxes, one that is marked by murderous intra-familial relationships and distantly at least calls Agamemnon to mind (thus inverting the expected Persian-Trojan pairing: on this see immediately below). But the future difficulties of Pausanias and Themistocles are evoked too (5.32; 8.109), and Herodotus invites the reader to think of the longer term politico-military fall-out of the events of 480–79, sometimes in passages that involve Homeric intertexts. But, if the entire troubled post-Trojan War era (which involved bad inverted-*nostoi* for surviving Trojans as well) is undifferentiatedly called to mind by the Trojan War/Persian War assimilation,

<sup>42</sup> Both authors generally regard any past, present, and future they deal with as in a single *spatium historicum*, though Herodotus might subdivide the past in terms of the accuracy with which things can be known (2.154), and his general time-frame is longer than Homer's, if mostly closer to him than in his view Homer's subject matter was to Homer. The first Dorian incursion into Asia (3.44–48, 56) is not a counter-indication (*pace* Meissner (2004) 226), since Herodotus need not regard Homeric Spartans as Dorians. (Vannicelli (1993) 29 argues that the proto-Dorians are Homeric Hellenes.)

<sup>43</sup> Artayctes is sexually corrupt, Xerxes' gambit did not work, and Herodotus side-lines the Persian view of the causative relevance of Helen for Persian attacks on Greece. And see below, p. 315 for Persian hypocrisy in this matter.

that means that the self-congratulatory equation of Persian War and Trojan War has unwelcome consequences and may be of questionable wisdom.

(b) If supposed Persian allusions to the Trojan War are not enthusiastically endorsed by the historian (n. 43), there are also in-text Greek allusions that raise questions: see below, pp. 337–40 on the Gelon Embassy and the Tegean-Athenian debate.

(c) There are implicit intertexts that cast Greeks as Trojans and Persians as Greeks: 1.88; 3.14; 5.97.3; 6.70, 113–14; 7.238; 9.70, 99.3. If the merit of the assimilation consists in its marking Greeks as winners and Persians as losers, any disturbance of that relationship seems unsettling, at least from a Greek perspective. The fact that the Greeks destroyed Troy and think they can lay claim to places like Sigeium on that basis (whereas the Persians at the time of writing have no stake there) hardly means that Greeks are simply entitled at will to be Trojans as well as Achaeans. In the light of the argument above, it seems rather clear that such cases invite us to question the good sense of the assimilation.<sup>44</sup>

6. Finally, we should acknowledge that searching for Homer can induce tunnel-vision. Other intertextual targets *were* available.<sup>45</sup> They may indeed already be present in 1.0 and 1.5. The historian as display-artist is in competition with other performance intellectuals; and the historian as traveller probably intertexts in ways we cannot see so clearly with other authors who represent the travel-enquiry-knowledge nexus, e.g., Parmenides, Democritus, and specially Hecataeus.<sup>46</sup> Herodotus conjures up a diverse Hellenic world (involving numerous *poleis*, great and small)—a virtual description of the Greek *oecumene*—and he does the same for the barbarian world. *Histories* is, one might say, an encapsulation or evocation of the whole *oecumene* that joins the descriptive enterprise of Hecataean *periplous*-literature with the narrative enterprise of Homer.

But non-Homeric intertexts can also be found in more modest forms. A choice example is 1.187.2. The message on Nitocris' tomb said that a later

<sup>44</sup> See below pp. 337–40, 345–8, 351, 354–5, 356–60, 361–2, 368–9.

<sup>45</sup> E.g., non-Homeric epic (Carey (2016); below, n. 180), Stesimbrotus (Pelling (2016); (2020b) 92, 96), pre-Socratics (Harrison, above, pp. 94–7, 98, 101–2), epinician poetry—for fame is a Pindaric thing (and *kleos* a Pindaric word) and 1.0 could be channelling *Nemean* 6—and tragedy (notably Aeschylus' *Persians*). Stesichorus surely lurks in 2.112–30 (above, p. 292) and Bacchylides perhaps in 1.86–8. For Archilochus see below, n. 144.

<sup>46</sup> Ἄνῆρ πολυπλανῆς (*FGrHist* 1 T 12), and himself a Homeriser: Hornblower (1994) 13. See Marincola (2006) 26. Hecataeus may be an unspoken intertext in the passage on Ocean (above, p. 292).

Babylonian king could remove the gold it contained if short of money, but must not do so unless the shortage was really dire: οὐ γὰρ ἄμεινον. It duly remained ἀκίνητος until Darius became king. The tag οὐ γὰρ ἄμεινον takes us to Hesiod's *Works and Days* (750), a warning that twelve-month and twelve-year-old children should not sit on ἀκινήτοισι (i.e., tombs or the like). This is Herodotus (not Nitocris) playing a little game, and it is a game that has an intratextual pay-off. Darius twice ends a speech οὐ γὰρ ἄμεινον during the events that led to his becoming king (3.71.2, 82.5). So Nitocris speaks like Hesiod, and Darius speaks like Nitocris—and these are the only four occurrences of οὐ γὰρ ἄμεινον (apart from a citation of the Hesiod passage) until the time of Lucian, so we are not dealing with casual coincidence. And the point? The upshot of the Nitocris story is that Darius broke into the tomb and found no money but only another message calling him ἄπληστος χρημάτων καὶ αἰσχροκερδής. His use of the tag recalls this episode (in the past in the text, though still to come in real time) and surely colours the reader's reaction to Darius' keenness to murder Smerdis and espouse monarchy: eliminating a usurper without delay and maintaining ancestral custom may be his asserted motives, but there is something else too—something concordant with what we discover very shortly after his elevation to the throne, namely that the Persians called him 'retailer' (κάπηλος: 3.89).

### 3.3. Opening Themes Pursued Elsewhere

So non-Homeric intertexts can be fun.<sup>47</sup> But our business is with Homeric ones. We return to the search for significant Homeric allusions beyond the confines of the opening of *Histories*. A good place to start is with themes already present in 1.0–5.

#### *Methodological statements*

Two passages belong under this heading.

1. The first is 5.65.5. Having recounted the fall of the Athenian tyranny, Herodotus turns to what happened between then and the arrival of Aristagoras. He will record ὅσα δὲ ἐλευθερωθέντες ἔρξαν ἢ ἔπαθον ἀξιοχρεα ἀπηγήσιος, thus echoing *Odyssey* 8.490, where Demodocus is praised for recording ὅσσ' ἔρξαν τ' ἔπαθόν τε καὶ ὅσσ' ἐμόγησαν Ἀχαιοί—a reference to the quarrel of Odysseus and Achilles.<sup>48</sup> The historian thus reminds us that,

<sup>47</sup> For fun in Homeric intertexts see below, pp. 364–5.

<sup>48</sup> Hornblower (2013) 194.

like Demodocus, he is *alter Homerus*, and uses the reminder to mark a new era of Athenian freedom that will lead (*via* the energising effects of *isēgoria* in 78) to Sparta's failure to reinstall Hippias, the embroiling of Athens and Persia, and Aristagoras. Hippias' return to Sigeium in 5.93–4 closes a loop with the first exile to Sigeium in 5.64. The passage is a sort of new preface for a long patch of text that is rich in significant Homeric intertexts (see below, pp. 341–8) and to a degree for the whole second half of *Histories*,<sup>49</sup> and the intertext is thus used (in intratext with 1.0) to mark an important historical and literary-structural point. That the quarrel of Odysseus and Achilles lurks in the background is not inappropriate to the inter-Hellenic strife that will ensue.

2. The second is 8.8.3–4, identified and discussed by Donelli elsewhere in this volume. Her view is that the passage (1) evokes celebrated poetic texts about the true and the false-but-like-truth,<sup>50</sup> (2) asserts *gnōmē* as a criterion for distinguishing the two, and (3) acts as a programmatic statement ahead of a number of episodes problematising what is seen and what is actual.

Each of the intertexts is distinct. In Homer Odysseus is straightforwardly a liar. Some of the stories about Scyllias were of similar character (stories told by an Odysseus) and Odysseus did some heroic swimming at times. So Scyllias is a quasi-Odysseus figure. (I return to this below.) Theognis makes the cleverness that dresses lies up as truth a boon that is still not as valuable as money. Donelli notes a general thematic link with references to money and bribes in the opening part of Herodotus' Book 8. (Scyllias' acquisition of *khṛēmata* from the Pelion shipwrecks may be noted in particular.) Meanwhile in Hesiod the issue is the poet's authority. Hesiod pictures the Muses as capable both of lying and truth,<sup>51</sup> though he presumably thinks they have picked him as a channel for the truth. In Homer the Muses know the truth because they were present whereas mortals only hear rumour and know nothing (*Il.* 2.485–6). At the start of *Histories* the Muses are replaced by *historiē* and the historian affirms what *he* knows. In the present passage *gnōmē* either replaces the Muses as a source of truth or permits the historian to

<sup>49</sup> This fits with Hornblower's view of the relationship of Book 5 to Book 1 (Hornblower (2013) 4–9).

<sup>50</sup> Hom. *Od.* 19.203 (Odysseus ἴσκει ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα); Hes. *Theog.* 22–8; Thgn. 699–718. D.H. *Lys.* 18 uses *Od.* 19.203 as a description of Lysias' skill in producing convincing narratives. The *Odyssey* passage was much cited in antiquity and is much discussed in modern literature, as is the Hesiod one.

<sup>51</sup> Which is doubtless why some things in a poem may be false: though Homer's lies about Helen (2.112–30) are apparently conscious and deliberate.



adjudicate between truth and falsehood, both of which *could* be the product of the Muses. In any case the passage re-affirms that we are in a Muse-free world in which, *pace* Homer, mortals (especially Herodotus) can have some control over rumour. That can stand as an important message in its own right—but Donelli's position is that Herodotus chooses to re-assert the human historian's authority just here because specious falsehoods are going to start appearing and we are to notice the author's (Odyssean?) skill in manoeuvring his way through them.

Perhaps the series starts sooner than Donelli observes. Herodotus does not say that Scyllias told the story about swimming from Aphetæ, but it is hard to imagine that he is *not* the source. But if we are dealing with an Odyssean liar, we have to reassess the other information he brings about a storm off Magnesia and the despatch of a squadron to circumnavigate Euboea. There are potentially interesting complications here. Were reports about the storm accurate? Herodotus says the Greeks at Artemisium thought the Persian fleet did not look as if it had been battered (8.4). Was there really a circumnavigating squadron? Moderns have often been sceptical. (It disappeared in another convenient storm.) Scyllias had (allegedly) rescued lots of goods after the storm—but also purloined some for himself. Odysseus would have done no less, one may feel, but should we trust anything he says? The fact that there were also true stories associated with Scyllias does not entirely eliminate the doubt. Herodotus explicitly applies critical *gnōmē* to Scyllias' swimming feat. Perhaps the intertextual echoes implicitly criticise his other reports.

#### *Programmatic Themes*

Four themes call for attention here.

1. *The role of women in historical causation.* In 1.1–5 Herodotus sets aside explanation of Greek-barbarian conflict in terms of the theft of women. But the theme is partly revived in the story of Candaules' wife. There are two distinct types of intertext here, one involving structure as well as content, the other just content. The first (in two forms) makes her a quasi-Homeric start both to the story and to the text of *Histories*, one that preserves the importance of sex as a driver for historical events but also, by offering a female victim who has powerful agency (though no name), marks the difference between Homeric epic and the 'modern' world of Herodotus.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>52</sup> (1) Candaules' wife's initiatory role in the history of the Mermnad kingdom (Gyges' usurpation is a start that is closed by Croesus' fall in a fated loop: so Candaules' wife marks

The second exploits a famous Homeric story (again involving sex) to give the Mermnad dynasty an epic Charter Myth in which (once again) Candaules' wife has a degree of direct agency lacking to the queen in the original story.<sup>53</sup> It thus reinforces the effect of the first intertextual connection: the prefatory material of 1.0–5 establishes *Histories* as a work for which Homer will be important: Candaules' wife provides a powerful example of this (and of the dissonant way in which it will sometimes work) at the outset of the main text.

2. *Wandering and eudaimoniē*. Candaules' wife underscores the Iliadic perspective of 1.0–5. The Odyssean one is underscored by the meeting of Croesus with Solon, a wanderer who speaks about *eudaimoniē*. The intertextual and intratextual strands that this sets off are quite complicated.

In the first instance we have an analogy between Solon in Lydia and Odysseus in Phaeacia.<sup>54</sup> Solon is treated less well than Odysseus: Odysseus' story earns him return home with treasure, Solon's story earns him dismissal without treasure (and no return home). Phaeacia is one of the points at which the long-suffering Odysseus for once prospers (albeit precisely by rehearsing his sufferings), whereas in Lydia the Solonian Odysseus fails to prosper by telling stories of good fortune, albeit stories whose dark shadow is that prosperity may only come with death. The episode thus underlines the programmatic observation of the Herodotean Odysseus in 1.5.3–4—an observation that transmutes the sufferings of the Homeric Odysseus into a theme of (broadly) political history for *Histories*, the changeable *eudaimoniē* of

an important moment in the greater scheme of things) apes Helen's initiatory role (and earlier that of the other rape-victims) in the history of the Trojan War—a structural parallel invited by 1.1–5 which has rehearsed the epic analogies. (2) Candaules' wife's initiatory role in the (main) text of *Histories* and its explanation of strife between Greek and barbarian apes Briseis' role as the cause of Achilles' wrath and so of the *Iliad*—a structural parallel invited by the structural analogy between 1.0–5 and the opening of *Iliad*. In both cases Candaules' wife is a sex-object but with great agency compared with Io or Helen. *Histories* has many agent-women (Hazewindus (2004)), and she is a marker for a different world: see Pelling (2006) 85.

<sup>53</sup> *Il.* 6.145–211: Proetus (told falsely of a sexual attack on Anteia by Bellerophon) is offered a 'Kill him or die yourself' choice by Anteia (the guilty inventor of the false accusation). Candaules' wife has been the innocent object of actual sexual attack and offers the unwilling attacker the same choice (kill Candaules or die). Proetus takes the kill option (though executes it in a roundabout and unsuccessful way, and Bellerophon ends up sharing half a kingdom), Gyges does so also, carries it through, and ends up as king. This time the parallel is not structural but one of content.

<sup>54</sup> Moles (1996) 265.

the cities of men—and evokes questions about *nostos* and final destinations.

Both of these themes can be pursued further.

2.1 The *nostos* theme is already implicit in the opening of *Histories*. Quite apart from the fact that the Trojan War cannot be evoked without prompting thought about *nostoi* (see above, pp. 303–4), Herodotus cannot be Odysseus without the question of his *nostos* arising. Odysseus travels, gets home and puts things there back as they should be. Does Herodotus do that in any sense? Does the journey that is the text end in that sort of closure for the traveller-historian? Is the disorder begun by Croesus (which is the starting point of the text-journey) brought to resolution? At first sight, the answer is at best yes-and-no. In these terms there is no clear *nostos*-closure.

Another approach is to broaden the discussion. As wanderer, Herodotus has three notable metanarrative pairs, Arion, Solon, and Democedes, the first two of whom come very close together in his text, and realise the *nostos* issue in Herodotus' Odyssean identity soon after the work's opening. Two are said to excel at what they do. Solon by contrast is one of many *sophistai* who came to Croesus and is not explicitly praised as such, but perhaps his exceptionality is taken for granted. In any event it seems fair to say that, if these figures are Herodotean avatars, Herodotus is claiming status for himself. (That is pertinent to the theme of author's *kleos* lurking in the proem and in the assimilation to Odysseus: above, pp. 296–300.) All three are encountered in connection with autocratic courts. Professionally speaking, Arion corresponds to Herodotus the *aidos* (*qua* Homer imitator), Democedes to Herodotus the Hippocratic,<sup>55</sup> and Solon to Herodotus the *sophistēs* and moraliser. Arion is a voluntary profit-seeking wanderer who has a remarkable *nostos* to his working base (not his home). Democedes is a voluntary and then involuntary profit-seeking wanderer who secures a true *nostos* to his actual home town. Solon is a voluntary/involuntary non-profit-seeking wanderer who has no narrated *nostos*—a fact underlined by the Odysseus–Phaeacia intertext. Solon is Herodotus' closest metanarrative pair (because of the intratext with 1.5.3–4, because Solon is the one who is not professionally implicated in an autocratic court, and because Herodotus is actually more *sophistēs* than singer or doctor), so this fact is important. One could say that Arion is an early first run of the *nostos* question which certainly has resonance with the opening of *Histories* (Arion is poet like Homer and traveller like Odysseus so embraces both Herodotus' characters). But his successful *nostos* is trumped by the Solon story with its blatant intratext to

<sup>55</sup> Thomas (2000); Pelling (2018).

1.5.3–4 (Herodotus is *particularly* Solonian) and absence of *nostos*. But later we have Democedes, who makes a successful home run from an autocratic court in the context of a voyage of investigation—so he is also a very Herodotean figure (see below, pp. 317–18). Perhaps the message here is that *historiē* can bring you home. But perhaps the message *overall* is still that successful *nostos* is unpredictable: Democedes was very lucky.

Two further observations can be made. John Moles detected a larger setting for the Solon–Croesus episode. Lydia resembles Athens as a destination of *sophistai*, and Athens may also resemble Lydia–Phaeacia in being vulnerable to blinkered and self-satisfied enjoyment of prosperity: Alcinous foresees a possible disaster which indeed comes to pass, but Croesus still has no inkling of what will happen to Lydia even after Solon’s remarks and the fate of his son. The Athens–Lydia link does not depend on there also being a Lydia–Phaeacia link, but that link provides another example of disaster—and (importantly) it is a fundamental change that may cut the Phaeacians off from the sea: for it is Phaeacia that adds the maritime perspective that is lacking in the story of Lydia (Croesus is not a thalassocrat) and enhances the analogy with Athens. If the reader’s mind is carried beyond the end of *Histories*, then we are into the proleptic strand of Herodotus’ text in which (see above, pp. 303–4) the difficult *nostoi* and inverted-*nostoi* of Trojan War survivors provide a dark intertextual commentary on contemporary Greece.<sup>56</sup>

But if we stick with the actual text of *Histories* there may be another sort of answer. Almost the last thing Herodotus says is that Persia is *λυπρή*.<sup>57</sup> The word is a *hapax* in Herodotus and in Homer (*Od.* 13.243), where it describes what Ithaca is *not*. Ithaca is also *τρηχεῖα* (as is Persia) and not *εὐρεῖα*, unlike (one imagines) the comfortable *πεδιάς* that the Persians foreswore and so presumably like Persia in this respect as well. It is a land that produces remarkable (*ἀθέσφατος*) corn and wine in plenty, but Odysseus at least is proof that it is not a soft enough land to produce soft men. So (being *ἀγαθὴ κουροτρόφος*: *Od.* 9.27) it is a land that, *pace* Cyrus in 9.122, can produce *καρπὸν θωμιστόν* (cf. *ἀθέσφατον*) and *ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί*. *Histories* thus ends with an allusive comparison between Persia and Ithaca. But why? A way of

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Friedman (2006) for whom Herodotus senses a disjunction between 480/79 when some degree of Hellenic cohesion existed and the time of composition when it did not (or, if it partially did, it was in the tyrant city’s rule of an imperial space), thus accentuating the absence of *nostos* and an abiding nostalgia.

<sup>57</sup> Noted without comment in Flower–Marincola (2002) 314 and Asheri (2006) 344.

underscoring how deeply Persia was home to Persians and the importance of Cyrus' advice? A way of acknowledging that Persia *did* produce *ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί*? A way of asserting that Greece was better at doing so in relatively benign circumstances? A way of asserting that Persian conditions were not quite as unbenign as Cyrus pretends? All these ideas can be in play. But perhaps it also functions as a *sphragis*-like allusion to the homeland of Herodotus' avatar, Odysseus. In one sense, at least, the wandering text *has* reached home.<sup>58</sup>

2.2 The *eudaimoniē* theme of 1.5.3–4 and the Solon–Croesus episode have further ramifications in *Histories* that are marked by Homeric intertexts, but ones drawn from *Iliad* rather than *Odyssey*. Four passages come into question, best treated in two pairs: (a) 7.45–7, 9.16, and (b) 1.88, 3.14.

Shortly after Xerxes visits Troy,<sup>59</sup> he and Artabanus have a famous conversation about the shortness and painfulness of human life, in which contentment is so fragile that everyone sometimes wishes to be dead (7.45–7). This clearly echoes the theme established in 1.5.3–4 and continued in the story of Croesus, in both cases with some Homeric colour (notably in the Solon–Croesus episode, but also the Adrestus–Atys story: see below, pp. 340–1). Moreover Artabanus tells Xerxes to heed the *παλαιὸν ἔπος* about ends (7.51.3), using a Homeric turn of phrase (*ἐς θυμὸν ὦν βαλεῖν*)<sup>60</sup> but also echoing Solon: he does so banally and inappropriately (Solon was making a point about human happiness, whereas Artabanus applies it to the question of Ionian loyalty to Persia) but that piece of characterisation (Artabanus' last hurrah as a consistently sententious speaker) does not prevent an intratextual echo of Solon's more profound point.<sup>61</sup> There is a skein of interconnections here, and some find another specifically Homeric one. The spectacle of the Persian enemy displaying a sense of human frailty has been thought to recall the meeting of Achilles and Priam in *Iliad* 24, in which both acknowledge a dark future, fixed by the gods and ineluctable: it is as though Xerxes and

<sup>58</sup> I forebear to discuss how this theme relates to Herodotus' alleged exile and eventual settlement at Thurii.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Matijašić, above, p. 13.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Matijašić, above, p. 26.

<sup>61</sup> The same turn of phrase is used by Artemisia in another disparaging comment about Xerxes' subjects ('good masters have bad slaves': 8.68γ.1): 'this august phrase introduces her coda on Xerxes' excellence' (A. M. Bowie (2007) 158). Perhaps there is an intratextual link here, but it is modest—and even more so when the phrase is used of a Persian soldier at Sardis (1.84).—*Μεμνεῶμεθα* (7.47.1) might be another tiny bit of Homeric colour (Stein adduced *Od.* 14.168–9).

Artabanus momentarily reach out to the enemy Greek reader as Achilles and Priam momentarily reach out to one another.<sup>62</sup> We are at an important moment in the story,<sup>63</sup> and Herodotus has marked it with a conversation ranging over philosophical, strategic, and practical issues. An evocation of the pause in hostilities in *Iliad* 24 (and an invitation to a moment of empathy with the invader) would not be inappropriate and its presence is made more likely by the fact that a similar thing will happen before the final battle on Greek soil.

This is another famous passage. Thersander and an unnamed Persian dine together before Plataea, and the Persian weeps at the prospect that few of his fellows will survive the battle to come—something well known to many but spoken of by none because it has been fixed by god and cannot be changed (9.16). The scene is intratextually linked both with the Demaratus–Dicaeus conversation before Salamis (8.65)<sup>64</sup> and with the Artabanus–Xerxes conversation: Xerxes notes that everyone in the army will be dead in 100 years, the Persian says much of the army will be dead tomorrow; and while Artabanus does not profess to *know* the expedition will fail (whereas the Persian does know the battle will be lost), his gloomy strategic analysis is unrefuted. The foreboding of the unnamed Persian is the foreboding of Xerxes and Artabanus, and the intratextual link takes us back to Croesus–Solon and 1.5.3–4. But the scene is also a variant on Homeric guest-reception tropes (dine first, then ask questions), contains Homeric words or turns of phrase,<sup>65</sup> and, like 7.45–7, can resonate with the Achilles–Priam meeting of *Iliad* 24. The Persian weeps because one cannot change a known (deadly) future if the gods have decreed it; Achilles says mourning is pointless as it changes nothing (Zeus doles out good and evil from jars, and sorrow is always part of the mix) and both Priam and he are going to die. Thersander

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Gould (1989) 134.

<sup>63</sup> Xerxes is about formally to start the war on Greece by leaving Asia and about to swap an ignored Persian adviser for an ignored Greek one in the shape of Demaratus—who presumably joined the expedition around about now from his home in the Caicus valley.

<sup>64</sup> There will be an unavoidable Persian defeat, and a voice from τὸ θεῖον proves it, just as at Plataea there will be a Persian defeat ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ and Persians are bound by ἀναγκαίη. At Salamis Dicaeus is not to say a word on pain of death, at Plataea there is no point in speaking (nobody wants to believe those who speak reliable things).

<sup>65</sup> See Flower–Marincola (2002) 130, 132 on μετέιναι πολλὰ τῶν δακρύων (16.3; cf. δάκρυον ἦκε χαμᾶζε (*Od.* 16.191; cf. 23.33)), ὀδύνη (16.5; *hapax* here in Herodotus), ἀναγκαίη ἐνδεδέμενοι (*Il.* 2.111) and ἐχθίστη (*Il.* 1.176, etc.). ἀναγκαίη ἐνδεῖν also occurs in the Candaules' wife story (1.11.3), another Homeric intertext (above, pp. 307–8).

did not die, of course, and about the Persian we do not know (though it is implicit: it makes him a grander and more tragic figure); only the Persian weeps, whereas both Achilles and Priam do so, his weeping is caused by the unchangeability of future but is not something that should be banished because it cannot change the future, and the Persian and Greek are not enemies (even if some would think they ought to be), so they do not perfectly map on to Achilles and Priam. But differences notwithstanding, the resonance *is* undoubtedly there. Moreover, although in both Herodotus passages there is only explicit reference to the death of Persians, the scene in *Iliad* 24 looks beyond the end of the poem to disaster and death for both Achaean and Trojan, and the intertext should be understood as a sombre one for Greeks as well as Persians.<sup>66</sup>

The *Iliad* 24 scene is also evoked twice more. One occasion is in itself rather slight. When Croesus has been miraculously saved, Cyrus and those with him look upon the Lydian king with wonder just as Achilles and *his* companions marvel at the sight of Priam who has miraculously appeared in their midst (1.88). The existence of other allusions to the Achilles–Priam meeting (not least the one still to come in Book 3: see below) makes this a more convincing allusion than it might otherwise seem. The intertext (as often) involves both similarity and difference. Enemies find common ground in both cases (Pelling (2006) 86), there is a miraculous element, and the actuality or prospect of the fall of a great kingdom is a shared setting. But Croesus' amicable relation with Cyrus has a future (and the miracle and the wonder it evokes is substantively instrumental in that), whereas that of Achilles and Priam does not (and the miracle—Priam making it past Achilles' security detail like a fugitive murderer—is instrumental only in creating a meeting).<sup>67</sup> The sense that Cyrus and Croesus may one day end up suffering or dead is not strongly evoked (though anything involving Croesus is charged with the idea of changeable fortune), but the intertext perhaps gives an extra emotional charge to the moment, and it certainly accentuates the fact that the outcome of defeat is quite good for Croesus—indeed surprisingly good, especially for readers who think they know that

<sup>66</sup> Herodotus insists that Thersander told the story *before* Plataea happened and that he (Herodotus) heard it from Thersander, presumably very much later. But that is an assertion about truth-value and there is no special reason to attribute the Homeric colour to Thersander (either in 479 or in later retellings) rather than to the historian, especially as its force is much tied up with links elsewhere in *Histories*, not only those just mentioned but also 1.88 and 3.14. See above, n. 41.

<sup>67</sup> On fugitive murderers cf. below, pp. 340–1.

Croesus did not survive the Persian conquest.<sup>68</sup> If *eudaimoniē* is vulnerable, it is also unpredictable: Croesus' fate exemplifies both characteristics, and the contrast between text and intertext serves to underline the point.

Another defeated king does not fare so well. The Egyptian Psammenitus is stoical at the enslavement of girls and at his own son's execution, but breaks down on seeing an elderly man begging. This, he explains to Cambyses (and Croesus), is because the suffering of a prosperous man (*ἐκ πολλῶν τε καὶ εὐδαιμόνων*) reduced to penury 'on the threshold of old age' is a piteous sight (3.14). The tag appears thrice in Homer, including at *Il.* 24.486 where Priam uses it in calling to mind the wretchedness of Achilles' father Peleus.<sup>69</sup> The points of contact with *Iliad* are divided between two figures in Herodotus, Psammenitus (who loses a son, like Priam and Peleus, but is himself relatively young) and the anonymous Egyptian (who is in a poor state on the eve of old age like Peleus), and, in pitying the man on the eve of old age, Psammenitus is channelling Priam's sense of solidarity with Peleus. (Peleus' son is still alive, but only for the moment.) But a common element is Priam, and Psammenitus' temporary survival and later death parallel Priam's survival in *Iliad* 24 and later death (see below). In these terms Cambyses and Croesus, who are moved by the story, resemble Achilles (and, appropriately, Cambyses had killed Psammenitus' son) and, since we are outside the wall of Memphis, the Egyptian capital becomes a sort of parallel for Troy.

From that one might go on to the *cherchez la femme* causation for Cambyses attacking Egypt (3.1–2: shades of 1.1–4?) and the bad *nostos* that Cambyses was going to have (3.61–6) and see the whole Persian attack on Egypt as a quasi-Trojan War.<sup>70</sup> The fall of Egypt is the end of an ancient and great kingdom, as was that of Troy. That in turn leads in two directions. (1) The fall of Egypt matches the fall of Lydia—and the presence of Croesus ensures that we recall this and the faint intertextual link with *Iliad* 24 in 1.88, in which Cyrus also becomes Achilles. (2) According to the Persian *logioi* Persia attacked Greece as flagbearer for Troy. But in Lydia and Egypt it turns out

<sup>68</sup> See West (2003) 418–27.

<sup>69</sup> *Il.* 22.60 rehearses the sufferings of old Priam up to death in an attempt to stop Hector fighting Achilles. *Od.* 15.348 speaks of the extreme unhappiness of Laertes on the threshold of old age. These parallels probably also contribute to the impact of use of the phrase.

<sup>70</sup> Could one even note the transgressive killing of the Apis bull—shades of Iphigeneia or Polyxena (though they are not Homeric stories) or even the Cattle of Helios (see below, p. 330)—and indeed Cambyses' Achilles-like mistreatment of Amasis' corpse (cf. below, pp. 355, 361)?



that they were busy destroying Troy themselves. We have here an example of the reversal of polarity in Persian War/Trojan War analogies already mentioned above (pp. 302–4), in this case drawing attention to Persian hypocrisy.

Meanwhile the intertext has another effect, which is to underline the difference between the fates of Psammenitus and Priam: Psammenitus (who showed pity for the impoverished Egyptian) later turned against the person who pitied him and was (one may feel justly) killed, whereas Priam (who showed pity for his enemy's father) did not but was later (one may feel unjustly, and certainly piteously) killed—and by his pitier's son, though admittedly not in Homer.<sup>71</sup> Formally it is Psammenitus who deploys the intertext and retrospectively his doing so seems rather inappropriate. Here too there is perhaps a warning against facile comparisons.

That said, nobody could deny that both the fall of Lydia and Egypt and the Persian defeat in Greece exemplify human *eudaimoniē* failing to stay in the same place (1.5.4), and for the historian to mark them with allusions to one of the most affecting passages in Homer is to accord such events a solemn status that befits their historical importance.<sup>72</sup> It also binds Persia's successes under Cyrus and Cambyses together with her failure under Xerxes and points up the contrast between them.

3. *Fame*. Two topics arise here.

3.1 Herodotus' aim is that the great and wonderful works of Greeks and barbarian should not become *aklea*. Presumably *Histories* achieves this, but the word *kleos* and its cognates are for the most part conspicuously absent and, when they do appear, it is almost always associated with the Spartans. Leonidas remained at Thermopylae to ensure *kleos* for himself and for the Spartans (and—in another link to the theme just discussed—to avoid the wiping out of Spartan *eudaimoniē*), Mardonius tauntingly contrasts Spartan behaviour at Plataea with what is to be expected *κατὰ κλέος*, and Pausanias won *κλέος* ... *μέγιστον Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν* for saving Greece (outdoing even Leonidas).<sup>73</sup> Less positively, Cleomenes' attack on Athens led to the infamous dissolution of his own army (5.77): *ἀκλεῶς* is not only, as Hornblower (2013) 222 remarks, a strong word for a very unusual event, but

<sup>71</sup> Psammenitus plays out the full Homeric analogy when he need not have done, a fact underlined by the intratextual link with Croesus.

<sup>72</sup> Asheri (2007) 412 notes the general parallel with Hdt. 1.86–90, but not the intertextual aspects. For those see Pelling (2006) 87–9; Haywood, above, p. 61.

<sup>73</sup> 7.220; 9.48.3, 78.2 (cf. 8.114).

precisely the right strong word because it denies the distinctively Spartan achievement of good kings. (It also comes conjoined with another Homerism: the episode was, as Herodotus says, the fourth Dorian attack on Athens, and readers of Homer know that the fourth attack is one in which the attacker always fails.<sup>74</sup> Herodotus marks the moment carefully as another stage in the upsurge of post-tyrannical Athens.)<sup>75</sup>

But there is one more (indirect) appearance of κλέος in Herodotus. Rhodopis, we are told, was so κλεινή that all Greeks had heard of her, while Archidice was also αοίδιμος even if less περιλεσχήμεντος than Rhodopis (2.135). There are some remarkable words here. Αοίδιμος is a near-*hapax* in Herodotus<sup>76</sup> and *hapax* in Homer, where it appears in an iconic passage—the complaint of Helen that the gods have fixed things so she and Hector will be αοίδιμοι to later generations (*Il.* 6.356–8). Αοίδιμος also occurs in Homeric Hymns, Stesichorus, and Pindar (including the opening line of the Athens poem), but it is not unreasonable to think the Iliadic passage (about a beautiful woman) specially pertinent. Κλεινή is a Herodotean *hapax* and unknown in Homer: but given the resonances of κλέος for both authors, the application of κλεινός to a courtesan is striking. Περιλεσχήμεντος is a *hapax* in Greek texts until two entries in Hesychius and then some late Byzantine uses (all ultimately derived from Herodotus). Archidice is variously the subject of song and (lewd?) comment in men’s meeting places, but Rhodopis has epic κλέος, as well as other poetic connections: she was manumitted by Sappho’s brother, and presumably figured in what Sappho wrote about him. She also made an unparalleled ποίημα, viz. the μνημέλον consisting in a pile of spits at Delphi. Ποίημα never means poem in Herodotus (1.25.2; 4.5.2; 7.84), but, if the joke is not quite direct, it is hard to feel that it is not there. Why does Herodotus do this with Rhodopis and Archidice? I suggest that he is provoked to it by the absurd Greek idea that one of the pyramids was

<sup>74</sup> In *Il.* 5.438, 16.705, and 20.447 the fourth attack results in Apollo intervening and forcing the Greek attacker to desist (in two cases spiriting the target away or hiding him in mist). In *Il.* 16.786 Patroclus’ fourth attack results in his death at Apollo’s hands. In *Il.* 22.208, as Achilles chases Hector past the Scamander for the fourth time (slightly different from the fourth-attack formula), Hector’s fate is decided by Zeus. Henderson (2007) 308 notes the trope of the fourth attack without pursuing the point fully. See also below, n. 171.

<sup>75</sup> On that pattern see below, pp. 341–8.

<sup>76</sup> The only other use of αοίδιμος in Herodotus is the statement that Linus is αοίδιμος in Phoenicia, Cyprus, and elsewhere (2.79), though with different names in different places (Maneros in Egypt)—piquant in terms of the theme of preserved fame: preservation is poor if you cannot even get the name right.

built by Rhodopis.<sup>77</sup> He identifies Rhodopis' true memorial (the Delphi spits: unparalleled but not a pyramid) but then playfully makes her (and Archidice for good measure) into quasi-epic heroines as his own version of an extravagant misrepresentation of the women. And there is perhaps a further undertone. Helen represents being *αοίδιμος* as the undesirable by-product of divine ordinance. Perhaps being a *hetaira* is not entirely a good way of becoming famous, even if Rhodopis at least shows every sign of having relished her fame. Moreover, as Herodotus' purpose is to ensure that the *erga* of mankind are not *aklea* and his work opens with women as sex-objects, Rhodopis and Archidice have some larger pertinence.<sup>78</sup> Herodotus perhaps relished the chance to draw playful attention to the peculiarities of fame and of people's reaction to it. Only Spartans achieve *kleos* in Herodotus, but one courtesan can be *kleinē* like a warrior and another *αοιδίμος* like the woman who caused the Trojan War.

3.2 Next, the historian's fame, a theme already hinted at in 1.0 (and with a Homeric perspective). It is well known that there is an intratextual connection in Herodotus between the historian and certain in-text characters who engage in or organise investigation of a sort not categorically very different from the ones he engages in. These in-text performers of *historiē* (though not necessarily described with that term) include: (a) Solon, Hecataeus, and other geographers; (b) Egyptian priests; (c) various rulers; (d) Pythius who understands his wealth *ἀτρεκέως* (a very Herodotean word); and perhaps (e) Socles who effects change by deploying historical narrative based on experience that gives rise to correct *gnōmē* (5.92a.2).<sup>79</sup> Solon and Herodotus sing from a similar ethical song sheet (instability of *eudaimoniē*), while other professional investigators are apt to be regarded with disdain:

<sup>77</sup> For a speculative explanation of the association of small pyramids with prostitutes see Quack (2013).

<sup>78</sup> E. Bowie (2018a) 57.

<sup>79</sup> For the theme see Christ (1994); Demont (2009). The *histor-* root occurs in the following passages: 1.0, 24.7 (Periander about Arion), 56.1, 2 (Croesus asking who are most powerful Greeks), 61.2 (Pisistratus' mother-in-law about sex life), 122.1 (Cyrus' real parents about his survival); 2.19.3, 29.1, 34.1 (Herodotus' enquiries about Nile), 44.5 (Herodotus about Heracles), 99.1 (Herodotus about Egypt), 113.1, 118.1 (Herodotus about Helen), 119.3 (Egyptian priests about the Menelaus story); 3.50.3 (Periander questioning Lycophron, presumably about his silence), 51.1 (Periander asking his elder son what Procles had said), 77.2–3 (eunuch officials questioning Darius and his companions); 4.192.3 (Herodotus about animals in Libya); 7.96.1 (giving commanders' name not necessary for *historiē*), 195 (Greeks interrogating prisoners). Note the interesting contrast in 1.119.3 between what one knows by *ιστορίη* and events in one's own environment that one knows *ἀτρεκέως*.

professional rivalry is an issue. Non-professional investigators are often rulers or politically effective non-rulers (Socles), though Pythius is just very rich—and a warning story about not making too much out of knowledge? So Herodotus the investigator is analogous to a positive model like Solon, better than some other examples (like Hecataeus), and appropriates the power-status of rulers—as he appropriates or outdoes Solon and geographers.

What is remarkable is that this intratextual relationship also has an intertextual aspect. For there are people within the Homeric text who do what Homer does—the professionals Phemius and Demodocus, and the non-professionals Odysseus (narrating his travels), Achilles (*Il.* 9.186–91, singing *κλέα ἀνδρῶν*) or indeed Helen weaving a picture of the war (*Il.* 3.125–8). Bards are the professional tool by which *κλέα ἀνδρῶν* are disseminated: they are crucial to the world-view of the ruling class of the Homeric world—though what they do *can* be done by members of that class themselves. Homer performs the same professional task for those individuals, but (actually) in a different world in which these particular people no longer exist and perhaps their whole class and environment does not either. He is preserver of enduring time-transcending fame (*κλέος ἄφθιτον*). And perhaps he partakes of the *kleos* that his in-text analogues can acquire.<sup>80</sup> The purpose of the in-text character/author analogy is to make claims for the poet (Homer) that the poet does not explicitly make for himself—including perhaps that the profession of poet still exists even though everything else about the world has changed: i.e., it is not just that the individual poet may lay claim to *kleos* but *also* that the profession he represents can claim an immortality that others can only have if the poet confers it. In other words, the poet (Homer) gets the better of the heroes he sings about. That a hero like Achilles will perform as a bard tends to underline the status of the bard (whether then or now); and, while Achilles may play at being a bard, the bard intrinsically appropriates the status of Achilles. So the in-text poets reinforce the status of Homer as poet, just as the in-text investigators reinforce the status of Herodotus as investigator.

Is the significance of Herodotus' use of in-text investigators to raise his own status increased by the fact that he is doing something that Homer did by using in-text poets? That is, in observing the analogy are we seeing not merely something that might have suggested to Herodotus the idea of having in-text investigators but also something that should be appreciated as another aspect of Herodotus as Homeric author? The answer is, I think, yes.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. de Jong (2006).

The Homeric example makes the poet as such more powerful than the heroes of the past: he controls their fame both in reporting it and (as a class) in having a longevity that they do not and effectively appropriating their status. Herodotus' aim in creating a *historiē*-related version of this Homeric gambit is to generalise the implications of the analogy between Herodotus himself and investigative rulers beyond specific investigative analogies into a claim for the profession of investigator: the investigative Homer-Odysseus appropriates and excels the status of the people he writes about. Homer's use of in-text poets elevates the status of the real poet into an exclusive category. Merely by casting himself as investigator-Homer Herodotus already potentially taps into that claim; but, by creating his own version of the author/in-text poet analogy, Herodotus both underlines the analogy between himself and the poet and enriches its content: the historian-ruler analogy rather cunningly *realises* the poet-ruler analogy that is implicit in Homer's construction of the poet. This is a genuine intertextual act: there is already a historian-ruler analogy which gives Herodotus a particular sort of status, but the existence of a similar analogy in Homer underlines the analogy's existence and increases its force. The Homer intertext gives extra value to what is already a status-enhancing intratext.<sup>81</sup>

4. *Ethnography*. As a new Odysseus Herodotus traverses cities, small and great. The primary stress in 1.5.3–4 is on variability of *eudaimoniē* and status, but the Homeric intertext means we cannot neglect 'knowing the mind of many men', something Odysseus achieved *inter alia* by travelling in some rather strange places. That Herodotus' ethnographic discourse is part of

<sup>81</sup> In this spirit one might also ponder whether the presence of in-text characters in Herodotus who allude to or intertext with Homer is itself an intertext with anything in Homer. In-text figures in Homer certainly allude explicitly to events outside the main narrative as do those in Herodotus and the richness of the digressive texture of *Histories* (whether it be a reference to epic-era events or those of the historical era lying outside the main narrative thread and whether it be done by Herodotus or by in-text figures) is in very broad terms reminiscent of Homer—in fact part of the general Homeric quality of the *Histories* and of Herodotus' posture as *alter Homerus*. But pursuing anything more specific than that is tricky. For example, that there might be an intertext between Herodotus' practice and the existence of in-text figures in Homer who intertext allusively with other texts (Pelling, above, p. 55), though not an impossible proposition, threatens a *mise en abîme* which I prefer to avoid. Perhaps in any case one should acknowledge—even insist—that the peculiar status of Homer in the literary world where Herodotus worked is precisely something that nothing had in the literary world in which Homer worked. For Herodotus, Homer and Hesiod are the beginning: there is nothing before them at all and nothing above them except the Muses. But it must be conceded that intertextual connections between the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* might be a fruitful line of enquiry.

what answers to this is hardly controversial, and the relationship is largely at a rather general level.

Something more specific is suggested in Elizabeth Irwin's study of the Ethiopian *logos* in Book 3. This argues that (a) there is an intertext with the Odyssean Cyclops, (b) it reverses the moral polarities of the original, and (c) it does so not to say anything about Cambyses and Ethiopia but to suggest that Odysseus' Cyclops narrative misrepresents a truth that would be more like the truth about Cambyses and the Ethiopians. So this is in the first instance an intertext about how to read Homer, not Herodotus; and, since the exercise is analogous to Herodotus' explicit critique of Homer in 2.112–30, it might be seen as parallel to the problematisation of Homer's Trojan War as a discursive analogy for modern conditions (see above, pp. 302–4 and below, pp. 337–40, 345–8, 351–2, 354–5, 356–60, 361–2, 368–9). But Irwin is primarily concerned with a different discursive analogy, that between the Cyclops island and Sicily: undermining the Homeric view of the former is supposed to problematise its (putative) use as a justification for making the latter the target of Athenian imperial ambitions.<sup>82</sup>

But perhaps one can stay closer to Herodotus and recover something from the intertext that bears on Cambyses. The unenlightened outsider who encounters distant places that have *uncivilised* characteristics but assert a claim to the moral high ground may be inclined to accentuate and demonise those characteristics. Odysseus' account of the unsocialised, if idyllic, pastoralism of the Cyclops on an island that seems to cry out for proper (Greek) occupation perhaps follows that script. But, if the parallel is noted,<sup>83</sup> the reader may feel it enriches our understanding of Cambyses' mind-set. Cambyses' entanglement with Ethiopia involves both the inclination to appropriate what belongs to others and sheer curiosity. If one does not read Odysseus' story as an untrue travesty (as Irwin would have it) but takes it more at face value, it validates Cambyses to the extent that Odysseus is a

<sup>82</sup> Irwin (2014). The claim that Homer knew the *whole* of the alternative story about Paris, Helen, Menelaus, and Egypt *à la* Euripides additionally leads Irwin to propose that the explicit critique in 2.112–30 (above, p. 292) also implicitly attacks Menelaus for Greek crimes against innocent foreign environments and provides another critique of Athenian imperialism targeting distant places—relevant because the imperial targets might include non-Greeks, e.g., Carthaginians. (De Jong (2012), by contrast, reckons that, although Herodotus attributes the alternative story to Egyptian priests and implies its existence since the time of the Trojan expedition, it is so fundamentally imprinted with Herodotean intellectual and narrative characteristics that it must largely be a Herodotean confection and so cannot have been known to Homer.)

<sup>83</sup> The Odyssean echo in the Ethiopian king's bow-stringing test (Hdt. 3.21–2) may help.

validating figure but warns of coming disaster: Odysseus' curiosity ('I wanted to see the owner') and appetitive tendency ('I wanted to get gifts from him') are exactly what causes the trouble. Both Odysseus and Cambyses barely escape, the former having lost comrades (who are eaten), the latter soldiers (who eat one another).

Suspicion about the truth of Odysseus' tales (already noted as a necessary concomitant of the comparison of historian and Homeric hero: above, pp. 298–9) characterises another reaction to Herodotean ethnography, John Marincola's reading of Book 2.<sup>84</sup> Even in a serially digressive author, Book 2 does stand out as a self-contained discourse heavily marked by the voice of authorial *ego*, and the suggestion that—with *Odyssey* 9–12 in mind—we might read it as an attention-grabbing *epideixis* containing some real oddities for any Greek audience (e.g., Menelaus/Helen/Egypt reported by Egyptian priests), some (deliberate?) inconsistencies or trigger-warnings, and (in general) an account that is as poetic as it is analytical, is at least heuristically illuminating. Of course, not all ethnography in Homer is in the voice of the mendacious Odysseus,<sup>85</sup> so ethnography in Herodotus is not necessarily unreliable and the historian does generally distance himself from the more outlandish wonders:<sup>86</sup> but even Menelaus mixes apparently down-to-earth narrative with the tall tale about the mastering of Proteus, so one can never be quite sure.

But there is also another and larger perspective (and not only for Book 2). This is not just about Herodotus reading and responding to Homer. The ethnographic element of the Herodotean enterprise is at home in a social, intellectual, and literary culture for which *Odyssey* (in particular) is a fundamental point of reference with its presentation of various forms of the Other and its engagement with those forms on the part of Greek protagonists. So there is a real analogy between Odysseus and Herodotus, and the Greek consumers of Herodotus were not only trained to notice it but had their own role in such an analogy. Not everyone could or did write Herodotus, but he emerges in a society aware of identity issues and one of the constitutive components of that awareness is the cultural authority of Homeric epic and its reciprocal relationship with actual contacts with the

<sup>84</sup> Marincola (2007) 51–67. Elements of the argument could also extend to Book 1 on Babylonia or Book 4 on Scythia.

<sup>85</sup> Marincola's list includes items in the putatively unproblematised voice of Eumaeus, Athena (*Od.* 13.242: though she *is* pretending to be someone else), Menelaus, and the narrator (on Phaeacia): Marincola (2007) 68–9.

<sup>86</sup> Fehling (1989) 96–104.

outside world. In this context there is an intertextuality that transcends the personal choice of the historian. And perhaps not only in this context: could Herodotus have conceived *Histories* at all without the narrative model of Homeric epic?<sup>87</sup>

### 3.4. Further Categories

The examples discussed so far are related in one way or another to themes highlighted in the opening pages of *Histories*. I move now to cases of which this is not (or not so obviously) true.

#### *Compositional Types*

As a narrative about war and political conflict (often of a personalised sort),<sup>88</sup> contextualised in a wide geographical and chronological canvas, and with an end that is not quite an end,<sup>89</sup> *Histories* has a very generalised literary relationship to *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. It is also conceived on a comparably large scale: the Homeric poems taken together are only about 7% longer than Herodotus. And although the discursive variety between, e.g., the opening half of Book 2 and the narrative parts of *Histories* is far greater than anything in Homer, the generally Homeric effect is reinforced by various narrative tropes and by such features as *oratio recta*, annotatory or explanatory digression, ring-composition, non-linear chronological arrangement, explicit or implicit foreshadowing, repetition, and multiple (including internal) focalisation. But the compositional component most obviously redolent of Homer, while not being in detail significantly Homerised, is the catalogue.

There are ten catalogues in Herodotus, mostly of troops (6.8; 7.60–99, 202–4; 8.1, 42–8, 72–3; 9.28–30, 31–2),<sup>90</sup> of which the Persian catalogue is much the grandest. It resembles Homeric catalogues in the consistent provision of names of commanders and numbers of ships. (The latter also occurs in other Herodotean catalogues, and those for Thermopylae and Plataea provide numbers of soldiers—which does not happen in Homer—but contingent-commanders are patchily named elsewhere.) Moreover there are 29 contingents in Homer and 29 *ethnos*-contingents (and commanders) in

<sup>87</sup> Cultural authority: Skinner (2018) 216–22. Narrative model: Romm (1998) 13–18; Boedeker (2002) 109; Rutherford (2012) 34; Haywood, above, pp. 82–3.

<sup>88</sup> See Raaflaub (2002) 180 for the political aspect of Homer.

<sup>89</sup> Rutherford (2012) 31–2.

<sup>90</sup> The others are of Persian *nomoi* (3.90–6) and Agariste's suitors (6.127).



Herodotus, and the 1207 ships of the Persian fleet amusingly outbids Homer's fleet tally by just one ship—though that case is confused by the fact that 1207 is already the total in one reading of Aeschylus. The presence of various sorts of (more or less mildly digressive) annotation is a feature shared by *Iliad* 2 and the Persian catalogue and to a rather slighter degree other Herodotean catalogues.

But there are differences. Herodotus give greatest space to a catalogue of the enemy. That catalogue consistently pays attention to armaments and weaponry, which is not true in Homer (in either catalogue) or in other Herodotean Greek catalogues. The sense of ethnic diversity central to the Persian catalogue and mildly present in Herodotus' Salamis and Isthmus Wall passages (with their remarks on Greek ethno-history or ethno-assignment) is quite absent in the Homeric Greek catalogue and barely present in the Trojan one (the Carian entry being the strongest example). Greek readers of the Homeric Greek catalogue would enjoy references to places they had heard of and the odd way its contents related to what they knew of the current geography of Greece, whereas in the Herodotean Persian catalogue they were mostly dealing with places they had not heard of—which might also, of course, be an occasion for enjoyment, albeit of a different kind. The geographical order in the Homeric Greek catalogue (Boeotia first) works differently from Herodotean Greek catalogues, while the Persian army list uses types of weaponry as an organising principle, and such other geographical grouping as there is recalls Homer's arrangement only inasmuch as it involves occasional jumps across the map, though the placing of heartland peoples at the start matches the Trojan Catalogue. The Persian *nomos*-list's consistent west to east arrangement has its least poor analogue in the catalogue of Agariste's suitors! The narrative frames the Persian army-list in terms of the organisation of troops into national contingents after they have been counted. That in Homer frames the catalogues in terms of the drawing up of troops for battle. That is occasionally reflected within the catalogue (Phocians to left of Boeotians; Salamis ships beached next to Athenian ones) but essentially the catalogue is not a description of battle disposition in the way that is true of some other Herodotean catalogues.

In short, the presence of catalogues globally is a tribute to the catalogues of *Iliad* 2 that exhibits a mixture of similarities and contrasts. The intertextual significance is relatively simple: Herodotus' catalogues are a historical marker of important events and a compositional marker that his text is an epic narrative. The contrast between the celebration of ethnographic

diversity in 7.60–99 and the relative absence of such things in Homer reflects the different subject matter (and offers the reader a different sort of entertainment) and the non-Homeric ethno-historical issues in the Salamis catalogue remind us that the Greek world of 480 differs from the Homeric one, but such dissonances do not alter the basic consonance of narrative type. And the 29 contingents and 1207 ships are a nice gesture for the reader to take the trouble to look.

#### *Unusual Intertexts*

Intertexts comes in various shapes and sizes, but some are decidedly unusual. The catalogue of Agariste's suitors (just mentioned) is part of a narrative widely recognised as having a Homeric feel,<sup>91</sup> but this may be because Cleisthenes of Sicyon was a man sensitive to the power of Homer (he once tried to ban Homeric poetry because of its pro-Argive bias: 5.67) and had planned it thus:<sup>92</sup> it is the event that is an intertext, not Herodotus' report of it—which does not prevent him using it to add lustre (and also critique?) to the lineage of Cleisthenes the reformer and Pericles (the lion-like grandson of Megacles).<sup>93</sup> Also wholly external to Herodotus is the fact that the Persian Masistius was called Macistius by Greeks (9.20). Homeric *μήκιστος* is a word for giants. Masistius was impressively large in stature (9.25.1). So perhaps the Greek sobriquet is a pseudo-dialectal adaption of the Homeric word to Masistius' actual name—not just an intertext put into the mouth of an in-text character by an imaginative historian, but an actual intertext from the real world, and even one that betokens respect for an impressive adversary (cf. below, p. 356).<sup>94</sup>

The reference to the Lotophagi in 4.177 is odd in a different way. They are the only people Odysseus encounters in *Odyssey* 9–12 whom Herodotus

<sup>91</sup> Griffiths (2006) 136; Hornblower–Pelling (2017) 276.

<sup>92</sup> Murray (1993) 212–13.

<sup>93</sup> The absurd story of Alcmaeon (involving Croesus) and Megacles' link to the tyrant Cleisthenes (even if he was a Homeriser—or is that too a little absurd?) make an odd endnote to Herodotus' ostensible defence of the Alcmaeonidae as tyrant-haters who could not have been pro-Persian in 490. Is there a subtext here running counter to the surface argument, one to which Pericles the lion and future 'first man' (Thuc. 2.65.9) also contributes? Do Alcmaeonids belong to a pseudo-Homeric world of tyrants?

<sup>94</sup> Giants: *Il.* 7.155 (the tallest and strongest adversary Nestor ever killed), *Od.* 11.309 (Otos and Ephialtes). Large and beautiful leaders: Flower–Marincola (2002) 145. Intertext from the real world: *ibid.* 139.

mentions and their story is not as famous in antiquity as some of the others in those books,<sup>95</sup> but it would be hard to encounter them without thinking of the *Odyssey*.<sup>96</sup> Yet Herodotus produces a matter-of-fact entry (like others in the Libyan *logos*) in which he says nothing about Homer. His description of the lotus—it is the size of a mastic berry and sweet as a date, and the Lotophagi make wine from it—might be said to hint at Homer: Homer says only that it is *μελιηδέα*, but that is a word often applied to wine. But it is a very faint hint. A more prominent fact is that Herodotus' Lotophagi are next to the Machlyes who also eat lotus (but not exclusively) and live by Lake Tritonis—about which we then hear that the Argonauts were driven there by a storm off Malea (179), the same location of the storm that drove Odysseus to the Lotophagi (*Od.* 9.80). So Herodotus has not only *not* adduced Homer; he has actually linked the Lotophagi (or strictly some not-quite-Lotophagi) with the Argonautic cycle. This must be deliberate.<sup>97</sup> What is the motive? (1) He simply pretends to be unaware of a Homeric connection and proudly produces an Argonautic one instead. (2) He is playing a Homeric game in the spirit of 2.112–30 (see above, pp. 292–4): his quiet correction/extension of Homer's information about the lotus proves that he knows Homer's story, but he has chosen a different story involving Argonauts, although not presumably because it is more decent (*euprepēs*) for *historiē* (any such criterion being surely satisfiable by either version). Or (3) his silence amounts to an implicit view that the story of Odysseus visiting Lotophagi was simply untrue. So in any event a literary game/pleasantry, but perhaps with an intratext to doubts about Homeric veracity—one resembling Irwin's reading of the Ethiopian *logos* and Marincola's of Book 2.

<sup>95</sup> Tuplin (2003) 117.

<sup>96</sup> The *polis* and *demos* (!) of the Cimmerians in *Od.* 11.14 is not evoked in any of Herodotus' references to the historical Cimmerians. Their baleful destructiveness may help account for Homer's location of them near the Underworld (Lanfranchi (2002); Xydopoulos (2015) 119–20) but that is a different matter.

<sup>97</sup> Another absent intertext or intertext consisting in absence: see above, p. 287. The absence of the marsh at Marathon (putatively visible in the Stoa Poikile) has been construed similarly (Pelling (2006) 243): the Homeric quality of Marathon is underlined by excluding a feature that would not have Homeric resonance. So too, perhaps, cavalry and hoplite-fighting: Hornblower–Pelling (2017) 244; Fragoulaki, above, pp. 123–4.

### *Jokes*

The absent Lotus-Eaters verge on being a joke.<sup>98</sup> Some items come even closer. I have already commented on Rhodopis and Archidice (above, pp. 316–7), which surely comes into this category, even though it is making a serious point, and other pieces of humour will be encountered later.<sup>99</sup> Two further examples may be noted here.

At the turning point in the Masistes story, Xerxes is forced to assent to Amestris' demand for the wife of Masistes, whom she will shortly mutilate. The word used is *κατανεύει*, the sole occurrence in Herodotus of a verb associated in Homer with the assent of gods (especially Zeus). The context makes this a faint evocation of the relationship between Zeus and Hera, but casts Xerxes as a supreme god who has lost autonomous agency.<sup>100</sup> It does not add much to the already ghastly story, but this is almost our last sight of Xerxes and it is a sardonic final twist to occasional implicit and explicit assimilations of the Persian king and Zeus (and his court and Olympus) earlier in *Histories*.<sup>101</sup>

There is a comparable effect at 8.98. In Herodotus no snow, rain, heat, or darkness prevents the speedy delivery of Persian messages. In Homer (*Od.* 4.566) no snow, storm, or rain spoils the easeful existence of those in Elysium but instead a refreshing zephyr blows in from the Ocean. The rapid transit of Persian post has all the untroubled ease of a permanent beach holiday for the heroic dead. This absurd comparison confers a delightfully satirical superhuman gloss on the system at a moment at which it is being used to report Persian failure.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>98</sup> It will certainly wrong-foot the reader: after a string of obscure Libyan tribes comes one that seems gratefully familiar—and it is not acknowledged as such.

<sup>99</sup> See below, pp. 364–5.

<sup>100</sup> Flower–Marincola (2002) 297.

<sup>101</sup> See below, pp. 333, 335–7, 343. — Xerxes' relations with his wife contrast with the politically productive relations of Darius with Atossa in a more cosily domestic setting: 3.134. Perhaps there are distant echoes here also of Zeus and Hera (Hart (1982) 22), even with a slight hint of *Iliad* 14 where Hera takes Zeus to bed to stop him watching the fighting: for Atossa in bed with Darius diverts him from his existing military plans. And Atossa *εἶχε τὸ πᾶν κράτος* (7.3), so here too the Great King's agency is compromised.

<sup>102</sup> A. M. Bowie (2007) 187.

*Elusive Intertexts*

Echoes of Homer can seem to be present without there being any very clear intrinsic pay-off. Examples involve Homeric grammatical forms, Homeric words present only once or twice in Herodotus, Homeric turns-of-phrase, and even allusions to particular Homeric passages. Some may contribute additional colour to contexts that already have other Homeric features (further examples of that phenomenon occur elsewhere in this discussion), others are free-standing signs that Herodotus' lexicon and style is epic-flavoured. I consign a number of examples to a footnote,<sup>103</sup> but note here a few of the more tantalising cases.

The Homeric phrase ἀναπλῆσαι κακά occurs in Herodotus' description of the Thracian Trausi, who mourn a new-born ὄσα μιν δεῖ ἐπέιτε ἐγένετο ἀναπλῆσαι κακά (5.4). The general sentiment intratextually chimes with the variability-of-*eudaimoniē* theme, a theme that has Homeric intertextual colour elsewhere (see above, pp. 297–8, 299–300, 308–9, 311–15, 354, 367). Is the presence of ἀναπλῆσαι κακά a sufficient trigger to see this passage as also

<sup>103</sup> *Grammatical forms*: use of perfect/pluperfect of πείθω to mean 'trust': 9.88. On the infinitival imperative see below, p. 333. *Rarely used Homeric words*: ὀπέωνες (9.50, 51) epicises Sparta's provision-fetchers but has no particular significance. Κάματος (9.89) is at best a faint Homerisation of the Persians' hard *nostos*. On φιλοφροσύνη (5.92γ.2), ποταμὸς Καύστριος (5.100), and ὄπισ (8.143.2; 9.76.2) see below, pp. 342, 348, 360 (n. 189). *Turns-of-phrase*: Stein thought ἀνά τ' ἔνδραμον καὶ ἔβλαστον (Syracuse under Gelon) had a Homeric flavour. A distant parallel with *Il.* 18.56, 437 on Achilles (Pelling (2006) 91) would be contextually appropriate (see below, pp. 337–8), but I think there is nothing here but default Homerising linguistic flavour. So too οἶός τις ἀνὴρ ἐγένετο (6.122.3), as compared with *Od.* 4.242 (Hornblower–Pelling (2017) 269). ἄμα ἠλίω σκιδναμένω (8.23) is surely in that category. (The marking of dawn/daybreak is a Homeric narrative feature found elsewhere too: 8.83; 9.47) On ἐς θυμὸν βάλλειν see above, p. 311. *Particular passages*. The use of ἐπιρρεῖν in 9.38.2 (ἐπιρρεόντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων of the medising Greeks) and *Il.* 11.724 (τὰ δ' ἐπέρρεον ἔθνεα πεζῶν of Pylians going to relieve the siege of Thyroessa) is unique in each author (though Herodotus uses *συνέρρει* of ships going to Salamis: 8.42.1), but reading the passages together produces no obvious point. Artabanus' vision of Mardonius torn by birds and dogs (7.10θ.3) perhaps evokes the phrase's prominent use in *Il.* 1.4 (and may even be piquant in view of 1.140, though Mardonius is not a *magus*: cf. Boedeker (2002) 102), but I see it as a small Homeric flourish (in a characteristically sententious speech) that is simply a sign that further *Homeric* are in the offing (see below, pp. 349–50) and a passing marker of the epic quality of the war to come. (But see below, n. 183 on omens for Mardonius' death.) The testing of Phocian *alkē* in 9.18 has no particular point as event or intertext. The snake-woman in 4.8–10 detains Heracles against his will until he has fathered three children. E. Bowie (2018a) 62 thinks this evokes Odysseus and Circe/Calypso (does the bow-drawing test Heracles sets the children help draw attention to Odysseus?), but, if so, there seems no obvious pay-off.

specifically evocative of Homer? Perhaps so: if Herodotus means us to see that, although the Trausi are unusual in taking a sombre view of life to the point of counter-normal rituals, the underlying idea is not alien, he may be trying to give the point special validation by invoking Homer.<sup>104</sup>

At Artemisium the two fleets separate *έτεραλκέως άγωνιζόμενους* (8.11.3). This is one of two uses of a Homeric word that (apart from a single instance in Aeschylus) does not recur until Nicander. The Homeric sense is ‘victory won with another’s help’ or ‘victory won by the side that was losing’ (five occurrences) or ‘capable of turning the tide and giving victory’ (*Il.* 15.738: *δημος έτεραλκής*). *μάχη έτεραλκής* in 9.103.2 is a battle evenly poised and needing an intervention to decide it (one was forthcoming from the Samians), and a similar sense can apply in *έτεραλκέως άγωνιζόμενους*, though, since the Persians reckoned the battle did not turn out as expected (*πολλόν παρά δόξαν άγωνισάμενοι*), there may even be a hint that the Greeks had been winning against the run of play. But there is no real intertext here, merely some Homeric flavour from an exceptionally unusual word, shared by Homer and Herodotus but used by Herodotus in a slightly un-Homeric sense. Or if there *is* an intertext, it lies in the pleasure a discriminating reader might get from noticing that Herodotus has given the word a slightly new meaning.<sup>105</sup>

At 9.13 Mardonius *ανεκώχευε ... ούτε έπήμαινε ούτε έσίνετο γήν τήν Άττικήν*. The distinctive combination of a word connoting truce-making and the sole Herodotean appearance of *πημαίνειν* perhaps evokes *Il.* 3.299: whoever first damages (*πημαίνειν*) the oaths of a treaty will suffer.<sup>106</sup> Over winter 480–479 Mardonius hoped the Athenians would do a deal with him, so he maintained a truce and did no harm. When no deal was made, he burned Athens and retreated. Do we say that, in realising the Athenians will not make a deal and burning the city, Mardonius is breaking a (metaphorical) oath and will therefore suffer (at Plataea)? Or that the Athenians have broken a (metaphorical) oath and must therefore suffer (in the burning of their land). Or that, since there *were* no oaths, nobody should suffer (so burning Athenian land was unjustified)? Or just that the Homeric passage came into Herodotus’ mind essentially randomly?

<sup>104</sup> Suggested intertext: Gould (1989) 133. The phrase also appears in 6.12 and 9.87.

<sup>105</sup> In this regard see below, n. 189 on *όπισ*; p. 333 on *άγορώμαι*.

<sup>106</sup> Flower–Marincola 2002 (123) note that *πημαίνειν* is Homeric (the root is quite common) but make no further comment.

After the Battle of Ephesus ‘those who survived scattered (ἐσκεδάσθησαν) to their cities. So on that occasion they fought (τότε μὲν δὴ οὕτω ἡγωνίσαντο), but afterwards the Athenians entirely abandoned the Ionians ...’ (5.102.3–103). Hornblower (2013) 286 draws attention to *Il.* 24.1–2: λῦτο δ’ ἀγών, λαοὶ δὲ θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας ἕκαστοι | ἐσκίδναντ’ ἰέναι. The conjunction of scattering and reference to an *agōn* might suggest that the latter is not there in Herodotus simply because the death of a games-competitor (Eualcides of Eretria) is mentioned in the previous lines.<sup>107</sup> But the statement that Simonides praised Eualcides does rather distract attention from Homer to another poet, and comparing the dispersal of survivors from a bloodbath at Ephesus with the orderly conclusion of Patroclus’ Funeral Games is odd. If one were sure that there is an intentional allusion, one could say that there is an implied contrast between the Achaeans, who will win the war of which Patroclus’ Funeral Games are a sad side-issue (especially as Achilles has now returned), and the Ionians, who may try to treat the ‘Games’ at Ephesus as a side issue but lose their Athenian allies (who refuse to help despite repeated pleas: shades of the earlier Achilles?) and will eventually lose the war. But this feels a little forced, and the echo of *Il.* 24.1 may not really be an allusion—unless the wider context within the passage sits says otherwise (see below, p. 348).

In Herodotus 6.9.3, 8.109.4, and 8.118.3 we encounter the Homeric use of *τῆς* in affirmative exhortation.<sup>108</sup> Is this more than just a casual grammatical feature? Homeric examples occur in pre-battle narratives as is the case in Herodotus 6.9.3, but whereas the Homeric cases are uncomplicated (Agamemnon exhorts the Achaeans to prepare their weapons for battle and Achilles exhorts the already keen Myrmidons to fight with ἀλκιμον ἦτορ), the Persian leaders exhort exiled Ionian tyrants to benefit the royal house by asymmetrical non-military methods (secret communication and threats designed to undermine the enemy’s morale). Might there be a contrastive intertext underlining the Persians’ already advertised lack of confidence in their own troops?<sup>109</sup> That Herodotus *is* doing something deliberate is suggested by the passages in Book 8, which are *also* about serving the king. In 8.118.3 the king himself exhorts fellow-travellers on a foundering ship to leap to their deaths to save his life—a metaphorical battle against the forces of nature and an exhortation not to preparedness for combat but to self-

<sup>107</sup> ‘The mention in 102.3 of the agonistically successful Eualcides might have exerted an unconscious pull towards this choice of verb’: Hornblower (2013) 286.

<sup>108</sup> *Il.* 2.382–4; 16.209. Hornblower–Pelling (2017) 95 mention only the latter.

<sup>109</sup> They are frightened by the Ionians’ 353 ships, even though they have 600 (6.8.2–9.1).

destruction.<sup>110</sup> And in 8.109.4 Themistocles exhorts his fellow-Athenians to rebuild houses and plant seed and *not* to fight Xerxes at the Hellespont—thus storing up credit with the king in case he should ever have to flee Athens! The intertextual message of all three passages could then be that serving the Persian ruler is not like serving a Homeric king, does not involve actual battle, and may involve treachery. But one has to wonder how many readers Herodotus might have thought likely to spot these intertextual and intratextual links simply on the basis of a grammatical feature. The fact that two are quite close together and belong within in the same narrative episode (Xerxes' return to Asia) is perhaps a help, but the case remains debatable.

Finally in this section we come to an echo that cannot (one feels) fail to be an allusion, but is hard to interpret.<sup>111</sup>

At 9.93–5 Herodotus tells the story of the seer Evenius. The starting point is the death of a flock of sheep belonging to Helios, and that inescapably evokes the slaughter of the Cattle of Helios—a crucial episode in *Odyssey*, mentioned in the poem's opening lines, doubly predicted by Circe and Tiresias, and responsible for Odysseus' final travel disaster and loss of all of his companions. Even though Herodotus may need a seer story to retard the narrative here as a parallel for that in 9.33–7, he could not choose this one without realising that Homer would come to the reader's mind.<sup>112</sup>

Both Evenius and Odysseus fall asleep by divine will and Helios' animals are then slaughtered (by wolves and Odysseus' companions respectively). Neither is culpably responsible, both survive and (after suffering) prosper: Odysseus loses his companions and fails as a leader, but gets home; Evenius loses his sight, but gets a home and a divine skill—and in undertaking to be *ἀμύνητος* already lays claim to the special quality of those who feel *μῆνις*.<sup>113</sup> There is a further interaction in that the blind seer Tiresias warned Odysseus of disaster if the Helios cattle were killed: that tends to underscore the Odysseus–Evenius link; and the agreement between Delphi and Dodona perhaps echoes that of Circe and Tiresias.

<sup>110</sup> One may remember the Herodotean Xerxes sending waves of troops to predictable death at Thermopylae.

<sup>111</sup> The case was discussed by Carmen Sánchez-Mañas in a paper presented at the Newcastle conference but not included in this publication.

<sup>112</sup> That said, Flower–Marincola (2002) 266 and Asheri–Vannicelli (2007) 303 note the link with 9.33–7, but not the Homeric intertext.

<sup>113</sup> See below, p. 354 on 7.229.2. *ἀμύνητος* is unknown in Greek literature until the 2nd c. AD, except thrice in Aeschylus (*Ag.* 649, 1036; *Supp.* 975).



But the mapping of the two stories is not perfect. (1) If Evenius corresponds to Odysseus, the Apollonians are *prima facie* the Companions: but they come out of it much better than the Companions. (2) The divine will that causes Odysseus' problems is less opaque (we know him to be the object of competing divine wills throughout) than that which causes the death of the Apollonian animals (for which no explanation is supplied). Odysseus understandably senses divine will in the situation from the outset, the Apollonians understandably do not: for why should the gods attack their own (which is not what happens in *Odyssey*)?

Given these dissonances one might say the intertext shows two things. First, divine will is inscrutable: you may not spot its presence and it may do unexpected things. Second, divine punishment does not fall as one expects: the wolves are not punished at all (which only makes sense when it turns out that they are agents of divine will), Evenius initially suffers unjust punishment (and is unable to demand the sort of recompense Tisamenus gets in the structurally parallel tale), and the Apollonians get away with things rather well, despite having acted against divine will.

Since the Helios cattle incident is vitally important in *Odyssey*, its intertextual use ought not to be casual. How do we explain it?

1. One possibility is that it underscores the contrast between the heroic and the modern world, a theme encountered elsewhere and one implicit in the whole Herodotean Homeric enterprise. But in order to construct a contrast between an epic story about an individual (Odysseus) and a modern one about a collective (Apollonia) one has to see both the Apollonians and Evenius in corresponding to Odysseus, and that is not easy.

2. Contextually the story marks the Greeks' decision to advance to Asia. Stadter sees this as an important moment where understanding the inscrutability of divine will (i.e., the difficulty of divining what it is) is pertinent. The message of story and the intertext is that the advance into Asia may not have been in accordance with divine will.<sup>114</sup>

3. Stadter's reading entails questioning the correctness of the mantic advice given by Deiphonus. But the Evenius story and its intertext are a celebration of mantic skill (the Apollonians erred because they assumed they knew what was what and did not consult oracles, and only got things right when they asked Delphi and Dodona, while in the *Odyssey* the seer Tiresias and magician Circe know the score from the outset) and in principle underline the authority of Evenius and his son—who might indeed take from

<sup>114</sup> Stadter (1992).

his father's story the point that the *mantis* must, like everyone, be very careful in practising his art. So one could argue that the story actually affirms the authority behind the decision to go east. In fact, if there is uncertainty about the son's interpretation, it lies not in the Evenius–Odysseus stories but in the suspicion that Deiphonus was *not* Evenius' son in the first place—a suspicion tossed in by Herodotus at the end with extraordinary casualness. So Stadter's proleptic political reading might be correct, but not for the reason he alleged—and without the intertext itself being complicit in the proleptic reference in the same way.

This is an unsatisfactory situation, and it is complicated by the fact that the Evenius story is not the only mass slaughter of grazing animals in *Histories*. When the Greeks withdrew from Artemisium (despite an earlier undertaking that they would not), Themistocles had them slaughter Euboean sheep and goats (since it was better for Greeks to take and eat them rather than leave them for the enemy)—a disaster great enough to have been foretold in a Bacis oracle that Euboeans had ignored (8.19–20). Blösel detects an intertextual connection with the Cattle of Helios,<sup>115</sup> and, if that is correct, it is relatively easily interpretable as a comment on the behaviour of Themistocles, who in this story is not the clever Odyssean we might normally expect (and who is visible in other parts of the opening of Book 8) but plays the role of Odysseus' companions. The imputation is that he behaved as wrongly as they did and (presumably) that sooner or later he will be punished for it: none of them got home and, one day, he will be forced to flee from his home into Persian exile (cf. above, pp. 303, 330). The incitement to see the incident as a Cattle of Helios story is not as strong as in the Evenius case—the animals are not sacred, though they were the subject of an oracle—but it is not negligible. But the easy availability of a possible interpretation only underlines the uncertainty in the Evenius case.

#### *Self-undermining Intertexts*

The possibility that in-text characters might be ascribed self-undermining intertexts was mentioned earlier. Some further examples follow.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>115</sup> Blösel (2004) 158–60.

<sup>116</sup> Leutyichidas' story about the dreadful fate of a dishonest man (6.86) is ironic, given his own association with dishonesty (6.66, 72), and this irony has been compared with Antinous' admonitory allusion to the drunken centaur Eurytion in *Od.* 21.299–301 (Antinous will shortly die, and with a cup of wine in his hands: *Od.* 22.8–20); Hornblower–Pelling (2017) 203. But Leutyichidas is primarily guilty of hypocrisy rather than a bad choice of Homeric intertext.

1. A new moment in the narrative leading to Marathon is marked by Darius firing an arrow in the air, instructing his servant to repeat 'Master, remember the Athenians', and uttering a prayer that has no precise verbal parallel in Homer but is in a Homeric grammatical form (infinitival imperative) found in prayers to Zeus and in content most closely resembles Agamemnon's prayer in *Il.* 2.413 that he will destroy Troy before the day is done (5.105).<sup>117</sup> Darius does not request such immediate success, but his prayer is like Agamemnon's in that it is not answered as he would wish. For the salient thing about *Il.* 2.413 is that Zeus says no: he accepted Agamemnon's offering but repaid it with *πόνον ἀμέγαρτον* (420). That is a nice (and even amusing) point for anyone who notices the echo—perhaps made easier by a string of Homerisms since 5.92: see below, pp. 341–8.<sup>118</sup>

2. At 6.11–12 we find a speech by Dionysius of Phocaea. The event is (sardonically?) marked at the start by Herodotus' sole use of *ἀγορῶμαι* (applied to an Ionian gathering) in a form that occurs only once in Homer (albeit in a different sense) in reference to an assembly of the gods,<sup>119</sup> but the vivid Homerism is Dionysius' assertion that things are on a razor's edge (*ἐπὶ ξυροῦ ... ἀκμῆς*)—also a *hapax* in both Homer and Herodotus (who uses other phraseology in comparable crucial moment passages).<sup>120</sup> The critical situation in *Iliad* is that the Trojans have reached the wall round the Achaean ships (provoking already the failed embassy to Achilles in *Iliad* 9), and Nestor uses the words in *Iliad* 10.173–6 when waking Greek leaders to urge inspection of the guard-posts and an operation to spy on the Trojan camp. (Are there after-echoes here of the secret communication between enemy

<sup>117</sup> 'Darius knew his Homer!' (Hornblower (2013) 292).

<sup>118</sup> One might compare Xerxes at Troy in 7.43. He casts himself as Priam and ignores the fact that Homer's Athena supported the Achaeans. Since the visit is surrounded by ill omen (preceded by a disastrous storm and the Scamander unprecedentedly running dry, and followed by a night-time panic), things do not look good. The visit to Troy was, of course, *meant* to have much more positive implications: see Haubold (2007), esp. 53–8.

<sup>119</sup> Hornblower–Pelling (2017) 96, noting that it prepares the way for the more striking allusion to come.

<sup>120</sup> 6.109.3; 8.60a, and 118.3. These are all 'it's up to you moments': Miltiades in the first speaks of freedom—but also of possible Athenian power (which Themistocles does not in 8.60a—but he is seeking to persuade a Spartan commander); the third passage is Xerxes on his sinking ship, which is presumably a sardonic intratextual comment on a contrast with Themistocles? (See also above, pp. 329–30, for another indirect Themistoclean aspect of this passage.) See also 8.74 (those at Isthmus built a wall *ἄτε περὶ τοῦ πάντος ἤδη {δρόμον} θέοντες*) and 9.60 (Pausanias to Athenians: *ἀγῶνος μεγίστου προκειμένου ἐλευθέρην εἶναι ἢ δεδουλωμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα*).

camps in 6.9–10?) The spy operation has its successes, but in the longer term the Achaeans' situation gets worse, so the overtones of ἐπὶ ξυροῦ ἀκμῆς are not encouraging. Dionysius changes the stakes from life and death in Homer to freedom and slavery (an intertextual assertion of their equivalence), but his plan—not inspections and espionage but the hard labour of military training—fails through Ionian softness: τίνα δαιμόνων παραβάντες τάδε ἀναπίμπλαμεν, they say, Homeric (if not exclusively) in the use of ἀναπίμπλαναι and speculation about the action of *daimones*. Dionysius is made to look a fool and his use of Homer (and echo of Nestor—famous for good organisation of troops!) underlines the point: he is right that there is a crisis, but the Homeric tag does not bode well for its resolution.

3. At 9.11 the Athenians complain that they are wronged by Sparta and bereft of allies (χήτει συμμάχων). The use of χήτει—a *hapax* in Herodotus, and rare in classical authors (once each in Eupolis and Plato)—gives a rather personal colour to the situation, and there is a particular echo of a famous passage of *Iliad* 6 (460–5) in which Hector imagines the captive Andromache in Argos grieving the loss of the heroic husband (ὅς ἀριστεύεσκε μάχεσθαι | Τρώων ἵπποδάμων) who could have protected her from slavery.<sup>121</sup> Athens, the latter-day Andromache, has now abandoned the high tone of 8.144 (τὸ Ἑλληνικόν) and is threatening to join the Persians in inflicting slavery on other Greeks.<sup>122</sup> That sits awkwardly with Andromache's earlier declaration of a peculiar family bond with Hector (he is father, mother, and brother to her as well as husband)—shades of τὸ Ἑλληνικόν?—and with Hector's insistence that honour requires him to fight even in a doomed cause.<sup>123</sup> Herodotus' Athenians will later claim ἡμῖν πατρώιον ἐστὶ ἐοῦσι χρηστοῖσι αἰεὶ πρότοισι εἶναι (9.27), but they seem to have forgotten such values for the moment. The intertextual effect is not to justify the Athenians (deprived of protecting Spartans they have no option but slavery) but to denounce them. And the twist is that this is the Athenians speaking: they are denouncing themselves. But we should not leap to (the wrong sort of) judgement. What they are proposing is awful—a plan whose presentation tramples on one of the most moving passages in the *Iliad*. But it is a thought

<sup>121</sup> Flower–Marincola (2002) 120. Asheri–Vannicelli (2007) 188 notes the Homeric word, but not the Andromache context.

<sup>122</sup> I doubt Provençal's claim ((2015) 253) that τὸ Ἑλληνικόν is an intertext with the Shield of Achilles.

<sup>123</sup> *Il.* 6.444–6: ἐπεὶ μάθον ἔμμεναι ἐσθλὸς | αἰεὶ καὶ πρότοισι μετὰ Τρώεσσι μάχεσθαι | ἀρνύμενος πατρός τε μέγα κλέος ἦδ' ἐμὸν αὐτοῦ.

experiment whose purpose is to be rejected, and the Homeric overtone is there to underline that point.

4. In 7.103 Xerxes starts his response to Demaratus' improbable claim that the Spartans would march against him with only a thousand men with the words *Δημάρητε, οἶον ἐφθέγγξαι ἔπος*, thus using a formula associated in Homer with the outraged complaint of a god (usually Hera) about something said by another god (usually Zeus). The norm in the Homeric cases is that the complainant does not persuade the other party to change tack and the *status quo* is maintained: the only exception is when Zeus has proposed something entirely absurd—ending the war and letting Troy survive or saving Sarpedon or Hector from their fated death. One might say that, since Demaratus' claim is extraordinary,<sup>124</sup> the fact that he does not back down at Xerxes' complaint in itself breaches the Homeric norm, but it is certainly true that Xerxes' use of the speech formula is quite out of line. In Homer the formula is used by one god to another who is either of equal or (normally) higher status. Demaratus is far too weak a figure to be addressed in this way by the Great King—or he should be: but the point of the intertextual colouring is to indicate that in this context Demaratus is the more powerful figure to whose solemn assertion of what he knows about Spartan character Xerxes can only respond with a faintly absurd bit of arithmetical bluster. Moreover, although Xerxes affects amused astonishment (he replies with laugh—generally a bad sign, as Lateiner (1977) noted), Demaratus had feared Xerxes' anger, and the intertext may hint that Xerxes is actually more angry than he is prepared to admit. (The divine complainants are normally genuinely angry, and even the mock outrage of Hera in *Il.* 14.330 is a little strained, given that Zeus has just given her a long list of his adulterous lovers.) So, the effect of Xerxes' use of *οἶον ἐφθέγγξαι ἔπος* is to make him look weak and hypocritical.

The significance of the passage is underlined if one takes account of two others in which Herodotus uses the formula. In both it is in the mouth of a Persian functionary speaking to the Persian king, so the power relationship is correct, at least in theory. In the first Megabyzus expostulates about Darius' award of Myrcinus to Histiaeus, and he succeeds in making the king change his mind—which, intertextually speaking, rather nicely establishes that the award had really been entirely improper and unwise. In the second we have (also rather nicely) Histiaeus himself outraged at Darius' suggestion

<sup>124</sup> It resembles the boast Agamemnon attributes to drunken Argives (*Il.* 8.230–4) who are now terrified of Hector (cf. Vannicelli ap. Vannicelli–Corcella–Nenci (2017) 419). But Demaratus is stone-cold-sober serious.

that he bore some responsibility for the Ionian Revolt. The reader knows that this is entirely true, but Histiaeus successfully placates the king (despite bluntly telling him that the revolt was the *king's* fault, because had 'deported' Histiaeus in the first place) and persuades him that he will travel to Ionia, put everything right, *and* conquer Sardinia without changing his clothes. This brazen performance bamboozled the king (*διέβαλλε*), and in achieving this Histiaeus outdid the goddess Hera:<sup>125</sup> for when Hera rejects an accusation (1.552; 8.462; 18.361), Zeus nonetheless gets his way; and when she makes a proposal *δολοφρονέουσα* (that they should return to Olympus to have sex), it is refused. Darius, by contrast, emerges as an easily manipulable version of the supreme god: so the power-relationship between Histiaeus and Darius is not as correct as it looked initially.

Taken together, the three passages chart a downward curve in the *Ersatz* Olympus that is the Persian royal court: Megabyzus speaks urgently but rationally<sup>126</sup> and the king is sensibly persuaded; Histiaeus is an absurd show-off and chancer who tricks a manipulable king; and Xerxes cedes the high ground (moral and otherwise) to a Spartan king, who is unmoved by his prissily arithmetical protestations.<sup>127</sup> It is altogether a model example of what

<sup>125</sup> Compare Socles: see below, p. 342. In this case Histiaeus is not undermining himself, but undermining Darius.

<sup>126</sup> Hornblower (2013) 291 detects an attempt to suggest court rhetoric in this speech and that of Histiaeus, noting the redundancy of *καὶ ἡμέρης καὶ νυκτός* and *πολλὸς ... πολλός* (5.23.2) and *ἢ μέγα ἢ μικρόν* and *πάντα ... πάντων* (5.106). And *καὶ ἡμέρης καὶ νυκτός* is an actual Persian phrase (DB §7), so Greeks whom it 'struck ... as specially appropriate in a Persian context' (Hornblower (2013) 120) were right. (It recurs in the alleged letter of Xerxes to Pausanias in Thuc.1.129.3.) But there is still a real contrast between Megabyzus' sobriety and Histiaeus' extravagance. Demaratus is also sober (see above, n. 124).

<sup>127</sup> Demaratus' stature as an adviser was arguably Homerically marked when he first came to Asia (6.70). He arrives as an exile and ex-ruler and is received grandly, with gifts of land and cities, having previously shone in Sparta *ἔργοισι τε καὶ γνώμησι*. Homer's Phoenix arrives as an exile in Phthia, is given riches and a people (*laos*) to rule over (*Il.* 9.482–4), and, when Achilles (whom Phoenix nurtured from childhood) goes to Troy, he accompanies him with the task of making the young man, lacking experience of war or counsel, into a 'speaker of words (*μύθων ῥητῆρα*) and doer of deeds (*πρηκτῆρα ἔργων*)' (9.443). Demaratus, having provided a clinching argument for the throne going to Darius' fourth youngest son (7.3: an act of nurturing?), accompanies the young (but not entirely inexperienced) Xerxes to war, where he acts as an expert on matters Spartan and spokesman for an ideology opposed to that of the Persian monarch. His analysis and advice are unsurprisingly always rejected. That is also (of course) Phoenix's undeserved fate in *Iliad* 9, and we are never told how much Achilles' prowess owed to Phoenix's instruction of him in words and deeds. But the Demaratus–Phoenix assimilation tends to ascribe to Demaratus extra authority for the true things he will say to Xerxes. Any implicit assimilation of Xerxes and Achilles is another

intertextuality can achieve: the downward curve is there anyway, but giving it a pseudo-Olympian colour both underlines the point and increases our enjoyment of it.<sup>128</sup>

5. There is also a great deal to enjoy in the Greek embassy to Gelon in 480 (7.159–61).<sup>129</sup>

There are two Homeric intertexts in 7.159. The primary intertext is with *Iliad* 7.124: Peleus would groan at the Greeks' cowardice in face of Hector. Nestor's complaint is prompted specifically by Agamemnon dissuading Menelaus from fighting Hector: eventually lots are cast and Ajax wins. Ajax was the best hero after Achilles (*Il.* 2.768), and Nestor's reference to Peleus has already evoked the absent Achilles, especially as he then describes the mission to Peleus' court to recruit Achilles for the Trojan War. Syagrus' reapplication of the words to a Spartan Agamemnon is thus *mal à propos* because the intertextual passage (a) shows Agamemnon devaluing the Spartan Menelaus and (b) reminds us that Agamemnon was responsible for the absence of the figure whom the Achaeans really need, viz. Achilles. That did not show Agamemnon's leadership at its best; and, if his view that Menelaus was not up to fighting Hector was a better bit of leadership, it is not one that can properly be deployed by Syagrus.

A secondary intertext follows on from this. The allusion to Nestor has evoked one sort of embassy in search of military help. But *Iliad* 9 offers a more prominent one, sent to Achilles as the Achaeans' military crisis deepens. This reinforces the fact that Syagrus' approach casts Gelon as an *Ersatz* Achilles—an awkward and unintentional consequence given Achilles' heroic primacy and additionally *mal à propos* because leadership is not an issue in *Iliad* 9 (Achilles is offered gifts but not even a share of leadership) whereas it is central in Syracuse. Achilles' response leaves open the possibility that he will fight if Hector directly threatens the Myrmidons. Gelon did indeed fight (on the same day as Salamis) in his own defence. But he refuses the Greeks' appeal because the Greeks did not help him earlier (Carthage, Dorieus, *emporía*) and he will not be subordinate to those who

reversal of the standard Achaeans–Greeks/Trojans–Persians script, albeit one that highlights Achillean pig-headedness. Hornblower–Pelling (2017) 182 note the verbal parallel with *Il.* 9.443 without further comment, save that Thuc. 1.139.4 also echoes Phoenix.

<sup>128</sup> For a different 'Olympian' Xerxes one might note how Salamis plays out beneath his repeatedly mentioned gaze—rather as Iliadic battles are surveyed by (partisan) gods.

<sup>129</sup> That intertextuality can be fun is noted by Pelling (2006) 77 and 86. This case (which might qualify for Pelling's adjective 'roistering') is discussed in Pelling (2006); Grethlein (2006); (2010) 162–4; and Haywood, above, pp. 75–8.

rejected his plea and now, having remembered him,<sup>130</sup> nonetheless insult him (*ἀτιμίη*: 158.4; Syagrus' words as *ὑβρίσματα*: 160.2). This seems like a counterpart to Agamemnon's insult to Achilles, and reinforces the Gelon–Achilles link. Yet, unlike Achilles, Gelon is prepared to make a compromise and share leadership. Syagrus' approach is doubly *mal à propos* but the intertext also underlines that he is still more successful than he deserves to be because the Sicilian Achilles whom he has called into virtual existence is not quite as unbiddable as the original one.

But the Athenians then reject Gelon's compromise with a Homeric argument of their own which matches and indeed outdoes Syagrus. The Spartans have a problem: they cannot *say* that Homer reports that Sparta supplied the overall commander at Troy because he does not. So they are bound *not* to mention Homer and to resort to an indirect allusion (albeit with a verbal quotation). But the Athenians can proudly quote Homer explicitly and say smugly that Homeric authority means that no blame attached to what might look like boasting.<sup>131</sup> And yet they do not entirely get the better of Syagrus. Syagrus scored an own goal by choosing a passage in which the actual Homeric Spartan king's inadequacy is thematised and Agamemnon's leadership at least debatable. But the Athenians do the same by choosing one that actually says that Menestheus was best at organising troops *except for Nestor, who was older*. They have quoted their source selectively or even lied about its identity: for what they say Homer says (and the annotation about there being no shame in mentioning it) recalls one of the 'Simonidean' epigrams about Eion: if that is a genuine mid-fifth century text, then Athenian misuse of Homer has a pre-Herodotean precedent. But in any event the real Homeric text (the thing they claim to cite) undermines their supposedly unnegotiable claim to undivided naval leadership.

Gelon's response brings a third allusive intertext, not with Homer but with Pericles: loss of his support means that the spring has gone out of the year. Since Pericles used the phrase of the Athenian war-dead (Arist. *Rhet.* 1365a and 1411a), whereas Gelon refers to an army that does not exist, Gelon perhaps speaks tastelessly and shows he has mastered the art of intertexting

<sup>130</sup> *μνηστis* (*γέγονε*) (Hdt. 7.158.3) is Homeric (once: *Od.* 13.280), a Herodotean *hapax* here, and otherwise just twice in Sophocles before the Hellenistic era (when it is still not common). In Homer Odysseus and a Phoenician crew are too tired to be *μνηστis* *δόρπου*, and they then abandon him with his goods while he sleeps. There is no specific intertext in Herodotus, just use of Homeric vocabulary.

<sup>131</sup> A unique example of implicit and explicit Homeric allusions working together within the same discourse.



(and even of leadership: Grethlein) as badly as his antagonists. But the evocation of Athenian losses in the future days of imperial power acts as a *sphragis*-like activation of a theme already present in 159–61, antagonism between Sparta and Athens about leadership. That thematic strand is in the spirit of evocations of the topic (and associated *kaka*) earlier in *Histories*.<sup>132</sup>

What does this all amount to?

1. Syagrus and the Athenians use Homer to claim primacy over a non-Homeric rival (the Athenians even add remarks about their antiquity and autochthony). This is not effective in the world of the meeting in Syracuse because, although willing to compromise (unlike his Homeric equivalent Achilles), Gelon is not cowed or impressed by the visitors' wish to live in the Homeric past. Perhaps that is a direct critical comment on subsequent fifth century discursive assimilation of the Trojan and Persian Wars—a theme encountered elsewhere in intertextual contexts.<sup>133</sup>

2. But things are also problematic in the metaworld of intertext. The Spartans' primary intertext with Homer casts Agamemnon in a debatable light (a good leader because he knows Menelaus' limitations? a bad leader because he alienated Achilles? a leader from a generation less good than that of Peleus and Nestor?) and undermines the Agamemnon–Sparta identification (the real Spartan is Menelaus, whose inadequacy is a central point in the *Iliad* passage). The Athenian allusion to Homer is inaccurate, again evokes the inferiority of the Agamemnon–Menestheus generation (Nestor was better than Menestheus), and prompts a non-Homeric intertext that evokes later hegemony struggles and provides a dark proleptic setting for the 480 debate in Syracuse—one that chimes with much else in the narrative about difficult Spartan–Athenian relations. In fact, the intertexts the two parties are assigned are so poor as to be almost a joke at their expense. Syagrus' allusion hardly deserved to work and, even if the Athenians' one did (which is barely the case), the naval hegemony they yearned for would end in tears. The (or one) reason discursive assimilation of Trojan and Persian Wars is questionable is that Homeric analogies are so liable to be self-defeating and are in any case only a mask for *Realpolitik*. In 7.159–62, then, Homeric intertexts are (a) an object of comment *in se* and (b) a means of revealing the blind and mendacious manners of politicians engaged in the fight for hegemony.

<sup>132</sup> See below, pp. 347, 368.

<sup>133</sup> See above, pp. 302–4; below, pp. 345–8, 351–2, 354–5, 356–60, 361–2, 368–9.

So far as the Athenians go there is a coda in Book 9. At 9.26–7 the Tegeans and Athenians debate their right to be posted on the left wing. The Tegeans appeal to a privilege going back to the return of the Heraclidae. The Athenians respond with mythical claims of their own from the Funeral Speech repertoire, concluding with a very perfunctory reference to Troy (their contribution was a good as anyone's), but then sweep all this ancient history aside as irrelevant compared with their achievement at Marathon. It is as though they have learned the lesson of the Gelon embassy—except that Marathon was, of course, no basis on which to argue for leadership at sea. In fact, 9.27 just emphasises that the ambassadors in 480 had a rather weak hand: until Salamis Athens had no proven claims as a maritime power, and Homer was no substitute. Once Salamis (as well as Marathon) had happened, Homer was unnecessary. But later-fifth-century Athenians did not learn and act on that lesson, and Herodotus uses another Homeric intertext to make that point, as we shall see below (p. 352).

### 3.5 Important Historical Episodes and Developments

We have already noticed the intertextual marking of important historical moments in the case of the fall of Lydia and Egypt (above, pp. 313–15). There is much more to be said under this heading.

#### 1. *Lydia*

In the case of Lydia this was the end of a story (the history of the Mermnad dynasty) that also began with a Homeric intertext (the wife of Candaules: above, pp. 307–8), and there are in fact other Homeric moments in between. The Solon–Croesus episode has already been discussed (above, pp. 309–11). At its conclusion Herodotus announces that Croesus was seized by *ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις*. The word is only here in Herodotus and is Homeric. There is no intertext with any specific passage, but it injects Homeric (or generally poetic) colour to mark a strong interpretative statement about the next story-line and its connection with the previous one. The next story-line is the death of Croesus' son Atys, and it begins in a Homeric manner: reception of a guest, a variant on the dine first/questions second trope in which purification stands for dinner, Croesus' formulaic question about Adrestus' origins (again adjusted: 'whom did you murder?'), and the very fact that fugitive murderers are a Homeric trope. Later on, the boar-hunt is not without epic overtones. This is the second reception-of-guest story in succession (it is neat that the message of Solon is fulfilled by the arrival of another guest) and the Homeric overtones of the first are further realised here. But there is more. Fugitive

murderers are particular associated with Peleus' court. So is Croesus momentarily figured as Peleus? He *is*, after all, about to lose a son, albeit in a freak (yet presumably fated) accident rather than in the warfare from which he has strenuously sought to protect him. This notion is reciprocally supported by the view that, when Cyrus and his companions observe Croesus with wonder, it recalls Achilles and his companions observing Priam with the wonder occasioned by the arrival of a murderer (above, p. 313). The alert reader is thus given a hint that the fugitive will become a companion to Croesus' son (as Phoenix and Patroclus were to Achilles) and that that son is in danger. That might be a bit of a stretch at a first reading/hearing. But once the story unfolds, the sense of fate at work is retrospectively enriched by the idea that there is a sort of pattern.

The rise and fall of Mermnad Lydia is thus accompanied by Homer throughout. This phenomenon has parallels elsewhere, as does the basic principle of marking important historical moments intertextually.

## 2. Athens From Tyranny to War with Persia—and Beyond

The most remarkable sequence of Homerisms is the one in the second half of Book 5 that accompanies the narrative from Athens' liberation from tyranny to the onset of the Persian Wars proper.<sup>134</sup> We have already noted the second preface at 5.65 (above, pp. 305–6) and Cleomenes' ignominious failure in Attica in 5.77 (above, pp. 315–16). The next stage is the speech of the Corinthian Socles in 5.92.

The speech breaks the silence in a cowed assembly (an established Homeric trope<sup>135</sup>) and is followed by a rerun of the same trope: the allies had been quiet but after Socles' intervention they spoke (5.93). It consists of the telling of an elaborate story (or several interconnected stories) in the manner of Phoenix in *Iliad* 9, but also of Nestor on more than one occasion (especially as they are stories about Socles' own city and in that sense about his own past), Achilles on Niobe (24.602–17), and Diomedes on Bellerophon (6.155–95).<sup>136</sup> The speech contains several Homerisms. The Homeric 'loose the knees' embedded in an oracle is perhaps not particularly significant. But the

<sup>134</sup> An exceptional example of the principle that intertexts can come in clusters (Pelling (2006) 77).

<sup>135</sup> Also used in 7.10, noted by, e.g., Pelling (2006) 101. Hornblower (2013) 249 compares *Od.* 8.532–3, which is a similar focusing device, but not particularly close.

<sup>136</sup> Gould (1989) 56; Hornblower (2013) 247. The compositional device recurs in Herodotus on a smaller scale in the speech of Leutychidas in 6.86 (see above, n. 116). Johnson (2001) examines them in tandem.

speech opens with ἦ δῆ (a common Homeric speech opener found only here in Herodotus), contains the only Herodotean use of φιλοφροσύνη, a word that also occurs just once in Homer, rehearses the story of Periander and Melissa (which Richardson links with Andromache's idea to burn Hector's clothes, 'not for your profit ... but as a source of honour in the sight of Trojan men and women'),<sup>137</sup> and ends with a plainly Homeric speech-trope ἵστε ὑμῶν Κορινθίους γε οὐ συναινέοντας.<sup>138</sup> This is a Homeric speech both in essential conception and some aspects of content. How are we to interpret this?

1. Socles' speech is an example of Homerically coloured political history. In that respect it is analogous to the *Histories* itself. It can thus be set alongside other examples of an analogy between Herodotus and in-text characters (see above, pp. 317–19)—and it may also express Herodotus' own political view.<sup>139</sup>

2. If the Homeric analogy for the Periander/Melissa story is recognised, it points up the difference between that pair and Hector/Andromache and supports the denunciation of tyrants.

3. The use of φιλοφροσύνη is harder to call. It expresses the reason for which Labda (wrongly) imagined the Bacchiad hitmen had come to see the child: φιλοφροσύνη τοῦ πατρός (Eetion? Amphion?) The sole Homeric occurrence of the word is in a γὰρ ἄμεινον line-ending of the sort Herodotus plays with in Book 3 (above, p. 305) and it occurs during the embassy to Achilles in *Iliad* 9 that is also home to the speech of Phoenix to which Socles' speech as a whole is formally analogous. These are both signs that the word's appearance is not accidental. Moreover, the precise context is Odysseus' recollection of what happened when he and Nestor went to fetch Achilles to the Trojan War<sup>140</sup>—another scene in which people come to get a child (albeit one older than Cypselus). But what Odysseus says is that Peleus told Achilles that φιλοφροσύνη is better than the μεγαλήτωρ θυμός and spirit of ἔρις that he is showing in his quarrel with Agamemnon, and the relevance of this to Labda's situation is opaque.<sup>141</sup> Are we invited to link μεγαλήτωρ

<sup>137</sup> Richardson (1993) ad *Il.* 22.510–14.

<sup>138</sup> With συν- nicely substituted for ἐπ-, as Hornblower (2013) 267 notes.

<sup>139</sup> Moles (2007).

<sup>140</sup> 9.256: the episode recurs in 7.124–8 and 11.765–91.

<sup>141</sup> Hornblower says that it is from a speech Achilles dismisses as insincere, so the reader should infer that the men were insincere (as they were). But Achilles does not dismiss the speech as insincere: Friedrich (2011).

θυμός and ἔρις with the Bacchiads? That might be appropriate but adds little to our existing understanding of them. Or, if Cypselus stands for Achilles, is it his future *μεγαλήτωρ* θυμός and ἔρις that are evoked? But that seems a bit tortuous. Perhaps the word is just a largely unconscious sign that Herodotus' mind has been on the embassy scene.

4. The final Homerism is, by contrast, easier—and important.<sup>142</sup> The trope casts Socles as a god addressing the Spartans as though they were Zeus. These are more disconcerting equations than those arising when Persians use the *οἶον ἔπος* trope (above, pp. 335–7)—a trope that appears at the start of some speeches that end with the phrase Socles uses, a fact that demonstrates that we are right to treat both as intentional allusions. But it seems likely that Socles *is* claiming the authority with which Athene or Hera challenge Zeus and that we are to approve of his doing so. And he actually claims more authority. In Homer speakers say ‘do it if you want, but we shall not approve’, but in Herodotus Socles does not: rather he just says ‘are you going not to stop but to continue trying to restore Hippias contrary to justice? Be assured that the Corinthians do not approve’. The truth is that Spartans are *not* Zeus, cannot do what they want, and are indeed powerless. This is why there is no narrator comment at all on the Spartan reaction to Socles' speech, only a report of the response of other allies—which is what settles things. The Spartans are marginalised. Socles is successfully claiming more authority than Athena or Hera and exposing Spartan weakness: they are would-be Zeus with none of his power. (We recall that the *οἶον ἔπος* passages also question the power of a Zeus-like ruler.<sup>143</sup>)

The Socles intertext varies Homer in another way. The Homeric cases are about war and death continuing as they are fated to (whether explicitly in the passage or not: the reader of Homer knows there is no way the Trojan War is suddenly going to end), whereas Socles is arguing for a war to stop and maintaining that its not doing would be contrary to the natural order.<sup>144</sup> So he uses the Homeric trope to a non- or counter-Homeric end and that perhaps adds to force of his achievement. In any event, however, the intertext is one that greatly reinforces Socles' authority and the effectiveness of his denunciation of tyranny.

<sup>142</sup> See Pelling (2006) 102–3, Hornblower (2013) 267.

<sup>143</sup> See above, pp. 335–7.

<sup>144</sup> Affirmed at the start in a topsy-turvy trope that is not Homeric: Hornblower (2013) 250 moots Archilochus.

The Homeric colour continues after Socles is finished. Defeated, Hippias retired to Sigeium, a place that was tied both to Cypselid history (the Pisistratids had it thanks to Periander) and to Homeric history: for the Athenians affirmed that they had as much right to Sigeium as any of the Greeks who fought alongside Menelaus to punish the abduction of Helen. The implication is that defeat of Troy gave all participating Greeks a right by conquest to Trojan territory (5.94). Athens fought Mytilene on that basis and it was the arbitration of that war by Periander that established Athenian control. Hippias' bolt-hole thus exemplifies the use of Homeric history to establish a claim, just as Socles' speech exemplifies the use of Homeric text to win an argument (and the Gelon embassy exemplified using it to lose one). But Hippias also copies Socles more exactly: for he says that the Corinthians will yearn (*ἐπιποθήσειν*) for the Pisistratids when the time comes for them to be hurt by Athens (5.93.1). In doing so he echoes Achilles' forecast that sufferings at the hands of Hector will lead the Achaeans to yearn (*ποθέειν*) for Achilles,<sup>145</sup> just as Socles echoed Athena or Hera when denouncing Spartan support of tyranny. Socles (as we saw) actually trumped the authority of Athena and Hera, and Hippias does something similar. For, whereas Achilles simply accompanied his statement with an oath, Hippias claims the extra insight due to his knowledge of oracles. Achilles makes what he says true by mere assertion—which he can do because what happens lies in his own hands: he can choose to fight whenever he wishes. But Hippias is speaking of a future beyond his own time, one only accessible by informed prediction. Enhanced Homeric authority is thus claimed both for Corinthian (and Spartan) hostility to tyranny and for the prospect of painful Corinthian–Athenian conflict—and extra weight is given to the opportunity inescapably offered to the reader to contemplate post-*Histories* history. Herodotus sometimes does that explicitly, in the various proleptic references to events down to the 420s: here at least there can be no doubt that he is implicitly inviting us to see the content of his text from the perspective of a later world.<sup>146</sup>

And what is he inviting us to see? Perhaps an Athens freed from tyranny that has become tyrannical and one whose poor relations with Corinth characteristically involved conflicts over territory—Megara (which Athens defended from Corinthian encroachment: Thuc. 1.103), Aegina (which

<sup>145</sup> Pelling (2006) 103.

<sup>146</sup> Hornblower (2013) 267: Hippias' prediction 'is the best card in the hands of the "irony" school of Herodotean interpreters'.

Corinth failed to defend, suffering a major defeat in the process: 1.105) and, most notoriously, two places further afield that Corinth claimed as hers (because they were colonies) but Athens had acquired as subjects (Potidaea) or as allies (Corcyra). The cosy territorial relationship between Athens, Corinth, and Sigeium in the days of actual tyranny stands in contrast to an unc cosy relationship in the days of metaphorical tyranny. Moreover there is potential Homeric colour to both sides of the comparison. Imperial Athens could claim that her power, which went back to her willingness to fight the barbarian and protect the Greeks after 478, was rooted in an ongoing Trojan War. Perhaps she had as much right to Potidaea as she had had to Sigeium—a right that the Corinthians *had* recognised. But anyone inclined to that reading (based on Athens as avatar of the Achaeans at Troy) might be given pause by the next Homeric intertext just three chapters later. The ongoing Trojan War was ultimately an artefact of the Persian attacks on Greece, and the next intertext disrupts the putative Athenian script by providing a different Homeric take on Athens' role in the origins of those attacks.

The Athenian ships sent to Ionia in 499 were, Herodotus says, the start of evils for Greeks and barbarians (5.97.3): this channels three Homeric passages, but most notably *Iliad* 5.62–4.<sup>147</sup> The reference to the start of evils contrasts with the stress at the beginning of *Histories* on the start of crimes (the mythological crimes involving women and what Herodotus takes as the real first crime, that of the Lydian conquest) but it also picks up on something implicitly present at or near the outset of the work: for the passage evokes the *kaka* involving Miletus and Naxos in 5.28–30 and those evils in turn are the second in a series of evils for Ionia that began either with the Persian

<sup>147</sup> *Il.* 5.62–4: the ἀρχεκάκους ships which were an evil to all the Trojans and for their builder since he did not know θέσφατα. Note that ἀρχεκάκους is a distinctive Homeric hapax absent except in *Il.* 5.62–4 related contexts until the Roman era. *Il.* 11.604: Patroclus comes out of his hut at a call from Achilles: κακοῦ δ' ἄρα οἱ πέλεν ἀρχή. *Il.* 3.100: Menelaus says that Argives and Trojans have suffered much εἴνεκ' ἐμῆς ἔριδος καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ' ἀρχῆς (codd.: ἄτης Zenodotus). The intertextual link is widely recognised. (It was already noticed by Plutarch in *Her. Mal.* 24, 861B.) A similar idea is expressed by Helen in *Il.* 6.356, a high-profile passage where she also says Zeus created an evil destiny (κακὸν μόρον) so that we shall be ἀοίδιμοι to later generations (cf. above, pp. 295, 316): εἴνεκ' ἐμεῖο κυνὸς καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ' ἄτης—and it is identical if one adopts Zenodotus' reading of ἀρχῆς for ἄτης. On 8.142.2 see n. 149. E. Bowie (2018a) 59 notes a further use of the trope in Hdt. 2.139: his daughter's death was the start of evils for Mycerinus—a story whose sexual content recalls another starting point, Candaules' wife (see above, pp. 307–8).

conquest of the region<sup>148</sup> or perhaps even with its first enslavement by Lydia. And yet there is still a contrast, because those were evils for Ionia and what we now have are evils for Greeks and barbarians. That much increased ambit extends the most direct Homeric intertext, where the ships are an evil for Trojans, and one of the secondary ones (the start of evil for Patroclus), but is matched in *Iliad* 3.100 where Menelaus says that the *Argives and Trojans* have suffered much εἴνεκ' ἐμῆς ἔριδος καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ἔνεκ' ἀρχῆς.<sup>149</sup> So the mixture of intratextual and intertextual features mark how important a new stage we have now reached.

But that is not all. Menelaus' perspective is historical (Paris started something and both parties have suffered between then and now), but Herodotus (like the other Homer passages) is prospective. The Homer passages look forward to the annihilation of Troy and Patroclus. That is a large weight for the undefined future evils of *Greeks and barbarians* to bear.

The conventional script about the Persian Wars would surely be more in line with the Homeric originals—defeat (though not annihilation) for Persia and victory for Greece. Herodotus' change is not casual. But is he just alluding to the fact that bad things happened to Greeks along the road to 479 (perhaps particularly to the Athenians whose city was destroyed)? That he is not limiting himself in this way is suggested by the observation in 6.98 that a Delian earthquake after Marathon portended *kaka* in the time of Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes, some of it due to the Persians and some to Greek *koruphatoi* fighting about *arkhē*. That is another explicitly proleptic Herodotean comment about the post-*Histories* world, like Histiaeus' remark in 5.93, and given the proximity of that remark to 5.97.3, it is clear interpreters are correct to understand the ambit of the ἀρχὴ κακῶν to extend far into the future—and to take it that the punning ambiguity of *arkhē* invites

<sup>148</sup> Hornblower (2013) 125.

<sup>149</sup> This may be connectable with Hdt. 8.142.2, depending on the text one adopts. The Spartans say to the Athenians: you started this war οὐδὲν ἡμέων βουλομένων, καὶ περὶ τῆς ὑμετέρης ἀρχῆς (codd.: ἀρχῆν Schaefer) ὁ ἀγὼν ἐγένετο. With ἀρχῆς we have a play on words 'about your beginning'/'about your rule' (proleptically), an allusion to *Il.* 3.100 (if the MS reading there is accepted, which on this scenario it should be, since it is supported by Herodotus), and an intratext to 5.97.3 (where both ἀρχή = beginning and ἀρχή = empire can be felt to be in question: Hippias' warning has prepared the reader for that), and the effect is to support the message of 5.97.3 about the evils to which fight for hegemony will expose Greece. With ἀρχῆν there is no play on words (unless one supposes Herodotus used ἀρχῆν in the hope of evoking ἀρχή—virtually inciting us to read περὶ τῆς ὑμετέρης ἀρχῆς) and no intertext with Homer: but in content, if not form, there may still be an intratext with 5.97.3. For another intertext affected by textual uncertainty see below, n. 168.



thought of the Athenian empire or at any rate the struggle about *arkhē* in 6.98. In 6.98 Herodotus described the evils as worse than those suffered by Greece in twenty generations and that accords with the intertextually implicit seriousness of the evils for Greeks and barbarians unleashed by the Athenian and Eretrian ships. Appropriately, twenty generations takes us before the time of Homer (400 years away: 2.53), so the evils to come outdo those since his time, though not perhaps the ones he records (which lie 800 years away: 2.145).<sup>150</sup>

In these terms it is also appropriate that the basic intertext with *Il.* 5.62–4 (and the secondary one in *Il.* 3.100) controvert the simple Persian War/Trojan War script by equating the Athenians with the Trojans: Athens is bringing disaster on herself not only because of the city's destruction in 480 but also because of the longer-term Greek evils of which she will be part. That is, of course, an aggressively dark reading of fifth-century Athenian history, at least until after 413. For those who believe Herodotus wrote after that date the situation is straightforward; for those who do not, it is more interesting: the fight for *arkhē* inflicts damage on both sides, and power is in any case a disaster waiting to happen because *eudaimoniē* does not stay permanently in one place (1.5.3–4). One wonders whether Herodotus knew that the Spartan Melesippus alluded to Homer at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.12.3–4). Thucydides professed to have realised from the outset how momentously greater than the Trojan or Persian Wars that conflict would be. Perhaps the combination of 5.97.3 and 6.98 reflects a similar realisation on Herodotus' part.

There is more than one way to react to this disruption of the New Trojan War script in the context provided by Hippias' warnings. (1) The Athens–Troy assimilation casts the Athenians as (bluntly) wrongdoers and indirectly links Athens and Persia: that is appropriate since the Hippias section has invoked Athens' future role as tyrant city. (2) 5.97.3 embraces Athens among the Greeks and barbarians who will suffer terrible things in the post-Persian Wars future: so the Athenians will be losers (like the Trojans) as well as winners (like the Achaeans). (3) Perhaps 5.92–4 has not only been displaying examples of the deployment of Homer as a tool of argument about contemporary politics but setting us up to question the wisdom of that enterprise—in which spirit we might go on to observe that, although in the

<sup>150</sup> 20 generations at three to a century (2.142) falls short of 800 years. But Hornblower–Pelling (2017) 219 envisage that Herodotus means the Trojan War or the return of the Heraclidae 80 years later (Thuc. 1.12). If the arithmetic is stretched anyway, one might as well go for the former option. But maybe we should not stretch it.

short term we may admire Socles' authoritative dismissal of Spartan support of tyranny, his posture nonetheless undermined, if not himself personally, then his city. These three reactions are not inconsistent. Perhaps it would be wiser of the Athenians not to talk about the Trojan War.

Herodotus and Homer have thus brought us some way from the heady excitement of Athens' empowerment by liberation and *isēgoria*, and the dark story of Athens' progression from suffering tyranny to exerting it is suffused by a Homeric colour that makes it an epic tale in its own right.<sup>151</sup> Nor does that colour disappear after 5.97. We have already noticed Darius' intertextually futile prayer for revenge on Athens (above, p. 333) and, in the light of the larger pattern, we may now be more tempted to detect a deliberate allusion to *Il.* 24.1 at 5.102.3–103.1 (above, p. 329). In the same vein there is one more passage that perhaps deserves mention.

As the Ionians, Athenians, and Eretrians march to Sardis they go along the River Cayster. Hornblower imagines some of them recollecting the comparison between the Achaean host and the birds of the Cayster valley in *Iliad* 2.459–65.<sup>152</sup> Should the reader be doing that too? Does mention of the Cayster evoke Homer as strongly as, e.g., Lotus-eaters or animals belonging to Helios (above, pp. 324–5, 330)? When Aristophanes makes an embassy to Persia pass that way (*Acharn.* 68), Olson for one does not see a Homeric element, merely the place's position on the Ephesus–Sardis–Persia route, and that is *prima facie* all Herodotus had in mind.<sup>153</sup> But the Cayster is absent from surviving texts between Homer and Herodotus, and the richly Homeric material of 5.92–7 might prime the reader to notice the name's Homeric resonance. What does it add if it is there? The Homeric simile evokes the huge number of troops pouring from the ships and huts onto the plain—an army that had been all for sailing home but for whom war is now sweeter than leaving (2.453–4). Perhaps, then, it is a sardonic comment on numbers and aspirations and a hint at the rapidity with which the Athenians, who came in ships, will go away again—a faint proleptic warning comparable with the one that might be read into 5.102.3–103.1 (above, p. 329).

<sup>151</sup> The same was true of the history of Mermnad Lydia: above, pp. 340–1.

<sup>152</sup> Hornblower (2013) 283.

<sup>153</sup> Olson (2002) 93.

### 3. Xerxes Goes to War

If the Athenian ships were the start of evils, another major point in the development of those evils was Xerxes' decision to invade Greece, and the series of dreams (involving figures standing over the dreamer in the manner of Homeric gods)<sup>154</sup> and assemblies linked with mobilisation for war in 7.12–17 evokes *Iliad* 2, where (in somewhat peculiar circumstances) troops are eventually massed for the first actual fighting in the poem.

There is a difference of scale (there are four dreams and four assemblies in Herodotus, only one dream and three assemblies in Homer<sup>155</sup>), but there are many thematic links: a general willingness not to fight; the idea of the same dream coming to different people (the real Nestor says if anyone else had reported a dream like this we would say it was false, but since the commander-in-chief has had it, it must be real); a dreamer initially doing opposite of what the dream said; a warner figure who changes his mind (elaborated out of the two guises of Nestor, though *they* were both in favour of war); the potential deceptiveness of dreams; and even the testing of an assembly with a false message—Xerxes' announcement to the second assembly is effectively like that as he is going against what the first dream said.

There are two sorts of intertextual point here. The first is general in nature: the epic paraphernalia once again adds colour, weight, and sense of occasion to a crucial historical moment, and indeed lodges the definitive decision to go to war in a transcendent realm: the rational argumentation of self-interested parties is replaced by a different sort of discourse. Xerxes first decides on war and then changes his mind, moved by Artabanus' arguments. But that he changes it back again is entirely due to dreams. The second is more specific and concerns the matter of deception.

Agamemnon's dream in Homer is explicitly deceptive (though Nestor—whom the dream impersonated—thinks it is not). But the situation in Herodotus is less clear. Xerxes' third dream is plainly wrongly interpreted by the magi, but seems to tell the truth (Xerxes as ruler is going to suffer a reverse.). Carey insists that the earlier dreams are deceptive: it is the expedition that will be disastrous, not—as the dream says—the failure to have an expedition.<sup>156</sup> The dreams do indeed say that not attacking Greece will be disastrous for Xerxes: the first dream threatens not to forgive Xerxes

<sup>154</sup> *Od.* 20.32 and elsewhere: Hornblower (2013) 174; Vannicelli ap. Vannicelli–Corcella–Nenci (2017) 321.

<sup>155</sup> Herodotus is generally very fond of dreams: Hornblower–Pelling (2017) 235.

<sup>156</sup> Carey (2016).

if he changes his mind; the second dream says Xerxes will be laid low if he does not mobilise; that is reiterated by the Artabanus dream which also threatens Artabanus with punishment if he tries to deflect τὸ χρεόν. Artabanus infers that there is a δαιμονίη ὄρμη, that φθορή τις θεήλατος is going to overtake the Greeks, and that Xerxes must do what the god says. Xerxes makes no comment, but then accepts a false magian interpretation of a plainly off-putting dream. Herodotus makes no comment at all. But there seems to be no undertaking that the expedition will be successful, and Artabanus' inference that it will be can be as wrong as the magi's interpretation of the third dream. All that is certain is that Xerxes' survival in power right now depends on the expedition happening. Agamemnon was told he would capture Troy. This was false. He then told the army that he had been told he would not capture Troy. This was also false. But the upshot is that the war continues, and Odysseus reminds everyone that Calchas' prophecy puts victory in the tenth year. What Agamemnon had been told was false *now* but not false in perpetuity. What Agamemnon told the army was false *now and* in perpetuity. But what Calchas said is a plausible interpretation of the omen, is taken as true by Odysseus, and can be taken as true by anyone because ten years are not yet up. The situation in Herodotus is different. What Xerxes is told is true *now* (he has to attack) but it has no future ramifications once the attack is undertaken. The inference of Artabanus is not authoritative (he is not a Calchas figure) and the view of the magi (who *are* Calchas figures) about the final dream, though taken to be true by Xerxes, is manifestly false.

The situation is clear in Herodotus' text without further additions. But the intertext tends to underline the point by offering a story in which there *is* a clear and authoritative prophecy of success—the thing that is lacking in Herodotus. The crucial proposition that Xerxes was structurally compelled to go to war *whatever the outcome*—a proposition almost entirely articulated through the dream sequence—is thus greatly reinforced when one sees the matter through the intertextual perspective of *Iliad 2*.

#### 4. Battles

War entails battles, and they are a natural focus for Homeric colour in a work presenting itself as a new *Iliad*. There are certain recurrent narrative features that recall Homer in very broad terms,<sup>157</sup> though there is no trace

<sup>157</sup> Marincola (2018). Battles with Persians are long (6.113.1; 9.62.2, 67, 70.2, 102.3, 119.2) like day-long Homeric battles.

of the prolonged *aristeia* of a specially heroic individual:<sup>158</sup> we are not in that sort of individualistic world, just as we are not in a world of physiologically vivid death<sup>159</sup> or, concomitantly, obituary digressions.<sup>160</sup> But the degree to which Herodotus adds more specific Homeric character varies.

Apart from *έτεραλκέως άγωνιζομένους* (above, p. 328) and a rather plain catalogue of Greek forces, Artemisium has little to offer.

Mycale is intratextually linked with Artemisium by use of *έτεραλκής* and involves non-Persian barbarians who (in quasi-Homeric terminology) 'no longer turned to *άλκή*', but is most notable for the word *έρκος*—not so much for its use to designate the actual Persian palisade (9.96.3, 97: also called *τείχος* in 9.102), since Homer never uses it in that way (and in particular does not apply it to the Achaean wall), but for the statement that the Persians used their shields to make a *έρκος*, which recalls Homer's statement that the Greeks sought to protect their wall *έρκει χαλκείω* (*Il.* 15.567). As the Persian shields were made of wicker, there is contrast as well as similarity here: we have heard before (at Plataea: 9.62) that, compared with Greeks, Persians do not lack valour but are at a disadvantage in equipment, and this small intertextual allusion (almost a joke?) reinforces the intratextual point. Of course, if the Persians are compared with the Achaeans, we have another case in which the Greeks are assimilated with Trojans.<sup>161</sup>

<sup>158</sup> Post-battle round-up passages identify those who fought best but that is not the same—or is the closest approach possible in the post-epic world? The occasional naming of individual fighters (usually as casualties) in the battle-narrative proper is part of the background Iliadic colour. But the Persians' capture and celebration of the heroically wounded Pytheas (7.181) is not really a Homeric incident.

<sup>159</sup> See Boedeker (2003); Fragoulaki, above, Ch. 5.

<sup>160</sup> The closest formal approach is 7.224, a five-line note on Abrocomes and Hyperanthes, sons of Darius by his niece Phratagune, a lady who inherited the whole of her father's estate—which matches the often genealogical character of Homeric passages. 6.114 famously does *not* say who Cynegirus was. Post-battle round-ups do afford the chance of elaborating about particular individuals, though characteristically about ones who are not dead. These can be stories about what happened in the battle (Epizelus (6.117); Eurytus (7.229); Ameinias (8.93); Adeimantus (8.94); Aristides (8.95); Aristodemus (9.71); Callicrates (9.72); Sophanes (9.73–4)) or at other times before or after (Dieneces (7.226); Aristodemus (7.229–31); Sophanes (9.75)). The Sophanes passage is particularly striking, with elements of mythological history, strange behaviour (Sophanes' anchor), and prolepsis to the 460s and the Peloponnesian War.

<sup>161</sup> See below, p. 356 for more on the (actual) wall.

And this is also true at Marathon.<sup>162</sup> The climax of the Marathon narrative is plainly Homeric: not only does it contain the only Herodotean instances of the Homeric use of *κόπτειν* in reference to battle violence,<sup>163</sup> but the calling for fire (something hardly readily available at Marathon?), the arm wounds, and the word *ἄφλαστον* (only ever encountered here and in *Iliad*-inspired passages) channel *Iliad* 15.713–15, in Hector's assault on the ships at the height of the post-Wrath crisis for the Achaean cause. Moreover, Hector was grabbing what had been Protesilaus' ship, just as the Persian ships at Marathon are the first to have landed in heartland Greece. And yet (as in 5.97.3) this heroic picture casts the Athenians as Trojans. The Trojan assault was, of course, ultimately unsuccessful, and the Persians will be back: both Trojan and Persian Wars continued. That is one point that may be in Herodotus' mind. But the Athenians paired Marathon with the *capture* of Troy in the Stoa Poikile,<sup>164</sup> and it seems inescapable that Herodotus is again taking a rather high-profile opportunity to comment a little sceptically on fifth-century use of the Trojan/Persian War script.

There is also an element of Homer-based critique in the treatment of Salamis. News of capture of the Athenian acropolis caused a commotion (*thorubos*) in which some Greek commanders at Salamis board their ships for flight, while the rest held a meeting, decided to defend the Peloponnese, and boarded their ships (to leave next day). The *thorubos* is contextually out of place in Herodotus, and a clear signal that an *Iliad* 2 parallel is at work here:<sup>165</sup> as with the fire at Marathon, an intertext deforms the historical record in a rather specific manner.<sup>166</sup> The crisis is stemmed by Mnesiphilus acting through Themistocles—a mundane alternative to Athena and Odysseus. In the ensuing assembly, Themistocles clashes twice with Adeimantus, responding to his barbs with witticism (59) and insult (61), in scenes that have been felt to echo Odysseus and Thersites.<sup>167</sup> The references to beating and to Themistocles being *apolis* (and thus inferior) give colour to this: if so, Themistocles is the Thersites figure, even though as Mnesiphilus'

<sup>162</sup> See Pelling (2006) 255; (2013) 9–11; Fragoulaki, above, pp. 122–5.

<sup>163</sup> *Il.* 11.146; 12.204; 13.203. The point is noted by Hornblower–Pelling (2017) 243, 255.

<sup>164</sup> Hornblower–Pelling (2017) 28 note the pairing, but not the dissonance.

<sup>165</sup> Pelling (2006); A. M. Bowie (2007) 145; Blösel (2004) 236–41.

<sup>166</sup> I distinguish this from, e.g., the way the dream sequence in Book 7 substitutes literary fancy for actual political and strategic discussion or the doubts one might have about the historicity of the Candaules' wife story.

<sup>167</sup> Asheri (2003) 261.

agent he echoes Odysseus. Perhaps this complicates and enriches the figure of Themistocles;<sup>168</sup> or perhaps it shows that any intertextual relation between *Iliad* 2 and these events is general and impressionistic—a suggestion that the difficulty of establishing sensible strategy at Salamis has something in common with the absurd (self-inflicted) disorder of *Iliad* 2.

Moreover *Iliad* 2 may not be the only thing lurking in the background. Underlying the arguments at Salamis is creation of a wall at the Isthmus, a counterpart to the wooden walls of the fleet but also to the crisis in *Iliad* 7 onwards centring round the Achaean wall and defence of the ships: walls, crisis, and ships are thus recombined in a different fashion. The Herodotean situation disjoins wall and ships, whereas in Homer the wall can protect the ships, and the point of intertext is to underline the disjunction: the Isthmus walls are no good for protecting ships—and so no good for protecting anything else.<sup>169</sup> Thinking along these lines, one is then tempted to associate the clandestine night-time episodes involving Sicinnus (who goes to the enemy camp) and Aristides and the Tenians (who in a sense come with information from it) with the events of *Iliad* 10, when the Achaean wall crisis has worsened and Greeks venture into the Trojan camp to return with information and booty.<sup>170</sup> Once again any echoes remain of a generic and impressionistic sort, and the Greeks of 480 *will* resolve the immediate crisis forthwith, whereas there is still a long while to go to anything similar in the *Iliad*.

So Herodotus *is* giving Salamis an epic quality befitting its importance: there were two moments at which Salamis was nearly abandoned—first in response to fall of the Acropolis (when some commanders rush to the ships and the rest make an assembly decision to withdraw the next day) and second in response to Persians advancing towards Isthmus and its wall-

<sup>168</sup> Thersites recurs in Book 8. At 8.92.2 (Polycritus speaks to Themistocles) the presence of *ἐπεκερτομήσε* and *ὄνειδίζων* brings us close to *Il.* 2.255–6 and the fact that *ἐπεκερτομήσε* is a Herodotean *hapax* and that 2.255–6 is from an episode already evoked in the pre-Salamis narrative suggests deliberate allusion, especially as there are plausible evocations of Thersites in 8.59–61 (Themistocles = Thersites) and 8.125 (Timodemus = Thersites). This is not fatally damaged by emending *ὄνειδίζων* to *ὄνειδίζοντα*, though with the latter both Polycritus and Themistocles become Thersites-like and the overtones of the intertext (and the place of this passage among the others) would be a bit different. (For another intertext affected by textual uncertainty see above, n. 149.) That Themistocles comes out in three Thersites-evocations variously as Odysseus, Thersites, and Agamemnon is perhaps a tribute to his slippery quality. He was channelling Odysseus' companions at the start of Book 8 (above, p. 332); and cf. also above, p. 330 for his dubious role in another intertext.

<sup>169</sup> Cf. below, p. 356.

<sup>170</sup> An episode already evoked earlier: see above, p. 333.

under-construction (when a new assembly is held)—and both provoke Homeric intertexts. But Herodotus is also seeking to underline what a dangerously close-run thing it all was and how much the Greeks themselves were responsible for this. And it should not be forgotten that he has already used the bizarre episode in *Iliad* 2 to suggest something similar about the original Persian decision to attack Greece. Homer does not always exist to make Greeks beautifully heroic: he can be used to establish that both sides can end up looking like headless chickens.

Things are a little different at Thermopylae, where a good deal of the narrative fulfils a simple agenda of investing Thermopylae in general and Sparta and/or Leonidas in particular with epic colour.<sup>171</sup> There are mostly no dissonant complications, though the marking of *kleos* as communal (as well as individual) is a reminder that we are in a post-epic world (see above, p. 315), as in a different way is the attribution of *μῆνις* to the Spartans collectively (7.229.2) rather than to a god or exceptional individual as in Homer and normally in Herodotus.<sup>172</sup> (In a nice intratext the Athenians describe their anger at Sparta's dilatoriness in 479 with the verb *μηνίω*: 9.7β.2.) Another programmatic theme from the opening of *Histories* resurfaces: Leonidas' *kleos* is paired with the preservation of Sparta's *eudaimoniē* (7.220.2).

More disturbing is the description of the Spartans as *ἀτέοντες* (7.223.4)—a *hapax* in Herodotus and in Homer (*Il.* 20.332), where Aeneas would be *θεῶν ἀτέοντα* if he fought against Achilles, a better man and one more beloved of gods: so a specific passage of Homer seems in view that carries the overtone of affront to the gods. Perhaps this is an acceptable exaggeration to capture

<sup>171</sup> Apart from items noted just below, attention has been drawn at various times to the catalogue (7.202–4), a Homeric dawn (7.217.1), a time-indication from peacetime (7.223; Carey (2016) 86), a hint of long-haired Achaeans (7.208), the naming of casualties mid-battle (7.224), the fight over Leonidas' body (7.225), the four attacks followed by failure (7.225; cf. above, p. 316), and the lion-statue (7.225.2) as an evocation of Homeric lion similes. For these and other items (including the double-*hapax* *περισταδόν* and various complexities in 7.229–34) see Fragoulaki, above, pp. 130–48; Barker, above, pp. 174–84. I am less persuaded that 7.219 recalls the panicking Greeks of *Iliad* 2 (Pelling (2006) 98), though it *is* an episode used elsewhere (see above, pp. 349–50, 352–3). For another *Iliad* 2 analogy one could look to 9.117: straight after a reference to Protesilaus, we have the Greeks wanting to abandon the siege of Sestos and go home, for all the world like the Greeks of *Iliad* 2. See Boedeker (1988) 34.

<sup>172</sup> 7.134.1, 137.1–2 (hero Talthybius), 169.3 (the dead Minos), 197.3 (god). The Athenians' wrath in 5.84 is about religious deficiency. See also above, p. 330 on the *ἀμῆνιτος* Evenius. Spartan wrath is directed against Aristodemus. On the intertext (*λιποψυχέοντα* in 7.229.1) which links him to Sarpedon and chimes with Herodotus' disapproval of the Spartan reaction to his death at Plataea, see below, pp. 359–60.



the circumstances of self-immolation—or perhaps it is simply true, since it is evident that the gods have willed the defeat at Thermopylae.<sup>173</sup> Either way it turns the Spartans into Trojans. The same happens both with Fragoulaki's enticing suggestion that the final act at Thermopylae echoes Hector's death outside the walls of Troy (above, pp. 134–6, 139, 142–8) and with Xerxes' decapitation of Leonidas' body (7.238): in the *Iliad* such behaviour is the reserve of Greeks and Leonidas thus becomes a Trojan—and of questionable rank: for the maltreatment of Hector's body is different and decapitation is limited to lesser persons. (Pausanias will later disavow this feature of Homeric Achaean behaviour (above, p. 361) as barbarous, but that actually intratextually validates the idea that Xerxes was inflicting Achaean indignity upon a Trojan.) It appears, then, that Leonidas and the Three Hundred provide another example of inversion of the New Trojan War script: they achieved Homeric *kleos* but at this point they were, after all, on the losing side. The case is provocative, but not, perhaps, quite as provocative as that of the Trojan Athenians at Marathon. The Athenians' victory *was* only provisional (above, p. 352), but assimilation to Hector in a moment of triumphant success is more disruptive than evocation of Hector in his hour of tragic failure.

Finally we reach Plataea, the battle with the largest number of discrete Homeric intertextual allusions. Some have already been noticed: Thersander's conversation with an unnamed Persian; the Persian–Phocian stand-off; Masistius' alternative identity as Macistius; the Athenian–Tegean dispute; the use of *ἐπιρρεόντων* in 9.38 and *ὀπέωνες* in 9.50–1<sup>174</sup>—and one might add *ἄδην ἔχειν* in 9.39.<sup>175</sup> Such things contribute to a persistent drip of Homeric colour, but they are individually of varied intrinsic significance, the Thersander conversation and Athenian–Tegean argument being much more thematically significant than the others (of which *ἄδην ἔχειν* is perhaps the most interesting)—and *their* significance is as much for their intratextual connections elsewhere in *Histories* as for their commentary on Plataea. (Both, of course, come from the preliminaries to the fighting.)

One element of the actual fighting may actually be labelled as Homeric. 9.70 announces that, when the Persians fled to their palisade, a *τειχομαχίη*

<sup>173</sup> Vannicelli ap. Vannicelli–Corcella–Nenci (2017) 576.

<sup>174</sup> See above, pp. 312–3, 324, 327 (n. 103), 340.

<sup>175</sup> *ἄδην εἶχον κτείνοντες*: this is the sole Herodotean example of a word that Homer uses when saying that Greek heroes (Achilles, the Ajaxes, Teucer) will give their Trojan adversaries their fill of war (13.315; 19.423): the assimilation of the slaughter of easy non-combatant targets to epic battle is a bitter joke that plainly criticises Persian behaviour. Flower–Marincola (2002) 180 note the Homeric word but not the intertextual point.

ἔρρωμενεστέρη ensued. This is the first use of the noun in surviving Greek, and it is very tempting to think its appearance presupposes use of the word as a name for *Iliad* 11 (first attested in Pl. *Ion* 539b) and that the final act at Plataea is thus officially a Homeric event. If so, it is one in which the Greeks have again become Trojans, just as the Athenians did at Marathon. And that intratext is specially appropriate since it was specifically the Athenians who made the Plataea assault successful, even though (in another intratext) it is the Tegeans who enter the stockade first. Meanwhile the passage displays a third pair of (Homeric) intratexts when the statement that none of the Persians ‘remembered ἀλκή’ when the stockade was breached recalls not only the Phocians in 9.18 (who *did* have a share in ἀλκή) but also the Persians’ non-Greek subjects at Mycale who ‘no longer turned to ἀλκή’ (9.102.3) when *their* wall was overrun. The Mycale passage has its own verbal allusion to the Iliadic *teikhomakhīē* (see above, p. 351) and is the only Herodotean event that literally matches Homer in having an attack launched on ships protected by a wall: in Book 8 it was the disjunction of ships and wall that was thematically significant (above, p. 353), at Marathon there was no wall, at Magnesia there was no attack (though the commanders feared one: 7.191), and at Plataea there are no ships. All of these passages belong together in the intratextual metanarrative, and one must stress again Herodotus’ persistent interest in an episode that equates 480 Greeks either with Achaeans at their weakest (in Book 8) or with temporarily rampant Trojans.<sup>176</sup>

Three passages turn the Homeric spotlight on the Persians.

Masistius is unheroically floored by a bowshot and despatched by an anonymous adversary,<sup>177</sup> but his fate involves a Homeric fight over his body, the closest Herodotus approaches to the gory tastes of Homeric narrative (he is killed by a stab in the eye), and ritual mourning that befits the death of a hero (even if its mode is distinctively Persian), and his adversaries may have meant to salute him with the name Macistius (above, p. 324).

The colloquy of Mardonius and Artabazus (9.41) can certainly be compared generically to those of Hector and Poulydamas in *Iliad* 12.200–50 and 18.243–313, where Hector disregards sound advice<sup>178</sup>—particularly the latter where Poulydamas advises retreat within walls that even Achilles cannot storm. Poulydamas has the skill to see future as well as past (he reads omens,

<sup>176</sup> From the perspective of 1.0, it is nice that the Achaean wall will have world-wide *kleos* (7.451) and eventually be utterly destroyed (12.13–33).

<sup>177</sup> Fragoulaki, above, p. 125–7.

<sup>178</sup> Flower–Marincola (2002) 181; Asheri (2006) 236.

and this informs his comments), and Herodotus says Artabazus could evidently see the future ('foresaw more'): and there have already been predictions (9.16). In the first episode Hector articulates the *εἰς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης* principle, while Mardonius speaks of following the *nomos* of the Persians. Omens favouring defence (not attack) figure in the immediately preceding narrative; and 9.42 is about oracles (including the manipulative use of one by Mardonius). The intertext marks a crucial strategic choice in Homeric manner, without creating any notable further complexities. Mardonius remains Trojan and perhaps (because he corresponds to Hector) at least mildly heroic.

Seven chapters later Mardonius issues taunts and a challenge (9.48–9). The contents and result of his taunt are generically Homeric:<sup>179</sup> heroic accusations about false boasting are echoed by Mardonius' remark that others falsely boast on Sparta's behalf,<sup>180</sup> he contrasts the Spartans' behaviour with what is expected *κατὰ κλέος* (the Homeric virtue largely confined to Spartans: above, pp. 315–6), the verb *πτώσσουντες* (only here in Herodotus) is absolutely appropriate,<sup>181</sup> and the Spartans' silent response is Homeric (Diomedes (twice), Deiphobus, Paris) as well as Laconic. The ensuing challenge to the Spartans specifically recalls Paris' challenge of Menelaus in *Iliad* 3. That does eventually result in a fight (from which Paris is rescued by Aphrodite); and the Persians and Spartans *do* eventually fight at Plataea in a sort of *monomakhia*, recalling the Athenian *monomakhia* at Marathon.<sup>182</sup> Mardonius is thus assimilated to Paris, and both lose, but Mardonius emerges from the intertext as the more heroic figure, one who wants to fight and whose death helps to provide some sort of closure. The Paris challenge, by contrast, was embarrassing. Paris' initial challenge resulted in his running away when Menelaus stepped forward to answer it and it is only resumed when Hector has denounced his cowardice (appropriately in a taunt speech) and reissued it on the penitent Paris' behalf; and, when Paris has been defeated, the Trojans break the truce, full-scale war continues, and the challenge has settled nothing.

<sup>179</sup> Taunts by enemies: *Il.* 8.148–9, 160–71; 13.446–54. Taunts by one's own side: *Il.* 3.39–57; 4.338–48, 370–400; 7.96–102; 8.228–44; 11.385–95.

<sup>180</sup> *ἐκπαγλομένων ὡς οὔτε φεύγετε ἐκ πολέμου οὔτε τάξιν ἐκλείπετε*. This is a rare and peculiarly Herodotean verb, also used in 7.181 and 8.92, both describing Persian admiration of the courage of the Aeginetan Pytheas.

<sup>181</sup> It appears in taunt speeches in *Il.* 4.340, 370–1 and seven times in descriptions of poor battle performance.

<sup>182</sup> The Tegeans (9.62) are side-lined: 9.65 makes it 'the Spartans beat the Persians'.

Mardonius thus emerges as a better version of Paris and even a simulacrum of Hector.<sup>183</sup> The tone of what he says *is* triumphalist (and that continues in his further taunting remarks at 9.58, which pick up on both of the previous passages)—ironically so, in view of the outcome—but the Homeric hero is not given to measured discourse, and, if readers feel that Mardonius is eventually somewhat redeemed from the manipulative and self-centred figure we saw at the start of Book 7, that is the product not just of what is said of his role in the battle (9.63)—the leader who can inspire his troops wherever he appears on the battlefield (itself a Homeric trope?)—but of the Homeric intertexts that precede it.<sup>184</sup>

What about his Spartan adversaries? Four individuals are in question, Amompharetus, Aristodemus, Callicrates, and Pausanias.

Perhaps Amompharetus' joke for the benefit of the Athenian messenger, replacing a voting pebble with a rock requiring two hands to lift, is a nod towards Homeric heroes and big rocks,<sup>185</sup> but on the whole the Amompharetus scene (9.53–7) has only at best rather general echoes of Homeric heroism. His eventual willingness to abandon his position is not un-Homeric (Homeric heroes sometimes retreat or are made to do so by their guardian gods), but it may make one think by contrast of Leonidas: that comparison has been in the air since Mardonius' comment on Sparta's false *kleos* in 9.48 (see above, p. 357)—and it is a comment he will repeat (9.58) in reference to the retreat of which Amompharetus becomes part.

The Callicrates episode (9.72) has been compared with the wounding of Menelaus in *Iliad* 4.127–219.<sup>186</sup> That episode is a huge set-piece—lots about his attacker Pandarus and his bow, a fine simile describing the wound, Agamemnon's despairing speech, medical treatment by Machaon, and so

<sup>183</sup> His death is foreshadowed as befits an epic hero (7.10θ.3; 8.114.2; 9.64.1), and there is a certain heroic quality when he envisages dying nobly in a great cause (*καλῶς τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον ὑπὲρ μεγάλων αἰωρηθέντα*) in 8.100.1. Flower–Marincola (2002) 9–11 see him as a Hector-like character with the moral failing of being an agent of imperialism.

<sup>184</sup> Another potentially Homeric Persian is Zopyrus, whose exceptional and exceptionally rewarded *ἀγαθοεργίη* involved a self-mutilation that recalls Odysseus' trip to Troy (*Od.* 4.242–64). Zopyrus secured Babylon whereas Odysseus only spied on Troy, but his role in its fall is recounted in an adjacent passage (*Od.* 4.265–89), so Zopyrus and Odysseus are globally comparable in their respective spheres, though Zopyrus (excelled only by Cyrus) is the more remarkable. But see West (2003) 428–33, reminding us that non-Homeric epic and the inventions of Zopyrus' family may be more directly instrumental here than Homer.

<sup>185</sup> Flower–Marincola (2002) 205, citing *Il.* 5.302–4. And a suggestion that Athenians are not real heroes?

<sup>186</sup> Fragoulaki, above, pp. 127–9.

forth—occurring at a crucial moment in a part of *Iliad* already evoked in Mardonius' challenge. So it is memorable, and the description of someone wounded by arrow before battle *might* call it to mind. But there *are* differences: Callicrates was wounded during the pause while Pausanias sought good omens to start fighting, whereas Menelaus is wounded during a truce. Unlike Callicrates, Menelaus is not sitting when hit (he is last heard of striding around looking for Paris), though the rest of army is presumably still seated since the duel. Menelaus was a unique (specially chosen) victim, Callicrates one of many (cf. 9.61.3), though that is not highlighted in 9.72. Callicrates regrets that he will not now perform the great deeds he is capable of: that half-resembles Agamemnon's fear that the death of Menelaus will mean both abandonment of the war on Troy and the loss of both Helen and Menelaus' body, but Callicrates' dignity is at odds with Agamemnon's extravagantly misplaced apprehension, just as the brevity of the whole account is at odds with a Homeric set piece that is at times comical and altogether a bit over the top. If we do think of Menelaus, we may allow that it adds some weight to the incident, but we shall also (maybe more powerfully) be led to reflect that the modern world is not the Homeric one (see below, p. 367) and to feel enhanced sympathy for Callicrates' banal but real death.

Sympathy and contrast with the modern world are also elements in the more complicated case of Aristodemus, the disgraced survivor of Thermopylae who redeemed himself in death at Plataea. In the Spartans' view Aristodemus was at fault for fighting crazily (*λυσσῶντα*: 9.71.3). This is the only Herodotean occurrence of a state of mind Homer attributes to Hector and Achilles<sup>187</sup>—on both occasions, oddly enough, in passages dealing with attacks on walls, the topic of the previous chapter in Herodotus. It is a state of mind unacceptable in the modern Spartan world, especially as Aristodemus also broke ranks to achieve great deeds,<sup>188</sup> and he is denied recognition as the best of the Spartans who fought at Plataea. From this unsympathetic perspective there is once again a difference between Homer's world and the present, and it works against Aristodemus' claim to be a Homeric hero.

<sup>187</sup> *Il.* 9.237–9, 353 (the *λύσσα* of Hector who rages madly because he trusts in Zeus) and 21.542 (the *λύσσα* of Achilles when he might have captured Troy had not Apollo intervened)

<sup>188</sup> ἔργα ἀποδέξασθαι μεγάλα, exactly in the spirit of the Herodotean programme: μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά ... ἀποδεχθέντα ἀκλεῖα γένηται (1.0). But in the Spartan view such acts fall short of becoming an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός.

But the Spartan perspective is not the only one nor, as Barker points out elsewhere in this volume (above, pp. pp. 166–7, 169–74, 189–90, 197–9, 201–4), is *λυσσῶντα* the only intertextually significant word in the story of Aristodemus. Herodotus' Aristodemus fainted at Thermopylae but survived disgrace to fight another day and die heroically (7.229). Homer's Sarpedon loses consciousness in *Iliad* 5 but recovers to fight again and eventually die at the hands of Patroclus. An intertextual connection between these stories is triggered when a Herodotean *hapax* (*λιποψυχέοντα*: 7.229.1), describing Aristodemus' faint, evokes a unique Homeric use of *τὸν δὲ λίπε ψυχὴν* to describe Sarpedon's temporary loss of consciousness (*Il.* 5.696), and it is a connection that claims a great deal for Aristodemus, given Sarpedon's status in *Iliad*, not least because of his ideologically programmatic speech about the heroic leader's duty to his community (12.310–28). The Spartans disdained Aristodemus twice, once for fainting and not wanting to die and then for dying when he plainly wanted to die (9.71). But Herodotus explicitly disagrees with the Spartans' post-Plataea judgement (mooting *phthonos* as its cause), and through the intertext he arguably rates Aristodemus as one of the greatest and most tragic of Homeric heroes – though, of course, in a by now familiar reversal, he is not a *Greek* hero: for Sarpedon is a Lycian and the buttress of the city of Troy (*ἔρμα πόλῃος*: 16.549).

So far then, while Mardonius can claim some Homeric quality, the Spartan cases have been less straightforward—even contentious. And, even with Pausanias, things are not entirely different.

While the slaughter is going on, a female suppliant comes to Pausanias dressed in gold and other finery, the name of her father reveals a *xenia*-relationship, and the woman is spared from slavery.<sup>189</sup> Some detect here overtones of the meeting of Diomedes and the gold-armoured Glaucus in *Iliad* 6.119–236, where discovery of a *xenia*-relationship prompts gift-exchange rather than fighting.<sup>190</sup> If so, the rather notable absence of any stories about Pausanias' personal valour to Plataea (he is seen here 'directing'

<sup>189</sup> The lady uses a Homeric turn of phrase, describing the Persians as people who have regard (*ῥπίς*) neither for *daimones* nor gods and echoing the Athenians' reference to Mardonius' lack of *opsis* for gods and heroes (8.143.2). *ῥπίς* occurs only in these passages in Herodotus and, although it is used in a non-Homeric way—in Homer *θεῶν ῥπίς* means the watchfulness of gods over men and their wrongdoings, whereas in Herodotus it is the respect men (should) show to the gods (a consequence of Homeric *θεῶν ῥπίς*)—the link and verbal colour are clear. But there is no more particular intertext involved.

<sup>190</sup> That Leutychidas' story about a different Glaucus in 6.86 is intertextually linked with this passage seems unlikely (Hornblower–Pelling (2017) 202). See also above, nn. 116, 136.

things during a massacre<sup>191</sup>) is partly compensated by a story that associates him with Homeric heroes who chose not to fight for honourable reasons (thus adding to his stature) and displays him behaving chivalrously to a woman (though, in *xenia* terms, he had little choice). But it is also another case of a famous Homeric scene (like the wounding of Menelaus, but much more dignified, notwithstanding Glaucus' moment of madness at the end) transmuted into something proper to the real world of 479.

When the fighting is finally over, Pausanias is celebrated for κλέος μέγιστον Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν for saving Greece (echoing—but exceeding? and also not communalising?—the *kleos* of Leonidas in Book 7 and his 'saving of Greece' in 8.114.2) and given prizes of women, horses, money, and camels, a list in which the women in particular recall the Homeric world<sup>192</sup> and the camels insist upon the contemporary one. But then (in a moment that also intratexts with Leonidas) Pausanias is shown rejecting impalement of Mardonius' corpse in revenge for Xerxes' mutilation (decapitation) of Leonidas' body, declaring such behaviour more suited to barbarians, and in this he is entirely rejecting the *Iliad* model. As already observed (above, p. 355), in the *Iliad* corpses are mutilated by Greeks and in fact *only* by Greeks (Trojans threats of this sort are never fulfilled), but Pausanias will not play the role of an Achaean. His position is more in the spirit of *Od.* 22.411–18, where Odysseus rejects any gloating over dead enemies who have been adequately punished for their sins (as Leonidas has now been revenged). But those with precise recollection of *Odyssey* 22 will, of course, understand that Pausanias' attitude is in part a tribute to Mardonius' status: Odysseus is protective of the dead suitors, but the serving women are hanged and Melanthius is gruesomely mutilated. (When the Athenians indulge in barbarian behaviour towards Artayctes they have a Homeric precedent, but only if Artayctes, as a sinner against the shrine of a Homeric hero, is deemed to have forfeited the rights due to an aristocratic opponent.)

As a pendant to the Achilles-like prizes, Herodotus reports Pausanias' use of the accoutrements of Mardonius' royal tent to make a comparison between Persian and Spartan dining. The king concludes the demonstration describing the poor Greek fare that the Persians unaccountably wished to

<sup>191</sup> Δίεπειν is the word Homer used of Odysseus getting the army back to assembly in *Iliad* 2—staff-officer terminology? The passage is formally part of the post-battle round-up, not the battle narrative itself.

<sup>192</sup> E.g., the gifts for Achilles in *Il.* 9.122–30: tripods, talents, cauldrons, horses, gold, and women.

appropriate as *δίαιτα οἰζυρή* (9.82.3), using a Homeric poetic adjective proper to war, grief, and human wretchedness (but not food) that is found only here in Herodotus and not again until the second century AD—a final darkly humorous epic flourish for the depiction of Pausanias the hero, and one that underlines how un-Homeric Spartan *diaita* is. No hero would have eaten like that or thought it consonant with his status, and once again it turns out that the Spartans of 479 are not really Homeric heroes.

In fact, the only way in which that is absolutely not true in the Plataea narrative is the fact that Pausanias wins unparalleled *kleos*. The Thersander story in a sense prefigures Plataea as a final epic showdown, and it can be said that the Achaean hero Pausanias wins out over the Trojan hero Mardonius. But, although the narrative is one of epic proportion and literary presence, Herodotus has used intertexts to maintain a distance between the plain of Plataea (and especially the Greeks on it) and the plain of Troy. Ironically it is the Athenian assault on the stockade that comes closest to being a Homeric event—and it is one of those that confuses the Achaean–Greek and Trojan–Persian categories.

#### 4. Concluding Remarks

We are dealing here with a topic where the devil is in the details. But some more general observations are possible by way of summary.

1. Intentionality can be an issue (see above, pp. 300, 323, 327–32, 342–3, 348, 354 (n. 171)). But the plentiful use of *hapax legomena* (both unique Herodotean use of Homeric words and Herodotean use of unique Homeric words and occasionally both) argues a discriminating knowledge of Homeric language that favours the possibility of quite slight linguistic hints (syntactical as well as lexical) being picked up,<sup>193</sup> and intratextual phenomena (cf. n. 197), including the adjacency of strong and faint allusions (e.g., pp. 332, 348), can assist the spotting and validation of relatively slight intertexts. In any case, there is no doubt that allusive intertexts do exist. If ancient commentators did not notice them, they were being blind, and if they did notice them but thought them uninteresting, their judgement must strike us as awry.

<sup>193</sup> For *hapax* and near-*hapax* uses see above, pp. 310, 316, 326, 328, 333, 334, 342, 348, 351, 354, 357, 359, 360, 362, 366 and nn. 64, 103, 130, 147, 168, 171, 175, 189. One may also note the deliberately restricted use of two iconic Homeric words, *kleos* (above, p. 366) and *mēnis* (above, pp. 330, 354).



2. The number considering the size of the text is not perhaps very large.<sup>194</sup> Whether it is larger than for any other target in Herodotus or for any other prose author intertexting with Homer is a matter for investigation. One suspects the answer is yes in both cases, though the issue may be complicated by later authors intertexting with Homeric Herodotus.

3. The relatively small number of specific intertexts in Herodotus means that they sit within a wider text that is (a) all in a sense Homeric inasmuch as 1.0–5 marks the *Histories* as such and the work's very general characteristics—long, leisurely, and digressive narrative about war and politics in many different settings—concur, but (b) often obedient to different literary and intellectual agendas. They are small islands in a large sea.

4. The target texts are not evenly spread across the entire Homeric corpus. There are several uses of *Iliad* 2 and 24 and of the middle books of *Iliad* (where the Achaeans are under pressure) but little sign (apart from 24) of the phase in which Achilles is back in the fray. Specific intertexts with *Odyssey* are less numerous (even though 1.5.3–4 makes the work programmatically fundamental) and relate to fairly limited parts of the work. The intertexts are also not spread evenly across the text of Herodotus. Scholars have been not as generous in alleging non-explicit Homeric intertexts in Book 2 or 4,<sup>195</sup> though both contain notable explicit references. Of course, full-blown ethnographic description is probably not going to engage with Homer in detail. But even in the historical narrative parts of *Histories* Homer's detailed impact seems comparatively small until we reach Books 5–9. Those are the books of the Persian War proper, and that is probably not coincidental. But one should acknowledge the possibility that modern readers have not looked for intertexts with the same attention in all parts of the work, because they have started out with certain assumptions about where they will be found.

5. Where intertexts do occur, they are found in association with important points in the structure of the text (above, pp. 296–300, 305–7, 309, 310–11, 311–15, 341, 345) and/or important events or trains of events in the narrative (above, pp. 306, 311–15, 323, 329, 331, 340–62). It is Herodotus' judgement of what belongs in this category that results in a dearth of cases in Books 1–4, apart from the Lydia sequence (above, pp. 309–10, 330–1, 340–1), Cambyses in Egypt (above, pp. 314–15, 320–1), and

<sup>194</sup> The dataset underlying this essay involves about 115 passages of varying extent.

<sup>195</sup> The intertext-of-absence in 4.177 seems clear (above, pp. 324–5). I am uncertain about 4.9–10 (above, n. 103) and about the impact of analogies or contrasts between Scythian habits and Homeric material noted by Skinner (2018) 220 (drinking) and Hartog (1988) 161 (booty).

some weaker touches in Darius' early reign,<sup>196</sup> and also leaves something of a gap between the battle of Lade (which ends a long sequence of material stretching back to 5.65) and Marathon. Once we reach Book 7 what count as important events come in a more continuous sequence, at least from Thermopylae onwards, and even the period between Salamis and Plataea attracts intertexts—which is to say that it is regarded as important in its own right.

6. There is a very important element of intratextual connection between intertext-marked material.<sup>197</sup> In some cases this helps to validate the recognition that an intertext is present at a particular point. The way in which a particular linguistic feature can mark a number of distinct passages that turn out to have a coherent message is striking (see, e.g., above, pp. 327–30, 335–7), as is the recurrent use of *Iliad* 2 and 24.

7. Intertexts can be in the narrator's voice or that of one of the in-text characters. They can trade on language (words and phrases), literary structure, episode-types, speech-types, other compositional elements, intratextual linkage, subject-type, or narrative content<sup>198</sup>—and these are not, of course, mutually exclusive categories—and they can target (i) a specific Homeric passage (or perhaps two distinct specific passages at once: above, pp. 307–8, 337, 360), (ii) a set of Homeric passages (defined by language or content)<sup>199</sup> or (iii) a more generic Homeric feel (though in practice this last category is probably only an extended, if fuzzy, version of the second one). Their tone or effect can be notably jokey, sardonic, or even satirical (above, pp. 317–19, 323, 326, 333, 339, 346, 348, 351, 352, 359), and a wider range of cases may claim to display a certain degree of humour (e.g., above, pp. 335–8) or to be a source of enjoyment (above, pp. 302, 304–5, 325, 328, 336–7). But there is also tonal neutrality or positive sobriety, and, although the

<sup>196</sup> An intratextual link to a Hesiodic intertext (above, p. 305), the no-more-than-generically Homeric catalogue of tribute-*nomoi* (above, n. 90), Atossa (above, n. 101), faint Homeric echoes in 3.127.2–128.1 with *Il.* 10.303 (Hector invites volunteers) and *Il.* 3.316, 7.161–83 (the use of lots in passages reflected elsewhere in Herodotus: above, p. 337), and the case of Zopyrus (above, n. 184). The big intertextual show-piece of the accession narrative is the constitutional debate which belongs to an entirely non-Homeric part of Herodotus' intellectual tool-kit.

<sup>197</sup> Above, pp. 301, 305, 305–6, 307, 308, 309–10, 312, 313, 315, 317, 318, 319, 322–3, 327, 329, 331, 335–7, 340–1, 343, 344, 346, 346–7, 348, 351, 354, 355, 356, 361.

<sup>198</sup> This includes *absence* of content: Lotophagi (above, pp. 324–5), physiologically vivid deaths (above, p. 351).

<sup>199</sup> One may stand out as particularly telling: above, pp. 312–14, 335–7, 345–6.

representation of Persian decision-making at the start of Book 7 is in one sense absurd, it is not a joke. Intertexts can add colour, weight, grandeur, or emotional charge (above, pp. 301, 311, 312, 327, 335, 340–1, 343, 344, 347, 348, 349, 354, 358). And even when we *are* invited to smile, we are generally also invited to see a serious point.

8. The way intertexts work is quite variable. All intertexts involve juxtaposing distinct discursive environments. But the degree of contrast beyond that default distinctness may differ; and the way in which any contrast plays in terms of the point the intertext is meant to make and the extent to which it either reinforces or disrupts the message of the surface text (which may itself not be unnuanced) is variable.

Most intertexts serve to reinforce the message of the surface text, though that judgement depends a bit on how one defines that surface message. (There may be a danger of circularity here.) They can do so by virtue either of analogy or contrast or a bit of both.<sup>200</sup> Slight contrasts need not disturb the reinforcing quality. Both modes can appear separately in cases that thematically run in parallel (e.g., above, pp. 324–8). The precise mechanisms that generate a contrast are variable, though not so much so that precise categorisation would be worth the effort.

Not infrequently something is revealed by an intertext that is not immediately so obvious (or obvious at all) in the surface text. That something is rather often negative, though that judgement is subjective: whether the revelation that freedom or slavery amounts to life or death (above, p. 333) is negative rather than heroic is debatable. It is a certainly a feature of intertexts that they may make the reader think of unarticulated aspects of the surface text/situation (e.g., above, pp. 289–90, 304, 306–7, 350). Often these additional perspectives do go along with general reinforcement of a surface message. But on other occasions they may be the principal effect of the intertext, which in that case is disruptive rather than reinforcing. Particular categories here are warning signs unnoticed by the actors in the story (above, pp. 312, 320–1, 329, 331–2, 339, 344–5, 345–6) and cases in which they undermine themselves (above, pp. 301–2, 305, 332–40, 348). The link between Herodotus' Odyssean character in 1.5.3–4 and the presence of a Persia-Ithaca intertext in 9.122 is a particularly charming example (above, pp. 310–11): the mere fact that the intertext is there in the final lines of

<sup>200</sup> Analogy: above, pp. 304, 305–6, 309, 310–11, 314–15, 317–19, 320–1, 321, 322–3, 324, 330, 332, 333, 348, 349, 351, 353, 354 Contrast: above, pp. 306–7, 308, 309, 312, 315, 323, 325, 326, 329, 333, 335, 338, 349, 351, 357, 358. Both: above, pp. 341–3, 349–50, 355–6. Classification is this sort is a bit crude and subjective.

*Histories* and relates to one at the start of the work is far more important than its precise meaning in the context in which it is placed.

9. Sometimes it is hard to say what an intertext is about either because there may not be an answer (above, pp. 324–5, 327–8, 329, 342) or because the answer is ambiguous (above, pp. 309, 320, 325, 328)—though ambiguity might be a point in its own right (above, n. 168)—or because, though an answer can be found, Herodotus’ intention in articulating it remains unclear (above, pp. 331–2). More normally, however, one (thinks one) can recognise that a point is being made and why. (That is, of course, implicit in the judgements about reinforcement and disruption in the previous paragraph.) It must be acknowledged that there is a significant element of subjectivity involved, and that any exposition of identifications and explanations of intertexts, including this one, runs the risk of imposing distinct form on what is by nature an elusive activity.<sup>201</sup>

Each individual intertext can in principle work independently as an invitation to the reader to view something from a different perspective and be amused (in the broadest sense) and/or instructed by the sight. But certain themes do emerge, which is unsurprising given the phenomenon of intratextuality and the linkage of intertexts with important moments in the narrative.

Some intertexts establish or reinforce basic things about Herodotus and his programme (including an elusive attitude to truth), giving him Homeric identity and status, while affirming distinctness and, if not superiority, then at least a human intellectual authority more appropriate to the world in which he was writing (above, pp. 296–300, 305–7, 310–11, 315–19).

Then there are themes arising from the author’s programme. Fame only rarely plays out in literally Homeric terms (*kleos*), and for that reason is particularly notable when it does (above, pp. 296–7, 301, 315–18, 354, 357, 361). But that both Herodotus’ own fame and the wonderful things he preserves from oblivion are generally not so classified symbolises rather well the historian’s claim to be doing something Homeric but in his own way. It is analogous to the shifting of *peripeteiai* from the actual experience of the Odyssean historian to the material through which he passes (above, pp. 297–8), and (once again), although that theme (the vulnerability of *eudaimoniē*) plays out through Homeric passages (above, pp. 297–8, 299–300, 308–9, 311–15, 327, 354), it is omnipresent in other guises. Another programme-

<sup>201</sup> See Pelling, above, pp. 44–5. Olga Tribulato’s essay (above, Ch. 8) exemplifies in a special case the mayhem that can result when people take a view about intertextual relation and then (literally) adjust the text to make it work better.

related theme (women, sex and historical causation: above, pp. 307–8), recurs in Homerised form: the ‘fame’ of Rhodopis and Archidice (above, p. 316), the distasteful tale of Periander and Melissa (above, p. 342), Xerxes’ loss of agency to a woman in a sex-centred story (above, p. 326), the manipulative Homer-quoting Artayctes mistreating women at the Protesilaum (above, n. 43), and (more decorously) the faint Olympian court overtones of Atossa and Darius (above, n. 101).

These last three items also belong in another thematic cluster, the Homerisation of Persia: we see Persian success (above, pp. 314–15), grandeur (above, p. 322) and even a touch of epic heroism (above, pp. 324, 356, 357, 361),<sup>202</sup> but also Persian hypocrisy (above, pp. 303, 315) and weakness (above, pp. 313, 320–1, 326, 330, 333, 335–7, 349–50, 351, 354). And Homeric treatment is also, of course, applied to the other major national players in the story.

Sparta comes out of it badly before the end of Book 7 (above, pp. 315, 341) and at the start of Book 9 (above, p. 354), but shines at Thermopylae and Plataea: and yet in the latter context Spartans are persistently marked as non-Homeric (albeit meritorious) and that even affects Pausanias, for all that he has the Homeric accolade of κλέος μέγιστον Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν. They belong (or see themselves as belonging) to a modern, not a Homeric world. Although it may seem unfair to Aristodemus (above, p. 359), this attitude is not necessarily bad, if it means suffering a dignified death rather than being part of an epic circus (above, p. 359) or (more seriously) setting one’s face against the mutilation of a dead adversary’s corpse (above, p. 361). Perhaps valuing community against extravagant individualism (already seen at Thermopylae, where *kleos* is for the city, not just Leonidas: 7.220.2, 4) is a good thing, and helps account for the strange way in which it is Mardonius who plays the more uncomplicatedly Homeric role. But that also draws attention to a final twist in the Spartan theme. *Kleos* at Thermopylae was communal, but Pausanias’ *kleos* is strikingly *not* marked in that way.

<sup>202</sup> Is there (provocatively) originally a touch of this in Xerxes? Mardonius wanted a good *logos* among men for Xerxes ‘best of Persians, past, present, and future’ (7.5.9); Carey (2016) 82 notes that the singularity of Leonidas (with his long genealogy: 7.204) matches the singularity of Xerxes, who has κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος (7.187)—and a genealogy too (7.11), albeit shorter; and Xerxes wanted to leave μνημόσυνα (7.24), which are a bid for fame—and even *kleos* (cf. above, pp. 315–17)?—of a sort also encountered at Thermopylae (7.226.2). Desire for power and for profit won by risk-taking (7.24.50) is not a necessary disqualification for Homeric status. But Xerxes is probably doomed from the outset (above, pp. 349–50) and develops both intertextually and otherwise as an increasingly unappealing figure. Mardonius perhaps ends better than he started, Xerxes certainly worse.

Herodotus and his readers know that Pausanias later (allegedly) went to the bad by trying to become a quasi-Persian (5.32). The story of the two dinners at Plataea has often been seen as a proleptic hint at that development. Perhaps the management of Pausanias' fame and Mardonius' heroism are part of a similar strategy.

Contrast between the Homeric and contemporary fifth-century world, present by default in *all* intertexts and sometimes more specifically thematised (above, pp. 297, 307, 317, 322–3, 331, 351, 354, 358–61),<sup>203</sup> is relevant to Athens and two final interconnected themes.

The longest coherent sequence of Homerisms has a persistently Athenian focus or reference (above, pp. 305, 341–8), and the Athenians figure in Homeric intertexts at many other points as well (above, pp. 303, 305–6, 310, 315, 320, 324, 328, 329, 332, 334, 340, 352–4, 357, 361). Some of these intertexts are neutral or positive moments from the point of view of Athens' reputation: they are beneficiaries of the Homeric fourth-attack principle and Darius' ill-judged prayer, they describe Mardonius as without regard (*opsis*) for the gods, and deploy Homer rather shockingly (but effectively) in complaining about desertion by Sparta, something that also evokes their Homeric 'wrath'. (Whether their impalement of Artayctes is a justified divergence for Pausanias' non-mutilation principle is more debatable: above, p. 361.)

But the rest of the intertextual material is another matter. Athens faces disaster like Phaeacia, provides troops who scatter in un-Homeric fashion, and is the home of the intertextual shape-changer Themistocles and (if Irwin is to be believed) the target of a critical reading of *Odyssey* 9. Above all, the city figures at high-profile moments that intersect with inversions of the expected Trojan War/Persian War parallel to produce Achaean Persians and Trojan Greeks (above, p. 304) and proleptic forays into Greek history after the end of *Histories*. Both intersections associate the Homerisation of Athens with awkward topics: Athens' future history as a successful competitor for hegemony (even a tyrant city<sup>204</sup>) and the propriety of overt linkage between the Trojan and Persian Wars in public political discourse. Herodotus' Athenians sometimes do not want to be Homeric (their own achievements need no epic gloss or precedent: 9.28), but high-profile passages make them produce bad (and ineffective) claims to be quasi-

<sup>203</sup> Cf. Haywood, above, pp. 75–81; Pelling, above, pp. 48, 51–2, 54; Fragoulaki, above, pp. 122, 149.

<sup>204</sup> Hippias' remarks do invite that specific gloss by linking the future Athens with her Pisistratid predecessor.

Achaean or actually turn them into Trojans: one of the latter category concerns the very event that the Athenians of 9.28 claim renders epic precedent irrelevant (an event they actually celebrated publicly with a Homeric gloss) and another specifically associates the inversion with proleptic reference to Athenian *arkhē*.

Nobody can be truly Homeric in the modern age. The closest to an unequivocal Homeric achievement within the *Histories*, measured by the acquisition of *kleos*, is the Spartan one at Thermopylae and that of Pausanias at Plataea, but the former is rooted in annihilation (and involves role-inversion) and the latter is under a shadow from future history. The Athenians do not achieve *kleos* and future history throws a significantly larger shadow on their Homeric pretensions—to the point that they might do better not to nurture them.

10. Which does, of course, raise a question about the historian himself. He has pictured the *Histories* itself as a Homeric achievement, albeit one for which he does not explicitly award himself *kleos* and which is distanced from the original in various ways. Is he entitled to do that? Is it prudent to do it?

Athenians who associated Marathon with the capture of Troy or their achievements more generally against Persia with those of the Homeric Achaeans were investing a large amount of Hellenic cultural capital in modern politics and warfare. If the results were disturbing, whether for subjects of Athenians rule or for the Athenians themselves (since *eudaimoniē* is vulnerable), that cultural capital was in danger of being badly disfigured. And since the results of politics and warfare will always be viewed negatively by some parties, this is always a danger in comparable circumstances. The historian was not trying to conquer the world (or even just the Aegean), but he was trying to stake out a claim in the metaphorical world of Greek literature. Was there less risk that anyone might think that the result dishonoured Homer? In principle no. But *Histories* betokens a degree of authorial self-confidence that guarantees that, if Herodotus contemplated that question (as logically he should have done), he judged the risk extremely small, and in the event he was clearly justified. That the story-line of *Histories* could properly constitute an epic narrative of heroic events was always unlikely to be disputed by many Greek readers: in those general terms it was itself part of the cultural capital of classical Greece. More specific intertextual features were *not* intended to dictate attitudes but to provoke questions and highlight what remain unresolved ambiguities: intertextual worries about Athens (and invitations to contemplate her post-479 history in other less Homeric passages) coexist with the ringing but admittedly controversial

endorsement of the Athenian stance and contribution in 480 (7.139). *Historiē* does not provide black-and-white answers. As an investigator Herodotus took on a role sometimes performed by men of power in the world of politics and warfare (above, pp. 317–19). But he could fairly claim to be performing it in a way that was both more far-reaching and more disinterested: everyone can be the object but no one is the target of his questioning. And, if people said that he was a teller of tales and even (in the manner of Plutarch) a biased teller of tales, he had at his disposal the reasonable rejoinder that he made no programmatic claim to be a truth-teller and that his advertised models, Homer and Odysseus, were just the same.



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