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EDITED BY ALEXANDER MEEUS

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PREFACE

Most of the papers in this volume originate in a workshop on history and narrative in Hellenistic historiography held in Lampeter on September 16 and 17, 2011. I would like to thank the Classics department of the University of Wales Trinity Saint David, especially Errietta Bissa and Kyle Erickson, KYKNOS: the Swansea and Lampeter Centre for Research on the Narrative Literatures of the Ancient World, and Peter Hopkins of the Roderic Bowen Library and Archives for their support in setting up this workshop. I would also thank Mike Edwards, who chaired one of the sessions, and the other participants who travelled to Lampeter and made it into an excellent workshop.

To John Moles and John Marincola I am greatly indebted for their offer to publish the papers in the Histos Supplements series; I deeply regret that John Moles no longer gets to see the result, and I dedicate the volume to his memory, both because I have learned so much about ancient historiography from him and because he has always been most supportive. I would also like to thank John Marincola for his editorial work. Judith Schönholz deserves gratitude for her help correcting the proofs with her habitual thoroughness. To Melanie Meaker I am greatly indebted for asking so many insightful questions about historiography and life.

A.M.

Mannheim

November, 2018
I

INTRODUCTION: NARRATIVE AND INTERPRETATION IN THE HELLENISTIC HISTORIANS*

Alexander Meeus

This volume aims to offer some new perspectives on Hellenistic historiography by focussing on its narrative dimension. After some brief remarks about Hellenistic historiography, I shall in this introduction address some of the criticisms voiced against narratology in recent scholarship and argue why and how I think a narratological approach can be useful; this is followed by an overview of the book’s chapters.

1. Scholarship on the Hellenistic Historians

The narratological study of ancient historians has become very popular in the last two decades, after Hornblower’s 1994 article demonstrated the fruitfulness of such an approach in the case of Thucydides.¹ This approach has not been applied to Polybius and especially Diodorus and Dionysius as often as to the classical historians.² Although

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1 Hornblower (1994). De Jong (2014) offers an excellent introduction to narratology for Classicists which includes a chapter on historiography.

2 Cf. Marincola (2006) 23 on the absence of Diodorus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus from De Jong-Nünlist-Bowie (2004), a standard work on narratology that does include many other historians. Recent studies of nar-
the tide seems to be turning in recent years, these authors still seem to attract less interest as writers than their classical counterparts. Although Polybius does fare better than Dionysius and especially Diodorus, even some recent overviews of Hellenistic literature pay scant attention to them, despite their being among the most extensively preserved Hellenistic prose authors.\(^3\)

Admittedly, many claim that Polybius is the only preserved Hellenistic historian and situate Diodorus and Dionysius rather in a Roman context, but this seems open to debate. Rome is far more central to Polybius' historiographical project than it is to that of Diodorus.\(^4\) Dionysius' perspective on Greece and Rome is very

\(^3\) Cf. Wallace (2012) 97–8. Believe it or not, even Diodorus has literary aspirations: see 1.2.5–7; Palm (1953), esp. 196; Schmitz (2011) 238. Gutzwiller (2007) 207 covers the period 323–50 BC and thus excludes Dionysius, but Diodorus also makes only a few brief appearances, and only as cover-text author for the fragments of lost authors. In Clauss and Cuypers (2010), a highly interesting essay by Gowing argues that Hellenistic historiography ends with Polybius and that Diodorus and Dionysius require a different label, although it is hard to say what that should be (Gowing (2010) 984). Scanlon (2015) 190 has the Hellenistic period end in 146 BC and places Polybius, Diodorus and Dionysius in the Roman Era (237). In Scardino (2014) the latest authors included are Strabo and Juba II.

\(^4\) For Polybius see 3.1.4 and 3.4.6 with, e.g., Marincola (2001) 117, 121–2 and 142 n. 123; for Diodorus, Rathmann (2016) 27–44, 295–305 and Cohen-Skalli (2018), though see also the different perspective of Yarrow (2006), esp. 152–6. That Diodorus can be placed in the 'Augustan period' (e.g., Schmitz (2011) 237) seems quite unlikely: on his date, see now Westall (2018). Schmitz's (2011) interesting analysis recognises some limited proto-classicising features in Diodorus which connect him to the second sophistic, but he may dismiss the role of paideia in Ephorus too easily (Stylianou (1998) 10–11 with references to Schepens and Burde; cf. Hau (2009) on the method of Sacks) and overstate the classicising dimension of Diodorus' moralising (cf. Hau 2016); it is also unclear how some of these proto-classicising features would have compared to other Hellenistic works of history.
different again, but the question of a definition of Hellenistic historiography surely involves more than that. In their language Polybius and Diodorus are very close, and Dionysius’ language is surely closer to theirs than he would have cared to admit himself. Hau has shown interesting narratorial similarities between Polybius and Diodorus which distinguish them from their classical predecessors, and which it would be interesting to compare to Dionysius and later post-classical historians. Obviously, even these issues do not exhaust the question, and it is surely a matter that deserves further study. Periodisation is always arbitrary and no ancient author had any idea that he might have been living in the Hellenistic age, yet it is useful as a way of structuring our answer to the question whether historians living close to each other in time also shared other characteristics that they did not share with those who lived at a greater temporal distance from them. In discussing historical narrative from Diodorus to Plutarch whilst also looking

5 Delcourt (2005); Gowing (2010); Wiater (2011) who does, however, use the label ‘Hellenistic’ (194); cf. also Hogg, below, Ch. 5, on Roman-ness and Greekness in Dionysius.

6 Palm (1955) 201–2 and 206; Usher (1982), esp. 825–30 and 837–8; Kim (2010) 473–5 and (2017) 49–51; Asirvatham (2017) 478: the change in language only really comes after Plutarch (see also Hogg, this volume, pp. 147–8 n. 9). Given the connection between Atticism and identity, the scope of this observation goes well beyond the merely linguistic. In that respect, one may wonder whether a history of Hellenistic historiography should end only with the time of Hadrian, like Chaniotis’ recent history of what he calls the ‘long Hellenistic Age’ (Chaniotis (2018)). This somewhat resembles the approach taken to the history of Greek literature by Schmid and Stählin (1920) 29–31, whose volume II.1 covers the period 320 BC–AD 100, although they subdivide it into ‘die schöpferische Periode’ and ‘die Periode des Übergangs zum Klassizismus’, the transition being in 146 BC in part for reasons similar to those of Gowing and Scanlon; yet they do not see any watershed ca. BC. For an overview of the different views on the beginning and end of the Hellenistic Age as a period in the history of literature, see Kassel (1987).

back to Polybius, the papers in this volume contribute to such an enhanced understanding of Hellenistic historiography.

2. A Narratological Approach to Ancient Historiography: Problems and Benefits

The focus on narrative may need no justification to many, but some basic problems seem worth being addressed here. In an excellent essay, Whitmarsh has recently argued that the difference between author and narrator, though known to the ancients, often was not observed by them even in cases where we would consider this absurd; he concluded from this that 'too heavy a dependence on modern critical schemes risks inattention to the reading instincts and habits of the ancients themselves'. On this basis one may doubt how useful narratology, developed as a tool for the study of the modern novel, is for the analysis of ancient texts. This

\footnote{Whitmarsh \(2013\) 67. Cf. 64: 'Ancient critics regularly took narrators' words as authors', even in instances where it often seems to us absurd to do so. Whitmarsh is primarily concerned with fiction, but similar problems may arise in the narratological analysis of historical writing, for instance in Wiater's (2006) narratological analysis of Diodorus' historiographical programme, which fails to take into account some of the workings of the self-fashioning of the ancient historian, and reads the text too much from a modern perspective: cf. Hau (2018) 283–3, and the earlier conclusions of Marincola (2007) 26–8 and Rathmann (2016), esp. 200–23. Yet one may also say, in narratological terms, that Wiater at times even confuses narrator and narratee (cf. Hau (2018) 284 n. 17).}

\footnote{Cf. Hall (2014): 'There are many ancient prose authors whose achievements are being misunderstood or diminished by forgetting about ancient critics' criteria of literary assessment in favour of Genette's'; Grethlein (2018) 18: 'Nearly all narratological concepts have been developed for the modern novel and its analysis. […] They are of little help though for capturing aspects that distinguish ancient narrative. In this regard, the success of narratology may have actually impeded our comprehension and appreciation of ancient narrative on its own terms'. Rood, below, Ch. 2, addresses a somewhat similar problem with applying modern understandings of East and West to ancient Greek historiography.}
call for a more historical approach to the study of ancient literature is most welcome and deserves emphasis, but at the same time there is no reason why modern theories should not be used as heuristic tools even if they would have been incomprehensible to the ancients. Yet the discrepancy between ancient and modern forms of narrative is but one of the relevant problems when we turn to historiographical narratives: narratology has been developed for the purpose of analysing the modern novel, i.e. for works of fiction, but history is not fiction.

De Jong, among others, has argued that narratology can nevertheless be applied to historiography because ‘ancient historians make use of the same narrative devices as their literary counterparts’. This is most certainly true, and the fact that it is so obvious would almost make one forget the significance of this observation which has for so long been, and sometimes still is, ignored in the study of ancient historiography. De Jong also rightly notes that historians use these devices ‘to convey their view of the past’, and in the accompanying case study of the Atys and Adrastus story she brilliantly (though with little use of the technical vocabulary of narratology) demonstrates how Herodotus’ literary mastery serves to emphasise his historical interpretation. One may wonder, however, whether it is not an overstatement of the importance of Greek tragedy or too much of a literary viewpoint to say that ‘Herodotus’ worldview is primarily a tragic one’ rather than that Herodotus and the tragedians share the same fifth-century BC Greek world-

10 Cf. Grethlein (2018) 2: ‘by no means does this mean that Genette’s and other narratological categories cannot be applied to ancient texts. Such a claim would be hermeneutically naive and is eloquently belied by the many insights that can be gained from narratological interpretations of ancient literature’. For the question of whether and how modern theories can be applied to ancient literature, see also e.g. Feeney (1995) and Heath (2002). Nünlist (2009) passim discusses many of the concepts of narratology as they appear in Greek scholia, though see 132–3 on the failure to distinguish between author and narrator.


view.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, it is easy to take this one step further and presume for instance that Herodotus actually used a tragic trilogy as his source for this account:\textsuperscript{14} a purely literary analysis thus easily risks forgetting that historians use literature—both their own text and those of writers they interact with—as a means of understanding the world rather than simply engaging with literature.\textsuperscript{15}

Evidently, the risk of overemphasising the literary dimension is not specific to narratology. Much in the same way as for the fictional autobiographies of Whitmarsh’s analysis, however, the modern formal model for the analysis of fiction may be ill-suited to address fundamental aspects of the ancient historical text. When the narrator of a historical text makes a claim about his use of sources, it is obviously relevant to know that this claim serves to increase the authority of his narrative, but it is all-important to know in addition whether the historian behind the narrator has actually used this source and in what way: at this point any meaningful distinction between author and narrator evaporates, for a historical source belongs to the material world of the author, not to the immaterial universe of the narrator.\textsuperscript{16} As a result, ancient historiographical polemics

\textsuperscript{13} I am not sure what to make of the statement that Herodotus here ‘turns a historical event into a quintessential Greek narrative with a beginning, middle, and end, replete with dreams, speeches and instances of dramatic irony’ (De Jong \textsuperscript{174}). Is the claim that Herodotus is fictionalising the event or merely that he interprets it in a Greek way and does not appear as epistemologically sensitive as the modern historian? Surely the choice of a beginning and end, and thus a middle, is inevitable for the historian, as is the use of some degree of narrative.

\textsuperscript{14} This proposal has been made by Rieks, as de Jong \textsuperscript{191 n. 47} points out.

\textsuperscript{15} Rood, below, Ch. \textsuperscript{2}, explores how Diodorus’ engagement with Thucydides is part of his historiographical interpretation, as Almagor does for Plutarch and Polybius (below, Ch. \textsuperscript{6}).

\textsuperscript{16} On this point I disagree with the excellent analysis of Hau \textsuperscript{284}, who does, however, show that a focus on the narrator can be both a useful way of avoiding the prejudice one almost inevitably brings to the text after two hundred years of negative interpretations of Diodorus
were discussions with the real-world author of the text, not with its narrator, much as is the case with modern scholarship.\textsuperscript{17}

Again, none of this means that we should not use narratology, for it is, as Bloch said so well in a different context,

nothing more or less than a perspective whose legitimacy is proved by its fruitfulness, but which must be supplemented by other perspectives to be complete. Such, indeed, is the true function of analysis in any category of research. Science dissects reality only in order to observe it better by virtue of a play of converging searchlights whose beams continually intermingle and interpenetrate each other. Danger threatens only when each searchlight operator claims to see everything by himself, when each canton of learning pretends to national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{18}

I thus wish to join the plea of Grethlein and Rengakos to use narratology but to do so in combination with other approaches.\textsuperscript{19} In this respect it is surely remarkable that

(\textit{unless one wishes to ignore the value of previous scholarship}) and of systematising much more clearly the differences between the various sections of the \textit{Bibliotheke}.

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. Whitmarsh (2013) 63 on the parallel with the modern scholar: ‘The words you are reading now are mine to the extent that you can hold me to them […]. But in another sense this is not the “real me” speaking: I do not adopt this persona when buying fish, talking to my children or playing soccer. Perhaps it is better to say that all of those separate verbal identities are facets of the same person, different roles that are assumed in the performance of everyday life. […] As a writer of non-fiction I may adopt stylistic mannerisms that are peculiar to [literary] writing, but I do not introduce claims I know to be counterfactual; if I am found to have done so, reviewers will take me to task.’

\textsuperscript{18} Bloch (1954) 124.

\textsuperscript{19} Grethlein and Rengakos (2009a) 3 and 11 on the need to combine the formal analysis of narratology with other approaches that explain the meaning of these formal elements.
within the field of Classics so little use has been made of the theory of history, which since the late 1960s has been very interested in questions of narrative, questions that for some have even been the central issue in the field.\textsuperscript{20} In establishing the relationship between narrative and interpretation in ancient historiography, this research is thus of obvious relevance: although it has likewise been developed mostly for the study of modern narratives, it can help us to systematise the various questions that need to be asked of a historical text, ancient as well as modern.

In so doing, it may for instance help to place the literary dimension of ancient historiography in its proper context.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{20} See Lorenz (2011) 23–6 on the dominance of narrative in the theory of history in 1970s and 1980s. The exception seems to be Hayden White, whose emphasis on rhetoric has obvious appeal to the classicist, but whose theory is too narrow from an epistemological perspective (cf. Lorenz (1998)). The only paper in Grethlein and Rengakos (2009b) which explicitly engages with historical theory is Grethlein (2009), which is not in the section on historiography. Pelling’s contribution to that volume, to name just one example, demonstrates that this can also be done excellently without explicit reference to the theory of history (Pelling (2009)), but that does not mean that such a more explicit engagement has no potential to sharpen further our analysis. Blank and Maier (2018) appeared too late to be taken into account here.

\textsuperscript{21} Scanlon (2015) vi–vii is symptomatic of the current overemphasis on the literary dimension of ancient historiography: “The study of Greek historical writing—what is called “historiography”—differs from the direct study of Greek history by focusing on the literary aspects of the historical texts, their narratives and themes, and less on the absolute veracity of their accounts. Historiography treats historical writing as a form of literature, and one that furnished a connected narrative of events within the chosen topic. Along the way, we look at the general structure of the major narratives, their use of prefaces, digressions and speeches, and direct authorial comments. […] Each chapter aims to situate the works it presents in their time and culture, specifically through a discussion of the life of each author, the structure of his work, and its debt to other literary and philosophical phenomena’. This is a necessary corrective to the neglect that the literary dimension has long suffered, and admittedly, questions of truth and research do feature in the introduction and throughout the book. But it remains telling that in the preface a programme is set out that does not contain these elements as central issues.
So as to avoid simplified polemics in this brief overview, I limit my discussion *exempli gratia* to a mistake I made myself in this respect in discussing the role of the many *peripeteiai* in the work of Diodorus. These reversals seem one of the main characteristics of his narrative, and their effect is often reinforced by mentioning the protagonist’s hopes which will later be cheated, or by pointing out just before the reversal occurs that things were going according to plan.\(^2\) One may argue that this focus on such *peripeteiai* aimed to satisfy Diodorus’ desire to narrate a good story, as the resulting suspense (e.g. in the description of the flight of Themistocles at 11.56–7) offers the same entertainment as suspense in fictional stories whilst it also occasionally diminishes Diodorus’ value as a source.\(^2\) Yet this is to forget that in ancient historiography the forms of representation are no means in themselves but serve to create and communicate historical meaning.\(^2\) The interconnections of the different aspects of history have been systematised most usefully by Rüsen in his khunian ‘disciplinary matrix’ of history, or,


\(^{2}\) Meeus (2013) 86–7; cf. Vial, *loc. cit.* Evidently, the question of an ancient work of history’s value as a source for the events it narrates is not necessarily a helpful question in historiographical analyses, since we only use such texts in that way because we do not have sufficient documentary evidence (cf. Meeus (2017a) 187–8; Morton, below, Ch. 3). Nevertheless, the loss in the domain of the history of events suggests potential in the field of the history of ancient thought by what this teaches us about Diodorus’ worldview and, as I hope to argue elsewhere, ancient Greek thinking in general.

\(^{2}\) For an excellent theoretically informed discussion of the social and cultural function of Greek historiography, see Gehrke (2014).
more appropriately in the context of ancient historiography, ‘matrix of historical thinking’. This matrix is not only an excellent means for understanding what history is nowadays but also for conceptualising changes in the history of historiography: in line with the its original aim of explaining paradigm change, the various elements in the matrix and their relative importance can be conceived in any number of ways. Rüsen gives due credit to the formal aspects of historiography, but connects the forms of representation to research methods and the cognitive and social functions that history fulfils:

1. **Semantic** discourse of symbolisation  
2. **Cognitive** strategy of producing historical knowledge  
3. **Aesthetic** strategy of historical representation  
4. **Rhetorical** strategy of providing historical orientation  
5. **Political** discourse of collective memory


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25 Rüsen (1983) 23–32; id. (2013) 66–96 = (2017) 42–66. For his view of the narrative dimension of history, see also e.g. Rüsen (1987) and (2001). For Rüsen, writing about research-based historiography, the existential orientation is to some extent a by-product (cf. Rüsen (1983) 30–4). That this may be different in other historical cultures, such as the the ancient one, is no reason in itself to consider them less historiographically: Hau (2016); Meeus (2018) 172 with n. 88.
That Diodorus is indeed concerned with creating sense and offering social orientation in his focus on unexpected reversals, is most clearly expressed at 18.59.5–6:

καὶ τούτ’ εὐλόγως ἔπασχον ἅπαντες οἱ τότε τὰς Εὐµενοὺς ἐπισκοποῦµενοι ἐπιστευταῖς. τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν λαβὼν ἑννυπαν τῆς κατὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίων ἀνωµαλίας καταπλαγεῖσθαι τὴν ἔπ’ ἀµφότερα τὰ μέρη τῆς τύχης παλιέροιας; ἢ τίς ἂν ταῖς κατὰ τὴν εὔρυχαὶς ἐξουσίαις πιστεύσαις ἀναλάβῃ φρόνηµα µείζον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἀσθενείας; ὁ γὰρ κοινὸς βίος ὡσπερ ὑπὸ θεῶν τινος οἰακιζόµενος ἐναλλὰς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς κυκλεῖται πάντα τὸν αἰῶνα. διόπερ παράδοξόν ἐστιν οὐκ εἰ γέγο νέν ἀνέλπιστον. διὸ καὶ τὴν ἱστορίαν προσηκόντως ἄν τις ἀποδέξαιτο· τῇ γὰρ τῶν πράξεων ἀνωµαλίᾳ καὶ µεταβολῇ διορθοῦται τῶν µὲν εὐτυχοῦντων τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν, τῶν δ᾿ ἀκληροῦντων τὴν ἀτυχίαν.

And it was reasonable that all those who at the time beheld the reversals of fortune of Eumenes experienced such feelings. For who could have considered the inconsistency in human life and not have been struck by the way in which fortune flowed back and forth? What person, experiencing good fortune, would trust in his abundance and have thoughts greater than human weakness? Our common life, as if steered by some god, moves in a circle throughout time alternately between good and evil. And so it is not unusual if one unforeseen event happens; what is unusual is that everything which happens is not unexpected. And so one would fittingly approve history, since by the irregularity and constantly changing nature of events it corrects both the arrogance of the fortunate and the despair of the poor. (trans. Marincola (2017) 162)
The unexpected reversals in the historical narrative, in correcting the arrogance of the fortunate and the unhappiness of the unfortunate, serve a function of διορθοῦται (*diorthosis*), the moral rectification which is a central aim of Diodorus’ historical project.\(^{26}\) To see the suspense of these narratives as merely literary, then, is to misunderstand completely Diodorus’ aims in writing history. The best way to avoid this is to bear in mind that—as extremely helpful as it is—a literary analysis *alone* cannot explain historiographical texts because from the many fields in the matrix of historical thinking it only addresses the field of representation. The matrix thus serves as ‘a tool-box, containing questions that can be asked with illuminating effect of the immense and varied body of historiography that […] confronts’ the historian of historiography, to paraphrase Megill: it thus ‘can help practitioners to see beyond their specialties, opening their minds to broader issues and improving their work in the process’.\(^{27}\) In that sense, the matrix can perhaps even be put to use to help us understand the development of Hellenistic historiography, including, to borrow Gowing’s phrase, its decline and fall, or indeed whether it makes sense to have a concept of Hellenistic historiography at all.

Part of the problem that leads to such one-sided literary interpretations may well be the tendency to apply the word ‘fictional’ to historiography in studying formal parallels between historiography and fictional literature: yet what is fictional in the latter kind of literature will more properly be termed ‘interpretational’ in historical writing, no matter how strong the formal parallel. When historians present a

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\(^{27}\) Megill (1994) 58 and 60. He is concerned with modern, professional historiography, but there is no reason why the questions could not be asked of other historiographical cultures (with which he just did not happen to be concerned). On p. 59 Megill lists some examples of such questions based on his own simplified version of the disciplinary matrix.
character’s thoughts, they are not making them up on the basis of the requirements of the story as the novelist does, but they are interpreting the character’s actions: they assume, as Collingwood does, not only that these have some origin in the character’s thoughts but also that her or his observable actions can provide at least some degree of access to the unobservable thoughts behind them. Of course, historians may get it wrong, e.g., by inadvertently imposing their own overall understanding of their topic in this process of interpretation, but even a wrong interpretation is not the same as fiction: as Lorenz puts it, not everything that has been thought-out is necessarily fictional or imaginary. Furthermore, we cannot exclude that at times the ancient historians or their sources, often themselves involved in the world of politics they describe, may have known the actual thoughts of their protagonists. However this may be, no proper understanding of ancient historiography can be achieved without distinguishing on its own terms between deliberately false history, accidentally

28 Cf. also the contributions in this volume of Wallace and Almagor.

29 Cf. Hau (2018) 298 n. 54. One need not agree with Collingwood (1946) for my point to hold true, for I think it remains valid on even a weak formulation of his theory, namely that there can be no history of human affairs without including the aspect of thought. See e.g. Collingwood (1946) 215: ‘the historian of politics or warfare, presented with an account of certain actions done by Julius Caesar, tries to understand these actions, that is, to discover what thoughts in Caesar’s mind determined him to do them. This implies envisaging for himself the situation in which Caesar stood, and thinking for himself what Caesar thought about the situation and the possible ways of dealing with it’. For a good introduction to Collingwood’s views, showing that they are not as naive and simplistic as often thought, see van der Dussen (2016): especially important is that they can only be understood from the point of view of a philosophical justification for the possibility of historical knowledge, not as a prescriptive account of historical method (van der Dussen (2016) 11) (as is also clear from Collingwood’s work on the history of Roman Britain).

30 Lorenz (1997) 40: ‘was erdacht wurde, ist ja nicht zwangsläufig fiktional oder imaginär’.

31 Cf. Wallace, below, p. 70 with n. 3.
mistaken history (whether caused by incompetence or missing the mark despite a brilliant attempt), and fiction.

3. The Contribution of this Volume

That one may disagree about these theoretical observations is to state the obvious, and indeed it is also illustrated by the different perspectives to be found in the papers in the present volume. Because of that, however, they can contribute both to a better understanding of the historians whom they discuss and to the theoretical discussion about the narrative dimension of ancient historiography.

In the first chapter, Timothy Rood analyses the way Diodorus presents parallels between mainland Greece and Sicily in various sections of the *Bibliotheke*. In contrast to the current trend among Diodoran experts, Rood—in my view rightly—acknowledges that much of the patterning we observe in the *Bibliotheke* may go back to Ephorus and Timaeus.\(^32\) He also points out, however, that its presence in Diodorus’ narrative ‘at the very least shows that he was concerned to preserve any parallels that he did take over from earlier historians’, and in some cases he does seem to have added some patterning of his own. Rood thus shows how the didactic aims of Diodorus’ work also affect its narrative structure: by its implication of historical repetitiveness the deliberate patterning across time and space stresses the validity of the *Bibliotheke*’s moral lessons.

\(^32\) Hau (2006) remains fundamental in this respect, and is all too rarely taken seriously in studies of Diodorus; see also Parker (2009); Bleckmann (2010); Rathmann (2016) 156–270; Schorn (2018) 243; Wallace, below, Ch. 3. For general reasons why we should not necessarily expect much originality in the *Bibliotheke*, see Meeus (2017b) and (2018) 150–4, and from a different perspective Cohen-Skalli (2014) 494; yet I do not claim that Diodorus was not in control of his narrative (see e.g. Meeus (2012) 90). Different views about Diodorus’ use of sources have been put forward, e.g., by Green (2006) 25–9, Sheridan (2010) 42–4, Parmeggiani (2011) 349–94, Muntz (2011) and Occhipinti (2016) 57–86; see also the papers in Hau–Meeus–Sheridan (2018).
Shane Wallace, who highlights the unevenness between different source units in the *Bibliotheke*, likewise points out that even the preservation of certain features of the narrative of his sources reflects Diodorus’ own thought and planning. Wallace is concerned with the representation of the thoughts of the protagonists in Books 18–20 and the interplay between this narrative technique on the one hand and characterisation and historical interpretation on the other. Regardless of the originality question, in focalising the narrative through historical characters such as Peithon, Peukestas and Polypcerhon, Diodorus presents his understanding of the historical process, for instance as it concerns the hybris of his protagonists, in a more emphatic way. Even when Diodorus’ source cannot be identified with certainty, the implications of this narrative technique remain just as relevant for historians of the early Hellenistic period who at times seem overly obsessed with Hieronymus of Cardia.\(^33\)

The problems that occur when the narrative needs to serve as a historical source and its readings are guided more by the hopes and wishes of the modern historian than by the aims and methods of the ancient historian, are central to the chapter by Peter Morton. These problems only increase when the narrative is fragmentary,\(^34\) as is the case with Diodorus’ narrative of the First Sicilian Slave War (though Morton prefers the term ‘Sicilian Insurrection’), which historians tend to consider a reliable and comprehensive account despite its state of preservation. Morton argues that Diodorus’ causal explanation for the insurrection’s outbreak is anachronistic, and he explores the effects of this anachronism on the way we interpret the fragmentary narrative and the events it describes: Diodorus’ moralism once more appears as the element that governs his interpretation and obscures our historical understanding.


\(^34\) On the problems with Diodoran fragments, see now also Yarrow (2018).
In the next chapter, Dan Hogg analyses the tragic setting of Dionysius’ account of the exile of Coriolanus and its focus on emotions, the treatment of which reveals Dionysius’ Greek background. The comparison with other preserved versions of this event shows all the more clearly how narrative structure and literary *topoi* underscore the interpretation of the individual historian. The tragic and epic elements in the story do not make it less historical, but they do reveal how strongly historical thinking is embedded in its wider cultural context and, in the case of the tragic elements, how historians can make use of space as a narrative means to accentuate their interpretation of events.\(^{35}\)

In his chapter on Plutarch’s use of Polybius, Eran Almagor asks why the narrator sometimes cites sources by name although he usually does not, and how the implication of research suggested by the source-citation connects Plutarch’s *Lives* to other forms of historical writing.\(^{36}\) Stressing the need for a clear distinction between narrator and author, he argues that Polybius’ text is being used to create Plutarch’s narrative world, and that mentions of the figure of Polybius are used to highlight significant aspects of this narrative world: appearances of Polybius in the text are interpreted as parallelisms to the historical events described, and because the Polybian version never seems to be the first choice, his reliability appears to be doubted.

The chapters in this volume thus shed new light on aspects of Hellenistic historiography that have been rather understudied, and I hope that they will inspire many further such studies.

\(^{35}\) See also above, on tragic elements in Herodotus and Diodorus.

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GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL PATTERNING IN DIODORUS SICULUS

Tim Rood

Abstract: This paper explores the function of geographical and historical patterning in Diodorus’ work, in particular parallels between Sicily and mainland Greece created both through explicit plotting of events and through intratextual and intertextual echoes. It examines how Diodorus relates two Sicilian leaders, Agathocles and Dion, to Alexander and Philip of Macedon; how he creates links between Agesilacus’ invasion of Asia and Dionysius I’s conflict with Carthage; and how he picks up Thucydides’ Sicilian narrative in his account of Gelon’s victory over Carthage. The paper also explores and questions the language of East and West that scholars have applied in speaking of links between mainland Greece and Sicily.

Keywords: Diodorus Siculus; Thucydides; Greek historiography; East and West

‘What literary scholar ever reads Diodorus or Polybius?’

P. Vidal Naquet (1995) 22

At the start of his eleventh book, Diodorus reports on Persian attempts to co-ordinate their planned invasion of Greece in 480 BC with Carthaginian operations against Greeks in the west: ‘Xerxes sent an embassy to the Carthaginians to urge them to join him in the undertaking and closed an agreement with them, to the effect that he would wage war upon the Greeks who lived in Greece, while the Carthaginians should at the same time gather great armaments and subdue those Greeks who lived
in Sicily and Italy’ (11.1.4). Later in the same book, in celebrating the Sicilian success against Carthage at Himera, he emphasises further the connection between events in Greece and Sicily by proposing a synchronism with the battle of Thermopylae: ‘Gelon won his victory on the same day that Leonidas and his soldiers were contesting against Xerxes at Thermopylae, as if the deity intentionally so arranged that both the fairest victory and the most honourable defeat should take place at the same time’ (11.24.1). As has often been noted, Diodorus is here building on—and adapting—a long-standing equation between the Greek victories over Persia and Carthage in 480 BC. Diodorus’ use of synchronism is also found in Herodotus, though here it is reported that Gelon’s victory occurred on the same day as the battle of Salamis rather than Thermopylae (7.166).1 And ten years after these battles, Pindar had composed an ode for Gelon’s successor as tyrant of Syracuse, Hiero, in which he presented the Syracusan victories at Himera and Cyme as having ‘delivered Hellas from grievous slavery’ (P. 1.75) and aligned those victories with Salamis and Plataea (P. 1.75–80).2 A similar message was also conveyed when Hiero hosted a production of Aeschylus’ Persians in Syracuse,3 and earlier still by Gelon’s dedication of a golden tripod at Delphi (Diod. 11.26.7) to match the golden tripod dedicated by the Greeks as a

1 The problems of these synchronisms have been much discussed: see, e.g., Pearson (1987) 132–6; Asheri (1991–2); Schepens (1994) 266–8; more broadly Feeney (2007) 43–67; Clarke (2008) 138–9, 231–4. More generally on Sicilian self-promotion in relation to mainland Greece, see, e.g., Prag (2010); also Harrell (2006) on the relation between local Sicilian and panhellenic concerns. Thermopylae is similarly invoked as inferior to a Roman success at Flor. Epit. 1.18 [2.2.14], where the 300 troops involved rather than the date are the basis for the comparison.

2 This passage may help to explain the linking of Pindar and the Persian Wars in the biographical tradition: Diodorus’ floruit notice of Pindar is placed immediately after his account of Gelon’s successes, at the end of his account of the archon-year 480/79 (11.26.8); compare (and contrast) the Suda’s notice that Pindar was forty in the year of Xerxes’ invasion.

3 Schol. Ar. Ra. 1028; Vita Aeschyli (Page OCT, p. 333 ll. 24–5).
thank-offering for their victory over Persia: in Michael Scott’s words, ‘East and West were joined through their victory dedications’.

The aim of this paper is to explore further the function of geographical patterning in Diodorus’ work, and in particular the role of parallels between Sicily and mainland Greece. Diodorus, I will suggest, points to a number of other links through his explicit plotting of events as well as through implicit echoes, both intratextual and intertextual (above all with Thucydides). My analysis will take further the arguments of a previous paper (Rood (2004)), where I proposed that Diodorus can be seen as picking up a number of Thucydidean themes in his account of the final years of the Peloponnesian War, sometimes in competition with Xenophon’s account of the same events. I argued in that paper that Diodorus continues a theme found already in Thucydides by presenting parallels between Sicily and mainland Greece, notably between the careers of Alcibiades and Hermocrates and between the political regimes in Athens and Syracuse. In this paper, I will be extending that analysis by looking at the period beyond the final years of the Peloponnesian War and by exploring direct patterning by Diodorus as well as his use of Thucydidean intertexts (above all Thucydides’ Sicilian narrative). My analysis will fall in four sections: the first will set the scene for the subsequent discussion by questioning the language of East and West that scholars have often applied in speaking of links between mainland Greece and Sicily; the second will examine two Sicilian leaders, Agathocles and Dion, in relation to Alexander and Philip of Macedon; the third will

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4 Scott (2010) 88; cf. ML 28 for the inscription on the tripod base, with the editors’ comment on p. 61; also Paus. 6.19.7 and ML 29 for dedications by Gelon and Hieron at Olympia. Cf. also Diodorus’ focus on temple-building in Sicily after the victory over Carthage (12.25.1, 12.26.7 for Syracuse; 12.25.2–4 for Agrigentum, cf. 13.82), with Pearson (1987) 139 on the implied contrast with the delay at Athens in rebuilding the temples burned by the Persians; also Morris (1992) 370 for another possible Persian Wars link.

move back in time to explore links between Agesilaus’ invasion of Asia (396 BC) and Dionysius I’s roughly simultaneous conflict with Carthage (399–396 BC); while the final section will pick up my initial focus on Diodorus’ account of Gelo’n’s victory over Carthage in 480 BC.

Given the generally low reputation of Diodorus in most modern scholarship, it may be helpful to clarify first what I mean when I speak of patterning by Diodorus. I do not mean to suggest that all the patterns that can be detected in his work are original to Diodorus himself. In considering Diodorus’ narrative of 480 BC, we have direct evidence for patterning between mainland Greece and Sicily in the historians generally seen as his sources, Ephorus and Timaeus; and there is other evidence that Ephorus and Timaeus were concerned with such links and also that Timaeus was more broadly concerned with bolstering the position of Sicilian Greeks in relation to Greeks living further to the east.

6 For the importance of considering lost sources, cf., e.g., Levene (2010) 111–17, discussing the analysis of Thucydidean echoes in Livy in Rodgers (1986).

7 Ephorus (FGrHist 70): see F 186 on 480 BC (with Vattuone (1983–4) 208 on the differences from Diodorus); also F 211 for a pact between Dionysius II and Persia (but this is likely to reflect some confusion in the source, a scholion on Aelius Aristides); for the postiging of this sort of direct causal link, cf. Diod. 15.23.5 (the Persian king and Dionysius both courting Sparta); Purcell (1995) 139 n. 36 for later examples; also ML 92 for epigraphical evidence for an appeal by Carthage to Athens; and below, n. 26 (Curtius on Carthage/Tyre). There is no evidence for any such geographical linking in the scanty remains of Hell. Oxy. Timaeus (FGrHist 566): see e.g. F 94 for Gelo’n’s readiness to help in 480 BC (where the source, Pol. 12.16b4–5, explicitly comments on how Timaeus seeks to exaggerate the importance of Sicily); F 105 (the story that Euripides was born on the day of Salamis and died on the day when Dionysius I came to power); FF 135–6 (the claim that Thucydides lived in exile and was buried in Italy—conceivably as a sort of parallel to Timaeus himself, who lived in exile in Athens). I will not myself be directly confronting the vexed question of Diodorus’ source(s) for Sicilian history, on which see the opposing views of Meister (1967) and Pearson (1987), who favour Timaeus, and Stylianou (1998) 50–84, who favours Ephorus.
patterning I will analyse in earlier historians: Polybius’ account of the First Punic War, for instance, includes passages that can be read as intelligent adaptations of sections of Thucydides’ account of the Sicilian expedition. While I will be alert, then, to the significance of Diodorus’ sources, it should be stressed that Diodorus’ re-casting of his sources at the very least shows that he was concerned to preserve any parallels that he did take over from earlier historians. In some cases, moreover, the patterning between Sicily and the Greek mainland is almost certainly due to Diodorus himself—and so evidence either of Diodorus’ creativity or (for those who deny him that) of the ease with which historians in antiquity were able to adopt the modalities of geographical *synkrisis*. Before looking at how Diodorus applies this comparative method, however, it will be helpful to consider how scholars in modern times have conceived the geographical division between Carthage and Sicily on the one hand and mainland Greece on the other.

**East and West**

Michael Scott’s comment (quoted above) that ‘East and West’ were joined by the monuments set up at Delphi to commemorate Greek victories against the Persians and the Sicilian victory at Himera reflects common scholarly usage: to give one other example, Denis Feeney in his superb recent book on ancient conceptions of time writes of Ephorus linking the affairs of Athens and Sicily by presenting the barbarians ‘to the west and the east’ working together, of ‘West/East synchronisms’, and of a ‘compar-

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8 Rood (2012).

9 Further uncertainties arise in the case of fragments whose location in Diodorus is uncertain (e.g. 26.19 for a comparison of Antioch on the Orontes with Syracuse); the fragment (derived from a scholion on Strabo) is placed by most editors in the context of the fall of Syracuse in the Second Punic War, but could belong elsewhere (Goukowsky (2006) 291 n. 17 suggests that a Seleucid context is more likely).
ative West/East mentality. The West and East that are here being joined are the western and eastern parts of the Mediterranean, in line with ‘the Greek conceptual division of the Mediterranean into two domains’ that has been proposed by Nicholas Purcell in the course of a brilliant discussion of the ideological significance of the Roman sacking of Carthage and Corinth. Purcell supports this conceptual division by appealing to the synchronic tendency that we have already seen applied to the battles of 480 BC and that also seems to be reflected in the Roman decision to destroy both Carthage and Corinth in the same year. Purcell goes on to cite Julius Caesar’s simultaneous re-foundation of both cities a century or so later, claiming that ‘the parallelism of East and West … is explicitly asserted by Plutarch’.

One problem in applying the language of East and West to the Mediterranean is the relativity of those terms. At one point in the Odyssey, the Phaeacian king Alcinous speaks of Odysseus as having come ‘either from eastern or from western men’ (8.29: ἠὲ πρὸς ἠοίων ἑσπερίων ἀνθρώπων). Alcinous here presumably means people living to the east or west of the Phaeacians’ island rather than those living to the East or West in any absolute sense; or, more precisely, towards dawn and towards evening, in line with the general Greek tendency to use the sun’s movement to define what we term compass points. The relativity of dividing the Mediterranean into West and East is particularly problematic for a reason noted by Feeney: ‘the more normal reference of West and East would be to Europe and Asia’.

Mainland Greece, then, can be seen as West in relation to Asia and East in relation to Sicily or Italy. And yet seeing


11 I am reluctant to accept with T. Schmitt (in Cancik und Schneider 1996–2009 IX.22, s.v. ‘Orient und Okzident’) that this Odyssey passage helps to explain the synchronism of 480 BC.

12 Winds were also used (as in Ephorus, FGrHist 70 F 30, on the four peoples living around the margins of the inhabited world; cf. Ps.-Scymn. 107–77, where both winds and sun movements are used), but to a lesser extent.
Sicily and Italy as West does not automatically mark Greece as East. A further possibility available to the Greeks (and not just for the Greeks, of course) was to see themselves as neither West nor East, but as central.13

Purcell himself is acutely aware of the relativity of East and West. Indeed, one of his points is that it is part of the repertoire of imperial power to essentialise spatial terms that are purely relative.14 The political importance of these spatial definitions makes it all the more important, however, to be precise about the terms employed in the sources rather than to assume a continuity of usage from Herodotus onwards. In the case of Carthage and Corinth, for instance, all that Plutarch asserts is that the two cities were both destroyed and re-founded at the same time (Caes. 57.8). It is Purcell himself who claims that the parallelism is between East and West.

To get a sense of how Diodorus divides up space, we may start by looking at the structure of the opening six books, which offer a spatially organised treatment of (what we term) mythical events prior to the Trojan War.15 The arrangement of these books is particularly important not just because they can be read as programmatic but also because it is undoubtedly the product of Diodorus’ own geographical vision (one of his main sources, Ephorus, only started his history after the Trojan War with the return of the Heraclids).

13 Cf., e.g., Xen. Vct. 1.6: ‘One might reasonably suppose that the city [Athens] lies at the centre (ἀµφὶ τὰ µέσα) of Greece, nay of the whole inhabited world. For the further we go from her, the more intense is the heat or cold we meet with’; Arist. Pol. 1327b29–30, where the Greeks are geographically in the middle (µεσεύει κατὰ τοὺς τόπους) of the colder, more spirited peoples of Europe and the (by implication warmer) peoples of Asia. For Rome and Italy as central, cf. e.g. Str. 6.4.1, Vitr. 6.1.11 (with a strong cold/north vs. warm/south contrast).


15 The temporal complexity in the treatment of the non-Greek and Greek pasts in these books is discussed by Rubincam (1987) 315–17; my focus here is spatial.
The ‘more normal’ alignment of East and West with Asia and Europe has been applied by Kenneth Sacks to these opening mythological books: ‘Books i–iii cover the “barbarian” (1.4.6) East and books iv–vi treat the West.’ Sacks’ analysis might seem to be justified by the fact that Diodorus starts by mentioning his own travels in ‘a large portion of both Asia and Europe’ (1.4.1), and then promises a division into three books focussing on the antiquities of the barbarians followed by three treating ‘almost exclusively those of the Greeks’ (1.4.6). The mythological books proceed to cover conquerors in the extremes of both Asia and Europe, with detailed presentation of (mythical) figures such as Heracles and Dionysus and proleptic anticipation of (historical) figures such as Alexander and Caesar.

Sacks’ equation of Greek and barbarian with West and East is nonetheless misleading. In Book 4, though Diodorus does start by picking up the initial distinction between barbarian and Greek (4.1.5), he describes Heracles’ travels in Egypt and in the west of Africa (4.17.4–18.2) as well as some myths localised in Asia Minor (Tantalus and the rulers of the Troad: 4.74–5). Diodorus also abandons at this point

16 Sacks (1990) 55–6. Though he calls the organisation of these books ‘simple’, Sacks does also note here that Book 5 includes islands in the Red Sea; but see also his formulation on p. 65: ‘Rather than dating myths, he simply divides them by East (books i–iii) and West (books iv–vi).’

17 Note the telling distribution of proleptic references in Books 1–3 versus 4–5 (Book 6 only survives in excerpts): Alexander is mentioned at 1.50.6, 1.84.8, 2.39.4, 4.15.4, Caesar at 3.38.2 (a reference to his conquest of Britain in the context of a discussion of geographical knowledge of the south and north), 4.19.2, 5.21.2, 5.22.1, 5.25.4; mention of both follows the outline at 1.4.6–7 according to which Books 6–17 span the period from the Trojan War to the death of Alexander and Books 18–40 cover events down to the start of the war between the Romans and the Celts in the course of which Caesar ‘advanced the Roman Empire as far as the British Isles’ (1.4.6–7). Note also that Rome is mentioned four times in the mythological narrative in the opening four books (1.83.8, 2.4.7, 2.17.3, 3.38.3) as opposed to more than thirty times in Books 4–5; similarly Carthage—although it is located in Africa—is mentioned only at 3.44.8 in Books 1–3 (in a geographical comparison) as opposed to more than twenty times in 4–5.
the explicitly geographical transitions that he had used for barbarian lands, preferring to move from one character to another. A geographical division of a new kind then emerges in Book 5, which is devoted to islands. Sicily is strongly marked off at this point both by being described in detail at the start of the Book and by the Book’s subsequent movement: Diodorus moves first from Sicily westwards and then beyond the Mediterranean to islands in the ocean off Libya and Europe; he then abandons his professed focus on islands to offer geographical and ethnographical treatment of the western barbarians omitted in the earlier Books (though not of the Romans). His account of the islands in the eastern Aegean is further cut off by a detour to islands in the eastern part of the southern Ocean (5.47.1). When he does turn back to the eastern Mediterranean (5.47.1), his account of the Aegean islands is marked by a lack of coherent geographical ordering. He also excludes altogether a number of islands between Sicily and the eastern Mediterranean, notably Corcyra, Ithaca, the other Ionian islands, Cythera, and Aegina.

The structure of Diodorus’ opening mythological books, then, does at times point to a division into separate areas (whether Asia and Europe or two halves of the Mediterranean), but the division between Greek and non-Greek proves to be much more elaborate than that in both Europe and Asia. Analysis of the organisation of these books still leaves open, moreover, the question of the explicit terms through which Diodorus articulates his vision of space.

Like other Greek writers, Diodorus marks space in relation to the movement of the sun. His most frequent use of east and west is at a local level, for instance to describe the eastern or western parts of a building (e.g. 13.82.4). Here the cardinals are overtly used in a relative sense, without implying anything like an idea of ‘the East’ or ‘the West’ as

18 Contrast the geographical transitions at, e.g., 1.98.10, 2.1.3, 2.47.1, 2.48.1, 3.1.3 with the character-based transitions at, e.g., 4.7.4, 4.39.4–40.1, 4.57.1.

19 Ceccarelli (1989) posits the use of a new source at this point.
separate regions. The relativity of the terms as well as the
difficulty of distinguishing between ‘east’ and ‘west’ as
descriptors of directions and as descriptors of regions is
shown at a larger scale when Diodorus describes how the
Nile wanders from its general path from south to north,
ποτὲ µὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνατολὴν καὶ τὴν Ἀραβίαν ἐπιστρέφων,
ποτὲ δ’ ἐπὶ τὴν δύσιν καὶ τὴν Λιβύην ἐκκλίνων (1.32.2: ‘now
turning towards the east and Arabia, now turning towards
the west and Libya’). Here Diodorus does seem to be
defining Arabia as an eastern region and Libya as a western
one, but in both cases relative to the Nile.

Most significant for Diodorus’ understanding of space
are passages where the point of orientation for east and west
is occluded. Thus when he speaks of the ‘eastern ocean’
(2.43.5: τὸν πρὸς ἀνατολὰς ὠκεανὸν, cf. 18.5.2) and ‘the
western ocean’ (5.12.3: τοῦ κατὰ τὴν δύσιν ὠκεανοῦ), he
seems to use the terms absolutely, locating the ocean on
either side of the inhabited world as the place where the sun
does actually rise and fall.20 Such phrases tend to be used in
quite a vague way. Thus when Diodorus claims, after
finishing his account of Britain, that he has discus
ded ‘the islands which lie in the western regions’ (5.24.1: ἐν τοῖς πρὸς
δυσµὰς µέρεσιν), it is not quite clear whether he is marking
an area distinct from ‘the islands which lie within the Pillars
of Heracles’ (a phrase used in the transition at 5.19.1) or
summing up the whole of the book so far, including the
account of Sicily. Similarly Sicily is both linked with but
separate from the vague western regions when Diodorus
(3.61.3) writes that Cronus ‘was lord of Sicily and Libya, and
Italy as well, and, in a word, established his kingdom over
the regions to the west’ (κατὰ Σικελίαν καὶ Λιβύην, ἔτι δὲ
τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καὶ τὸ σύνολον ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἑσπέραν τόποις)
and that there are places named after him ‘both throughout
Sicily and the parts which incline towards the west’ (κατὰ τὴ

20 Cf. also 5.19.1, of an island in the Ocean ‘lying to the west’
(κεκλιµένη πρὸς τὴν δύσιν).
The corresponding language of ‘the east’ is used in a similarly vague way: thus Diodorus describes how Alexander ‘sacrificed to the Sun, who had given him the eastern regions to conquer’ (17.89.3: Ἡλίῳ ἔθυσεν ὡς δεδωκότι τὰ πρὸς ἀνατολὴν µέρη καταστρέφασθαι). While Diodorus’ use of west and east in these expressions is vague, it is clear that these phrases are used to mark areas near to the extremes of the inhabited world rather than to oppose Europe to Asia or the western to the eastern half of the Mediterranean.

There is also a revealing temporal dimension to Diodorus’ use of the vague spatial language of eastern and western regions. Such language is more common in the earlier portions of his work, reflecting the greater lack of spatial differentiation in earlier times (which is also matched by their greater temporal indeterminacy).22 It is also more commonly applied to the west than to the east,23 perhaps reflecting the perception that the western Mediterranean became civilised (and so entered history, as it were) later than areas further to the east. In his later narrative, by

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21 The second half of the first passage seems to sum up the first half, including Sicily in the west, while the second passage seems to distinguish Sicily from ‘the parts which incline towards the west’.

22 Though we should also remember that there would have been more focus on the far west in some of the final stages of the work that survive only in excerpts.

23 It is significant that ‘the eastern regions’ at 17.89.3 is focalised through Alexander. The language of western extremes is most common in the book on islands, but even here Sicily is given prominence not so much through the west-east axis but in relation to other groups of islands in a line from the north-west (Britain) to the south-east (the islands in the Indian Ocean) (see esp. the transition at 5.41.4: ‘now that we have described the lands which lie to the west and those which extend toward the north, and also the islands in the ocean, we shall in turn discuss the islands in the ocean to the south which lie off that portion of Arabia which extends to the east’). For a north-west/south-east axis explicitly centred on Delphi, cf. Plut. Mor. 410.A (‘two revered men coming from opposite ends of the inhabited earth met together at Delphi, Demetrius the grammarian journeying homeward from Britain to Tarsus, and Cleombrotus of Sparta, who … had sailed beyond the Persian Gulf’), with Bowersock (2005) 170–1.
contrast, Diodorus continues to use geographical markers when he moves from place to place, but the places highlighted in this way tend to be more precisely defined. Often he uses as a transitional formula the neuter plural of the definite article with the preposition κατά and the name of a city or country (e.g., 20.53.4: ἡµεῖς δὲ περὶ τούτων ἱκανῶς εἰρηκότες ἐν µέρει διέξιµεν περὶ τῶν κατὰ Λιβύην καὶ Σικελίαν πραµὴντων ("Now that we have said enough about these matters [viz., affairs in the successor kingdoms], we shall relate in their turn the events that took place in Libya and in Sicily"). If we look just at the places he mentions in transitions to and from Sicily, we find that he speaks of continents such as Asia (14.100.1), countries such as Hellas (15.6.1, 15.73.1) and Italy (16.16.1), and smaller units such as Rhodes (20.89.1), Mytilene (13.79.8), or Athens (14.7.1). These transitions sometimes describe events in Sicily or Carthage as ‘of a different nature’ (τὰς ἑτερογενεῖς πράξεις: 11.20.1, 16.5.1, 16.64.3–65.1), but never use the language of east and west.

The Greek concern for geographical symmetry could still lead to the objection that East/West co-ordinates may be implied when Diodorus presents parallels between Persia and Carthage. But for this objection to have any power, the geographical polarity of east and west would have to be applied to areas other than the extreme east and west. Yet when Diodorus reports Alexander’s final memoranda (18.4.4), for instance, he does not conceptualise his ambitions to conquer Carthage or to transplant populations between Asia and Europe in terms of east and west. It is only when he specifies that Alexander planned also ‘to make a road along the coast of Libya as far as the Pillars of Heracles’ that general Greek conceptions make it reasonable to see the Pillars as a specifically western counterpart to Alexander’s conquests in India. Here too, then, the East/West polarity is activated at the margins of the inhabited word.

Further objections may be made to seeing a symmetrical geography lurking behind the Persia/Carthage pairing. For one thing, east-west symmetry is in general less strongly stressed in Greek geography than north-south symmetry. It must also be recalled that other links between places may be more powerful than purely spatial relations: when Diodorus, drawing on Timaeus, reports that Alexander captured Tyre ‘on the day with the same name and at the same hour on which the Carthaginians seized the Apollo at Gela’ (13.108.4 = Timaeus, FGrHist 566 F 106), it is the colonial link between Carthage and Tyre rather than the geographical location of the two cities that is prominent.

We have seen, then, that applying the language of East and West to parallels drawn by Diodorus between mainland Greece and Sicily or between Persia and Carthage is not justified by his geographical terminology. Nor is Diodorus at all unrepresentative of Greek writers of his own time or earlier. There is no space here to support this claim in detail, but a few generalisations can be made. Mainland

25 Cf. Romm (1989) 110–11 on Herodotus. The stress on north-south symmetry, as Katherine Clarke reminds me, is doubtless due to the more striking geographical differences as one moves from north to south within the northern hemisphere; cf. also Diod. 18.5–6 for a strong north-south divide within Asia.

26 Cf. Curtius 4.3.22 for a variant (after a Tyrian dreams that Apollo deserts the city, the Tyrians bind with a gold chain a statue of Apollo that the Carthaginians had carried off from Syracuse), following a chronologically impossible story that during Alexander’s siege of Tyre envoys from Carthage arrived, announcing that ‘the Syracusans were devastating Africa and had pitched their camp not far from the walls of Carthage’ (4.3.19–20).

27 Similarly, to return to the sacking of Carthage and Corinth, Purcell (1995) 138–9 well points to the way Velleius Paterculus mentions how long both cities had been founded; rather differently Cic. Amic. 11 compares them in terms of their enmity to Rome (‘duabus urbis eversis inimicissimis huic imperio’) and Flor. Epit. 1.33 (2.17.2) in terms of distinction (‘duo clarissimarum urbisium’). Flor. Epit. 1.33 (2.17.1) also casts Carthage–Corinth–Numantia as successive destructions, rather than focussing on synchronicity (and note also that Flor. Epit. 1.35–6 (2.20.1, 3.1.1) casts Asia Minor, Africa, and Spain as east, south, and west).
Greeks could mark off Sicily and Italy as belonging in some sense to a separate sphere without seeing it as ‘the West’: thus Thucydides’ Nicias speaks of ‘boundaries’ for those travelling by sea (6.13.1: ‘the Ionian Gulf for the coastal route and the Sicilian Sea for an open crossing’). Nicias here uses the hodological (journey-based) rather than cartographic perspective that is prevalent in most modes of Greek geographical writing—and that itself militates against any absolute division into East and West. As for conflicts between Greece and Persia, Greek writers did not view those as conflicts between East and West. Rather, as in Diodorus, the explicit polarity of East and West was most often used in speaking of the extremes of the known world, generally either to define the limits of human settlement and geographical knowledge or to stress the extent of an empire: thus Appian’s proem contrasts the failure of the cities of mainland Greece to extend their power by invading ‘Sicily’ or marching into ‘Asia’ with the Romans’ success in extending the boundaries of its empire ‘from the setting of the sun and the Western ocean to … the Eastern ocean, so that their boundary is the ocean both where the sun-god rises and where he sinks’ (praef. 8–9). This totalising language (which is expressed in the early parts of Diodorus, as we have seen, by a focus on Heracles and Dionysus and by proleptic allusions to Alexander and Caesar) does not

28 Greek conceptions are often betrayed in translation: thus Warner translates αὐτόθεν at Th. 3.86.4 as ‘from the west’ (contrast Hammond: ‘from that area’), or again τὴν ἐκεῖθεν προσγενόµενη δύναµιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων and αὐτὰ τὰ προσγενόµενα ἐκεῖθεν χωρία at Th. 6.90.3–4 as ‘the additional Hellenic forces which we should have acquired in the west’ and ‘our new conquests in the west’ (contrast Hammond: ‘this entire additional force of overseas Greeks … these foreign acquisitions’—phrases with ideological implications of their own).

29 Though note that a more cartographic approach was adopted by some writers, e.g. Hipparchus.

30 See e.g. Mayor (1881) n. on Juv. 10.1–2 (including the omitted material printed on p. 69); Fraenkel (1957) 451 n. 4; Woodman (1977) 241.
justify transferring the East/West division into the Mediterranean.\footnote{Purcell (1995) 139, by contrast, writes that ‘the Greek conceptual division of the Mediterranean into two domains shaped the theme of the two options for world conquest, that of Dionysus or that of Heracles, as it appeared in the historiography of Alexander or of condottieri like Rome’s enemy Pyrrhus’—though Dionysus and Heracles are much more linked with the extremes of Asia and Europe, and Heracles in any case came to be portrayed as a conqueror in India (cf. Str. 15.1.7 for ancient debate on whether Heracles went to both eastern and western extremes).}

The explicit conceptual division of the Mediterranean into East and West is far more common in Roman writers, especially after the civil war between Antony and Octavian. The difference can be illustrated by the use of a famous image of ‘the west’ in Polybius and in Justin’s epitome of Trogus’ history. When Polybius presents Agelaus of Naupactus warning against allowing ‘the clouds now gathering in the west (τὰ προφαινόµενα νῦν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑσπέρας νέφη) to loom over Greece’ (5.10.4.10),\footnote{Also flagged here by τοῦ συνεστῶτος πρὸς ταῖς δύσεσι πολέµου (‘the war in the west’) at 5.10.4.2, and cf. 9.37.10.} he uses the language of the west without the corresponding language of the east. When Justin presents Philip V of Macedon echoing (in a different but more or less contemporary setting) that phrase, he does use the undifferentiated language of East and West—and even here it is Greece and Asia together that form the East: ‘to the West (ab Occidente) the new empires of Carthage and Rome were in the ascendand, and all that held these back from attacking Greece and Asia was their duel for supremacy. The victors in this conflict, he said, would lose no time in crossing to the East (in Orientem). He could see arising in Italy; he continued, the cloud of fierce and bloody war; he saw a storm coming from the west (ab occasu)’ (29.2.9–3.1).\footnote{For east/west language in Justin, note e.g. 12.2.1–2 (where the East embraces ‘Asia and Persia’, the West ‘Italy, Africa, and Sicily’); 30.4.15 (Macedonian’s eastern vs. Rome’s western empire); 41.1.1 (Parthia vs. Rome); Clarke (1999) 262–3. This language is used especially from the age of Alexander onwards. There are of course...} Roman writers also strengthen the
geographical division by the use of metonymy. The formulation ‘the clouds from the west’ is so memorable because it is exceptional in Greek authors at this time; Diodorus’ more circumspect language of ‘places’ or ‘parts’ that lie ‘towards the west’ is much more common. Roman writers, by contrast, were much freer in speaking of ‘orizens’ and ‘occidens’ absolutely.

This necessarily brief discussion has suggested that analysing comparisons between mainland Greece and Sicily in terms of ‘a comparative East/West mentality’, as Denis Feeney does, involves a misleadingly strong use of geographical polarisation. Stressing the importance of exploring the precise terms of the comparison is not to deny the importance of the comparative mentality itself. Indeed, the rest of this paper will be aiming precisely to build on Feeney’s discussion of the significance of this comparative mode itself.

**Agathocles and Alexander, Dion and Philip**

Towards the start of his narrative of Alexander’s invasion of Persia, Diodorus describes how Alexander chose to place his troops on the far side of the River Granicus, site of his first major battle in Asia. He then points to a later parallel—the case of Agathocles, king of the Syracusans, who

numerous parallels in imperial Greek authors, e.g. App. *Mithr.* 438 (on Pompey’ campaigns against pirates).

34 The phrasing at 6.5.1 on Picus/Zeus as king of Italy, ‘holding sway over the west (κρατῶν τῆς δύσεως) for one hundred and twenty years’, is not Diodorus’ own, but that of the source-text, the *Chronicle* of John of Antioch; similarly 26.13.1 (a highly compressed account of Hannibal’s march ‘from the west and the Pillars of Hercules’ (ἀπὸ δυσµῶν … καὶ τῶν Ἡρακλειωτικῶν στηλῶν)) must reflect the language of the excerptor.

35 For the undifferentiated ‘east’, cf. e.g. V. *Aen.* 1.209 ‘spoliis orientis’.

36 Feeney’s free adoption of this spatial language (cf. above, n. 10) is particularly striking in view of his brilliant analysis of the dangers of anachronistic temporal conceptions. (I should add that in earlier writings I have myself used the East/West opposition in the same loose way.)
copied the strategy of Alexander and won an unexpected and decisive victory. He had crossed to Libya with a small force and by burning his ships deprived his men of any hope of escape by flight, thus constraining them to fight like heroes and thereby win a victory over the Carthaginians, who had an army numbering many tens of thousands’ (17.23.2–3). The Sicilian Diodorus here suggests a parallel between the initial conflicts in Alexander’s crossing to Asia and in Agathocles’ crossing to Africa—a parallel that seems to amplify the achievement of the Sicilian Agathocles.37 The Alexander/Agathocles parallel acquires further resonance in the account of Agathocles himself, both when he crosses to Libya, thereby implicitly putting into practice some at least of Alexander’s plans for future campaigns (18.4.4, discussed above), and again when he defends Corcyra from a Macedonian attack.38 This parallel can also, however, be taken as highlighting the far greater scope of Alexander’s venture into Asia rather than any points of comparison between the two leaders.

When Diodorus comes to deal directly with Agathocles’ career, he suggests indirectly a link with two earlier military leaders—another Sicilian, Dion, as well as Alexander’s father, Philip II of Macedon. Diodorus highlights the rise of Agathocles in his proem to Book 19, in which he reflects on the tendency of powerful individuals (especially in Sicily) to overthrow democracies (19.1.5). He then focuses on ‘the most extraordinary instance of all’—‘that of Agathocles, who became tyrant of the Syracusans, a man who had the lowest beginnings (ἀφορµαῖς … ἐλαχίσταις χρησάµενος), but who plunged not only Syracuse but also the whole of Sicily and Libya into the gravest misfortunes’ (19.1.6). A similar

37 This prolepsis is tellingly absent from the other Alexander historians, though see above, n. 26 for a different Agathocles link in Curtius. As Goukowsky (1976) 183 notes, Alexander and Agathocles are also aligned at Plaut. Mostell. 775.

38 Diod. 21.2.2: ‘the Sicelites wished not only to be regarded as victors over the Carthaginians and the barbarians of Italy, but also to show themselves in the Greek arena as more than a match for the Macedonians, whose spears had subjugated both Asia and Europe’.
phrase is used later when Diodorus berates Timaeus for his hostile account of Agathocles: ‘Yet who does not know that of all men who ever came to power, none acquired a greater kingdom with fewer resources (ἐλάττοσιν ἄφορμαῖς χρησάμενος)?’ (21.17.2).

Agathocles’ rise to power from humble beginnings seems to have been a part of the historiographical tradition. It appears, for instance, in a digression where Polybius compares Agathocles with his fellow Sicilian tyrant Dionysius (15.35.2–4). In Diodorus, Agathocles’ rise from lowly beginnings is also explored comparatively, but in a more indirect manner. The introduction of Agathocles at the start of Book 19 echoes firstly that of Philip at the start of Book 16: ‘Philip was king over the Macedonians for twenty-four years, and having started from the most insignificant beginnings (ἐλαχίσταις … ἀφορµαῖς χρησάμενος) built up his kingdom to be the greatest of the dominions in Europe, and having taken over Macedonia when she was a slave to the Illyrians, made her mistress of many powerful tribes and states’ (16.1.3). The terms of this introduction are in turn resumed in Diodorus’ obituary notice on Philip: ‘Such was the end of Philip, who had made himself the greatest of the kings in Europe in his time. […] He is known to fame as one who with but the slenderest resources (ἐλαχίσταις … ἄφορµάς) to support his claim to a throne won for himself the greatest empire in the Greek world’ (16.95.1–2). These echoes mark out both Agathocles and Philip as men who rose to positions of great influence from the lowest beginnings.

Diodorus invites a further (and more immediate) comparison between Sicily and Macedonia when he introduces Dion a few chapters after his introduction of Sicily: ‘With slenderer resources (ἐλαχίσταις … χρησάμενος ἄφορµαῖς) than those of any conqueror before his time he succeeded contrary to all expectation in overthrowing the

39 Bizière (1975) 7 n. 3 stresses the importance of the Dionysius comparison for Diod. 19.1, adducing Diod. 13.96.4, Isoc. 5.65 for Dionysius’ rise from lowly origins.
greatest realm in all Europe’ (16.9.1).\textsuperscript{40} The parallel of Philip and Dion is bolstered by other echoes. Their anticipatory introductions—themselves a significant structural parallel—attribute their rise to their personal qualities rather than to fortune. Philip also acquires just as Dion overthrows ‘the greatest realm in all Europe’ (μεγίστην τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην δυναστείαν (16.1.3) ~ μεγίστην δυναστείαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην (16.9.1)).\textsuperscript{41} Both Philip and Dion, moreover, are devoted to philosophy (κτωρικῶς και τῶν ἁριστῶν ἱρωκος ἀγωνιζομένου (16.4.6: ‘Philip with his best troops fought with true heroism’) ~ ἱρωκος δ’ ἀγωνιζόμενος (16.12.4: Dion ‘fighting with true heroism’)).\textsuperscript{42}

Is it appropriate to view the historical comparison between Sicilian and Macedonian leaders as a form of geographical mapping? As with Agathocles, Dion’s rise from lowly origins was also part of the historiographical tradition. Indeed, the same phrase Diodorus applies to Dion (in addition to Agathocles and Philip) is used in the first sentence of Plutarch’s synkrisis of Dion and Brutus: ‘We see, therefore, that both men had many noble traits, and especially that they rose to the greatest heights from the most inconsiderable beginnings (ἐλαχίσταις ἀφορµαῖς); but this is most to the credit of Dion.’\textsuperscript{43} Nonetheless, the specific

\textsuperscript{40} These intratextual echoes are noted by Sordi (1969) 22; Vannicelli (1978) 180–1 (see n. 48); and Lefèvre (2002) 535–6 (who stresses their pedagogical utility).

\textsuperscript{41} For Dionysius’ power as the greatest in Europe, cf. also 16.5.4, 20.78.3; for Philip’s, cf. 19.1.6, 32.4.1.

\textsuperscript{42} Itself something of a Diodoran cliché: the adverb ἱρωκος occurs 22 times in extant parts of Diodorus, seven times in conjunction with the verb ἀγωνιζεσθαι (including of Epaminondas at 15.87.1; cf. 16.2.3 (quoted in n. 44) for another Philip/Epaminondas link).

\textsuperscript{43} Cf. already Dio 50.4 for the joy in Syracuse at the expulsion of Dionysius II: ‘For since, among the many illustrations men give of the mutations of fortune, the expulsion of Dionysius is still to this day the strongest and plainest, what joy must we suppose those men themselves then felt, and how great a pride, who, with the fewest resources (ἐλαχίσταις ἁφορµαῖς), overthrew the greatest tyranny that ever was!’
parallel in Diodorus between Philip, Dion, and Agathocles is supported by the rareness of this phrase in extant Greek literature. Though the phrase ἀφορµαῖς χρῆσθαι is not uncommon,⁴⁴ a search in the TLG corpus of extant Greek literature for the dative plural forms ἐλαχίσταις and ἀφορµαῖς within one line of each other yields, besides the passages I have quoted from Diodorus and Plutarch, only two Byzantine excerptors of Diodorus and Plutarch, while a search for the accusative plural forms ἐλαχίστας and ἀφορµάς yields only a Byzantine excerptor of Diodorus (there are no results for the nominative and genitive plurals).⁴⁵

It could still be argued that Diodorus was far more concerned with the rise of great leaders from humble origins as a general historical pattern than with its precise geographical distribution.⁴⁶ A general pattern is also at stake, for instance, when Diodorus uses Solon’s warning about Peisistratus (19.1.4) to illustrate the tendency of

Both the use of the phrase in Sicilian and mainland Greek contexts in Diodorus and the occurrence of the same phrase in Plutarch have possible source implications: they tell against, e.g., the view of Hammond (1938) that Diodorus closely followed different sources for the Sicilian and Philip narratives in Book 16.

⁴⁴ Thus Diodorus uses a similar phrase of Philip’s Pythagorean training in close proximity: ‘Philip, availing himself of the same initial training (ταῖς αὐταῖς ἀφορµαῖς χρησάµενος), achieved no less fame than Epaminondas’ (16.2.3); cf. e.g. Lys. 24.24, Isoc. 2.4, Dem. 3.33, Pol. 1.3.10, 23.3.9. For the phrase applied to the basis of a rise to power, cf. Pol. 1.5.2: ‘we must first state how and when the Romans established their position in Italy, and what prompted them (τίσιν ἀφορµαῖς … χρησάµενοι) afterwards to cross to Sicily, the first country outside Italy where they set foot.’

⁴⁵ Dative plural: one instance is a Constantinian excerpt from Diodorus 19 (the Agathocles passage), the other from a fifteenth-century history derived from Diodorus and Plutarch (Gemistus Pletho, E Diodoro et Plutarcho de rebus post pugnam ad Mantinam gestis per capita tractatio). Accusative plural: Constantinian excerpt of Diodorus 16.

⁴⁶ Pomeroy (1991) 62 comments (in relation to 16.95.2) on the common Hellenistic motif of the self-made man. As Katherine Clarke notes, the presence of this motif would not in itself stop the resulting geographical patterning being of note.
powerful men like Agathocles to overthrow democracies. Nonetheless, that mention of Peisistratus does also fit into Diodorus’ concern to compare the Athenian and Sicilian experiences of tyranny. And the linking of Philip and Dion is also strengthened, as we have seen, by broader reflection on power relations in Europe: earlier Dionysius had been alarmed at the position of the Carthaginians as ‘the most powerful people in Europe’ (14.41.2); he grew to become the greatest power in Europe himself; and his overthrow by Dion coincided with the rise of Philip, who takes over that position. Diodorus suggests, that is, the idea of *translatio imperii*—but not in the most common pattern whereby the succession of empires involves a shift from east to west. Through a distinctively Sicilian interpretation of that theme, he highlights the achievements of Carthage and Syracuse. As for Agathocles, the stress on his crossing to Africa to confront Carthage on home ground highlights the failure of Alexander’s plans for world empire while also preparing for the decisive shift of power to Rome.

**Dionysius and Agesilaus**

I turn now to Diodorus’ presentation of the more or less contemporaneous wars undertaken by the Syracusan tyrant Dionysius I against Carthage and by the Spartan king Agesilaus against Persia. Diodorus presents his account of Dionysius’ war against Carthage (14.41–78, spanning three archon years) in between the Spartans’ engagement in Asia under Thibron and Dercylidas (14.35.6–37.4; 38.2–3; 39.4–6) and the decision to send out Agesilaus (14.79.1). The chronological interweaving between conflicts involving Persia and Carthage evidently continues the linking found in the narrative of 480 BC, but now it is Greek powers taking the initiative against non-Greeks (though, unlike

47 Cf. 13.95.5–6; also the implicit links discussed by Rood (2004) 364. For another specific Sicily-Athens connection, cf. 5.4.4 (the Athenians were first to receive the gift of corn after the Sicilians).

Persia and Carthage, they do not co-ordinate their efforts. This purely chronological connection, I will suggest, is bolstered by a number of other links between the two narratives.

One link lies in Diodorus' stress on the greatness of the conflicts. When Dionysius enters on his war, he assumes that 'the war would be a great and protracted one since he was entering a struggle with the most powerful people of Europe' (14.41.2: ὑπελάµβανε γὰρ ἔσεσθαι μέγαν καὶ πολυ-χρόνιον τὸν πόλεµον, ὡς ἂν πρὸς τοὺς δυνατώτατος τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην μέλλων διαγωνίζοµεν). Dionysius is here in the position of the historian Thucydides at the start of the Peloponnesian War, predicting a great conflict on the basis of the size of the forces involved (1.1.1). But he is also in the position of the Spartans as Diodorus presents them deciding to increase their commitment to their war with Persia by sending Agesilaus: 'In Greece the Lacedaemonians, foreseeing how great their war with the Persians would be …' (14.79.1: κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Λακεδαιµόνιοι προορώµενοι τὸ µέγεθος τοῦ πρὸς Πέρσας πολέµου …). A further link with the Spartan expedition to Asia emerges from Diodorus' account of the steps Dionysius takes in preparation for the war. He gives a particularly detailed account of Dionysius' construction of weapons in

49 For the idea of greatness, cf. 14.44.3: µέλλων δὲ µέγαν ἐξεγείρειν πόλεµον ('Since Dionysius was going to raise up a great war'); for the phrase, see also Smith (1900) 72 on the epic register of τὸν πόλεµον ἐγείροµεν at Thuc 1.121.1 (and cf. Hdt. 8.1.42.2). Note also 14.63.3 (Himilcar’s perception that the siege of Syracuse would be lengthy).

50 The opening sections of Thucydides are also evoked by the focus on naval innovations (14.41.3, 42.2–3: quadriremes and quinqueremes); in particular, the phrase ἀκούων γὰρ ὁ ∆ιονύσιος ἐν Κορίνθῳ ναυπηγηθήσαν τριήρη πρῶτος (‘hearing that triremes had first been built in Corinth’) hints at Th. 1.13.2 (τριήρεις ἐν Κορίνθῳ πρῶτον τῆς Ἑλλάδος ναυπηγηθήσαν). Cf. also 14.42.1 for the invention of the catapult.

51 The expectation of a great war is a common motif in Diodorus, cf. 2.5.7 (Second Punic War), 12.76.1 (Peloponnesian War), 13.44.5 (Sicilian-Carthaginian conflict of 410–409 BC), 15.15.2, 15.28.5, 16.28.1, 17.111.4, 18.35.1; note also Pol. 5.104.2; App. Syr. 62.
Syracuse (14.41–3): ‘With so many arms and ships under construction at one place the beholder was filled with utter wonder at the sight. For whenever a man gazed at the eagerness shown in the building of the ships, he thought that every Greek in Sicily was engaged on their construction; and when, on the other hand, he visited the places where men were making arms and engines of war, he thought that all available labour was engaged in this alone’ (14.43.1). Diodorus’ description can be compared with Xenophon’s account of Agesilaus’ preparations in Ephesus: Agesilaus established prizes for hoplites, cavalry, peltasts, and archers, so that ‘one could see all the gymnasias full of men exercising, the horse track full of men practising their horsemanship, and the javelin throwers and archers working at their tasks. Indeed Agesilaus made the whole city where they were stationed a marvel to look at; the agora was full of all sorts of horses and weapons for sale, and the coppersmiths, joiners, smiths, leather workers, and painters were all fashioning weapons for war in such profusion that one would have thought the whole city was really a workshop for war’ (Hell. 3.4.16–17, trans. Marincola). Both descriptions stress the visual effect of the scenes, using the perspective of an anonymous onlooker; they also make repeated use of the language of totality; and they stress the productive power of rivalry (though Xenophon focuses more on exercise, Diodorus more on manufacture). Diodorus’ account is probably derived ultimately from Philistus, and it is possible that either Xenophon or Philistus was influenced by the other’s account. To set aside the issue of sources, it is striking that there is no counterpart in Diodorus’ work to Xenophon’s elaborate description of Agesilaus’ preparations in Ephesus. Perhaps the very elab-

52 See Sanders (1987) 145 on Philistus FGrHist 556 F 28 (a later rhetorician’s testimonium on Dionysius’ preparation), with 30 n. 3 for modern scholarly views on whether Philistus influenced Xenophon or Xenophon influenced Philistus. That Xenophon’s account was later imitated by both Polybius and Livy in their accounts of Scipio’s preparations in Spain (see Levene (2010) 92–5 on Pol. 10.20.6–7 and Liv. 26.51.7–8) adds further to the geographical patterning.
oration of Xenophon’s account led Diodorus to neglect that scene and highlight instead events in Sicily at the expense of the Aegean region.

The relation between the two expeditions becomes more complex as Diodorus’ narrative proceeds. Agesilaus’ venture proves to be short-lived once discontented cities in Greece unite against the Spartans, thinking it will be easy to defeat them since they were ‘hated by their allies because of their harsh rule’ (14.82.2: μισουµένων γὰρ τῶν Λακεδαιµονίων ὑπὸ τῶν συµµάχων διὰ τὸ βάρος τῆς ἐπιστασίας). This account of the hatred felt for the severity of Spartan rule echoes Diodorus’ presentation of the feelings of Carthage’s subjects. He brings those feelings out firstly as he describes the support for Dionysius as he marches through Sicily to attack Carthaginian possessions in the west: ‘they were all eager to join his campaign, hating as they did the heavy hand (µισοῦντες … τὸ βάρος) of Phoenician domination and relishing the prospect at last of freedom’ (14.47.5).53 Later, after the Carthaginians have withdrawn from Sicily, they are confronted by a disturbance in Africa: ‘Their allies, who had long hated the oppressive rule (µισοῦντες τὸ βάρος) of the Carthaginians and even more at this time because of the betrayal of the soldiers at Syracuse, were inflamed against them’ (14.77.1).54 Diodorus’ account suggests a link between Spartan rule in Greece and Carthaginian rule over their subjects in Sicily and Africa, painting a positive image of Dionysius’ anti-Carthaginian policy. This link is then reinforced by his comment that when Agesilaus was left to make his way back to Greece, he passed ‘through the same country as Xerxes did when he made his campaign against the Greeks’ (14.83.3, cf. Xen. Hell. 4.2.8). By placing the

53 Cf. also 14.46.3 for the hatred (µῖσος) felt by the inhabitants of Greek cities under Carthaginian rule for their Phoenician co-habitations; 14.48.1 for the people of Eryx going over to Dionysius because of their hatred (µισοῦντες) of the Carthaginians.

54 The clustering is suggestive, even though hatred (µισ- stems) and severe rule (βάρος) are also associated at 13.66.6 and 20.35.4; note also the use of βάρος of Spartan rule at 14.6.2 and of Dionysius at 14.18.7.
Spartans in the position of Persia, Diodorus bolsters the parallel of their rule with that of Carthage.

It is not just by comparison with the Spartan invasion of Asia Minor that Diodorus magnifies the significance of Dionysius’ conflict with Carthage. He also draws extended comparisons between the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily and the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415–413 BC. In this case, the comparisons are drawn through echoes of Thucydides’ Sicilian narrative, which itself had portrayed the Athenian invasion as in some ways a replay of Xerxes’ invasion of Greece, as well as through earlier parts of Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War narrative.

An initial echo of Thucydides appears when Diodorus presents Dionysius putting the case for war to the Syracusans: ‘For the present, he pointed out, the Carthaginians were inactive because of the plague which had broken out among them and had destroyed the larger part of the inhabitants of Libya, but when they had recovered their strength, they would not refrain from attacking the Sicilian Greeks, against whom they had been plotting from the earliest time. It was therefore preferable, he continued, to wage a decisive war upon them while they were weak than to wait and compete when they were strong’ (5.43.3). The argument that the Carthaginians are constrained from attacking only by the plague recalls the historical precedent of the Athenians attacking Sicily once they had recovered from plague (Thuc. 6.26.2), while the argument that the Syracusans should seize the opportunity to attack right away recalls the terms of the Mytilenean appeal to Sparta in 427 BC, where the plague had also been stressed as a source of weakness (Thuc. 3.13.3).

55 Rood (1999); Harrison (2000).

56 There is a slight tension with Diodorus’ account of Dionysius’ picture of Carthaginian strength; cf. 14.47.2 for the Carthaginians as weakened by plague and ‘totally unprepared’ (τοῖς ὅλοις ἀπαρασκευαστοῖς), in opposition to the Thucydidean picture of preparedness in Greece at the start of the Peloponnesian War. For plague in Carthage as an argument for Syracusan action, cf. also Diod. 15.73.1.
Further parallels can be suggested in the articulation of
the war narratives in Diodorus and Thucydides. Diodorus’
account of Dionysius’ initial advance against Motye, ‘a
Carthaginian colony, which they used as their chief base
of operations against Sicily’ (14.47.4), recalls Thucydides’ stress
on the Athenians’ perception of the strategic possibilities of
Messene as a base (Thuc. 4.1.2, 6.48), suggesting in turn a
geographical contrast between Carthage and Athens (the
one approaching from the south-west, the other from the
east), but a similarity in their designs on the island;
Dionysius’ failure to contain the war in the west of Sicily is
later underlined by Himilco’s perception of the advantages
of Messene (14.56.1). The Motyans’ despair at the expectation
that they would suffer themselves what they had done
to others (14.52.2), while contributing to Diodorus’ general
stress on the importance of moderation, recalls Gylippus’
appeal to the Athenians’ past crimes in support of the harsh
punishment of the Athenian captives in Sicily (13.30.6), and
even more closely Xenophon’s account of Athenian fears at
the end of the Peloponnesian War (a theme itself
anticipated in Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue). Thucydides’
famous account of the final sea-battle at Syracuse is then
picked up in Diodorus’ focus on the sight of land troops on
the shore as a source of encouragement to those fighting on
board ships (14.59.6) and on the confusion between land
and sea fighting (14.60.3). Next, Thucydides’ plague
narrative (2.47–54) is echoed in multiple ways in Diodorus’
account of the plague that hits the Carthaginians (14.70.4–
71); this account also includes an allusion to the Athenians’
sufferings in the same spot (14.70.5, alluding back to 13.12).

57 Cf. already 14.46.3–4, where the Sicilian Greeks are harsh to
Phoenician inhabitants, bearing in mind what they had suffered; the
Motyan fears are in due course fulfilled at 14.53.1.

58 Cf. Rood (2004) 364–5 on Diodorus’ transfer of this motif to
Sicily.


60 Note Diod. 14.70.4 (ἔνεπεσεν) ~ Thuc. 2.48.2 (ἔνεπεσεν); Diod.
14.71.1 (care for sick stopping) ~ Thuc. 2.51.3; Diod. 14.71.4 (upsetting of
kin relations) ~ Thuc. 2.51.3; Diod. 14.70.6 (κατὰ δὲ τὴν μετεγραφήν [ γ]
This succession of parallels culminates in the contrasts Diodorus draws between the arrival and departure of the invading Carthaginian army (14.76.1–2):

\[\text{οὕτως µὲν οὖν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἡ τύχη ταχεῖα τὴν µεταβολὴν ἐποίησε, καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἔδειξεν, ὡς οἱ µεῖζον τοῦ καθήκοντος ἐπαιρόµενοι ταχέως ἐξελέγχουσι τὴν ἰδίαν ἀσθένειαν. ἐκείνοι γὰρ τὸν κατὰ Σικελίαν πόλεων σχεδὸν ἀπαισών πλὴν Συρακουσῶν κρατοῦντες, καὶ ταῦταν ἀλώσεσθαι προσδοκῶντες, ἔξαιρης τῆς ἰδίας πατρίδος ἁγωνίαν ἱµαγκάσθησαν, καὶ τοῖς τάφωσι τῶν Συρακοσίων ἀνατρέψαντες πεντεκαίδεκα µυριάδας ἐπείδου ἀτάφους πεντεκαίδεκα µυριάδας ἐκείνοι τοῦ Σικελίας στόλον ἀπελέγοντο καταπλέοντες ὑπερηφάνως, καὶ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἐπιδεικνύµενοι τὰς ἑαυτῶν εὐτυχίας, ἠγνόουν ἑαυτοὺς µέλλοντας νυκτὸς ἀποδράσεσθαι καὶ τοὺς συµµάχους ἐκαταλυέαν τοῖς πολεµίοις.}\]

With such swiftness did Fortune work a change in the affairs of the Carthaginians, and point out to all mankind that those who become elated above due measure quickly give proof of their own weakness. For they who had in their hands practically all the cities of Sicily with the exception of Syracuse and expected its capture, of a sudden were forced to be anxious for their own fatherland; they who overthrew the tombs of the Syracusans gazed upon one hundred and fifty thousand dead lying in heaps and unburied because of the plague; they who wasted with fire the territory of the θερµότης ἔµιγνεν, ὡς ἂν τοσοῦτο πλῆθος ἐν στενῷ τόπῳ συνηθροισµένον (‘in the middle of the day the heat was stifling, as must be the case when so great a multitude is gathered together in a narrow place’)) echoes Thucydides’ account of the suffering of the Athenian prisoners in the stone-quarry at Syracuse (7.87.1–2) as well as the plague (2.32.2). For the links between the accounts (generally attributed to Philistus), see Littman (1982); Sanders (1987) 131–2; Lewis (1994) 144 n. 103; cf. also Levene (2010) 62 n. 153 on Livy 25.26, another Sicilian plague.
Syracusans now in their turn saw their own fleet of a sudden go up in flames; they who so arrogantly sailed with their whole armada into the harbour and flaunted their successes before the Syracusans had little thought that they were to steal away by night and leave their allies at the mercy of their enemy.

The theme of the mutability of fortune is a common historiographical trope, but this accumulation of reversals nonetheless demands to be read against Thucydides’ account of the reversal to the Athenians’ fortunes in Sicily (7.75.7):

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μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τὸ διάφορον τοῦτο [τῷ] Ἑλληνικῷ στρατεύµατι ἐγένετο, οἷς ἀντὶ µὲν τοῦ ἄλλου δουλωσόµενου ἠκεῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτο µᾶλλον δεδιότας µὴ πάθωσι ξυνέβη ἀπιέναι, ἀντὶ δὲ εὐχῆς τε καὶ παιάνων, µεθ’ ὧν ἐξέπλεον, πάλιν τούτων τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐπιφήµισαν αἵροµάσθαι, πεζοῦς τε ἀντὶ ναυβατῶν πορεύοµεν καὶ ὀπλιτικῷ προσέχοντας µᾶλλον ἵα ναυτικῷ.
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This was indeed the greatest reverse experienced by any Greek army. They had come with the intention of enslaving others, and now found themselves leaving in fear of enslavement themselves; they had set out to the accompaniment of paeans and prayers for success, and were now retreating with quite different imprecations in their ears; they were on foot, not on ship, and reliant now on infantry rather than navy.\(^{61}\)

In both cases, the grandeur of an invading army’s initial arrival is contrasted with the miserable circumstances of its departure. Besides this, the Carthaginians’ fear that they will be attacked by those they set out to conquer (14.76.2)

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\(^{61}\) Cf. also the stress on mutability at Thuc. 7.55. Cf. also Diodorus’ account of the abandonment of Agrigentum in 406 BC (13.89).
evokes the Athenians’ fears when they hear of their defeat in Sicily (Th. 8.1.2—see further below). 62

By drawing repeatedly on Thucydides, then, Diodorus aligns Athens and Carthage, highlighting the pattern of heroic Sicilian resistance to invasion. And yet Diodorus also upsets this pattern by presenting a much more disturbing image of Dionysius. The Syracusans are willing to take part in the war against Carthage because they hate Carthage for compelling them to take orders from a tyrant—and also hope war may give them a chance of freedom (14.45.5).63 A negative image is further conveyed by a telling parallel with Sparta. In the course of his account of the war against Carthage, Diodorus presents a speaker at Syracuse, Theodorus, arguing that the Syracusans should take action not just against Carthage but against Dionysius himself (14.65.3): ‘But it behooves us, fellow citizens, to put an end not only to the Phoenician war but to the tyrant within our walls. For the acropolis, which is guarded by the weapons of slaves, is a hostile redoubt in our city’. The focus on Dionysius’ hostile control of the acropolis within Syracuse is paralleled by Diodorus’ explanation of why Peloponnesian cities are unwilling to revolt from Sparta owing to the position of Sparta within the Peloponnese (14.82.4): ‘For Sparta, lying as it does along the side of it, was a kind of acropolis and fortress (καθαπερεί τις ἀκρόπολις ἦν καὶ φρουρά) of the entire Peloponnesus’. Far from Dionysius’ triumph against the Carthaginian invaders being simply contrasted with Agesilaus’ rapid return along Xerxes’ route to Greece, then, we see that Dionysius can be assimilated to

62 Meister (1967) 95 sees Diod. 14.76 as typically Timaean, adducing 20.13.3-4 and 20.79 as parallels; but Thuc. 7.75 seems closer than either of those passages.

63 Possibly alluding back to 13.114.1, the treaty with Carthage that had confirmed Dionysius as ruler of Syracuse. Cf. also 14.46.2 for the Syracusans’ willingly joining the war despite their hatred of Dionysius’ tyranny and 14.58.1 for the Sicels’ attachment to Carthage owing to their hatred of Dionysius; also 14.61.1-3, where Dionysius is unwilling to encounter Himilco on land because of his worries over Syracuse, leading to his being abandoned by the Sicilian Greeks.
Sparta as a hostile acropolis destroying the freedom of his subjects. Indeed, Theodorus’ speech presses this negative image of Dionysius further by aligning Syracuse under his tyranny with a sacked city (14.65.2) and by invoking both Gelon’s victory over the Carthaginians at Himera and the Syracusan victory over Athens to rouse the Syracusans to action against Dionysius. Rather than being seen as the latest in a line of heroic Sicilian patriots resisting foreign invasion, Dionysius is here aligned rhetorically with both Carthage and Athens.

The strands I have highlighted linking thematically the three great cities of Carthage, Syracuse, and Athens come together in Diodorus’ account of Dionysius’ death (15.74.3–4). Diodorus reports how a messenger hurries back to Syracuse to bring Dionysius news of his victory in the Lenaea at Athens in 367—a reversal of the focus on the Athenians and Carthaginians hearing bad news brought to them from Sicily. Dionysius turns to excessive drinking and dies—thereby, we now learn, fulfilling an oracle that he would die after conquering his betters. Dionysius, Diodorus explains, had taken ‘his betters’ to refer to Carthage—and it was for that reason that he had never pressed home his advantage at any point in his wars against Carthage. The oracle, it turns out, meant better poets at Athens.

64 For another link with 480, note the allusion to the Carthaginian’s destruction of the tomb of Gelon and wife (14.63.3; also alluded to proleptically at 11.38.4–5). Diodorus similarly posits links with 480 in his account of the Carthaginian invasion of 410–409: the general Hannibal, who is ‘grandson of Hamilcar, who fought in the war against Gelon and died at Himera’, and desires ‘to wipe out the disgraces which had befallen his ancestors’ (13.43.5–6, cf. 13.59.5–6), tortures and kills 3,000 prisoners at the spot where his grandfather had been killed by Gelon (13.62.4); and the Selinuntines are surprised to be attacked by Carthage as ‘they had been the only Sicilian Greeks to fight on the side of the Carthaginians in the war against Gelon’ (13.53.1).

65 Note also that Theodorus’ appeal to the Syracusans to seize their opportunity (14.69.4) strengthens the parallel by echoing the rhetoric that Dionysius himself had used against Carthage.

66 The earlier narrative had presented a more rationalistic account of Dionysius’ motives: at 14.75.3 he makes peace so as to keep alive in
Diodorus and Thucydides on Athens, Sicily, and Carthage

We have seen in the last two sections that Diodorus draws links between events in Sicily and in mainland Greece by the use of verbal parallelism and by more extended narrative patterning. Besides this, he adopts Thucydidean motifs as a way of connecting Athens’ disastrous invasion of Sicily with the history of Syracusan–Carthaginian conflict. In this section, I will take this analysis further by looking both at Thucydidean echoes and at broader historical patterning in Diodorus’ account of the two great Carthaginian invasions of Sicily in the fifth century, in 480 and 410–409 BC.

Diodorus connects the Carthaginian invasion in 410 BC with the Athenian expedition five years earlier in a number of ways. One factor that leads the Segestans to seek help from Carthage is expectation of punishment for their alliance with Athens, which had played a central role in the run-up to Athens’ invasion (13.43.1). Another factor in the Segestan decision, a quarrel over disputed land with Selinus (13.43.2–3), is an exact repetition of the antecedents to that invasion. Again, when the Segestans appeal to Carthage, that mirrors their actions a few years earlier—at least as Diodorus has portrayed them (12.82.7; this appeal is not mentioned by Thucydides68). The Carthaginians are Syracuse the fear of Carthage as a check on the Syracusans’ ambitions for internal freedom (this link of internal and external is similar to the Roman concept of the ‘metus hostilis’, except here the external threat serves to keep Syracuse subjected to a tyrant rather than free from corruption at home); cf. Theodorus’ accusations at 14.68.1. Scholars tend to posit a different source for the rest of the Sicilian narrative (Meister 1967) 104 sees it as un-Timaean, and Stylianou (1998) 84 as non-Ephoran but possibly Timaean); in its spatial implications at least it is coherent.

67 This story in turn links suggestively with the stories that Dionysius seized power on the day that Euripides died (Timaeus, FGrHist 566 F 105; see above, n. 7) and that Euripides was born on the day of the battle of Salamis (ibid.; also Vit. Eur. ll. 20–1 Méridier).

68 Cf. Lewis (1994) 128: ‘If Segesta had already attempted to get Carthaginian help against Selinus in 416 … she had had no success. It
initially reluctant to help Segesta, ‘having just witnessed the Syracusa

‘n’sighting the armaments of the Athenians’ (13.43.4). But the conflict then escalates as Segesta sends once again to Carthage while Selinus appeals to Syracuse (13.44.4). Next, Diodorus offers an emotive account of the Carthaginian’s siege and sack of Selinus before describing how they turn to Himera. He then maintains the emotional level as some of the besieged Himaraeans stage a desperate break-out, ‘having as spectators on the walls parents and children (θεατὰς ἔχοντες ἀπὸ τῶν τειχῶν γονεῖς καὶ παῖδας) as well as all their relatives’ (13.60.4)—a precise echo of his earlier account of the final naval battle in the Athenian expedition, where it was the Syracusans who had ‘their parents and children as spectators of the struggle’ (13.15.5: θεατὰς τῶν ἀγώνων ἔχοντες γονεῖς καὶ παῖδας69), as well as a looser echo of Thucydides’ famous account of the final battle in the great harbour at Syracuse (7.70–1).70 Once more literary echoing draws attention to historical patterning.

Diodorus’ account of Gelon’s great victory over Carthage at Himera in 480 BC offers readers the chance to draw further connections with Thucydides’ Sicilian narrative. The account, though much briefer than Thucydides’ narrative, has a similar stress on the emotional involvement of participants, especially their shifts in morale. Particularly close to Thucydides is Diodorus’ account of the Carthaginian response to the news of their defeat at Himera (11.24.2–4):

was therefore surprising that a renewed application in 410 was more warmly received.’

69 Cf. also 13.14.3 and 13.16.7 for the presence of spectators in the narrative of Athens’ siege of Syracuse.

70 For such spectators in Diodorus, note also θεατὰς ἔχοντες τῆς ἀρετῆς at 13.72.8 (where the spectators are on walls) and 14.67.3 (from Theodorus’ speech denouncing Dionysius), θεατὴν ἐχόντων τῆς ἀρετῆς at 11.7.1, and θεατὰς ἔχοντες τῆς ἀνδρείας at 19.83.5.
A handful only of survivors got safely to Carthage in a small boat to give their fellow citizens a statement which was brief: ‘All who crossed over to Sicily have perished.’ The Carthaginians, who had suffered a great disaster so contrary to their hopes, were so terror-stricken that every night they kept vigil guarding the city, in the belief that Gelon with his entire force must have decided to sail forthwith against Carthage. And because of the multitude of the lost, the city went into public mourning, while privately the homes of citizens were filled with wailing and lamentation. For some kept inquiring after sons, others after brothers, while a very large number of children who had lost their fathers, alone now in the world, grieved at the death of those who had begotten them and at their own desolation through the loss of those who could succour them.

The model for Diodorus here is Thucydides’ account of the Athenian defeat in Sicily and the subsequent position in Athens (7.87.6–8.1.2):

κατὰ πάντα γὰρ πάντως νικηθέντες καὶ οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδέν κακοπαθήσαντες πανωλθητία δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ πεξός καὶ νῆσε καὶ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλεσο, καὶ ὀλίγον ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπὶ οἰκον ἀπενόστησα, ταῦτα µὲν τὰ περὶ Σικελίαν γενόμενα, ἐς δὲ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐπειδὴ ἤγγελθη,
ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν ἠπίστουν καὶ τοῖς πάνι τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἔξ
αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου διαπεφευγόσι καὶ σαφῶς ἀγγέλλουσι, μὴ
οὖτω γε ἂγαν πανσυδὶ διειθήθαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν …
pάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἑλύσει τε καὶ περιειστήκει
έπὶ τῷ γεγενηµένῳ φόβῳ τε καὶ κατάπληξις μεγίστη δὴ.
ἀμι μὲν γὰρ στερόµενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ πόλις
ὀπλιτῶν τε πολλῶν καὶ ἱππέων καὶ ἡλικίας οἵν οὐχ
έτεραν ἑώρων ὑπάρχουσαν ἐβαρύνοντο· ἅµα δὲ ναῦς οὐδὲ
ὁρῶντες ἐν τοῖς νεωσοίκοις ἱκανὰ οὐδὲ χρήµατα ἐν τῇ
κοινῷ οὐδὲ ἐπηρεασίας ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀνέλπιστοι ἦσαν ἐν τῷ
παρόντι σωθήσεσθαι, τοὺς τε ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας πολεµίους
εὐθὺς σφίσιν ἐνόµιζον τῷ ναυτικῷ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιὰ
πλευσεῖσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοσοῦτον κρατήσαντος.

This was, as they say, ‘total annihilation’. Beaten in
every way on every front, extreme miseries suffered on
an extreme scale, and army, fleet, and everything else
destroyed, few out of all those many made their return
home. Such were the events in Sicily. When the news
reached Athens, for a long time they could not believe
that their forces had been so utterly destroyed, and
would not credit even the unambiguous reports
brought back by soldiers who had actually witnessed
the events and made their escape. Then when they had
to accept the truth … on every side there was nothing
for them but pain, and they were plunged into fear and
the utmost consternation at what had happened. The
burden of loss lay heavy on individual families and on
the city at large—so many hoplites gone, so many
cavalrymen, such a swathe of youth and no
replacement to be seen. And when at the same time
they could not see an adequate number of ships in the
docks, adequate funds in the treasury, or an adequate
supply of officers for the ships, they despaired of
surviving the situation as it was. They thought that
their enemies in Sicily, particularly after such a crush-
ing victory, would immediately send a ship against the
Peiraeus.
Both descriptions stress the small number of survivors; the despair felt back home at the unexpected news; grief at both a private and a public level; the lack of adequate reserves; and the fear of an attack by the very people they had sought to conquer.\footnote{For this fear, cf. also 14.76.2 (cited above), 16.81.3. The parallel between the Diodorus and Thucydides passages is also observed, and excellently discussed, by Feeney (2007) 52; cf. also Williams (1993) 274.}

Diodorus was not the first or last historian to apply Thucydides’ account of the despair in Athens after the loss of the fleet in Sicily to a conflict involving Carthage. Polybius uses many of the same motifs as well as some close verbal echoing in his accounts of the mood in Carthage in the aftermath of the First Punic War and of the response in Rome to the defeat at Cannae;\footnote{Rood (2012) 60–1, 62. Rapin (1706) I.316–17 compared Thuc. 8.1 with Livy’s account of the aftermath of Cannae.} similarly Appian echoes Thucydides’ run of negatives in describing the Carthaginian response to news of the outbreak of the Third Punic War (\textit{Pun.} 76, 82).\footnote{Cf. also Xen. \textit{Anab.} 3.1.2, Sall. \textit{Iug.} 39; and the inversion at App. \textit{Pun.} 134 (Roman disbelief at the news that Carthage has been destroyed).} Nor was Polybius necessarily the first historian to adapt this Thucydidean passage. While Diodorus himself wrote a century after Polybius, he may have drawn the Thucydidean echo from an earlier historian such as Timaeus, Ephorus, or Philistus (a renowned imitator of Thucydides).\footnote{Note that Williams (1993) 273–4 even suggests that Antiochus could be the ultimate source of Diod. 11.20–4, and so that Thucydides’ focus on morale could itself be echoing Antiochus’ presentation of the Carthaginian invasion.} This type of description was not just part of the historiographical repertoire for elevating the emotional level,\footnote{Cf., e.g., Josephus’ account of the Jewish response to news of the fall of Jotapata (\textit{BJ} 3.432–6).} but also a significant way of drawing out historical patterns.

The comparison Diodorus suggests between the Carthaginian and Athenian defeats in Sicily is reinforced by two sets of internal echoes. In arguing for the superiority of
the Sicilian achievement in 480 BC over the mainland Greeks’ victory against Persia, Diodorus presents Himera as a greater battle than Plataea and Gelon’s stratagem as greater than Themistocles’ (11.23.2): ‘in the case of the Persians the king escaped with his life and many myriads together with him’, while ‘in the case of the Carthaginians not only did the general perish but also everyone who participated in the war was slain, and, as the saying is, not even a man to bear the news got back to Carthage (µηδὲ ἄγγελον εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα διασωθῆναι)’. The proverbial phrase about no messengers surviving reappears twice in the extant parts of Diodorus, both times in connection with the Athenian disaster at Syracuse. The first passage occurs in Nicolaus’ speech in the debate Diodorus presents at Syracuse over the punishment of the Athenian prisoners: ‘from the preparations they made on such a scale not a ship, not a man has returned home, so that not even a survivor is left to carry to them word of the disaster (µηδὲ τὸν ἀγγελοῦντα αὐτοῖς τὴν συµφορὰν περιλειφθῆναι)’ (13.21.3). The second occurs in a speech we have already noted, Theodorus’ denunciation of the tyranny of Dionysius: ‘only yesterday, as it were, when the Athenians attacked Syracuse with such great armaments, our fathers left not a man free to carry back word of the disaster (οὐδὲ τὸν ἀπαγγελοῦντα τὴν συµφορὰν ἀπέλιπον)’ (14.67.1). This strong intratextual echo is reinforced by the Thucydidean resonance in Diodorus’ initial stress on the proverbial nature of the phrase: ‘as the saying is’ (τὸ δὴ λεγόµενον) was applied by Thucydides to the ‘utter destruction’ met by the Athenians in Sicily (7.87.6, cited above).77

76 Cf. Lyc. Alex. 657 for the survival of one messenger; Jos. BJ 3:433; AJ 2:34: App.Hist. 57, 63; Just. 24.8.16 for none (also Pol. 32.2.7; App. Sann. F 4.8 for speeches recommending this course), Flor. Epit. 1.46 (3.11.10) for ‘scarcely a messenger’. The ancestor of the trope is Polydamas’ warning at Il. 12.73; Eustathius ad loc. noted that the phrase was proverbial in cases of utter destruction (πανωλεθρίας που γενοµένης). Cf. also Suidas s.v. ἀνάγγελον.

77 Note too how Diodorus’ comparison between the later fate of Gelon with that ‘of the most distinguished of the leaders of the Greeks,
The other set of internal echoes relates to the theme of moderation in success. Diodorus first praises Gelon after the battle of Himera for ‘bearing his good fortune as men should, not toward them alone but even toward the Carthaginians, his bitterest foes’ (11.26.1: τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἀνθρωπίνως ἔφερεν οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων Καρχηδονίων). Then, in the Syracusan debate over the Athenian prisoners in 413 BC, he presents Hermocrates arguing that ‘a fairer thing than victory is to bear victory with moderation’ (13.19.5: ὡς κάλλιόν ἐστι τοῦ νικῆς ἐνεγκεῖν ἀνθρωπίνως). The counter argument in that debate, delivered by the Spartan general Gylippus, is in due course precisely echoed in the Roman debate over Carthage at the end of the Second Punic War (13.30.5, 27.18.1). The importance of moderation in success is itself a common one in Diodorus, but its articulation at these emphatic moments still serves to bind together the fortunes of Carthage and Athens.

Diodorus’ use of Thucydides to link the Carthaginian and Athenian invasions of Sicily can also be read as offering a commentary of sorts on the earlier writer. Two passages in Diodorus are particularly suggestive—both, significantly, from speeches given to Nicias, the Athenian general whose speeches in Thucydides are the vehicle for much of the symbolic construction of the magnitude of the Athenian defeat in Sicily. First, Diodorus reports Nicias’ words of encouragement before the final battle in the Great Harbour (13.15.2): ‘Those who were fathers of children he reminded of their sons; those who were sons of distinguished fathers he exhorted not to bring disgrace upon the valorous deeds of Pausanias and Themistocles’ (11.23.3: ‘the former was put to death by his fellow citizens because of his overweening greed of power and treason, and the latter was driven from every corner of Greece and fled for refuge to Xerxes’) picks up Thucydides’ parallel account of the later careers of the two Persian Wars heroes (1.128–38). For a less pro-Sicilian perspective, see the praise of Epaminondas over Gelon (among others) at 15.88.2.


of their ancestors; those who had been honoured by their fellow citizens he urged to show themselves worthy of their crowns; and all of them he reminded of the trophies erected at Salamis and begged them not to bring to disrepute the far-famed glory of their fatherland nor surrender themselves like slaves to the Syracusans'. Diodorus here offers a re-writing of the emotional pre-battle speech that Thucydides gives Nicias at 7.69.2—and makes explicit what is implicit in Thucydides, namely that the coming defeat is to be read as a reversal of the success at Salamis.80

Even more suggestive is a section from Nicias' attempt to persuade the Athenians not to invade Sicily in 415. One of the arguments Diodorus attributes to Nicias is precisely the failure of the earlier Carthaginian invasion of Sicily: 'how could they hope to subdue the greatest island in the inhabited world? Even the Carthaginians, he added, who possessed a most extensive empire and had waged war many times to gain Sicily, had not been able to subdue the island, and the Athenians, whose military power was far less than that of the Carthaginians, could not possibly win by the spear and acquire the most powerful of the islands' (12.83.6).81 Here Diodorus uses Nicias to point up not so much Thucydides' historiographical patterning as the selectivity involved in that patterning. He draws our attention to the suppression of the Sicilian version of 480 BC that is implied by Thucydides' account of the Sicilian expedition. As we have seen, the Sicilian story equated that victory with the victories of the mainland Greeks over

80 Cf. how the echo of Th. 7.70–1 in the Salamis narrative in Lysias' Epitaphios (2.37–9), noted by Rood (1999) 160 n. 45, also invites reflection on Thucydides' structuring of his narrative.

81 Kagan (1981) 170 implausibly suggests that Diodorus' report of Nicias' appeal to Carthage could be founded on reliable evidence; contrast Sacks (1990) 131 who argues from the vocabulary that 'it is probably Diodorus who added to the debate between Nicias and Alcibiades the proud sentiments about Sicily'; also Levene (2010) 114–15, who argues that Diodorus used the same anti-Thucydidean reworking of the debate (probably by Ephorus) that inspired Fabius' arguments against transferring the war to Africa at Livy 28.41–2.
Persia. In presenting Athens as a new Persia, Thucydides makes no allusion to the fact that the cities of Sicily had also resisted foreign invaders in 480 BC. He even has the Syracusan leader Hermocrates encourage his fellow citizens by alluding to the general failure of large expeditions abroad (6.33.5–6) without any mention of their victory over Carthage.\footnote{Hermocrates also goes on to propose that the Syracusans send ambassadors to the Carthaginians, who are ‘in constant fear that the Athenians may attack their own city’ (6.34.2). For the Carthaginian aspect, note also Alcibiades’ claim at Sparta that the Athenians want to conquer Italy and Carthage (6.90.2)—a claim that is meant to frighten the Spartans, but at 6.15.2 Thucydides has suggested that Alcibiades’ own thoughts were not too different.}

Thucydides also underplays the scope of the Syracusans’ naval experience in suggesting that they acquire naval proficiency in response to the Athenian invasion much as the Athenians had in response to the Persian invasion (‘Hermocrates’ at 7.21.3). The battle of Himera, moreover, is omitted from both the Archaeology (where the Carthaginians are mentioned only at 1.13.6 for their defeat in a sea-battle at the hands of the Phocaeans) and the Sikelika (6.1–5).

Diodorus delivers a riposte to Thucydides’ historiographical slight. In relation to Sicily, he presents Athens as a new Carthage rather than as a new Persia—and as a one-off threat rather than a continuous enemy. And yet Diodorus’ commentary on Thucydides is not purely negative. He also seems to follow the strong Homeric hints of Thucydides’ Sicilian narrative by noting at the start of Book 13 that his previous six Books have covered the period of 768 years between the Trojan War and Athens’ invasion of Sicily (13.1.2).\footnote{The only other initial overview with a precise number of Books occurs at 19.1.10, with an indication of the years between the fall of Troy and the start of Agathocles’ tyranny; Rubincam (1998) 232 offers a good explanation for this pattern (initial hexadic structuring) that throws further stress on the events chosen for these books. Troy is also used as a chronological marker at the start of Books without a precise number of Books at 14.2.4 (down to the fall of Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War), 20.2.3 (down to the year before Agathocles’ crossing to Africa); cf. Clarke (2008) 123–5, noting how such markers give ‘Dido-}
comparison between the Athenian disaster and the sack of Troy—while also serving as a reminder that it will be Carthage that will eventually go the way of Troy.\footnote{Cf. Diod. 32.24 for Scipio’s citation of famous Homeric lines on the destruction of Troy (II. 6.448–9) on the occasion of the sack of Carthage (with a reminder of the mortality of Rome); also Rood (1998) 253–4 on the echo of Th. 7.87.5 in Appian’s version of the scene (Pun. 132).}

This paper started from the synchronic link drawn by Diodorus between the Persian invasion of Greece in 480 BC and the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, and with a warning against the modern tendency to conceive such links in terms of ‘east’ and ‘west’. It went on to suggest that a number of other parallels can be found in Diodorus’ narrative between events and characters in mainland Greece and in Sicily (expeditions by Agesilaus and Dionysius; the figures of Agathocles, Philip, and Dion) and between successive invasions of Sicily by foreign powers (Athens and Carthage); and that these parallels are established both intratextually, through verbal and narrative patterning, and intertextually, through allusions to Thucydialoge's Sicilian narrative. For ‘Diodorus’ we can of course choose to substitute other names—Timaeus, Ephorus, Philistus—provided we acknowledge Diodorus’ role in preserving in his own reworking of his sources their patterning of history. In other words, we must allow that Diodorus in constructing his universal history put some thought into patterns across time and space. His geographical and temporal patterning is a topic that deserves exploration in its own right and not just for any clues it may offer to the now lost works of his sources.

To allow Diodorus this much freedom is not to elevate his work into the highest rank of ancient historical writing.
The use of Thucydides I have posited largely involves sections that were often imitated by other authors and may also have played a role in discussions of Thucydides as a stylistic model.\(^\text{85}\) The broader type of historical patterning I have suggested is also widespread: it is reflected, for instance, in the way Thucydides links Athens’ invasion of Sicily with Xerxes’ invasion and in the way that the Persian Wars were themselves often interpreted in the light of the Trojan War;\(^\text{86}\) it can also be seen in the tendency for stock anecdotes to be transferred from one war to another.\(^\text{87}\) Such historical patterning can also be found in non-historiographical works, notably in the Greek novel (for instance, in Chariton’s modelling his ‘depiction of a Syracusan expedition to Ionia on Thucydides’ account of the Athenian expedition to Syracuse\(^\text{88}\)) and in works such as the pseudo-Plutarchan *Parallela Minora*.\(^\text{89}\) Whatever its uses in other genres, within historiography it creates the possibility of a deep intellectual engagement with past historians—a possibility that was powerfully exploited by Thucydides in his use of Herodotus and by Polybius in his use of Thucydides. But while I have suggested that Diodorus does offer a distinctively Sicilian reading of Thucydides,


\(^{86}\) Cf. e.g. the suggestive patterning of the Trojan and Persian Wars in lyric and the visual arts; or even neo-analytical approaches to narrative patterning in Homer.

\(^{87}\) E.g., the story of Scipio’s releasing spies before the decisive battle of the Second Punic War (Pol. 15.5.4–7, *Liv.* 30.29.2–3; *App. Pun.* 39), seemingly modelled on an episode from the Persian Wars (Hdt. 7.146–7); or solar eclipses at the start of expeditions at Hdt. 7.97.2 (Xerxes’ expedition) and Justin 22.6.1 (Agathocles’ Carthaginian expedition).

\(^{88}\) Smith (2007) 180; cf. 84 on ‘the east-west dynamic that pervades Chariton’s novel’. The language of east-west is supported at least by the narratorial summary at 8.1.3.

his work as a whole is purposefully built on an aesthetic of repetition that seems to privilege moral generality over historical particularity.\textsuperscript{90}

\textit{St Hugh’s College,} \hspace{1cm} timothy.rood@st-hughs.ox.ac.uk

\textit{University of Oxford}

\textsuperscript{90} Thanks to Alexander Meeus and Katherine Clarke for comments on a draft of this paper, as well as to the audience at the workshop in Lampeter where parts of it were presented. The translations of Diodorus are those of Oldfather et al. in the Loeb; those of Thucydides are Hammond in the Oxford World’s Classics series. This paper was submitted in 2013, and I have not been able to take account of subsequent scholarship.
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IMPLIED MOTIVATION IN DIODORUS’ NARRATIVE OF THE SUCCESSORS*

Shane Wallace

Abstract: This chapter examines the issue of implied motivation in Diodorus’ narrative of the Successors, Bibliotheca Books XVIII–XX. It focuses on the depiction of three individuals, Peukestas, Peithon, and Polyperchon, and argues that Diodorus preserves evidence of a sophisticated and layered narrative that combined historical narrative with a critical dissection of individuals’ thoughts and motives. The use of embedded focalisation within the text reveals an interest in a hermeneutic approach to history which, while likely not Diodorus’ own, was preserved by him because it fit the moral-didactic programme of Diodorus’ Bibliotheca.

Keywords: Implied motivation, historiography, Diodorus, Successors

1. Introduction

The elaboration of motives is an important feature of ancient historiography, though it is more frequently studied in highly regarded historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides than in Diodorus. Debate has focused not only on its historiographical role but also on

* Before the Lampeter workshop this paper was also presented at the Classical Association conference in Durham in 2011. I would like to thank Alexander Meeus and the anonymous reviewer, whose comments have greatly improved this paper. Translations of Diodorus are adapted from the Loeb Classical Library, Geer (1947) and (1954). I have used Hellenised spelling, except in the case of well-known individuals, e.g. Alexander, Herodotus, Thucydides, Diodorus.

whether the motives ascribed to a character are authentic or inferred by the historian. Thucydides, for instance, continually recounts the thoughts and intentions of his characters, both collectively (e.g. 1.5.1) and individually, and in the debate leading up to the Pylos campaign he gives a detailed account of Kleon’s thoughts and motives, which it is extremely unlikely that he would have known. It is widely assumed that Thucydides inferred a character’s motives from the result of his actions, though Simon Hornblower and others have cautioned that in some cases, such as Thucydides’ account of the campaigns of Brasidas, first-hand knowledge of a character’s motives cannot be discounted.

The use of implied motive allows authors such as Herodotus and Thucydides, amongst other things, to ‘focalise’ their narrative through individual characters, from whose perspective the situation can be perceived and evaluated. In doing so the author gives his audience a character’s perspective: what he sees and thinks and how he responds to events. This individual becomes the focal-point and the author, as focaliser, evaluates the situation by focalising the narrative through the character’s thoughts and motives.

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2 Thuc. 4.27.3, 27.4, 28.2; Hornblower (1987) 78–81.

3 Thompson (1969); Hunter (1973); Schneider (1974) 127–37; Hornblower (1987) 77–81; id. (1991–2008) I.23, II.161; Rood (1998) 20–1, 49. Note also Lang (1995). Westlake (1989) argued that Thucydides either gleaned motives directly from the individuals to whom the motives are ascribed, derived them from recorded actions, or interpreted them based on the individual’s character.


6 Bal (1977) and (1981) uses focaliser to refer to the character. Rood (1998) 294–6 uses it to refer to the author. Thus, Thucydides focalises events through Kleon by describing what the latter sees and thinks.
In this chapter I explore the importance of implied motive in Diodorus’ narrative of Alexander’s successors. The feature was recently highlighted by Joseph Roisman, who ascribed its appearance, without discussion, directly to Hieronymos of Kardia.\(^7\) I build upon Roisman’s arguments in a number of ways. A holistic treatment of implied motive within the entire *Bibliotheke* is beyond the scope of this chapter, which merely points some directions forward. Instead, I discuss a number of instances where the historian uses implied motive as a way of focalising the narrative and examining events through the perspectives of individual characters. I examine Books XVIII–XX, which form a convenient source unit, and explore the different functions that implied motive serves within Diodorus’ narrative. I avoid explicit source ascription and instead focus primarily on the roles focalisation and implied motive play within Diodorus’ work, not that of his hypothesised source (though when discussing Diodorus’ work we are to some degree discussing the work it condenses). In doing so, I argue that the use of embedded focalisation and the interest in implied motive adds nuance to the narrative and reveals an interest, though likely not Diodorus’ own, in a hermeneutic approach to history whereby history as agency is manifested through the thoughts, motives, and decisions of individual historical actors.

Implied motive recurs throughout Books XVIII–XX—it would likely have been even more common in Diodorus’ source—and marks a new trend in historical analysis from the previous books, where the thoughts and motives of actors were not subjected to the same degree of extended analysis. Roisman cites the reasons given for Alexander’s ‘Exiles Decree’ in 324 as an example of this new focus on implied motive. In Book XVII (109.1), based on Kleitarchos, the simple fact of the restoration of the exiles is recorded, without description or elaboration.\(^8\) In Book XVIII (8.1–3),


\(^8\) On Kleitarchos (*FGrHist* 137) and his use by Diodorus as the source for Book XVII, see Goukowsky (1976) ix–xxi; Pearson (1960) 212–42; Prandi (1996); Parker (2009); Ogden (2010). Kleitarchos has commonly
commonly thought to be based on Hieronymos of Kardia (below, §6), the text of Alexander’s edict is recorded and the historian describes the king’s motives: to gain fame and to prevent sedition by planting loyal followers throughout the Greek cities. Document and motive come together in Book XVIII and Diodorus’ new focus on motive is drawn from his new source.9 The focus on thoughts and motives early on in Book XVIII signifies its importance for Books XVIII–XX as a whole, the Greek and Asian narratives of which are likely based on the same account.10

Modern scholarship on Diodorus is rarely positive and historians seldom look for sophisticated historiographical techniques in his work, and when they find them they are usually ascribed directly to his source. Scholarship has moved beyond Macaulay’s ‘stupid, credulous, prosing old ass’, but Diodorus is still commonly and influentially thought of by the likes of Panico Stylianou as a garbled epitomator, an organ-grinder to his sources.11 More recently, however, there has been a tendency, initiated most notably by Kenneth Sacks, towards rehabilitating Diodorus as an original thinker and a serious historian.12 As is often

been dated to the late fourth century, with his work published ca. 310. *P. Oxy.* LXI 4808, however, records that Kleitarchos was a tutor (διδάσκαλος) of Ptolemy IV Philopator (ca. 224–205), placing him firmly in the late third century. This important piece of evidence is dismissed by Prandi (2012) as incompatible with the ‘high’ dating, but see Michael Park’s (2014) cogent criticisms.

9 However, as Alexander Meeus suggests to me, it is also possible that Diodorus, coming to the end of the very long Book XVII, and knowing that he would address the matter in more detail at the start of Book XVIII, decided not to dwell on Alexander’s motives at all.

10 The Sicilian narrative is probably based on Timaeus of Tauromenium, on whom see Baron (2013).

11 Macaulay, letter of 30 November 1836: ‘I have finished Diodorus Siculus at last, after dawdling over him at odd times ever since last March. He is a stupid, credulous, prosing old ass; yet I heartily wish that we had a good deal more of him’; Stylianou (1991); id. (1998) passim.

12 Sacks (1990). See also, for instance, Sheridan (2010) and (2014); Sulimani (2008) and (2011); Muntz (2011), (2102), and (2017); Stronk (2016); Rathmann (2016); Walsh (2018); cf. Dudziński (2016).
the case, by responding to the highly negative *communis opinio* the pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction, with some scholars crediting Diodorus with a level of originality not found in his work. Lisa Hau’s work on *tyche* is a sobering reminder that seemingly original themes or ideas found throughout the *Bibliotheke* might actually be historiographical motifs or techniques drawn from his sources. Future publications promise to nuance further our understanding and, dare one say it, appreciation of Diodorus as a historian. This modest contribution argues not for Diodorus’ originality as a historian, but for his interest in and preservation of sophisticated historiographical techniques, such as implied motive, which he found in his sources.

Diodorus wrote long after the events he described and depended on earlier, now lost works. It is unlikely that he invented *ex nihilo* the motives and intentions that he ascribes to his characters; rather, he likely preserved what he found in his source. The fact that both he and Plutarch record similar ulterior motives for Polypcerchon suggests a common source (below, §4). If Diodorus’ source for Books XVIII–XX was indeed Hieronymos of Kardia, as is widely assumed (below, §6), then it is possible that Hieronymos knew an individual’s motives from personal experience, as has often been argued for Thucydides. At the very least, he would have been in an excellent position to infer logically their motives based on his own first-hand knowledge of their actions and personalities. Both Diodorus and his source wrote histories which were literary works, but, as historians, their purpose was also to create truthful accounts of the past, which recorded events and explained the causes of actions. The inference of motives acts as a way of stressing the human agency within history. It may also, however, have served a function specific to Diodorus’ *Bibliotheke*,

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13 See in particular the reviews of Stylianou (1991) and Fornara (1992).
14 Hau (2009).
15 See now the proceedings of the conference ‘Diodorus Siculus: Shared Myths, World Community, and Universal History’ held at the University of Glasgow in September 2011: Hau–Meeus–Sheridan 2018.
which would explain why he preserved the technique in his own work: the emphasis on ulterior motives reinforces Diodorus’ claim that those who act in a hybristic manner will be punished and cannot escape their fate (1.1–2.4). The elaboration of a character’s thoughts, motives, and intentions, and the use of focalisation as an interpretative tool, reflects a hermeneutic approach to history whereby the historian stresses human agency. Actions are manifestations of individuals’ intentions and become, as a series of erga or res gestae, the events of history. By emphasising a character’s thoughts and motives the historian, as narrator, is emphasising the importance of human agency as a motivating factor in historical analysis. In some episodes, events become manifestations of the will of historical actors.

2. Peukestas

Between 318 and spring 316 the royal general Eumenes led an alliance of satraps and generals against Antigonus Monophthalmos. Eumenes’ alliance consisted of numerous different groups each with their own interests and allegiances: Eumenes and his own troops opposed Antigonus, the Silver Shields joined Eumenes by royal order (Diod. 18.58.1, 59.3), while the Persian and Macedonian satraps of the Upper Satrapies were united in opposition first to Peithon and then to Antigonus (Diod. 19.14). Loyalty to either Eumenes or the cause was not a given and Peukestas, the Silver Shields, and others would all later turn to Antigonus.

The most powerful of Eumenes’ contenders for command of the royal army was Peukestas, whose reputation was based on his defence of Alexander during the Mallian campaign, for which he was made an unprecedented eighth bodyguard. Peukestas was popular

17 Curt. 9.5.14–18; Arr. Ar. 6.9.3, 10.1–2, 11.7–8, 28.4; Arr. Ind. 19.8; Diod. 17.99.4; Plut. Alex. 63.3. On Peukestas, see Heckel (1992) 243–6; id. (2006) 203–5.
in the east. He was made satrap of Persis, spoke Persian, and was given permission by Alexander to dress in Persian attire.\(^\text{18}\) He turned to Antigonos after Eumenes’ defeat at G Gabiene in winter 317 and later appears as a member of the courts of Antigonos and Demetrios.\(^\text{19}\) Many scholars have detected a negative portrayal of Peukestas in Diodorus’ narrative: he is an open contender with Eumenes for the leadership of the satrpal forces (19.15.1, 23.4), is slow in executing orders (19.17.5), considers defecting to Antigonos’ side (19.17.5), and is both cowardly and lacking in spirit (19.38.1–2, 42.4–5, 43.2–5). Since Diodorus is widely assumed to have used Hieronymos of Kardia, a compatriot of Eumenes and an eye-witness source for the wars of the Successors, the negative depiction of Peukestas is often taken at face value and ascribed directly to Hieronymos.\(^\text{20}\)

Diodorus’ depiction of Peukestas has recently come under scrutiny. Alexander Meeus has questioned whether Diodorus/Hieronymos actually depicted Peukestas negatively, arguing that the aforementioned examples may simply be statements of fact, and that negative accounts of Eumenes’ deceits and deceptions are also present (Diod. 19.23.1, 3–4, 24.1).\(^\text{21}\) Joseph Roisman has focused on Diodorus’ description of Peukestas’ motives.\(^\text{22}\) Upon Antigonos’ advancement into Mesopotamia and his alliance with Seleukos, Eumenes ordered Peukestas to summon bowmen from Persia. Diodorus (19.17.5–6) records that:

\(^{18}\) Arr. An. 6.30.2–3; 7.6.3; 23.3; Diod. 19.14.5, 48.5. Note in particular his Persian-style banquet at Persis: Diod. 19.21–23; Plut. Eum. 14.3; Polyben. Strat. 4.8.3; Bosworth (2002) 255–6; Wallace (2017) 8–10. Peukestas was not, however, the only Macedonian to wear Persian dress (Meeus (2009a) 121–2).

\(^{19}\) Diod. 19.48.3; Staatsverträge III 429, line 13; Phylarchos, FGrHist 81 F 12. Tisikrates of Sikyon, a pupil of Lysippus’ son Euthykrates, created a statue of Peukestas, though the date, location, and context are unknown (Plin. HV 34.67).


\(^{21}\) Meeus (2009a) 147–8.

ὁ δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὐ προσείχεν αὐτοῖς, μεμψιµοιρῶν ἐπὶ τῷ µὴ τετευχέναι τῆς στρατηγίας, ὕστερον δὲ δοὺς αὐτῷ λόγον συνεχώρησεν ὅτι κρατήσαντος Ἀντιγόνου συµβήσεται καὶ τὴν σατραπείαν αὐτὸν ἀποβαλεῖν καὶ περὶ τοῦ σώµατος κινδυνεύσαι. ἀγωνιῶν οὖν ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ καὶ τῆς στρατηγίας µᾶλλον τεύξεσθαι νοµίζειν ὡς πλείστους ἔχων στρατιώτας προσήγαγεν, καθάπερ ἥξι- ουν, τοξότας µυρίους.

At first Peukestas paid no heed to them, since he still bore a grudge for not having received the generalship; but later, reasoning with himself, he admitted that should Antigonus be victorious, the result would be that he himself would lose his satrapy and also be in danger of his life. In his anxiety, therefore, about himself, and thinking also that he would be more likely to gain the command if he had as many soldiers as possible, he brought up 10,000 bowmen as they requested.

In this passage, we can see the narrative focalisation through Peukestas within the text, elaborating his response to Eumenes’ order. Roisman argues that the narrative creates a negative image of Peukestas, who initially refused to obey Eumenes and Antigones, and only provided the requested troops once he realised that his situation would be worse under Antigonus, when he would have no chance of gaining command. However, from a practical point of view, Peukestas was given an order that must have taken some time to complete and that he eventually fulfilled. For Roisman, the account of Peukestas’ thoughts is unnecessary and exists solely to undermine his actions by causing the reader to see the selfish, ulterior motives behind his loyal fulfilment of an order. Roisman ascribes this technique to Hieronymos of Kardia and sees in it ‘Hieronymus’ tendency to look for, and to explain actions through, the
actor’s ulterior motive, even when such explanation is unwarranted.\textsuperscript{23}

While Roisman’s focus on internal motives is worth pursuing, one must exercise greater caution in attributing this trend to a specific source. It is important to remember that we are dealing with Diodorus’ account not Hieronymos’, of Peukestas’ thoughts. What we have in Diodorus is a compression of what was present in his source, ultimately perhaps Hieronymos, but we cannot be certain of the degree of compression, how Diodorus altered his source, or whether he used Hieronymos directly or through an intermediary.\textsuperscript{24} Both of these considerations caution against Roisman’s attribution of this technique directly to Hieronymos.

Rather than attributing historiographical techniques to now lost sources, it is worthwhile to consider how these techniques work within the surviving historical narrative. We do not know whether Diodorus’ source invented Peukestas’ delay or whether it actually happened, but as the former cannot be proven it is perhaps better to assume the latter. Peukestas delayed for some reason, perhaps to consider his options, as Diodorus suggests. The ascription of deceitful motives to Peukestas shows the historian applying a model of rational explanation to an interpretation of Peukestas’ actions, whether based on first-hand knowledge of Peukestas’ intentions or inferred through logical deduction. Roisman’s comment that this ‘distorted cooperative conduct [sc. of Peukestas]’ is correct, even if we cannot tell whether the source was accurately reporting Peukestas’ thoughts or simply inferring them from his actions, as Roisman suggests.\textsuperscript{25}

This passage must be read in light of Peukestas’ characterisation throughout Diodorus’ narrative. Peukestas, as emphasised above, would later desert Eumenes after the

\textsuperscript{23} Roisman (2010) 135.

\textsuperscript{24} On Diodorus compression of his sources see Simpson (1959); Meeus (2013).

\textsuperscript{25} Roisman (2010) 137.
Battle of Gabiene. His loyalty to Eumenes throughout the year 317 was continually in doubt. Therefore the motives given to Peukestas at this point in the text, whether authentically Peukestas’ or not, are plausible within the wider narrative; they further his image as an unreliable and untrustworthy ally and they foreshadow his eventual betrayal of Eumenes after the Battle of Gabiene. By using embedded focalisation to present Peukestas’ motives, the author (Diodorus or his source) attempts to understand his actions—his delay in sending troops—by understanding his thought processes. Peukestas’ later desertion of Eumenes perhaps conditioned his depiction in Diodorus’ source.

If the description of Peukestas’ thoughts was influenced by his later desertion of Eumenes, then this suggests that implied motive played an important role in both Diodorus’ and his source’s narratives. By representing Peukestas as someone who thinks of himself first, delays obeying orders, and considers desertion, the historian is telling us that he is an untrustworthy character who may later betray Eumenes in order to pursue his own interests. By describing an actor’s thoughts and motives, the historian reveals his character and elucidates the logic behind his actions. Repeatedly employed over a detailed narrative, this allows the reader to learn the personalities of the protagonists and use this knowledge to anticipate their actions. By analysing an actor’s motives, the historian is giving the reader the tools to predict that actor’s response to events; he is also offering genuine historical analysis by analysing events and inferring motives. Furthermore, he is creating an engaging and thought-provoking narrative that draws the reader into, and makes him a part of, the machinations of Alexander’s successors, forcing him to consider issues of loyalty and deceit and, by analysing the relationship between thoughts and actions, form his own opinions on historical causation.
3. Peithon

Many scholars have also identified the presentation of Peithon son of Krateuas as hostile. As with Peukestas, Diodorus’ description of Peithon’s ambitions and motives allows the reader to learn his character, anticipate his actions, and understand the role of human agency in history. It also reflects Diodorus’ own interests in the vicissitudes of fortune and the ways in which hybris and excessive ambition lead to defeat and even death. Cicero’s statement (Fam. 5.12.4) that ‘nothing tends more to the reader’s enjoyment than varieties of circumstance and vicissitudes of fortune’ (temporum varietates fortunaeque vicissitudines) suggests that these themes were commonplace in ancient historiography. Naturally, then, the narrative of Peithon’s repeatedly thwarted ambitions appealed to Diodorus and was preserved by him because it reflected his interest in reversals of fortune and allowed him to focus on Peithon’s deceitful and hybristic actions in the Upper Satrapies as a prelude to his later downfall under Antigonos. It is tempting to follow Roisman and ascribe this narrative directly to Hieronymos, but the fact that Diodorus preserved this depiction of Peithon argues for its relevance within the Bibliotheke’s own moral-didactic programme.

When the question of the regency was debated in Babylon after Alexander’s death, Peithon son of Krateuas, one of Alexander’s bodyguards (Arr. An. 6.28.4; Diod. 18.7.3), opposed the kingship of Philip Arrhidaios, Alexander’s half-brother, and proposed instead that Perdikkas and Leonnatos be made joint guardians of Alexander IV while Antipatros and Krateros act as governors of Europe (Curt. 10.7.4–5, 8–9; Just. Epit. 13.2.14). This placed Peithon, for the time being, in Perdikkas’ camp. He was awarded the satrapy of Media and charged with quelling the rebellion of

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27 For examples of these themes in the Bibliotheke, specifically Books XVIII–XX, see Meeus (2009a) 23–6; id. (2013) 86–7.
the Greek settlers from the Upper Satrapies. Peithon was given 3,000 Macedonian infantry and 800 cavalry as well as letters for the satraps ordering them to furnish him with 10,000 foot and 8,000 horse. Diodorus describes the preparations for the suppression of the revolt. His account is notable for dwelling at length on Peithon’s motives and Perdikkas’ suspicions (18.7.3–5):

Περδίκκας δὲ πυθόμενος τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπόστασιν ἐκλήρωσεν ἐκ τῶν Μακεδόνων πεζοὺς μὲν τρισχιλίους, ἵππεις δὲ ὀκτακισχιλίους, τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἐλόμενος στρατηγὸν Πίθωνα τὸν σωματοφύλακα μὲν Ἀλεξάνδρου γεγονότα, φρονήματος δὲ πλήρη καὶ δυνάμεων στρατηγεῖν παρέδωκε τούτῳ τὸν ἀποκληρωθέντας, διὸς δ’ αὐτῷ πρὸς τοὺς στράτας ἐπιστολάς, ἐν αἷς γεγραμμένου ἦν στρατιώτας δοῦναι τῷ Πίθωνι μυρίους μὲν πεζοῖς, ἵππεις δὲ ὀκτακισχιλίους, ἐξαπέστειλεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀποστάντας. οὗ δὲ Πίθων μεγαλεπίβολος ἀσµένως ὑπήκουσεν εἰς τὴν στρατείαν, διανοούµενος τοὺς μὲν Ἑλλήνας ταῖς φιλανθρωπίαις προσάγεσθαι, τὴν δὲ δύναµιν τῇ τούτων συμµαχίᾳ µεγάλην ποιήσαντες ιδιοπραγεῖν καὶ τῶν ἄνω στρατευµάτων δυναστεύειν. οὗ δὲ Περδίκκας ὑφορώµενος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιβολὴν διεκελεύσατο καταπολεµήσαντα τοὺς ἄφεστοις ἀπαντάς ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ τὰ λάφυρα διαδοῦναι τοῖς στρατιώτασι.

When Perdikkas heard of the revolt of the Greeks, he drew by lot from the Macedonians 3,000 infantry and 800 horsemen. As commander of the whole he selected Peithon, who had been of the Bodyguard of Alexander, a man full of spirit and able to command, and assigned to him the troops that had been drawn. After giving

him letters for the satraps, in which it was written that they should furnish Peithon 10,000 footmen and 8,000 horsemen, he sent him against the rebels. Peithon, who was a man of great ambition, gladly accepted the expedition, intending to win the Greeks over through kindness, and, after making his army great through an alliance with them, to work in his own interests and become the ruler of the upper satrapies. But Perdikkas, suspecting his design, gave him definite orders to kill all the rebels when he had subdued them, and to distribute the spoils to the soldiers.

As primary narrator-focaliser the author is omnipresent. He knows and records his character’s thoughts and motives, simultaneously presenting the intentions of multiple characters with overlapping narratives. Tension arises not just from the elaboration of motives and intentions, but from their deliberate and explicit contrast. Peithon’s character is revealed by the author (‘full of spirit and able to command … a man of great ambition’) who then, in turn, elaborates the thoughts of both Peithon and Perdikkas, each of whom is planning to deceive the other: Peithon’s deception is anticipated by Perdikkas, who, unknown to Peithon, takes measures to forestall it.

Before the narrative of Peithon’s actions has even begun he is presented as ambitious and duplicitous and the reader is told to suspect his intentions, as Perdikkas already does. Once again, as with Diodorus’ description of Peukestas’ recruitment of 10,000 Persian archers, an individual’s deceitful motives are highlighted in advance of the narrative of his actions in order to present him as dishonest and prefigure his impending desertion or rebellion. As a result, we know in advance that Peithon is going to betray Perdikkas, but that Perdikkas has foreseen this and taken steps to prevent it. By applying a model of rational explanation, the historian has shown us how, by understanding both Peithon and Perdikkas’ characters, we can anticipate how events will unfold. This technique also engages the reader by building the suspense over whether or
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not Peithon’s deception will succeed. A simple narrative of thwarted ambitions becomes an engaging exposition of deception and counter-deception.

Diodorus’ account of Peithon’s motives may work on another level. As with Peukestas’ uncertainty over the provision of bowmen, the focus on motives and intentions works in tandem with the narrative and causes the reader to re-evaluate the historian’s account of events. Diodorus continues (18.7.5–9):

Peithon, setting out with the troops that had been given to him and taking the allies from the satraps, came upon the rebels with all his forces. Through the agency of a certain Aminianian he corrupted Letodoros, who had been made a commander of 3,000 among the
rebels, and won a complete victory. For when the battle was begun and the victory was doubtful, the traitor left his allies without warning and withdrew to a certain hill, taking his 3,000 men. The rest, believing that these were bent on flight, were thrown into confusion, turned about, and fled. Peithon, being victorious in the battle, sent a herald to the conquered, ordering them to lay down their arms and to return to their several colonies after receiving pledges. When oaths to this effect had been sworn and the Greeks were interspersed among the Macedonians, Peithon was greatly pleased, seeing that the affair was progressing according to his intentions; but the Macedonians, remembering the orders of Perdikkas and having no regard for the oaths that had been sworn, broke faith with the Greeks. Setting upon them unexpectedly and catching them off their guard, they shot them all down with javelins and seized their possessions as plunder. Peithon then, cheated of his hopes, came back with the Macedonians to Perdikkas.

This passage presents numerous embedded focalisations: the Greeks ('believing that these were bent on flight'), Peithon ('Peithon was greatly pleased, seeing that the affair was progressing according to his intentions'), and the Macedonians ('remembering the orders of Perdikkas and having no regard for the oaths that had been sworn'). The use of different perspectives, besides showing the author's continued omnipresence, builds tension and plays with the reader's expectations—will Peithon or Perdikkas be successful?—while also developing an overarching narrative of deceit and deception.

Peithon's ambitions initially go according to plan. Leaving Babylon in December 323,\(^{29}\) he used his contacts in the Greek army to turn Letodoros who, with 3,000 troops, deserted the battlefield and handed victory to Peithon. The Macedonian troops, however, remembered Perdikkas'

orders and killed the surrendering Greeks. Perdikkas had anticipated Peithon’s intentions and his plan to thwart them had been successful. Cheated of his hopes, Peithon returned to Perdikkas. Both the historical narrative and the prefiguring description of Peithon’s ulterior motives work together to create an image of intended but unfulfilled deceit. Indeed, the description of Peithon’s motives at 18.7.3–5 conditions our reading of the narrative itself, forcing us to expect and assume Peithon’s guilt at 18.7.5–9.

A different reading may be possible if we focus just on the historical narrative. What actually happened? Peithon defeated the Greek army through a ruse, swore an oath with them causing them to be disarmed and interspersed among the Macedonian troops, massacred the rebels, and returned to Perdikkas in Babylon. When we compare this with Perdikkas’ orders to Peithon—to defeat and massacre the Greeks—we find that he has fulfilled these orders to the letter. Peithon’s deceit is only apparent in the author’s description of his ulterior motives. In action he completes his orders and returns to Perdikkas; in intention, however, we see this as a failed rebellion.30

This is not to argue that Peithon did not plan to betray Perdikkas and rule the Upper Satrapies. He may well have intended to do so, and his later actions suggest as much (see below). My point is simply that within the context of Diodorus’ narrative Peithon’s duplicity only becomes apparent through the historian’s description of his motives. In the end, both Peithon and Peukestas fulfil their orders. Their planned deceit is just the historian’s inference, but the focus on their motives characterises each individual as untrustworthy, both prefiguring and explaining their later betrayals and downfalls. Peithon may indeed have planned to betray Perdikkas and rule the Upper Satrapies, but the relationship between historical narrative and ulterior motive calls for a more sensitive and nuanced reading of Diodorus’ account than it has frequently been given.

30 Waterfield (2011) has argued that Peithon’s actions were not rebellious—he simply dismissed the Greeks back to their colonies—but that later propaganda turned this into a bid for power.
Deception is the major theme not just of Diodorus’ characterisation of Peithon, but of his account of the revolt of the Upper Satrapies. Peithon is representative of a wider, more pervasive trend whereby every individual or group involved in the revolt of the Upper Satrapies is untrustworthy. Peithon intends to betray Perdikkas and rule the Upper Satrapies. Perdikkas anticipates this and devises his own ruse to prevent it. Peithon has secret contacts within the Greek army and contacts ‘a certain Ainianian’ who in turn corrupts Letodoros who, with his troops, abandons the Greek army to the Macedonians. The Macedonian troops in turn break their oaths with the Greeks and massacre those who have surrendered to them. No one is trustworthy and everyone has ulterior motives and hidden agendas. The depiction of Peithon must be read as part of this larger sequence of events. By elucidating Peithon’s ulterior motives, and describing the failure of his planned revolt, the historian focalises his narrative of ulterior motives, hidden agendas, and failed revolts through the character of Peithon, who becomes the centrepiece of this wider narrative of deception and deceit. In doing so, the historian engages the reader, through an entertaining narrative of hidden agendas and unfulfilled expectations, to consider the role of deceit and individualism in the wars of Alexander’s Successors.

The passage as we have it in Diodorus, though ‘ampio e articolato’,\(^\text{31}\) is a condensed and reworked version of what he found in his source. Consequently, we should be cautious when ascribing the use of motives and intentions directly and unhesitatingly to his source. As it stands, there are features that suggest compression. The commander of the Greek army is Philon the Ainianian, while Peithon used ‘a certain Ainianian’ to corrupt Letodoros, himself perhaps also Ainianian, though Diodorus does not specify his ethnicity.\(^\text{32}\) We may have here an instance of personal or

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\(^\text{32}\) On Philon, see Heckel (2006) 215–16, s.v. ‘Philon [2]’. Yardley et al. (2011) 122 state, without discussion, that Letodoros was Ainianian. Heckel (2006) 151 is more cautious. The name itself does not provide a
national hostility between two or more Ainianians within the Greek alliance, perhaps more fully elaborated in Diodorus’ source. Peithon’s actions after the battle are also perhaps unusual. Diodorus records that he made an oath with the defeated Greeks allowing them to return to their colonies, which would appear to be contrary to his apparent plan to recruit the Greeks into his own army. Furthermore, it is not at all clear who the Greeks executed by the Macedonians were. Diodorus implies that the entire Greek army of 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry was killed (ἀφυλάκτους ἅπαντας κατηκόντισαν, 18.7.9) and most scholars have accepted this, but the numbers involved seem implausible. Holt suggested that only the 3,000 with Letodoros were killed, though Heckel maintains that Letodoros and his troops would have been rewarded. Heckel further argued that only the prisoners were executed (though I am unsure why they would then have been intermingled with the Macedonians in a way that pleased Peithon). Tarn and Welles make the interesting suggestion that Diodorus has confused the revolts of 326/5 and 323/2

definite answer. The manuscripts preserve ‘Leipodoros’ (F) and ‘Lipodoros’ (R) and most scholars emend this (though Goukowsky (1978) 14 retains ‘Leipodoros’ in the Budé edition), with Dindorf (1868) 512 proposing ‘Nikodoros’ and Niess (1893) 199 n. 4 suggesting either ‘Diodoros’ or ‘Asklepiodoros’. ‘Letodoros’, suggested by Dittenberger (1896), is rare. Thirteen entries are recorded in the LGPN for Λητόδωρος, from Rhodes (9), the Black Sea (2), Thrace (1), and Cyprus (1). The ‘Leto’-stem relates, most likely, not to the Homeric Leto of Delos but to the local Leto of south-western Asia Minor, recently illuminated by the remarkable dossier recording the Kytinian embassy to Xanthos in the late third century (SEG XXXVIII 1476; Parker (2000) 71). ‘Letodoros’ is also attested in a 3rd-century graffito from Egypt, with no indication of the bearer’s origins (Perdrizet and Lefebvre (1919) 364).

33 The Ainianians also sided with Athens during the Lamian War (Diod. 18.11.1). National tensions were earlier apparent during the first revolt of the Upper Satrapies in 326/5 between Athenodoros and Biton who were of the same nationality but hostile to each other (Curt. 9.7.3–4).


and that the 3,000 he claims were killed in 326/5 (17.99.6) are actually the 3,000 under Letodoros executed in 323/2.\textsuperscript{37} In short, while Diodorus’ account is clear in its general narrative it seems abridged in certain details, due no doubt to his process of compression. His description of Peithon’s motives and the deceitful actions of the other protagonists would also presumably have been more fully elaborated in his source.

As Peithon’s implied motives must be understood in the context of Diodorus’ narrative of duplicity within the revolt of 323/2, so too must his actions be understood in relation to his depiction throughout Books XVIII–XIX. Again we need to bear in mind that we are dealing with Diodorus’ portrayal of Peithon, not his source’s. We do not know what Diodorus left out of his source’s fuller account. In the \textit{Bibliotheke}, Peithon continually, though not exclusively, appears in connection with the Upper Satrapies. He quells the revolt of 323/2 and looks to govern the area himself (Diod. t8.4.8, 7.3–9). In 319/8 he expels the satrap of Parthia, Philotas (Philip?), and assumes the title ‘General of the Upper Satrapies’ (19.14.1).\textsuperscript{38} Finally, in spring 316 he is executed by Antigonos who deceived him (for a second time, after Perdikkas) by promising to make him General of the Upper Satrapies (19.46.1–4; Polyaen. 4.6.14).\textsuperscript{39} Peithon is

\textsuperscript{37} Welles (t963) 405 n. 5; Tarn (t984) 72; Hammond (t983) 65–6; cf. Goukowsky (t975) 257.

\textsuperscript{38} Most scholars agree that Diodorus confused Philip, who had been awarded Parthia in 320 (Diod. t8.39.6; Arr. \textit{Sisc.} 1.33) with Philotas; see Wheatley (t997) 62; Billows (t990) 90 n. 17; Heckel (t006) 214; Meeus (t009a) 177–18, for an overview of the scholarship. Alternatively, the satrap may have changed between 320 and 318 (Schafer (t002) 159; Bosworth (t002) 105–6 with n. 32). Peithon likely assumed the title ‘General of the Upper Satrapies’ in 319/8 (Bengtson (t937) 179–80; Schober (t981) 74–8; Billows (t990) 90 n. 16; Meeus (t009a) 117). Yardley et al. (t011) 122 plausibly suggest that he revived the title he had held in 323/2.

\textsuperscript{39} Bosworth (t002) 160–2 argues that Peithon did not plan a revolt. He suggests that the historian assumed this based on Peithon’s actions. On Diodorus’ account of Peithon’s downfall and death, see Meeus (t009a) 239–41.
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routinely presented as ambitious and scheming, a characterisation that, in its vocabulary at least, might be Diodorus’ own. His ambitions regarding the Upper Satrapies are a key feature of his presentation throughout Books XVIII and XIX and they lend a sense of dramatic irony to his eventual death.

Once Antigonos decides to do away with Peithon we have reached the climax of his story in the Bibliotheca. His characterisation, established through his suppression of the revolt of 323/2 and his attempted usurpation of power in 319/8, means that the reader can guess in advance that Antigonos’ ruse will work. Peithon is untrustworthy and has twice tried to gain control of the Upper Satrapies, his ambitious and duplicitous nature means that he will try again. The reader can therefore expect that Peithon’s repeatedly unsuccessful ambitions will be his downfall. Antigonos distrusts Peithon but he hides his intentions (τὴν μὲν ἰδίαν προαίρεσιν ἐπεκρύψατο, 19.46.1), claiming instead that he wishes to make him ‘General of the Upper Satrapies’. The ruse works. Peithon meets with Antigonos who prosecutes him before his council and has him killed.

Without prior knowledge of events, the reader cannot tell whether Antigonos’ plan will work or not, much as he did not know whether Perdikkas’ earlier plan would, but because Diodorus has described Peithon’s twice-frustrated ambitions towards the Upper Satrapies the reader knows, as Antigonos does himself, that Peithon will not be able to resist the offer of command. The continued focus on Peithon’s ambitions means that the reader can anticipate the outcome by understanding Peithon’s motivations. As

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40 φρονήματος δὲ πλήρη … μεγαλεπίβολος (18.7.3-5); ὄντος τοῦ Πίθωνος κινητικοῦ καὶ μεγάλα ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς περιβαλομένου (19.14.2); Πίθωνα πολλοῖς τοῖς ἐν τῇ χειμασίᾳ στρατιωτῶν ἐπαγγελίαις καὶ δωρεάς ἰδίους κατασκευάζει καὶ διανοεῖται νεωτερίζειν, τὴν μὲν ἰδίαν προαίρεσιν (19.46.1); cf. Polyaen. Strat. 4.6.14. Peithon was also one of the leading members of the revolt against Perdikkas in 321 (18.36.5). Mecus (2009a) 119 points out that some of the terms used to describe Peithon, such as μεγαλεπίβολος, appear elsewhere in the Bibliotheca (2.7.2; 15.66.1) and so might be Diodorus’ own.
with Diodorus’ depiction of Peukestas, the elucidation of Peithon’s ambitions towards the Upper Satrapies allows the reader to learn how he thinks and how he will act. The account of Peithon’s actions in 323/2 means that the reader can anticipate his actions in 319/8 and his eventual downfall in spring 316. Peithon may have been ambitious, but these ambitions were obvious and clearly anticipated by both Perdikkas and Antigonos, who, like the reader, understood Peithon’s character and were able to take measures to forestall him.

It is difficult to assess the purposes of this depiction. On one level, the focus on implied motive shows the historian employing a model of rational explanation to reveal how the historical actor perceives the situation, what the consequences of his actions might be, and what his aims and motivations are. This focus on aims and motivations nuances the reader’s understanding of the narrative and allows him to see how events are conditioned by the personality of the historical actor. Furthermore, this gives the reader the means to anticipate the consequences of events and understand how and why individuals act in the way they do. The reader learns that Peukestas will desert Eumenes and that Peithon will fall for Antigonos’ plan. By focalising the revolt of the Upper Satrapies in 323/2 through Peithon, the historian presents and examines wider issues of revolt, deception, individualism, and the breakdown in centralised authority through the failed ambitions of an individual character. The author uses embedded focalisation to elaborate the plans and deceptions of Perdikkas, the Greeks, and the Macedonians, a technique that contributes to the moral-didactic elements of Diodorus’ history, namely the claim that individuals who act in a hybristic manner will be punished and cannot escape their fate (1.1–2.4). The focus on intentions, motives, and characterisation serves multiple functions within Diodorus’ narrative.
4. Polyperchon and Alexandros

The focus on motives and intentions can also be used to present an overtly negative image of an individual, as can be seen in the case of Polyperchon and his son Alexandros. In this instance Diodorus’ description of the ulterior motives behind Polyperchon’s claim to liberate the Greeks in late 319 helps create an explicitly negative image of the Successor and his son. That this image appears in both Diodorus and Plutarch implies a common source.41

After the death of Antipatros in autumn 319, Polyperchon was appointed regent of the kings Philip-Arrhidaios and Alexander IV. Antipatros’ son Kassandros, appointed chiliarch but upset at not succeeding his father to the regency, plotted war against Polyperchon.42 Fearing Kassandros’ influence over the garrisons and oligarchies installed throughout Greece by Antipatros after the Lamian War, Polyperchon decided to free the Greek cities and remove Antipatros’ oligarchies (Diod. 18.55-3):

ἐδοξεν αὐτοῖς τὰς µὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεις ἑλευθεροῦν, τὰς δ’ ἐν αὐταῖς ὀλιγάρχες καθεσταµένας ὑπ’ Ἀντιπάτρου καταλύειν· οὕτως γὰρ ἂν µάλιστα τὸν µὲν Κάσανδρον ταπεινώσειν, ἑαυτοῖς δὲ µεγάλην δόξαν καὶ πολλὰς συµµαχίας ἀξιολόγους περιποιήσειν.

It was decided to free the cities throughout Greece and to overthrow the oligarchies established in them by Antipatros; for in this way they would best decrease the influence of Kassandros and also win for themselves great glory and many considerable allies.

Polyperchon drafted, under the name of Philip Arrhidaios, an Edict that drew attention to the benefactions (eugerseiai) given to the Greeks by the Macedonian kings and the

41 On the negative image of Polyperchon in the historical tradition, see Heckel (1978) and (2007).
42 On the chiliarchy under Alexander and his successors, see the series of articles by Collins (2001) and (2012), and Meeus (2009b).
goodwill (*eunoia*) Philip Arrhidaios still maintained for them. Further, he claimed to restore the Greeks to the freedom and democracy they held under Philip and Alexander (Diod. 18.56). Polyperchon’s claim to liberate the Greeks offered something to both parties. He would win the ‘great glory and many considerable allies’ required for his war against Kassandros, while the Greek cities would regain the freedom and democracy they had lost after the Lamian War. Diodorus’ narrative confirms the widespread popularity of Polyperchon’s action (18.57, 64–9). Having published his Edict, Polyperchon wrote immediately to the Greek cities (18.57.1):

εὗρασεν ὁ Πολυπέρχων πρὸς τὴν Ἀργείων πόλιν καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς, προστάτων τοὺς ἀφηγησαµένους ἐπ' Ἀντιπάτρου τῶν πολιτευµάτων φυγαδεύσαι, τινῶν δὲ καὶ θάνατον καταγνῶναι καὶ δηµεῦσαι τὰς οὐσίας, ὅπως ταπεινωθέντες εἰς τέλος µηδὲν ἰσχύσωσι συνεργεῖν Κασάνδρῳ.

Polyperchon wrote to Argos and the other cities, ordering them to exile those who had been leaders of the governments in the time of Antipatros—even to condemn certain of them to death and to confiscate their property—in order that these men, completely stripped of power, might be unable to co-operate with Kassandros in any way.

Diodorus records that there was a popular movement to Polyperchon’s side throughout Greece, especially in Athens and the Peloponnese (18.64–9). After leaving an army in Attica under his son Alexandros with orders to besiege Kassandros’ garrison in Piraeus, Polyperchon moved into the Peloponnese. He wrote a second time to the Greek cities (18.69.3–4):

41 On Polyperchon’s Edict, see Poddighe (1998) and (2013); Wallace (2014a).
Polyperchon also sent envoys to the cities, ordering that those who through Antipatros’ influence had been made magistrates in the oligarchical governments should be put to death and that the people should be given back their autonomy. Many in fact obeyed him, there were massacres throughout the cities, and some were driven into exile; the friends of Antipatros were destroyed, and the governments, recovering the freedom of action that came with autonomy, began to form alliances with Polyperchon.

Polyperchon’s claims to liberate the Greeks won him widespread support throughout Greece, but his ineffective sieges of Piraeus and Megalopolis (18.68–72.1), coupled with Antigonos’ defeat of his general Kleitos, cost him dearly. By spring 317 Polyperchon was seen as slow and ineffective and the goodwill and support he had earned in Greece and Macedon was slipping away. Diodorus’ narrative contrasts the private, ulterior aspect of Polyperchon’s intentions with Athens’ open, public perception of them. Although Polyperchon’s actions are initially popular and win him widespread support throughout Greece, Diodorus

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44 Rosen (1967) 68–9 argues for a pluperfect meaning here and suggests that the letters sent at 18.69.3–4 are simply duplications of those sent at 18.57.1.


46 See also, Polyaen. Strat. 4.6.8; Engel (1973); Landucci Gattinoni (2008) 264–7.

repeatedly undermines this by stressing that his intentions were deceitful and self-centred. Diodorus’ account of Phokion’s trial and Polyperchon’s campaign into Attica is worthy of note (18.64–9). Polyperchon and his son Alexandros are singled out for particular criticism and on two separate occasions Diodorus describes in detail the ulterior motives that underline their actions. The first example is when Alexandros arrives in Attica in spring 318 (18.65.3):

Alexandros the son of Polyperchon arrived in Attica with an army. The Athenians, indeed, believed that he had come to give back Munychia and the Piraeus to the people; this, however, was not the truth, but on the contrary he had come from interested motives to take both of them himself for use in the war.  

As with his description of Peithon’s suppression of the revolt of the Upper Satrapies in 323/2, the author as primary narrator-focaliser again employs multiple perspectives to stress tension and the gulf between expectations and reality. The Athenians expect Alexandros to act in a certain way, but his intentions are otherwise. This heightens the tension in advance of the narrative of Alexandros’ actions by causing the reader to wonder how these contrary expectations will play out.

Plutarch (Phoc. 33.4) preserves a similar account: ‘[Alexandros’] ostensible design was to bring aid to the citizens against Nikanor, but he really wished to seize the city, if he could, now that she was ruinously divided against herself’ (λόγῳ µὲν ἐπὶ τὸν Νικάνορα τοῖς ἐν ἄστει βοηθήσων, ἔργῳ δὲ τὴν πόλιν εἰ δύνατο καταληψάμενος, αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ περιπετηθεὶς γενοµένην).
The ulterior motive that Diodorus ascribes to Alexandros is used to present his actions negatively. It is plausible within Diodorus’ narrative as he had earlier made clear that Polyperechon’s claim to liberate the Greeks was not entirely altruistic. The claim to liberate the Greeks would give Polyperechon glory and loyal allies just as the Greek cities would win their freedom from Kassandros’ garrisons and oligarchies. The ulterior motives ascribed to Alexandros, however, do not simply cause us to doubt the absolute magnanimity of his actions—if the actions of any of Alexander’s Successors were completely magnanimous—but also present him as disloyal to his father’s word and intent on deceiving the Athenians. The deceitful image of Alexandros prefigures that of Polyperechon. The doubts concerning Alexandros’ aims and his apparent intention to deceive the Athenians act as warnings to both the Athenians and the reader of his father Polyperechon’s intentions.

Alexandros’ campaign into Attica sets the scene for his father’s later arrival in more ways than one.

By the time Polyperechon arrives in Athens both the Athenians and the reader suspect his intentions, and there is little expectation that he will fulfill the promises of his Edict. However, Polyperechon initially appears true to his word. Whereas Alexandros had welcomed the exiled oligarchs and sent them to Polyperechon with favourable letters, Polyperechon sides with the democrats (Diod. 18.66.1–2). At Pharygai, in Phokis, he adjudicated between the embassies of Phokion and the Athenian demos concerning the return of Munchchia. Phokion called on Polyperechon to hold Munchchia for himself, while the demos, led by Hagnonides (Plut. Phoc. 33), requested him to return it to Athens, in accordance with the autonomy guaranteed in the Edict. Diodorus’ account of Polyperechon’s thought process is worth quoting in full (18.66.2–3).

49 Alexandros apparently held meetings with Nikanor, the commander of Kassandros’ garrison in Piraeus, to which the Athenians were not invited (Diod. 18.65.3; Plut. Phoc. 33.3). The purpose of these meetings is unknown.

50 On these events, see Wallace (2014a) 609–18.
Πολυπέρχων ἔσπευδε µὲν φρουρᾷ κατέχειν τὸν Πειραιᾶ διὰ τὸ πολλὰ δύνασθαι χρησιµεύειν τὸν λιµένα πρὸς τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολέµοις χρείας· αἰσχυνόµενος δὲ ἐναντίον πράττειν τῷ υἱῷ ἐαυτοῦ γεγραµµένι διαγράµµατι καὶ νοµίζων ἀπιστὸς κριθήσεσθαι παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλληνσὶ, ἦν ἐἰς τὴν ἐπιφανεστάτην παρανοµήν πόλιν, µετενόησε τῇ γνώµῃ. διακούσας δὲ τῶν πρέσβεων τοῖς µὲν παρὰ τοῦ δήµου πρεσβεύουσι φιλανθρώπως κεχαρισµένας ἔδωκεν ἀποκρίσεις, τοὺς δὲ περὶ Φωκίωνα συλλαβὼν ἀπέστειλε δεσµίους εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας, διδοὺς τὴν ἐξουσίαν τῷ δήµῳ εἴτε βούλεται θανατοῦν εἴτ' ἀπολύσαι τῶν ἐγκληµάτων.

Now Polyperchon was eager to occupy the Piraeus with a garrison because the port could be of great service to him in meeting the needs of the wars; but since he was ashamed of acting contrary to the edict that he himself had issued, believing that he would be held faithless among the Greeks if he broke his word to the most famous city, he changed his purpose. When he heard the embassies, he gave gracious responses in a kind manner to the one sent by the people, but he arrested Phokion and his companions, granting the people the authority to put them to death or to dismiss the charges as they pleased.

Polyperchon’s actions follow his declarations in his Edict. He supports the democracy, grants it the authority to prosecute the oligarchs, and besieges Kassandros’ garrison in Piraeus. However, the author undermines these positive actions by claiming that Polyperchon originally intended to deceive the Athenians and take control of Piraeus but only changed his mind because of selfish concerns for his reputation and the success of his campaign.51 This passage

51 Plutarch (Phoc. 32.2) ascribes the same intention to Polyperchon, though without Diodorus’ analysis of his internal thought process: ‘Polyperchon was scheming (as he plainly showed a little later) to dispose the city in his own interests, and had no hope of succeeding unless Phokion was banished’ (συσκευαζόµενος γὰρ ἐἰς ἑαυτὸν, ὡς µικρὰν
undermines Polyperchon by presenting as selfish and deceitful that which was apparently the fulfilment of his promise to reinstate the demos, support its freedom, and restore the Piraeus to Athens. Positive action is undermined by negative intentions. The preceding passage concerning Alexandros functions in a similar way and the presence of both so close together—although we cannot be sure that they were as close in Diodorus’ source—betray a strongly negative interpretation of not only Polyperchon’s campaign, but of the intentions and character of both himself and his son.

A source close to the events of the years in question, such as Hieronymos, might have assumed that Polyperchon intended to remove Kassandros’ garrison from Piraeus and fortify the site for his own use in the war, but the description of Polyperchon’s changing thought processes must remain the historian’s own interpretation and it likely belongs to Diodorus’ source (below, §6). As such, it serves a distinctive and important role in the work. As in the cases of Peukestas and Peithon, it shows the author once again applying the model of rational behaviour to describe, in this instance, the aims and motives of the actor and his perception of and response to events. The author is offering the reader his interpretation of his characters’ thoughts and motives. He is showing the reader how the events of his history are dependent on the thoughts, decisions, and actions of his historical actors and how their characters and personalities influence the events of history.

5. Truth and Perception

Diodorus makes it clear that there is a gap between what the Athenians assumed Alexandros’ and Polyperchon’s intentions to be and what they actually were. The discrep-

\[ \ddot\text{υστερο} \ddot\text{ρο} \ddot\text{ν ἔδειξε τοῖς ἔργοις, ὁ Πολυπέρχων τὴν πόλιν, οὐ\ddot\text{δὲν ἤλπι} \ddot\text{ξε περαίνειν μὴ τοῦ Φωκίωνος ἐκπεσόντος).} \]

\[ ^{52} \text{Dixon (2007) 163–7 has argued that Hieronymos was present in Macedon when Polyperchon’s Edict was published in autumn 319.} \]
Implied Motivation in Diodorus

In Books XVIII–XX and is frequently expressed in terms of perceptions of the truth (ἀλήθεια). For instance, when Antigonos sided with Kassandros in 319/8 (18.54.4) he pretended (προσποιούµενος) to be aiding him because of his own friendship for Antipatros, but in truth (τῇ δ’ ἀληθείᾳ) it was because he wished Polyperchon to be surrounded by many great distractions. Eumenes counsels Olympias (18.58.3) not to trust those who are always supposed to be guardians of the kings but were in truth (τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ) trying to transfer the kingdom to themselves. When Antigonos decides to do away with Peithon he devises a plan ‘because he wished to prevent Peithon from suspecting the truth (τῆς µὲν ἀληθοῦς ὑποψίας) and to persuade him to come within reach.’ As with the aforementioned examples of Alexandros and Polyperchon, the historian highlights the distinction between what the actor intended and what the audience thought he intended, frequently by emphasising the actor’s own thoughts.

Antigonos Monophthalmos is not treated in a uniformly positive manner by Diodorus. He is presented as an ambitious rebel, duplicitous, deceitful, aggressive, and unjust. Kings were expected to be truthful, but Antigonos was happy to lie when it suited his interests. However, Antigonos

Further examples: 18.42.2; 19.70.2, 107.4; 20.30.2, 106.5, 113.2, cf. 20.44.2. Equally relevant, though not expressed in terms of ἀλήθεια, are 18.23.3 and 19.15.5.

See, for instance, Diod. 18.41.4–5; 47.5; 50.1–5; 52.4; 54.4; 58.4; 19.48.3–4, 55.4–6, 56.2; 20.106.3; 21.1.1. Landucci-Gattinoni (1981–2) and (2008) xi–xvii argues that such passages cannot come from Hieronymos; she suggests Duris of Samos as a source: see ead. (1997) 194–204 and (2008) xii–xxiv. Hornblower (1981) 136 seems no problem attributing anti-Antigonid sentiment to Hieronymos, in spite of Pausanias’ comments regarding his partiality towards the Antigonids (FGrHist 134 FF 9, 15; P. Oxy. LXXI 1408).

Mendacity was not a royal virtue (Gorteman (1958) 262–5) and kings were expected to tell the truth, as Arrian famously presumed of Ptolemy in the preface to his Anabasis. Herodotus (1.136) records that the Persians taught their children three things: riding, archery, and truthfulness (ἱππεύειν καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ἀληθεῖεσθαι).
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Onos’ commitment to the policy of Greek freedom between the years 315 and 302 is routinely presented in highly positive terms by Diodorus, who claims that on a number of occasions Antigonos tried to convince the Greeks of the sincerity of his actions and his commitment to fulfil his promises. In this instance we see how the historian uses an individual’s intentions and thoughts not to make a contrast with his actions but rather to emphasise the consistency between intention and action.

At Tyre in 315 Antigonos called for the Greeks to be ‘free, autonomous, and un-garrisoned’. According to Diodorus (19.61.4), ‘Antigonos believed (ὑπελάμβανε) that through their hope of freedom (τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς ἐλευθερίας) he would gain the Greeks as eager participants with him in the war.’ Ptolemy quickly recognised the importance of this statement and similarly declared his commitment to the principle of Greek freedom, ‘since he wished the Greeks to know that he was no less interested in their autonomy than was Antigonos’ (19.62.1). Both successors, ‘perceiving (ὁρῶν-πές) that it was a matter of no little moment to gain the goodwill (εὔνοιαν) of the Greeks, rivalled the other in conferring favours (εὐεργεσίας) upon this people’ (19.62.2).

In 313 Antigonos dispatched his nephew Telesphoros to Greece. Diodorus again intrudes with a comment elucidating Antigonos’ motives (19.74.1):

τοῦτο γὰρ πρᾶξας ἤλπιζε πιστιν κατασκευάζειν παρὰ τοῖς Ἐλλησιν ὅτι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν φροντίζει τῆς αὐτο-νομίας αὐτῶν.

Antigonos hoped by doing this to establish among the Greeks the belief that he truly was concerned for their autonomy.

56 On the importance of declarations of freedom in Antigonos’ campaigns and the wars of Alexander’s successors, see Wallace (2011) and (2014b).

57 On Telesphoros’ campaigns under Antigonos, see now Wallace (2014b).
Later again, when Antigonus' general Polemaios captures Chalkis, he leaves the city ungarrisoned (19.78.2):

τοὺς Χαλκιδεῖς ἀφῆκεν ἀφρουρήτους, ὥστε γενέσθαι φανερὸν ὡς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν Ἀντίγονος ἐλευθεροῦν προήρηται τοῖς Ἑλληνες. ἐπίκαιρος γὰρ ἡ πόλις ἔστι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἔχειν ὁμηρήμιον πρὸς τὸ διαπολεμέειν περὶ τῶν ὅλων.

He left the Chalkidians without a garrison in order to make it evident that Antigonus in very truth proposed to free the Greeks, for the city is well placed for any who wish to have a base from which to carry through a war for supremacy.

Once again, the author’s use of embedded focalisation forces the reader to consider events from Antigonus’ standpoint and in line with his expectations. Rather than emphasise the gulf between what is claimed and what is intended, Diodorus stresses instead their unity. Klaus Rosen saw in these comments Hieronymos’ unqualified praise of Antigonus.58 Others, however, have argued that they show that Antigonus only claimed to defend Greek freedom in order to deceive the Greeks into becoming his allies.59 Both readings are possible, but an important distinction must be drawn between principle and policy. These comments are only negative if we assume that Antigonus was committed to the principle rather than the policy of Greek freedom. Antigonus is presented as genuinely committed to a political policy that benefitted both him and the Greek cities, not altruistically enamoured of the principle behind that policy. He is only concerned with making the Greeks believe that he is committed to their freedom and he achieves this by liberating cities such as Athens and Chalkis.

A contrast with Ptolemy is also drawn. Ptolemy is presented as much less devoted in his defence of Greek

59 Meeus (2009a) 330.
freedom. When his declaration of Greek freedom at the Isthmian Games of 308 is not met with the expected support, he abandons the policy altogether, garrisons Sikyon and Corinth, and returns to Egypt (20.37.1–2).

Now Ptolemy planned to free the other Greek cities also, thinking that the goodwill of the Greeks would be a great gain for him in his own undertakings; but when the Peloponnesians, having agreed to contribute food and money, contributed nothing of what had been promised, the dynast in anger made peace with Kassandros, by the terms of which peace each dynast was to remain master of the cities that he was holding; and after securing Sicyon and Corinth with a garrison, Ptolemy departed for Egypt.

Embedded focalisation is once more employed, here elucidating Ptolemy’s plans and his anger at their failure. Both Antigonos and Ptolemy claim that they want to free the Greeks and both made significant efforts to that end, though with Ptolemy apparently following Antigonos’ example (19.62.2). But whereas Antigonos maintains his commitment to the policy of Greek freedom in the face of numerous setbacks, Ptolemy abandons his once events do not go in his favour. There appears to be a contrast in Diodorus’ account, which the author elaborates through the aforementioned embedded focalisations explaining each

(60) See also, Suda s.v. Δηµήτριος (Δ 431); Polyaen. Strat. 8.58; D. L. 2.115.
successor’s thoughts and intentions. Antigonos is presented as genuinely concerned with making sure that the Greeks see him, as indeed many later did, as truly committed to Greek freedom. Ptolemy, on the other hand, merely claims to support Greek freedom. He garrisons Corinth and Sikyon, whereas Antigonos leaves Chalkis ungarrisoned, and he forgoes his campaign to liberate the Greeks once it encounters resistance, Antigonos, on the other hand, continues his policy in the face of resistance and the revolt of two of his nephew-generals, Telesphoros and Polemaios.

The author’s focus on Antigonos’ motives, and his use of embedded focalisation, presents Antigonos as trustworthy and committed to the policy, if not the principle, of Greek freedom. The description of Antigonos’ motives adds depth to the narrative by showing his commitment to Greek freedom in both intention and action, which ensure his success in winning the goodwill of the Greeks. A contrast is drawn with Ptolemy who also sought their goodwill but abandoned his claims to defend the Greeks once he encountered difficulty. He, unlike Antigonos, is duplicitous and so he garrisons Corinth and returns to Egypt. Antigonos might also be contrasted with Polyperchon, who is also the subject of detailed embedded focalisation. Whereas Antigonos’ motives are congruent with his actions, Polyperchon’s are not and he plans to deceive the Athenians and seize Piraeus. Polyperchon does not intend to honour his claims. Like Ptolemy, his motives are deceitful, the historian is careful to record them, and he fails to win the goodwill of the Greeks.


62 Wallace (2014b). Antigonos did, of course, have garrisons in Cilicia (Diod. 26.27.1) and Myndos (Diod. 20.37.1), the latter of which may have been installed by Dioskourides under Antigonos’ orders or independently by Polemaios on his journey to Kos; see Seibert (1969) 188 n. 41; Billows (1990) 224–5. Hammond and Walbank (1988) 170 claim that it was installed by Kassandros.
6. Sources and Conclusion

The use of embedded focalisation and the emphasis on thoughts and motives in Books XVIII–XX is part of a hermeneutic approach to history whereby history as agency is manifested through the thoughts, motives, and decisions of individual historical actors. The focus on motive serves numerous functions within Diodorus’ narrative. First, it emphasises characterisation as a tool of historiography. The depictions of Peithon and Polyperchon, for instance, show that an accurate understanding of the character of the individual can allow the reader to predict that person’s reactions to, and influence on, historical events. Thus, Peithon’s end can be anticipated because the reader, like Antigonos within the text, has learned Peithon’s character and ambitions regarding the Upper Satrapies and knows that he will fall for Antigonos’ trap. The reader can understand the history of the period by understanding the thoughts and motives of the individuals whose actions shaped it. Second, it highlights the importance of the distinction between what an individual said in public and what he thought in private. This serves a number of different roles. While it shows the reader the realities of power during the wars of Alexander’s successors—loyalty and sincerity were sacrificed at the altar of individual expediency—it can also be used to undercut or nuance the narrative. In the cases of both Peukestas and Polyperchon the historian explains that neither intended to fulfil their promises but only did so after they realised that deception would not be in their best interests. The exposition of an actor’s motives necessitates a close engagement with the text on the reader’s part if he is to understand the relationship between thoughts, actions, and characterisation.

Third, it problematises the view that individuals are depicted in either a positive or negative light by Diodorus. While Antigonos is often presented negatively in Books XVIII–XX, he is continually presented as committed to the policy of Greek freedom. This stands in stark contrast to others, such as Polyperchon and Ptolemy, who are represented as duplicitous and manipulative in their claims
to be supporting Greek freedom, but elsewhere described in highly positive terms (below, n. 65). Fourth, it allows the historian to use embedded focalisation as a tool of historical analysis, elucidating his characters’ thoughts and motives. On its simplest level, this adds tension and excitement to a narrative whose outcome the reader very likely knew. It also functions within a hermeneutic approach to history whereby the historian, be it Diodorus or his source, attempts to reveal historical truth by exploring his characters’ motivations. By focusing on the motives and intentions of individuals such as Peukestas, Peithon, and Polyperchon, the historian examines the role of the individual within history and compels his reader to consider the importance of character as an influence on historical events. Further, the historian uses embedded focalisation to discuss the wider relationship between thought and deed. By studying the motives of individual Successors the historian explores the breakdown of centralised authority in the wars of Alexander’s Successors and the role played by personal ambition within it.

The use of embedded focalisation and the elaboration of thoughts, motives, and intentions is not unique to Books XVIII–XX, but it does seem to operate differently there than in other Books. Elsewhere in the Bibliotheca we are told Alkibiades’ motives in offering advice to Pharnabazos (13.37.3–5), Hannibal’s plans regarding his embassy to Syracuse (13.43.6–7), Hermokrates’ reasons for stopping outside Syracuse to bury the Syracusan dead (13.75.4), and Konon’s thoughts and plans before his actions at Methymna (13.77.2). However, in none of these examples does Diodorus’ account of an individual’s thoughts and motives undermine the subsequent historical narrative or cause us to reinterpret it as it does throughout Books XVIII–XX. The topic will obviously benefit from further study, but I would suggest that the use of embedded focalisation and the focus on thoughts and motives is, as Lisa Hau has shown with tyche, a historiographical technique of interest to Diodorus and lifted by him from his sources.63 If so, then it

63 Hau (2009).
would likely differ in its frequency and use depending on the source Diodorus used. As mentioned above (§1), the focus on ulterior motives fits well with Diodorus’ interests in reversals of fortune and his aim of showing how those who act in a hybristic manner cannot escape their fate and will suffer punishment (1.1–2.4), a moral especially clear in the case of Peithon.

It is widely assumed that the ultimate source for Books XVII–XX is Hieronymos of Kardia and it is tempting to follow Roisman and ascribe Diodorus’ use of implied motive directly to him.64 However, since we cannot say for certain that Diodorus used Hieronymos either directly or exclusively for Books XVII–XX, attributing historiographical features of Diodorus’ text to him is hazardous. Diodorus’ account contains numerous pro-Seleukid, pro-Ptolemaic, and anti-Antigonid passages that do not fit well with Hieronymos’ known bias towards the Antigonids.65 Landucci-Gattinoni has argued that Diodorus drew on both Hieronymos and Duris of Samos, but this goes against what we know of Diodorus’ working method, namely that he tended to follow one source for extended periods of time.66 The traditional Einquellentheorie has yet to be disproved, and there is no conclusive evidence that Diodorus used more than one source at a time. Accordingly, the presence of pro-Seleukid, pro-Ptolemaic, and anti-Antigonid passages in Books XVII–XX is most logically explained by Diodorus’ use of an intermediary source, which integrated Hieronymos and other accounts. This would also explain the presence of pro-Rhodian features of apparently second-

65 Pro-Ptolemaic: 17.10.7; 18.14.1, 21.9, 28.6, 33–34.4, 36.6–7; 19.55.5, 56.1, 86.2–5; 18.21.9. See also, Suda s.v. Δηµήτριος (Δ 431); Just. 13.6.19; 15.17; Plut. Demetr. 5.4. Pro-Seleukid: 18.14.1, 28.6, 33.3; 19.55.5–9, 56.1, 90.3–4, 90–92. Anti-Antigonid: above, n. 54. On Antigonos and Hieronymos, see above n. 54.
century BC date. Agatharchides of Knidos is the most likely suggestion; he used Hieronymos (\textit{FGrHist} 86 F 4a–b) and Diodorus used him (1.32–41.3 (\textit{FGrHist} 86 F 19); 3.11.1–3 (\textit{FGrHist} 86 F 1); 18.4, 48.1–4). Since the issue of Diodorus’ sources for Books XVIII–XX cannot be resolved, it is best to avoid attributing historiographical features to lost historians and analysing them as part of their literary style. It is surely more profitable to analyse the appearance and use of such features in the context of the authors in which they are preserved.

It is useful to begin with what we have, even if that is only Diodorus. The focus on motives and intentions, as we have it, forms part of Diodorus’ narrative and must be a much-compressed version of the now lost original. Due to this process of compression, we cannot be sure that what Diodorus preserves is an accurate representation of the original. We do not know the degree to which he altered or condensed the original account to fit the structures of his own work. We can, therefore, only analyse the use of embedded focalisation and the elaboration of motives and intentions within Diodorus’ narrative, with awareness of the limits of such analysis. The depiction of Peukestas, Peithon, Polyperechon, and Antigonus might have been radically different in Diodorus’ source, and the parallels that I have highlighted between the depiction of Antigonus, Ptolemy, and Polyperechon may simply be the result of Diodorus’ process of compression. Further, the characterisation of Peithon that I have argued for may not even have been represented within Diodorus’ source, nor even intended by Diodorus himself. It could simply be the result of Diodorus’ process of compression.


\footnote{Schubert (1914); Bottin (1928) 19; Meeus (2009a) 56; contra, Hornblower (1981) 62–3; Merker (1988).}
In this chapter I have highlighted one interesting feature of Diodorus’ narrative that has not hitherto been given much attention and have pointed some directions forward in the analysis of Diodorus’ role as an author and epitomator, rather than as a cipher for his sources. The use of embedded focalisation and implied motive within Books XVIII–XX shows that these were historiographical techniques of interest to Diodorus, perhaps because they could be used to express his views on *hybris*, and they merit further study for that reason alone. Diodorus’ text is what survives and our analysis should begin with it.

*Trinity College Dublin*  
swallace@tcd.ie
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FILLING IN THE GAPS: STUDYING ANACHRONISM IN DIODORUS SICULUS’ NARRATIVE OF THE FIRST SICILIAN ‘SLAVE WAR’*

Peter Morton

Abstract: Diodorus Siculus’ narrative of the First Sicilian ‘Slave War’ is often considered to offer an ‘accurate, reliable, and comprehensive’ account of the war. This article aims to demonstrate that the text is not necessarily authoritative by reassessing the narrative function of an anachronistic explanatory passage that is often ‘fixed’ in modern accounts with a plausible, but hypothetical alternative. It is argued that we cannot ‘fix’ this anachronism without thereby jeopardising the text’s narrative structure. In sum, the anachronism was inserted because the author did not understand the events he narrated or their immediate historical context.

Keywords: Diodorus Siculus, First Sicilian Slave War, anachronism, historiography

Ancient authors of historiography often stress the importance of their work and their own competence in order to persuade readers of the narrative’s worth.¹

* I would like to thank Ulrike Roth, Alexander Meeus, Nicole Cleary, and the participants at the Kyknos Workshop in Lampeter on ‘History and Narrative in Hellenistic Historiography’ for their help with the composition of this article. The text of Diodorus is that of the Loeb translation of F. R. Walton; all translations are mine.

¹ Both of these concerns have been discussed in great detail by Marincola (1997): for the importance of the work see 34-43 and 95-117; for the historian’s competence see 5-12, 68-86 and 128-74.
In a literary world that was increasingly crowded with historical texts, ancient writers would compete, each claiming the primacy of their text over those of their competitors. In spite of the resulting textual clutter, which led Diodorus Siculus to comment that most people found it difficult to read or even find all of the existing historical narratives (1.3.4–8), only a small portion of them has survived to the present day. Among all the effects that this scattered preservation has had on modern narratives of the ancient world, perhaps the most problematic is that for many periods of ancient history we are left with only a single continuous narrative source to depend upon from the many that were written. When studying the First Sicilian ‘Slave War’ of 136 to 132 BC we encounter this problem even more acutely: the best surviving source for the conflict, Diodorus Siculus, is fragmentary. While discussing the war, Diodorus’ narrator observes that:

... καὶ ταῦτα ἀπήντησε τοῖς µὲν πολλοῖς ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως, τοῖς δὲ πραγµατικῶς ἐκαστα δυναµένους κρίνειν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἔδοξε συµβαίνειν ...

... and these things happened unexpectedly and contrary to the expectations of most people, but to those who could judge each matter realistically, they did not seem to happen unaccountably ...

Given our reliance on this source for our own narratives of this conflict, we hope that the narrator is among those who

2 Livy noted this problem in particular, and the difficulty in being noticed in the crowd of historical writers (praef. 3).
3 Again, the work of Marincola (1997) is the essential overview of this competition and the techniques employed to claim the primacy in historiography.
4 I hope to explore elsewhere the problems created by calling this event a ‘slave war’, and to argue that this event can be studied profitably if we consciously avoid using terminology that prejudices the event’s meaning and its participants’ intents. I therefore use the term ‘slave war’ in quotation marks throughout.
can judge matters realistically. Indeed, the text’s authority and construction of events has often been accepted. The implication of this is that we have relied almost entirely on Diodorus’ text for our understanding of the problems facing Sicilian society in the mid-second century BC. This has led Bradley, for instance, to comment that despite problems with the source’s fragmentary nature, it could be considered ‘accurate, reliable, and comprehensive’.

However, it is problematic to deem the text as authoritative when reconstructing the events in Sicily during the 130s BC and discussing the reasons for their occurrence. I have argued elsewhere that the rebel leader of this revolt, a Syrian named Eunus, cannot be understood within Diodorus’ narrative without appreciating the literary context of, and historical interpretation behind, his portrayal. Eunus is presented through a complex interweaving of stereotypes related to Hellenistic kingship, ancient magic, and servility that is at odds with the picture painted by the numismatic evidence bearing his royal name. In another context Pfuntner has recently argued that Diodorus’ account of the First Sicilian ‘Slave War’ can be read profitably with a full awareness and understanding of its filtration through Photius’ Myriobiblion and an appreciation of Photius’


6 Bradley (1989) 54. See, more recently, Dowden’s reiteration (2015) of ‘the traditional position that Diodorus is our best guide to the content, both topics and expression, of Poseidonios’, and, moreover, that the text offers a ‘reasoned, principled, and obviously philosophical, Roman senatorial/optimate view’ of the conflict (italics original). For the former comment see ad BNJ 87 F 108f, for the latter ad F 108a.

7 See Morton (2013) for Eunus’ literary character, and Manganaro (1982), (1983), and (1990) for the numismatic evidence. The reconciliation of the literary Eunus with his numismatic alter ego, Antiochus, is at the crux of our historical understanding of the First Sicilian ‘Slave War’, and is a topic I will return to at another time.
influence on the text.\textsuperscript{8} It is more generally argued that Diodorus’ text owes its entirety to the lost history of the Stoic philosopher Posidonius, although the extent of that debt remains a question.\textsuperscript{9} If we recognise the fact that Eunus is portrayed within a certain literary context and also understand the text as a Photian reworking, we make any straight readings of the narrative impossible. This raises a difficult question about how much we can trust Diodorus’ text to be accurate, reliable, or comprehensive for our own historical reconstructions. Even so, the precision of the text’s explanatory passages remain largely unquestioned, despite the ‘notorious anachronism’\textsuperscript{10} resting at the centre of the narrative.

The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, we will reassess a well-known anachronism that concludes Diodorus’ preface to the narrative. This reassessment will ask how our reading of the text changes if we do not assume that the anachronistic material can be replaced with a plausible but hypothetical alternative. Secondly, we will rethink how far we can use this text to reconstruct our narratives of the war without

\textsuperscript{8} Pfuntner (2015).

\textsuperscript{9} See, e.g., Forrest and Stinton (1962) 88; Vogt (1965) 21; Verbrugghe (1974) 48; Momigliano (1975) 33–4; Malitz (1983) 37; Sacks (1990) 142–54; Shaw (2001) 27; Ambaglio (2008) 27, 68. I do not intend to comment here on the question of the ultimate source of the information presented in the narrative given by Diodorus, but this is a topic I hope to return to in the future when considering the historiographical purpose of the ‘slave war’ narratives in Diodorus’ Bibliotheca: see Morton (forthcoming). For potential routes to answer these questions see Sacks (1990), Matsubara (1998), and now Wozniczka (2018). Wozniczka, in particular, argues for a greater deal of Diodoran input into the text than has been usually argued in the past, especially concerning the principles of analysis that drive the text and narrative. For the purposes of the argument given here it is assumed that the narrative has the same narrator throughout (even if not necessarily the same source), and so I will be using the name Diodorus throughout to refer to the text of Diodorus and the historical tradition which it represents. The peculiar problems presented by the dual preservation of Diodorus’ text in the Photian epitome and the Constantinian excerpts will be commented on where applicable.

\textsuperscript{10} As Sacks (1990) 146 described the passage in question.
turning to other forms and bodies of evidence. The argument will, therefore, focus on the moment in the narrative in which the narrator presents an anachronistic interpretation of the reasons for an incident during the second century BC. By re-examining this anachronism we will see that it cannot be easily discarded from the narrative but is in fact central to the text’s explanation for the conflict’s origin—its αἰτία—and, by extension, to the text’s construction of the beginning—the ἀρχή—of the conflict. Finally, by rethinking how the narrative’s reading of Sicily intersects with what little we do know about second-century Sicily, we will see that the text’s anachronism is indicative of a broader, and more problematic, disconnect between the Sicily of Diodorus’ Bibliotheca and reality. First, however, it will be useful to revisit the anachronism at the centre of this discussion.

I. The Text of the Anachronism

Diodorus’ narrative of the war opens with an explanatory preface for the conflict in which he details the development of Sicily during the preceding years. This preface depicts a rise of banditry among the herdsmen of Sicily, which Diodorus connects to the mistreatment they suffered under slave owners (34/5.2.1–2 and 25–30). He ends the preface with the failure of the governors of Sicily to react to the development—this is preserved in both the Photian epitome and the Constantinian excerpts (34/5.2.3 and 31). Diodorus explains that the governors failed to act because of constraints on them imposed by the extortion courts in Rome. Both Photius and the Constantinian excerpts present this passage in similar ways (34/5.2.3 and 34/5.2.31 respectively):

οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ κωλύειν μὲν ἐπεχείρουν, κολάζειν δὲ οὐ τολμῶντες διὰ τὴν ἰσχύν καὶ τὸ βάρος τῶν κυρίων, οἱ ἐδέσποζον τῶν λῃστῶν, ἠναγκάζοντο περιορᾶν λῃστευ-οµένην τὴν ἐπαρχίαν· οἱ πλεῖστοι γὰρ τῶν κτητόρων ἵππεῖς ὄντες τῶν Ῥωµαιῶν, καὶ κριταὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν
The governors tried to repress them, but did not dare to punish them because of the power and influence of the men who were the masters of the bandits. They were forced to disregard the plundering of the province: since most of the owners were Roman knights, and were judges for charges against governors from provinces, they caused fear in the governors.

The governors tried to repress the madness of the slaves, but did not dare to punish them. Because of the power and strength of the masters they were forced to disregard the plundering of the province. Since most of the owners were recognised Roman knights, and were judges for charges against provincial governors, they caused fear in the governors.

The historical inaccuracy is clear. The description ἱππεῖς ... τῶν 'Ῥωμαίων, ‘Roman knights',\(^\text{11}\) refers to the *equites*. The statement that the *equites* served as judges in the courts for charges against governors is incorrect for the 130s BC. The first court for trying cases of extortion among Roman governors was permanently established in 149 BC, which precedes the First Sicilian ‘Slave War’; but this court was

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\(^{11}\) The Constantinian excerpt adds that these *equites* were also ἐντελείας, ‘recognised’: they were not only *equites*, but notable ones.
not composed of equites.\textsuperscript{12} It is clear that Diodorus could not have been referring to this court, and so we must look to the later history of the extortion courts. The next major known change to the system of extortion courts took place at the earliest in 123 or 122 BC. The \textit{lex Acilia} set up a court in which the provincials themselves could bring extortion cases against governors, either with or without a Roman \textit{patronus}.\textsuperscript{13} The case was then brought before a jury of fifty men chosen by a complex system of selection and rejection from a standing panel selected each year by the \textit{praetor} of four hundred and fifty men.\textsuperscript{14}

The text of the \textit{lex Acilia} stipulates stringent limitations on the composition of the jury. The selected individuals had to be between thirty and sixty years old, could not be or have been major or minor magistrates, and could not be senators or the fathers, sons, or brothers of senators.\textsuperscript{15} The text of the \textit{lex Acilia} does not provide any positive qualifications, and for these we have to look to later literary sources. Appian’s account from the second century AD about the reform of the extortion courts states that C. Gracchus gave control of these courts to the \textit{equites} (B. Civ. 1.22). A passage from Pliny the Elder suggests that the courts were given to a group of people who came to be known as the \textit{equites}, but were first

\textsuperscript{12} Rather than having a jury composed of equites, the proceedings took place in front of a board of senators, after an appeal had been made to a \textit{praetor}, believed to be the \textit{praetor peregrinus}. See Jones (1972) 48–9; Stockton (1979) 139; Mitchell (1986) 1; Lintott (1992) 14–16; id. (1993) 99–100.

\textsuperscript{13} I agree with the arguments put forward by Lintott (1992) 166–9 and Crawford (1996) 49–50, that the \textit{tabula Bembina lex repetundarum} records the \textit{lex} of a colleague of C. Gracchus, rather than a later \textit{lex} by C. Servilius Glaucia in 104 or 101 BC. For this reason the following discussion is based on the reconstruction of the \textit{lex Acilia} from the \textit{tabula Bembina}.


known as *iudices* (*HN* 33–34). Jones argued that this passage indicates that the positive qualification defined in the law was one of a census qualification of 400,000 sesterces, the same census qualification required to be part of the eighteen voting centuries that were given the public horse. In time, this body became regarded as part of the *equites*, and was certainly thought of as such by the late Republic. But in the 1st century BC it had no control over or input on the extortion courts in Rome.

This error in Diodorus’ text is well known. The issue is often dismissed as Diodorus (or Posidonius) mistaking generic aristocratic pressure on the *praetores* for the real threat of legal retribution, which would have made sense in his own time. It is argued that the text is fundamentally correct since only the finer details are incorrect, which can be easily accounted for. We can, in this way, replace the *equites* of the law courts with rich landowners. Nonetheless, some problems remain: by correcting the anachronism with a hypothetical correction we are left with an incomplete understanding of what the anachronism achieves within the narrative, and we create almost from nothing a historical picture of Sicily that is not so readily found in other evidence.

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16 Jones (1972) 86–90.

17 Badian (1972) 82–4.

II. The αἰτία

In order to show this, let us turn to the function of the anachronism. As noted above, the anachronism comes at the end of an extended introduction to the condition of Sicily prior to the war, and effectively concludes that introduction. As an introduction and background to the more detailed account of the event, Diodorus describes the development of banditry on the island in the preceding years, and presents this as the αἰτία of the conflict.  

Although both Photius and the Constantinian excerpts preserve versions of this narrative, the version from the Constantinian excerpts is more detailed, and will be used for the following discussion. The analysis is split into two sections: the first will discuss the actions of Sicilian landowners (the cause), and the second will consider the results of these actions (the effect).

Diodorus describes the actions of the landowners (34/5.2.7):  

19 This vocabulary is present in the Photian version just before the beginning of the introductory narrative (34/5.2.1): ὁ δουλικὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπανέστη πόλεµος ἐξ αἰτίας τωαύτης, ‘the slave war arose against them for the following reason’. This Polybian vocabulary is also found in a later section of Diodorus’ narrative in which the story of Damophilus is described as being (34/5.2.9) ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ἀποστάσεως, ‘the start of the whole revolt’. This is similar to Polybius’ theory of causation outlined in 3.6–7 of his History, in which he differentiates between the αἰτίαι, ἀρχαί, and προφάσεις of wars: that is, following Walbank (1972) 158, the matters contributing to the decision to go to war, the first acts of the war, and the pretext under which war was declared respectively.

20 An alternative Photian version is also given (34/5.2.1–2): ἐπὶ πολὺ τοῖς βίοις ἀναδραμόντες καὶ μεγάλους περιποιησάμενο πλούτους συνηγόραζον οἰκετῶν πλῆθος, οἷς ἐκ τῶν σωματοφυλείων ἀγεληδὸν ἀπαχθεῖσιν εὐθὺς χαρακτῆρας ἐπέβαλλον καὶ στιγµὰς τοῖς σώµασιν. ἔχρων δὲ αὐτῶν τοῖς νέοις νοµεῦσι, τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις ὡς πῃ ἑκάστῳ ἡ χρεία ἐπέβαλλε. βαρέως δ‘ αὐτοῖς κατά τις ὑπηρεσίας ἔχρωντο, καὶ ἐπιµελείας παντελῶς ὀλίγης ἥξιον, ὅσα τε ἐντρέψεσθαι καὶ ὅσα ἐνδύσασθαι. (‘Since they had become more prosperous in their daily lives and acquired great wealth, they were buying up a large number of slaves, onto whose bodies, as they were led away from the slave merchant like cattle, they were inflicting brands and marks. They employed the young men as herdsman, while they employed the others
In a similar fashion, the large landowners were buying whole slave markets to work their land ... to bind some with fetters, and wear down others with weight of work, and they marked all with their arrogant brands. Consequently, so large a multitude of slaves flooded all Sicily, that those who heard the extravagant numbers did not believe them. Those of the Sicilians who had acquired much wealth were contending hotly with the Greeks of Italy in arrogance, greed, and wickedness. The Italians who had acquired many slaves allowed their herdsmen such a self-indulgent life-style that they did not provide them food, but permitted them to plunder.

The text describes the actions of landowners in Sicily, and differentiates between how they treated slaves generally and herdsmen in particular. In addition, the text shows that different specifically named groups of landowners were behaving in slightly different ways: it appears that the Ἰταλιωταί, ‘Greeks of Magna Graecia’, were in competition in such ways as need arose for each. They abused them with a heavy hand in their service, and altogether thought them worthy of the minimum of care as far as food and clothing were concerned.}
with the practices of the Σικελιωταί, ‘Sicilians’, with regard to their slaves; whereas the Ἰταλικοί, ‘Italians’, were those who allowed the herdsmen to get out of hand. Sacks concluded that this narrative actually comprised two separate narratives: one, which comes from Posidonius, blames the Greeks of Sicily and Magna Graecia for the collapse of Sicilian law and order, and another, from Diodorus or some other Sicilian source, blames the Italians and Romans. We do not need to be this complex about the narrative’s composition to understand its purpose in the context of the First Sicilian ‘Slave War’. In a passage that most likely introduced the whole narrative, Diodorus states that the mistreatment of slaves was the source of a general malaise among the slave-owners on the island (34/5.2.26):

διὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς εὐπορίας τῶν τὴν κρατίστη νόησαι ἕκκαρπωμένων ἅπασις σχεδὸν οἱ τοῖς πλούσιοι προκεκοφότες ἐξήλωσαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον τρυφήν, εἰδ’ ὑπερηφανίαν καὶ ὕβριν. ἐξ οίνοις ἀπάντων αὐξανομένης ἐπ’

21 The Photian version (above, n. 20) does not specify who is mistreating slaves: there is no subject provided for the verb in the first sentence of the passage. This can be taken to indicate a continuation of the subject from the lines immediately preceding which discuss the Sicilians (34/5.2.1): ὅτι μετὰ τὴν Ἱουρικάδος κατάλυσιν ἐπὶ ἑξήκοντες ἔτες τῶν Σικελῶν εὑροῦντον ἐν πᾶσιν, ὁ δουλικὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπανέστη πόλεµος ἐξ αἰτίας τοιαύτης. (‘After the destruction of Carthage, when things had been flowing smoothly for the Sicilians in every respect for sixty years, the slave war arose against them for the following reason.’) Had we only Photius it would appear that the mistreatment being described was the sole responsibility of the Sicilians. See Prag (2013) 40–1, for a discussion of Σικελιωταί to mean Sicilian within Diodorus, even though the more usual ethnic identifier found in epigraphic texts is Σικελός, for which see ibid. 41–5.

22 Sacks (1990) 144–51. Verbrugghe (1972) 544–5, seems to consider that the law-court anachronism, and the resulting confusion about who was to blame, was owing to cross-contamination from the narrative of the so-called Second Sicilian Slave War. Dowden (ad BNF 87 F 108d) argues that the inconsistency in slave treatment between different groups on Sicily is the result of Diodorus transferring the story from Posidonius incompletely, leaving loose ends that are filled in by Photius’ recapitulation of the story at 33/4.2.1–2.
Because of the excessive wealth of those enjoying the fruits of the most excellent island, nearly all of those who had become wealthy strove after first luxury, then arrogance and insolence. Because of this, and since the mistreatment of the slaves and their estrangement from their masters increased equally, there was, when opportune, a general outburst of hatred.

The text is clear that arrogance and mistreatment of slaves were widespread amongst those on Sicily. It is not a problem that specific actions are attributed to the Italians regarding their herdsmen, which then led to the herdsmen’s reaction: the Sicilians, apparently competing with the Italian Greeks, were mistreating their slaves. This does not create undue problems with the introduction of the Italians, who figure so prominently in the overture to the war, especially since the narrator earlier confirms that mistreatment of slaves was a universal cause of revolt and essentially the \( \textit{a} \textit{i} \textit{t} \textit{i} \textit{a} \) for the war. Within the text as we have it, we do not need two different sources of information as Sacks suggests to understand why everyone was complicit in the mistreatment, or that some engaged in mistreatment in one form, and some in another. We should now turn to the effect of their actions.

IIII. Herdsmen and Praetors

The description of the landowners’ actions is immediately followed by the results of these actions. This chain of events leads to the introduction of the law-courts anachronism. The Constantinian excerpt closely records the details (Diod. 34/5.2.28–30):\(^{23}\)

\(^{23}\) There is a parallel passage in the Photian version, but it is so compressed that it does not appear to be of any use as a comparative
Since power such as this had been given to men, who, because of their physical strength, were able to accomplish everything they chose, and because of their licence and leisure had the opportunity, and because of their lack of food were compelled to undertake perilous
tasks, it came about that there was a swift increase in lawlessness. First they murdered those who travelled singly or in pairs in conspicuous places. Then, coming together in bands, they attacked in the night the farmhouses of the weak, and were destroying them by force and were plundering the possessions and were killing those who resisted. Since their courage kept growing ever greater, by night Sicily was not passable to travellers, and for those accustomed to living in the countryside it was not safe to spend time there. Everywhere was filled with violence, banditry, and killings of all kinds. Since the herdsmen were experienced in the countryside and equipped like soldiers, they all were, understandably, full of arrogance and boldness: for since they were carrying clubs, spears, and remarkable shepherd’s crooks, and covered their bodies with the hides of wolves or wild boars, they had a striking appearance and one that was not far from warlike. A pack of fierce dogs following each man, and a plentiful supply of milk and meat being available made their bodies and minds wild. Therefore the whole countryside was full as though of scattered armies, as if the boldness of the slaves had been armed by the guardianship of the masters.

The text is then concluded by our anachronism concerning the equestrian domination of the Roman law-courts. The anachronistic reference to praetors unable to act because of legal repercussions serves to amplify the magnitude of the problem: not only was there banditry, but no-one could stop it because the authorities had their hands tied at the time. This description has been used to reconstruct the development of slavery in Sicily in this period, including the causal link between mass mistreatment of slaves and revolt. This has been achieved by the simple measure of removing the anachronistic law-courts but otherwise leaving the

\footnote{In the Loeb edition L. A. Post suggested \"ἀνεπιφανεστάτοις\", i.e. ‘inconspicuous’. Perhaps, although the narrative is not inexplicable without this.}
historical explanation intact, as we saw above. Yet, doing this diminishes the narrative that the text is developing and fails to address why the anachronism was inserted in the first place—and inserted it evidently was, as it is historically out of place by a full ten years. The narrative purpose of the anachronism is to bind the collapse of order together with provincial and imperial mismanagement, and to show that the conflict was the product of forces external to Sicily. The ἀρχή, the beginning, of the whole war makes this function clear.

IV. ἡ ἀρχή τῆς ἀπόστασεως: the Beginning of the Revolt

Diodorus noted that, despite his own description of the rise of banditry, the true start of the war, the ἀρχή, was caused by Damophilus’ mistreatment of his slaves (34/5.2.9). We


26 This is not to suggest that ancient historical writers should not have been expected to try to understand history, nor that historical artifice is a priori a problem. It is a problem, however, to assume that where we find an ancient author inserting incorrect material we can excise the contamination without making assumptions ourselves, as will be argued below.

27 The line, which links the rest of the narrative to Damophilus, is preserved only in Photius. Even so, in what follows, the Constantinian excerpts on Damophilus will be used, as they preserve much greater detail of Diodorus’ account: the Constantinian excerpts record the story of Damophilus in 34/5.2.34–6, 38, 37 + 24b, roughly two full pages of the Loeb edition, while the Photian version (34/5.2.10) is barely a third of a Loeb page by comparison. A fragment of Posidonius, preserved in Athenaeus, also blamed Damophilus for the rise of the revolt (12.59.21–9 = F 59 Kidd): Ποσείδώνιος δ’ ἐν τῇ ὀγδόῃ τῶν Ἱστοριῶν περὶ Δαµοφίλου λέγων τοῦ Σικελιώτου, δι’ ὅν ὁ δουλικὸς ἐκινήθη πόλεμος, ὅτι τρυφῆς ἦν
learn that this man copied the behaviour of the Italians in Sicily in terms of both the number of his slaves and their mistreatment. It was among this man’s slaves that the revolt actually started, and they incited only those from his household (34/5.2.34–36):

There was a certain Damophilus, whose family came from Enna, an exceedingly wealthy man, and of arrogant character, who, since he cultivated a vast

οἰκέους, γράφει καὶ ταύτα τρυφῆς οὐν δοῦλος ἦν καὶ κακουργίας, διὰ μὲν τῆς χώρας τεταρκίκλους ἀπήνας περιαγόμενος καὶ ὑποίπους καὶ θεράποντας ὀρών καὶ παραδρομὴν ἀνάγωγον κολάκων τε καὶ παιδῶν στρατιωτικῶν. ὢσπερον δὲ πανωκία ἐφεβρίας κατέστρεψε τὸν βίον ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν περιμβροθεῖς. (Posidonius, in the eighth book of his Histories, says about Damophilus of Sicily, because of whom the slave war was set in motion, that he was addicted to luxury, and he writes this: “He was therefore a slave of luxury and wickedness, leading round the countryside with him four-wheeled wagons, horses, beautiful attendants, an ill-bred following of flatterers and even of boys dressed as soldiers. But later he, with his whole household, wantonly ended his life after having been grievously insulted by his slaves.”

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circuit of land, and had acquired large herds of cattle, not only emulated the luxury of the Italians in Sicily, but even their great numbers of slaves and their inhumanity and arrogance towards them ... His ill-bred and uneducated nature, having gained possession of unaccountable power and an excessive fortune, first produced satiety, then wantonness, and finally ruin for himself and great misfortunes for his country. For, buying great numbers of slaves in the market, he used to treat them outrageously, branding marks on the bodies of those who had been born free in their own countries, but who had experienced the fate of slavery through capture in war. Some of them he fettered in chains and threw into worker’s barracks, while others he assigned as herdsmen, and provided neither appropriate clothing nor food.

The links to the preface provided by Diodorus are clear. Initially Damophilus is introduced as emulating the luxury, slaves, and attitudes ‘of the Italians in Sicily’ (τῶν κατὰ Σικελίαν Ἰταλικῶν). Furthermore, by the end of the passage we are informed that Damophilus is exactly copying the treatment given to the herdsmen in the preface: ‘he provided neither appropriate clothing nor food’ (οὔτ’ ἐσθήτας οὔτε τροφὰς ἐχορήγει τὰς ἁρµοττούσας). These two aspects link Damophilus to Diodorus’ preface. Diodorus indicates in another place what truly drove Damophilus’ slaves to revolt and it provides further connections to the preface. Several passages from the Constantinian excerpts detail the actions of Damophilus and his wife toward their slaves (34/5.2.38, 37 and 24b):

ὁτι Δαµόφιλος ὁ Ἐνναῖός ποτε προσελθόντως αὐτῷ τινων οἰκετῶν γυµνῶν καὶ διαλεγοµένων ὑπὲρ ἐσθήτος οὐκ ἤφεσεν τὸν ἔνευξιν, ἀλλ’ εἶπὼν· Τί γάρ; οἱ διὰ τῆς χώρας ὁδοιποροῦντες γυµνοὶ βαδίζουσιν, καὶ οὐχ ἡτοίµην παρέχονται τὴν χορηγίαν τοῖς χρείαν ἔχουσιν ἰµατίων; ἐπέταξε προσδῆσαι τοῖς κίοσι καὶ πληγὰς ἐµφορῆσαι ἐξαπέστειλεν ὑπερηφάνως.
Damophilus of Enna, when some naked slaves approached him and talked with him about clothing, could not endure the conversation, but said, ‘What? Do those who walk through the country go naked, and do they not offer a ready supply for those who need clothes?’ He ordered them bound to pillars and beaten, and dismissed them arrogantly.

Because of his wilfulness and cruelty of character, there was not a day when the same Damophilus was not mistreating some of his slaves without just cause. The wife of this man, Metallis, who delighted no less in arrogant punishments, treated her maidservants, and the other slaves who fell in her way, cruelly. Because of the outrages and punishments from both of them, the slaves became brutal towards their masters, and believing that nothing worse than the present evils could come to them ...

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28 More accurately recorded as Megallis in the Photian version: see Diod. 34/5.2.10, 14.

29 The narrative picks up again immediately with no change in subject in 34/5.2.24b.
The slaves agreed with one another about revolt and the murder of their masters.

With Damophilus’ instruction to his slaves to loot ‘those who walk through the country’ (οἱ διὰ τῆς χώρας ὁδοιποροῦντες), the text brings to mind images from earlier in the narrative of mass banditry perpetrated by slaves across Sicily. Yet, there is still something of a disconnection between the story of Damophilus’ slaves and the herdsmen in the narrative’s preface. The text is explicit that it was ‘because of the outrages and punishments from [their masters]’ (διὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀµφοτέρων ὕβριν καὶ τιµωρίαν) that Damophilus’ slaves chose to revolt, and specifically because the slaves believed ‘that nothing worse than the present evils could come to them’ (µηδὲν ἔτι χεῖρον τῶν παρόντων αὐτοῖς κακῶν ἀπαντήσεσθαι). In contrast, the herdsmen were earlier described as enjoying ‘a self-indulgent life-style’ (συνήθειαν ραδιουργίας, 34/5.2.27) and ‘full of arrogance and boldness’ (ἀπαντες … φρονίματος καὶ θράσους, 34/5.2.29). And while Damophilus’ excesses are linked to the Italians of Sicily, it is his own ‘ill-bred and uneducated nature’ (ἀνάγωγος γὰρ καὶ ἀπαίδευτος τρόπος), not his learnt behaviour from the Italians, that ‘first produced satiety, then wantonness, and finally ruin for himself and great misfortunes for his country’ (τὸ µὲν πρῶτον κόρον ἐγέννησεν, εἰδ’ ὤβρεν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον ὀλθὲρὼν τε αὐτῷ καὶ συµφορὰς µεγάλας τῇ πατρίδι; all the above from 34/5.2.35). Critical aspects of Damophilus’ character and actions are all understandable without Diodorus’ preface, yet the connection to herdsmen and meddlesome Italian landowners provides a compelling backdrop for Damophilus’ misconduct. In addition, he becomes part of a much wider problem—the mismanagement of the whole province, exemplified by the paralysation of the Roman governors by equestrian corruption.

What is more, this reading of the narrative was expressed openly in the text itself (34/5.2.33):
Not only in the exercise of political power should prominent men behave moderately to those who are humble, but also in their private lives, if they are wise, they should attend gently to their slaves. For just as arrogance and a heavy hand in cities produces civil conflicts among the free citizens, so in private homes it produces slave plots against their masters, and terrible revolts in common against cities. The more the powers that be might be changed into savagery and lawlessness, so much more are the characters of those subject to that power made savage to the point of despair: for all whom chance has made humble willingly yield to those in power for virtue and good repute, but when deprived of good treatment become an enemy of those who savagely lord it over him.

This excerpt comes immediately before the account of Damophilus and shows how Damophilus’ story serves as an example to demonstrate the moral lesson outlined in this passage. The anachronism, by amplifying the problem of the herdsman through implications of administrative cor-

30 See, e.g., Sacks (1990) 144-5.
rupture, elevates the narrative beyond the subject of only a ‘slave war’. The narrative demonstrates the benefits of healthy political practice by showcasing an example of an island that fell into war as a result of upper-class arrogance and greed. The αἰτία of the war then draws the ἀρχή involving Damophilus into the bigger debate: Italian greed and vice corrupt more than administrative duties, going so far as to destroy the practices of the Sicilians themselves, thus causing, indirectly, the ἀρχὴ of the revolt.\textsuperscript{31} We cannot remove the equites and the governor from the narrative in favour of a more ‘accurate’ replacement without endangering a great deal more of the narrative’s careful construction.

V. Sicily in the Second Century BC

Diodorus’ text is not only using the events of the First Sicilian ‘Slave War’ to think about issues that go beyond ideas specific to slavery, but was also written at least half a century after the events in question. While the Bibliotheca remains one of our only pieces of narrative evidence for Sicily in the second century BC, it does not stand alone when reconstructing the island in this period. If we work from only Diodorus’ text we are left with an image of Sicily in which the praetorian governors were both the supreme

\textsuperscript{31} Verbrugghe (1975) 197–204, building on the work of Strasburger (1965) 43, argued this tale of administrative mismanagement was a narrative template that ‘Posidonius’ used to understand a conflict about which he knew only ‘episodic adventure stories’, for which see Verbrugghe (1975) 192; at 198–201 he argued that this template was based jointly on what he calls the latifundia of Italy in the 70s BC and the rise of piracy in the first century BC. This thesis is impossible to prove and is reliant on two hypotheses: first, that the source underlying Diodorus’ account is uncomplicatedly Posidonius; second, that the general details of the narrative of the conflict appear to be disconnected from each other because they actually were disconnected details. On the first point, see Sacks (1990) 142–54, and Matsubara (1998) 142–84; on the second point, it should be noted that with an account as fragmentary as that of the First Sicilian ‘Slave War’, it is impossible to tell, for the most part, if the disconnection of narrative details was the case in the original narrative, or merely the result of fragmentation.
authority on the island as well as the only force capable of suppressing possible banditry. The governors' impotence in the face of a corrupt landowning equestrian class left Sicily in danger. This is the picture that readily emerges from scholarship on the 'slave wars'. Yet this image of Sicily reliant on centralised Roman authority and at the mercy of foreign landowners does not fit with what we do know about the second century BC. This is especially the case with regard to two connected points: how Rome governed Sicily; and the practices of slave owners in this period.

First, Prag has shown that Rome did not control Sicily by using troops on the ground. He argued that the annual magistrate in Sicily was not sent with a garrison force assigned to him from Rome or Italy; the forces used to patrol Sicily were from the island itself and were connected to the island's strong Hellenistic gymnastic culture. Moreover, the Sicilian levies used to police the island and protect its coast against pirates were often led by Sicilian officers drawn from the political classes of Sicily. The use of localised levies and commanders in Sicily is just one manifestation of the vibrant and complex political entities, urban vitality, and local identities within Sicily in this period that are not represented in Diodorus' narrative. It is not clear that Sicilian cities would have necessarily needed the praetor to act if they had significant problems with banditry. The backdrop of politically active Hellenistic poleis in Sicily does not necessarily disprove the Diodoran narrative, but it does complicate the picture given in


33 For the prevalence of the Sicilian gymnastic culture see Prag (2007) and Mango (2009). Over twenty examples of gymnasia have been found on Sicily; for an overview see Campagna (2006) 29–31.


Diodorus that the governor of Sicily was the sole power on
the island. And if the poleis were capable of intervening on
their own, it raises questions about exactly what the
‘banditry’ of herdsmen on the island really signified. This is
especially the case given the lack of response to the problem
from both the Roman authorities and the Sicilian poleis,
something not accounted for if we simply replace the
equestrian law-courts with local landowners within the
anachronism.

On precisely the topic of how to read the ‘banditry’ of
Diodorus’ narrative, Roth has argued that the ‘banditry’
that lends the anachronism its narrative force should be
read as a slanted description of ‘(slave) herdsmen using
(public) land reserved for the pasturing of cattle, in order to
grow food on some part of it’.  

The banditry of our text
could therefore be viewed as the utilisation of public land
within the peculium granted to the herdsmen of rich land-
owners, and not as part of a system to dehumanise or
oppress the herdsmen. This explanation of the slave-
owners’ actions sits more comfortably with how the text
describes the herdsmen—enjoying ‘a self-indulgent life-
style’ (συνήθειαν ῥᾳδιουργίας, 34/5.2.27) and ‘full of arro-
gance and boldness’ (ἀπαντες ... φρονήματος καὶ θρά-σους,
34/5.2.29)—although it does not allow the herdsmen
enjoying a degree of freedom to fit very well with the story
of Damophilus. If we read the ‘banditry’ of Diodorus’ text
in this light, we may be able to explain much better why no
landowners, Italian, Sicilian, or otherwise, wanted to act
against the ‘banditry’: it was not, in reality, a problem.  

36 Roth (2005) 291–2, citing Festus 392L, whose definition of pasture-
land includes reference to herdsmen cultivating small parts of public
pasturage for their own provision.

37 At least not for the landowners. The exploitation of public land in
this manner by rich landowners could well have caused conflict between
these landowners and the poorer members of their community who
relied on the public land to augment their own limited holdings. This,
in turn, may be part of the underlying reason for the period of social
disorder that arose during the conflict, described at Diod. 34/5.2.48: I
hope to return to this disorder at another time. The freedom granted to
the herdsmen could well have been a problem for the governor: for this
Taken together, these two points problematise the image of second-century BC Sicily given in Diodorus’ text.

VI. Conclusion

The analysis undertaken here of a single anachronistic passage in Diodorus reminds us that we must be careful, when constructing our own narratives of ancient conflicts, not to assume that we can overwrite narratorial errors in the ancient sources, especially where these mistakes form a key part of the text’s analysis. The example discussed here has shown that we cannot rely on our principle ancient source’s explanation of why the conflict took place, at least not in terms of slave mistreatment and administrative misconduct as he describes it. The text’s moral tale of provincial mismanagement depends upon two aspects. First, irresponsible landowners across Sicily offered their slaves the freedom to seek their own maintenance, resulting in widespread disorder. Second, those same landowners protected themselves from the repercussions of their actions by threatening legal action against Roman governors who intervened. Each aspect requires the other element in order to drive the narrative forward. Without the central anachronism of legal extortion resulting in gubernatorial inaction we cannot assume that the remainder is accurate, especially if we want to make this text central to our own understanding of Sicily in the second century BC. This is not to say that Diodorus’ text cannot be used in any way to reconstruct Sicily’s history in the second century BC, but rather to argue that relying on the Bibliothèque’s narrow historical interpretation and literary presentation is to limit our own horizons, circumscribed as they are by the desire to tell moral tales. The first step to exceed the limitations of

see Bernard, Damon, and Grey (2014) 958–62, who argue that the Polla stone (CIL I 638) records the actions of a governor in Sicily rounding up herdsmen who had been given the licence to plunder as described by Diodorus. In their view, the Polla stone should be understood as part of the negotiation of power between the governor of Sicily, the island’s landowners, and landowners in Lucania (see esp. 977–8).
our literary source material lies in evaluating the full range of evidence available for reconstructing the ancient world and endeavouring to challenge where necessary the validity of the analysis provided by our historiographical sources.

University of Manchester peter.morton@manchester.ac.uk
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EMOTION AND GREEKNESS IN DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS’ ACCOUNT OF THE EXILE OF CORIOLANUS

Dan Hogg

Abstract: Dionysius’ account of Coriolanus’ exile is rarely treated on its own terms, normally being deprecated as inferior to Livy or Plutarch’s version of the same. On the contrary, Dionysius’ account is a powerful illustration of his method in combining Roman source-material with Greek literary heritage. In particular, Dionysius uses epic and technical elements of stage language to draw out the psychological tensions at play in the story. This account, therefore, not only helps us get closer to Dionysius’ vision of Romanness, as Greek-inflected and distinct from Livy’s; it also problematises tough, Roman masculinity, suggesting that Dionysius is a more subtle observer of Rome than is usually imagined.

Keywords: Coriolanus, family, mother, Livy, tragic history, Dionysius of Halicarnassus

This paper considers Dionysius’ narration of Coriolanus’ encounter with his mother (8.36–54), with especial regard to Dionysius’ presentation of their emotional relationship, and the ways in which this

*I would like to thank all those who commented on versions at various stages, starting with Chris Pelling, who supervised the DPhil of which a version of this formed a part; Katherine Clarke and Stephen Oakley, who examined the DPhil; Julietta Steinhauer; the audience in Lampeter; the editors and anonymous reviewer of Histos; and Alexander Meeus, for organising the conference where this was presented, and then performing his role as editor so generously. All references to Dionysius are to the Antiquitates Romanae, unless otherwise noted.
relationship drives the plot of Dionysius’ story. The encounter takes place when Coriolanus, having rebelled against Rome, is encamped with his new Volscian allies a few miles in front of the city of Rome.\(^1\) Coriolanus’ mother, herself still living in the city, goes to meet Coriolanus to try to persuade him to desist. It is a classic, complex story, the main thrust being the conflict between public and private, in the sense of personal, duty. I will investigate the shifts in the story between public and personal planes in order to illustrate the changing relationship between mother and son. Dionysius explicates this relationship by playing with Homeric epic and, in particular, the formal strictures of tragedy,\(^2\) and so my discussion will permit insights into the way Dionysius builds his narrative artistically, with a view to broader considerations about Dionysius’ construction of Greeks and Romans. I will not directly address standard

\(^1\) The example of Coriolanus arises frequently in modern discussions of family relationships during the Roman Republic. Attempts to fit the Coriolanus story into a broader typology of Roman family relationships include Africa (1978); D’Ambra (2007) 30; Dixon (1988) 9; Evans (1991) 172–4; Fraschetti (2001) 53; Hallett (1984) 40–3, 246–8. Part of the catalyst seems to have been Africa’s bizarre attempt to demonstrate a Roman ‘Coriolanus-complex’ to sit in parallel with a Greek ‘Oedipus-complex’. Dionysius’ version has occasionally been excluded from the discussion, e.g. by Hallett (1984) 41, though she obviously knows the text (e.g., at 47–8 n. 17).

\(^2\) On space in tragedy, see e.g. Rehm (2002); Taplin (1978), esp. 31–57 on entrances and exits. In addition, part of the function of the story of Coriolanus is aetiological, to explain the origin of the temple Fortuna Muliebris (see, e.g., David (2001) 18, 20–1); so the story exists at the point of interaction between physical space and memorialisation on the one hand and history on the other. In his epigraph on Coriolanus, Dionysius emphasises the same sense of memory. The Herodotean language of the passage, underlined, recalls Herodotus’ figurative use of the language of physical erasure in his preface (8.62.3): ἐτῶν δὲ μετὰ τὸ πάθος ὁμοί τι πεντακοσίων ἡδη διαγεγονότων ήδη διαγεγονότων εἰς τόπῳ τοῦ χρόνου οὐ γέγονεν ἔξιτηλος ἤ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς μνήμη, ἀλλὰ ἤδη καὶ ἀνασαὶ εἰς πάντων ὡς εἰσεβής καὶ δίκαιος ἀνήρ. (‘And though nearly five hundred years have already elapsed since his death (τὸ πάθος) down to the present time, his memory has not become extinct, but he is still praised and celebrated by all as a pious and just man.’) (This and all other translations of the Antiquitates Romanae included here are taken or adapted from Cary 1937–50).
questions of pro- or anti-Roman or Greek sentiment, a seam which has been mined sufficiently already. I will instead investigate what sort of Romanness and Greekness Dionysius establishes in this story, and how this may be used to illuminate the depiction of Romans and Greeks in the *Antiquitates Romanae*.

The two most commonly discussed versions of the Coriolanus story are by Livy and Plutarch. Dionysius’ account of Coriolanus’ rise and subsequent exile differs in some details from each of these. The young Marcius is a successful soldier of noble stock who earns the cognomen Coriolanus along with considerable fame in Rome. When later he harbours political ambitions, he loses an election, and becomes so divisive and anti-plebeian that the senate decide to allow him to be exiled to spare them the wrath of the people. According to the *Antiquities*, after Coriolanus is expelled, himself enraged, he goes to join the Volsci, and wages a long war, capturing Roman town after Roman town until he reaches the fifth mile marker. Successive Roman embassies of senators and of priests fail to convince him to desist, until finally the women’s embassy containing his mother Veturia and his wife Volumnia persuade him to stop. There are various traditions for what happens next:

3 Plut. *Cor.*; Livy 2.33–40 (cf. Florus 1.5; Eutropius 1.14). The ancient accounts of Coriolanus which have been preserved also include Valerius Maximus 3.2.1, 4.1; App. *Rom.* 2.1.5 = Polyb. 8.25.3; Cassius Dio F 18 = [Aur. Vict.] 19; cf. the now-lost version by Atticus, mentioned by Cicero at *Brut.* 19. See also Salmon (1930) 96 n. 1; David (2001) 17 with nn. 1–6.

4 Ogilvie (1965) 314–8 explains the differences between Dionysius’ and Livy’s accounts from a Livian perspective. Most obviously, Livy’s account of Coriolanus’ campaign is significantly more compressed than Dionysius’ version.

5 Easy comparison between the versions of Livy, Dionysius and Plutarch is hindered by the different names used of the characters. Livy and Dionysius have Veturia as the mother and Volumnia as the wife. Plutarch (followed by Shakespeare) has Volumnia as the mother and Vergilia as the wife. In this chapter, I shall use the Dionysian system, or clearly mark otherwise, or simply refer to the ‘mother’ or the ‘wife’ as appropriate. Russell’s explanation (1963) 22, that we owe the variation to a slip of Plutarch’s memory, is the popular and most plausible expla-
Livy prefers the one where Coriolanus dies in exile, years later, old and embittered. Plutarch and Dionysius choose the more dramatic and obvious motif of having him killed while about to make, or in the process of making, a speech.

**Departure and the Mother**

Dionysius gives a sophisticated and intricate portrayal of the mother, Veturia. Because scholars usually adopt a Livian or a Plutarchan perspective, this aspect is often overlooked. In essence, this is due to Dionysius having a more balanced focus in his account between her and Coriolanus. This approach is evident in the way that Dionysius devotes considerable space to the first women’s embassy, led by Valeria, to Veturia’s house to persuade her to go to her son, which is much more briefly narrated by Livy and Plutarch. Both Dionysius and Livy use the opportunity to touch upon the nature of women’s strengths. While Livy (8.39.3) filters this through the voice of the narrator, Dionysius has Valeria address the Roman women in direct speech, in a manner which loosely recalls Livy’s version of the passage. They will persuade Veturia to act with a strength:

6 Pelling (1997/2002) 394 allows more nuance than most, but his analysis is more concerned with detecting points of interest in Plutarch’s version (393).

7 Plut. Cor. 33; Livy 2.40.

8 Livy 2.40.2: pervicere certe, ut et Veturia, magno nata mulier, et Volumnia duos parvos ex Marcio ferens filios secum in castra hostium iurent, et, quoniam armis viri defendere urbem non possent, mulieres precibus lacrimisque defendenter. (‘They certainly prevailed upon both Veturia, the older woman, and Volumnia, bringing her two sons by Marcus with her, to go to the camp of the enemy and, since they were unable to defend the city with men’s weapons, to defend as women, with prayers and tears.’)
... οὐχὶ ὅπλων, ἔφησεν ἡ Οὐαλερία, καὶ χειρῶν δεοµένη·
toú'ton mèn γὰρ ἀπολέλυκεν ἡµᾶς ἡ φύσις.

‘... that does not require weapons or hands’, said
Valeria, ‘for nature has relieved us of these.’

Livy draws attention in his account to how Veturia  will
attempt to win over her son using the feminine weapons of
prayers and tears (precibus lacrimisque, 2.40.2). In Dionysius’
version, Valeria goes on to say that she and the other
women should use the gifts granted her by her womanly
physis, namely logos and eunoia. This is a particular sort of
logos, because as with Livy it is bound up with weeping and
entreaty. Dionysius’ Valeria tries to win over Veturia, but
her logos alone fails: only when she weeps, and so uses
prayers and tears, will Veturia be persuaded to undertake
the embassy. It is remarkable, however, that Dionysian
women do possess a logos that is more closely associated with
political discourse than this, though they may not always
have the opportunity to use it. Indeed, women’s logos shares
some of the features of men’s: for example, Veturia and the
consular C. Claudius each use the metaphor of ship-as-state
(8.49.1; 11.9.1; cf. 2.62.4). This means that later, when Vetu-

9 The language of the ship-of-state metaphor in Dionysius is
extremely interesting, because Flierle (1890) 63-7 has identified a
Thucydidean parallel in the phrasing, and his discussion illuminates
Dionysius’ method of constructing speeches in the Antiquities. He argues
that Claudius’ speech contains rare Thucydidean words: κλύδωνι
(‘wave’ or ‘sea’, 11.9.1) and ὄρεγόµενον (‘grasping at’ or ‘reaching for’,
11.14.3). Neither of these examples is definitively Thucydidean. In the
first instance, the word is used in a ship-of-state metaphor, which is a
very common metaphor indeed (Page (1955) 179-97 at 182 n. 1; e.g., Alc.
A6 Lobel-Page; Dem. Phil. 3.69). The full expression, ἐν ὧν κλύδωνι τὰ
πράγµατα σαλεύει (‘in what sort of sea the affairs [of the state] are
tossed’), has its closest parallel (to my knowledge) in Chrysippus, the
earliest usage revealed by TLG (Fragmenta Moralia 476 (SIT III.127.22)).
But it is rather Dionysian than Thucydidean, being attested three times
in the Antiquities (including 2.62.4, used by the narrator, and 8.49.1), and
not in that form in Thucydides. The closest parallel in Thucydides is at
2.64.3, in the account of the sea-battle at Naupactus. If the parallel is
conscious, then it is another striking instance, alongside 7.66.5, of
ria discusses state business with Coriolanus, it will be no
surprise that she is equipped with the appropriate language
for governing.

Dionysius’ Veturia at first refuses to do as the women ask
(8.41.1–42.2). Her refusal, in direct discourse, is revealing of
the emotional relationship between Coriolanus and his
family. In a lightly dramatic-ironical moment, Veturia
describes Coriolanus’ soul as hard (σκληράν) and invulner-
able (ἄτρωτον),10 which picks up Valeria’s belief—expressed
earlier to the other Roman women, but not said directly to
Veturia—that Coriolanus cannot be so stubborn (στερράν)
and invulnerable (ἄτρωτον) that he will hold out against his
mother’s pleas.11 Valeria had expected that Coriolanus
would yield in the face of Veturia’s lamenting and
entreating (8.39.5). Valeria is right, but not in the way she

Dionysius elevating Thucydidean language to the clearly figurative
level. In the second case, Thucydides uses ὀρεγόµενον four times (Thuc.
2.61.4, 65.10; 4.92.2 [in a close parallel]; 6.16.6, 83.1), but the word is also
attested frequently in Xenophon (e.g., Xen. Hell. 4.4.6; 6.5.42; Hiero 7.1;
9.7; Agesil. 1.35; Hipp. 1.23; Symp. 8.23; Const. Lac. 2.13) and Isocrates
(e.g. Antid. 217; Dem. 2.52; Pac. 7.23 [both close parallels], 62; Nic. 2; Phil.
134, Soph. 4), two important sources for Dionysius. See also Aesop, Fab.
27.3, 8; 28.15; 42.6; 59.4 for very close parallels. It has been pointed out
to me by Alexander Meeus (whom I thank for the point) that while
ὁρεγόµενος might not be a very common word, it also occurs
comparatively frequently in Polybius and especially Diodorus. This is in
fact a pattern often observed when looking at the frequency of a word
through the ages: in spite of his early Atticism, Dionysius’ language is
also still very Hellenistic and words that are remarkably frequent in
Diodorus will also occur fairly often in Dionysius, and often disappear
only after Plutarch. The word is perhaps then indicative of Hellenistic
usage rather than Dionysius’ own idiolect. See further Usher (1982)
passim, esp. 810 on Dionysius’ idiolect.

10 8.41.6: πρὸς δὴ τοιαύτην ψυχὴν οὕτω σκληρὰν καὶ ἄτρωτον, ὦ
Οὐαλερία, τίνα ἰσχύν ἐξουσιάν αἱ παρ’ ἡµῶν δεήσεις (‘on such a mind, so
hard and invulnerable, Valeria, what force will the entreaties of us
women have?’).

11 Once again, the verbal parallel is studiedly off-centre: 8.39.5: οὐχ
οὕτω στερρὰν καὶ ἄτρωτον ἔχει καρδίαν, ὥστε ἀνασχέσθωι μητέρα πρὸς
τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ γόνασι κυλιοµένην. (‘He does not have a heart so hard and
invulnerable that he can hold out against a mother who grovels at his
knees.’)
Emotion and Greekness in Dionysius’ Coriolanus

expects. Coriolanus will succumb to his mother’s pleas, but that will be because she recalls in speech the closeness of her relationship with her son: in other words, she will use her eunoia and her logos, not the grovelling that Valeria had predicted.

Veturia came to understand her son’s harshness at his moment of parting from her four years previously. She recounts to Valeria Coriolanus’ words upon departure in detail and in embedded direct discourse, indicating the vividness of her memory, and so we see the emotional closeness that she feels. Veturia’s explicit recollection of the moment of the departure is a partially expanded version of the scene as it appeared in the text at 7.67.2:

\[ \alpha\upiota\varsigma\;\delta'\;\alpha\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\varsigma\;\alpha\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma\;\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma\;\alpha\upsilon\kappa\nu\kappa\lambda\alpha\upsilon\nu\varsigma\mu\alpha\nu\xi\varsigma\mu\epsilon\iota\varsigma\nu\varsigma\omega\varsigma\;\tau\alpha\varsigma\;\alpha\upsilon\omicron\tau\omicron\varsigma\;\alpha\omicron\nu\iota\mu\omicron\alpha\omicron\varsigma\nu\varsigma\;\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma\;\alpha\omicron\alpha\upsilon\omicron\theta\omicron\omega\nu\iota\omicron\nu\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma\;\alpha\upsilon\omicron\iota\omicron\alpha\upsilon\varsigma\varsigma\;\alpha\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma\;\alpha\iota\upsilon\varsigma\nu\iota\omicron\nu\varsigma\;\alpha\nu\delta'\;\alpha\omicron\nu\iota\omicron\nu\varsigma\nu\varsigma\varsigma\varsigma. \]

But Marcius himself was not seen either to bewail or to lament his own fate, or to say or do the least thing unworthy of his greatness of soul.

The emphasis when the departure scene was narrated was not on Coriolanus’ words to his mother, as it is when Veturia tells it later. Rather the focus is on impassivity, a strikingly Roman characteristic. This mark of Roman masculinity is not an unalloyed strength of Roman manhood in the Antiquities. Dionysius is drawing on the expectation of Roman men in the first century that in

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13 Janssen (1972) passim analyses emotions in Livy’s account of Coriolanus. He sees ira and subordination of ira in the name of the res publica and pietas as Livy’s chief themes; in my opinion he overplays the importance of the anger of the gods.
public they ought to be seen to be unmoved, or at least largely unmoved, by family grief.14 This was the case in contemporary Greece too, but Dionysius actually distinguishes impassivity as Roman, as opposed to the classical version of Greece presented by Dionysius here, full as it is of lachrymose Homeric and tragic heroes, as I will argue later on.15 If we were to push the argument further, we might suggest this as evidence that in the Antiquities, Dionysius writes Hellenistic Greece out of his definition of Greekness: such a view is consistent with Dionysius’ deprecation of Hellenistic rhetoric in his theoretical treatises (e.g. Vett. Orr. 1.1).

The Romanness of impassivity is drawn out through Coriolanus’ similarity to another Roman in the Antiquities who was impassive at a moment of loss, Lucius Junius Brutus, the founder of the Republic, when he had his two

14 ‘In public’ might include before one’s children: e.g. Prop. 4.11.79–80 (on which see Hutchinson (2006) ad loc.): *et si quid doliturus eris, sine testibus illis! | cum venient, siccis oscula falle genis!* (‘And if you are going to lament in any way, do it without them [i.e. the children] as witnesses! | When they come, deceive their kisses with dry cheeks!’)

Cicero’s grief at the death of his daughter Tullia is well documented (*Att. 12.14, Fam. 4.3; 4.6; Treggiari (2007) 135–8*). This grief lasted long enough to seem suspicious to some of those around him (*Cic. Fam. 4.6; Wilcox (2005))*; see further Aemilius Paullus (*Liv. 43.42.1*). It was not in itself shameful to express deep pity in public, so long as the pity was for someone else rather than oneself (e.g. the contrasting characterisation of the doleful Cicero defending the stout Sex. Roscius Amerinus (*Cic. Pro Sex. Rosc. Amer. 143*)). On the way Cicero handled his life’s misfortunes, Livy is cited by Sen. *Suas. 6.22: sed in longo tenore felicitatis magnis interim ictus vulneribus, exilio, ruina partium pro quibus steterat, filiae morte, exitu tam tristi et acerbo, omnium adversorum nihil ut viro dignum erat talit praeter mortem.* (‘But in the long course of his happiness he was sometimes struck by great blows, by exile, by the ruin of the faction for which he had stood firm, by the death of his daughter, so saddening and bitter, yet of all these misfortunes he bore nothing in the manner worthy of a man besides his death.’)

On grief and pity in Plutarch, see Pelling (2005).

sons executed. The phrasing clearly echoes the Coriolanus passage (5.8.6):

μόνος οὔτ’ ἀνακλαυσάμενος ὤφθη τὸν µόρον τῶν τέκνων
οὔτ’ ἀποιµώξας ἑαυτὸν τῆς καθεξούσης τὸν οἶκον ἐρηµίας
οὔτ’ ἄλλο μαλακὸν οὐθὲν ἐνδούς, κτλ.

But he alone was not seen to bewail the fate of his children, nor lament himself for the desolation that would possess his house, nor to betray any sign of softness, etc.

The similarity of expression draws Coriolanus and Brutus into the same archetype of Roman heroic stolidity, superficially drawing a contrast with Greek emotiveness. The narrator in the Brutus episode was afraid that the reader would perceive Brutus’ impassivity upon seeing his sons led off for execution as ‘harsh’ (σκληρά), exactly the word (σκληράν) which Veturia, a Roman, uses to describe her son’s impassivity in the departure scene. Then, Dionysius praised Brutus’ behaviour, while saying that the reader, being Greek, might be horrified by the story.16 Yet this is not the whole picture. The Roman Collatinus, Brutus’ colleague in the consulship, was so angered by what Brutus did that the event caused an irreversible schism between the consuls: the Greeks and the Romans, implies the narrator, are not so different after all. The consequences for Roman history are lasting. Collatinus is so angry that he speaks up, causing the first moment of argument in direct discourse in the new Republic, and so his anger opens up a new way of speaking in the Antiquities.

In Coriolanus’ situation, it is left unclear how impressed the reader is expected to be by his impassivity, since his

16 5.8.1: τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔργα θατέρου τῶν ὑπάτων Βρούτου µεγάλα
καὶ θαυµαστὰ λέγειν ἔχων, ἐφ’ οἷς µέγιστα φρονούσι Ῥωµαῖοι, δέδοικα µὴ
σκληρὰ καὶ ἄπιστα τοῖς Ἕλλησι δόξω λέγειν, κτλ. (‘I am afraid that the
subsequent noble and astonishing behaviour of Brutus, one of the
consuls, which I am now to relate and in which the Romans take
the greatest pride, may appear cruel and incredible to the Greeks, etc.’).
refusal to weep does not seem to help him much. While Brutus’ unmoved expression angered Collatinus so much that new ways of speaking opened up in Roman history, Coriolanus’ does not actually benefit anyone. Converse-
ly, Coriolanus’ eventual fate is sealed in part by a display of emotion (8.54.2). It may in fact be the case that Cori-
olanus’ achievement is not to be unmoved but to be seen to be unmoved. For even though Coriolanus did not show affection towards his family when he left them to go into exile, abandoning formally his relationship with them, his residual affectionate feelings have become clearer over the course of the narrative. For example, the hatred felt by Coriolanus towards some Romans is not extended to those Romans who helped his family (8.29.1).

My next point again concerns the family, and how Coriolanus’ father is long dead, making Coriolanus in Greek terms an orphan. The way Coriolanus expresses himself when he mentions this to his mother opens up the idea that in this story Dionysius’ Greeks are rooted in the heroic world. Modern scholars investigating from a Plutarchan perspective are right to observe that this orphan status, elaborated and pushed to the front in Plutarch, is merely incidental in comparison when Veturia mentions it in Dionysius. Nevertheless, because Coriolanus is an orphan, Dionysius can telescope the entire range of direct family relationships into these two characters (8.51.3):

\[\text{ὅς ὀρφανὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς καταλειφθέντα σε παραλαβοῦσα γηίσον διέμεινα ἐπὶ σοὶ χήρα καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς παιδιτροφίας ἀνήντλησα πόνους, οὐ μήτηρ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πατὴρ καὶ προφῆς καὶ ἀδελφῆ καὶ πάντα τὰ φίλτατα σοι γενομένη.}\]

I who, when you were left an orphan by your father, took you as an infant, and for your sake remained a

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widow and underwent the labours of rearing you, showing myself not only a mother to you, but also a father, a nurse, a sister, and everything that is dearest.

This telescoping brings to mind the moment in the *Iliad* of Andromache’s farewell speech to Hector (*Il. 6.407–39* at 429–30). As Hector represents husband, father, and brothers for Andromache, so does Veturia become invested with the force of Coriolanus’ whole family. This force destabilises Coriolanus’ position when she finally confronts him in the camp. It means, further, that the power of the story lies in the difficulties Veturia and Coriolanus face in living up to their supposed Roman archetypes. While Livy’s Veturia is strong, the archetypal Roman matron, Dionysius’ Veturia is only with difficulty able to put the state’s interests above her son’s, as the archetypal Roman matron is expected to do. In my view Dionysius has laid the groundwork for this in his emphasis upon the emotional relationship between mother and son, making his Veturia a more layered character than either in Livy or Plutarch. As I will go on to argue in the next section, this emotional relationship adds a Dionysian depth to Coriolanus’ character: trying in his impassivity to fit into the broader picture of Romanness, and Roman heroes, ultimately he cannot; yet he is brought down by his own Roman, familial attachment to his mother.

**Confrontation and Reconciliation**

The relationship between Coriolanus and his mother is expounded in detail in the scene of the embassy which the Roman women undertake to Coriolanus (*8.44–54*). They find him encamped five miles outside the city. Coriolanus dispenses with the usual tools of office, and asks the lictors to lay aside their axes, then goes to meet his mother before the camp. After a few tender words are exchanged, Veturia begins the speech with which she hopes to win over Coriolanus, but it is ineffective. He interrupts her, saying that she is asking the impossible. Veturia then speaks again. This second speech, which addresses more closely their
relationship, convinces Coriolanus to stand down; he yields, with the knowledge that in doing so, he is ruined.

Critics have tended to use this scene as a *comparandum* for showing how much better Livy or Plutarch managed the scene. They do so by stressing the strength of Livy’s Veturia, or Plutarch’s Volumnia. Among scholars who have discussed Dionysius’ version in more depth, Bonjour argues that Plutarch and Dionysius made their scene of confrontation between Coriolanus and his mother more ‘emotive’ (*pathétique*) than Livy did because that was the milieu, Greek, from which they came. Evans cites and rejects other scholars who argue that Dionysius in particular is composing according to the principles of ‘tragic history’.

Of course, to say that Dionysius’ narrative in this passage is ‘tragic’ could lead to counter-productive inferences relating to ‘tragic history’ in the ‘debased Hellenistic sense’.

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20 Walsh (1961) 91 says that ‘Livy depicts a nobler, more controlled character, whose patriotism transcends even her maternal feelings.’ Ogilvie (1965) 314 is typical too: ‘The tragedy leads onto the supreme interview between Coriolanus and his mother in which Coriolanus acts out the secondary moral [besides the theme of *externus timor* at 2.39.7] that in the last resort a true Roman’s love for his country outweighs every other consideration.’ Cf. Burck (1934) 75 who describes Veturia as *die Römerin war* ἐξοικείωσθαι ἀπὸ τιμίου (*par excellence*) (though note that Aly, cited by Bonjour (1975) 171, describes the story as un-Roman).

21 Bonjour (1975) 174–5; while there is more ‘sobriety and reserve’ in Plutarch, ‘les historiens grecs ont … interprété le personnage de la mère de Coriolan selon leur mentalité: tendresse et loquacité.’ Janssen (1972) 414 observes a ‘griechisch-geistige Erziehung’ in Plutarch’s and Dionysius’ accounts.


23 Pelling (1980) 132 n. 26, with bibliography. See also Braund (1997); Zadorojnyy (1997) 170; Mossman (1988) and (1992) *passim*, esp. 90–1 discuss the ‘tragic’ in Plutarch in terms of allusion to ‘Tragedy, the literary genre’ (Pelling, cited above). ‘Tragic history’, however, carries pejorative tones of a history constructed around dramatic requirements at the expense of ‘proper’ history (it is worth keeping the term vague). The extreme of ‘tragic history’ was often considered to be Duris of
theless, the term ‘tragic’ will remain useful to this discussion for the following reasons.

There are several ways in which tragedy and history can intersect. In some senses, Thucydides is a strongly dramatic historian, admired in antiquity for the *enargeia* of his scenes. Nonetheless, he also removes the ‘tragic’ from his history insofar as his concentration on public affairs in non-monarchic *poleis* precludes the interplay between public and personal duty which characterises such tragedies as *Antigone*.

Samos, who ‘was so influenced by tragedy that he constantly mentions the various costumes in which his characters strut across the stage in appropriate stage setting’ (Ullman (1942) 39, with references to the fragments); but if this can be taken rather as indicating Duris’ care for *enargeia* then it should be applied to Thucydides in equal measure. Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 9; Pol. 2.56; 12.24.5, 26b.4ff. who discusses Phylarchus and Timaeus; cf. Cic. *Inv.* 1.27; [Cic.]* Ad Her.* 1.12–13. See esp. the fundamental studies by Walbank (1938), (1960) and (1972) on Polybius’ use of the term, which, taken in concert with an over-reading of Aristotle’s distinction at *Poetics* 9, helped form the misguided modern concept of ‘tragic history’, as exemplified by Ullman (1942), esp. 25–6. Dué (2000), who discusses ‘tragic history’ in Adherbal’s speech in Sallust *Jugurtha* (14.14ff.), is a more modern example; she uses ‘tragic’ and ‘dramatic’ in a non-pejorative way but one which still proposes too anachronistic an understanding of historicity (Dué (2000) 311–13); cf. 313 n. 8 (and also 322–5 on Herodotus’ tragedy, and Pompeius Trogus’ criticism of Sallust and Livy (Just. *Epit.* 38.3.11)), where she explains that she follows Fornara’s insistence upon a fairly firm yet nuanced distinction between history and tragedy rather than Walbank’s alternative reading (Fornara (1993) 124–6). On Thucydides see also Greenwood (2005) 83–106. More recently, Marincola (2015) has argued that Polybius’ criticisms of tragic history are focused upon the truth or falsity of a given account, and he has tried to set Polybius’ apparent engagement with Aristotle within the broader context of attempts ‘to assert the claims of history as a more valuable endeavour than tragedy’ (90). See also Fromentin (2001) for a recent, thorough overview of the ancient sources.

*24* Plut. *Nic.* 1.1, 1.5; Rood (1998) 3–5 with bibliography. Cf. Ullman (1942) 38 with n. 70, who suggests that Plutarch says that Duris ‘exaggerates in tragic fashion’ (*σοφός ἐπιστραγῳδεύει*, Plut. *Per.* 28.2); but that the word might not be so meaningful because Dionysius uses the same of Thucydides (*Thuc.* 28). Cf. Macleod (1982). For Thucydides’ excursus on Themistocles and Pausanias (1.128–38) see Hornblower (1991) 211–25, esp. 211–12, who notes the ‘unusualness’ of the narrative for Thucydides. The motifs of the excursus, such as curses and flight, resemble those of tragedy, perhaps specifically the *Telephus*. 
In other words, whenever family relationships have an impact on events within the historian’s compass, then history starts inevitably to tread on the same ground as tragedy: this is an important point of intersection for the present study.

The second important point of intersection lies in the way the narrator prepares the scene for the viewer, whether that viewer is the audience in the story or the external audience. A good example of this in historiography is Thucydides’ account of the sea-battle in the harbour at Syracuse (7.69–72), in which the sense of the dramatic and epic is heightened by the narrator shifting the focus between the battle itself and the responses of the ‘audience’ of soldiers watching it. The role of the audience will be important in my argument too.

Now for space. What can tragedy do with that? To take a simple example, in *Hippolytus*, the movement of Phaedra’s bed outside the palace signals the start of the tragedy, as what is conventionally private spills out onto the stage: all the characters of this play are undone in the tension between what they try to control, and what they are ultimately able to. For Herodotus, however, it is not the bed or the bath which moves, but the narrator. It is at his discretion that private and personal spaces remain private, and they frequently do not. In presenting a public conflict between mother and son, the tradition of Coriolanus is

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25 Ancient authors may also use tragic allusions in unexpected places to make links and tensions between apparently very different worlds, creating the impression that history and tragedy are in normal circumstances very different (see above, n. 24). Such forced cross-generic pollination is very common in poetry: see, e.g., Homeric metaphors in archaic lyric (or is it lyric metaphors in Homer?), or the way in which the *Aeneid* keeps looking as though it will slip into tragedy, but in the end remains epic.


27 A. Ag. 1343–406, esp. 1405.

28 E.g., Candaules and Gyges, 1.8–12; Phaedyme, 3.68–9; Atossa at 3.133–4 (cf. 7.3–4; Dominick (2007)); Xerxes and Masistes’ wife, 9.108–10.
fertile ground for an analysis of that tension between public and personal.  

The flexibility of historiography stands in contrast with the fixed confines of the stage. The force of a narrative can come when a narrator allows access to a space that should be secluded. In the case of the Antiquities, the narrator ventures into the bedroom for the rape of Lucretia in the episode which introduces Lucius Junius Brutus and the establishment of the Roman Republic (4.64.4–65.4). Now Dionysius’ narrator is resolutely public: he is interested in the formation, consolidation and expansion of the city of Rome. Personal affairs are not usually his concern; but with the rape of Lucretia by Sextus Tarquinius, the state interferes with personal affairs (itself a topos of events preceding the overthrow of a tyranny). By following Sextus into the bedroom as well, the narrator carries out the same intrusion as the character. This willingness to eavesdrop on private conversations occurs in the Antiquities when women start to wield power: in each instance, the eavesdropping and the privateness of the situation are emphasised. 

The physical staging of tragedy is important to Dionysius’ scene. Dionysius treats the confrontation between Coriolanus and his mother as occurring on a ‘stage’, namely the tribunal on which he is sitting. There are movable stage-props and a skénê in the background, in a literal and a figurative sense: literally, the actors will retire from their public discussion to the commander’s tent at

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29 Livy has Scipio say that Coriolanus was recalled from public parricide by private piety: *revocavit … a publico parricidio privata pietas* (28.29.1).

30 No women speak in direct discourse in the Antiquities between the expulsion of the Tarquins at the end of Book 4 and Valeria’s speech in Book 8. Most direct discourse by women occurs in Book 4, in other words during the decline of the regal period (e.g., Tanaquil at 4.4, Tullia at 4.39.2, Lucretia at 4.66.3).

31 Ogilvie (1965) 314 describes Livy’s version of the story as a ‘tragedy’. 
8.54.2;\textsuperscript{32} figuratively, the \textit{skênê} is a defining element of the Greek stage. The raised tribunal and the \textit{skênê} are accompanied by a lower, clear area in front (8.45.3), perhaps like an \textit{orkhêstra}, so the scene approximately resembles a theatrical stage.

After they are reconciled, Coriolanus and his family will leave this ‘stage’ in order to take counsel about what to do next, as characters in tragedy might enter a stage-building. The narrator stays outside the tent for all of the discussion, simply reporting at the end the decisions to which they have come (8.54.2):

\[ \text{η̂ν δὲ τὰ δόξαντα αὐτοῖς τοιάδε ...} \]

The decisions they reached were as follows …

The language is official: \textit{τὰ δόξαντα} almost always refer to decisions taken by the senate or the people.\textsuperscript{33} The deliberations are revealed to the audience as \textit{faits accomplis}, in which the decisions are presented, and only subsequently explained, and the announcement is concluded with a modified recapitulation of a stock phrase, such as (8.54.3):

\[ \text{τὰ μὲν δὴ βουλευθέντα αὐτοῖς καὶ δόξαντα δίκαιά τε καὶ ὡστε εἶναι, φήμης τ' ἀγαθῆς ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ μαλακτά ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐσπούδαζε παρὰ πᾶσι τευξόμενα, τοιάδε ἦν.} \]

Such were the subjects of their deliberation and such were the decisions they reached as just and right and

\textsuperscript{32} 8.54.2: ταῦτ' εἴπὼν ἐπὶ τὴν σκηνὴν ἀπῄει κελεύσας ἀκολουθεῖν τὴν τε μητέρα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ παιδία … (‘After saying this, he retired to his tent, bidding his mother, his wife, and his children follow him …’).

\textsuperscript{33} E.g. 2.14.1, 60.3; 3.1.3, 27.2; 29.5, 36.1; 4.26.5, 75.4, 84.2, 85.2; 5.54.5, 57.3, 57.4, 70.5, 6.84.1, 88.4, 8.43.7, 81.1, 9.5.2, 10.15.7, 5.5, 58.2, 19.6.3. Its frequency when attached to the senate or the people makes its occurrence alongside other nouns or (more commonly) pronouns—such as \textit{μοι} at 6.10.3—revealing. \textit{τὰ βουλευθέντα}, on the other hand, is much rarer, occurring just four times (4.3.3; 8.36.3, 54.3, 11.17.1).
calculated to win the good opinion of all men—a thing which Marcius had most at heart.

At the same moment in Livy’s scene, Feldherr observes an ‘interconnectedness between family and state’. In Dionysius, this would be underplaying the point. Instead, in its appropriation of the language of state in τὰ δόξαντα and τὰ βουλευθέντα, the family subsumes the role of government. The narrator does not follow the family into the tent. Like the later Roman trials intra cubiculum, women become involved in decision-making again, and government becomes private.

By this stage in the story, son and mother are a model of agreement. That had not been the case at the beginning of the embassy. The initial confrontation between mother and son came earlier, at a point when the personal relationship between mother and son had been long denied—and we are seeing how Dionysius uses the occasion to play suggestively with the intrusion of personal affairs into public, and vice versa. For while the mother and son are not yet reconciled there is no private space for them to retreat to; but when they will be reconciled the private space will become available to them again, and they take public affairs, government, in with them. Dionysius thus uses the screen of the skénê to particular effect.

It is therefore tempting to describe the scene as ‘tragic’ because this dramatic or tragic element is reinforced in Coriolanus’ moment of capitulation, when Veturia falls at her son’s feet. I disagree here with Evans, who says that Coriolanus remains completely unresponsive to Veturia’s appeals to his patriotism and pietas in her speech, and that ‘it is only when she falls to the ground at his feet that he is

34 Feldherr (1998) 121.
35 E.g., Messalina at Tac. Ann. 11.2; cf. 5.1; 13.4.2; 14.50.4; Suet. Claud. 15. See Purcell (1986); Wallace-Hadrill CAH X.302–4. There is an effective discussion to be had here comparing this moment with Dionysius’ portrayal of the senate, but space does not permit it.
36 On the response of the supplicated to an act of supplication in Homer, see Gould (1973) 78–82.
finally moved and submits to her will'. In fact, the closing of Veturia’s speech and her falling to the ground come so close together that it is the combination of supplication and speech (logos) which moves Coriolanus. It is dramatically important that Coriolanus does not cut his mother off before she can finish her speech: more on that below.

Veturia’s supplication will prove fatal for Coriolanus. Supplication is commonly disastrous for the recipient in tragedy. But the theme of supplication is present in epic too. Schönberger saw Iliadic resonances in the story of Coriolanus, especially in the failed embassy at Iliad 9 and the story of Meleager and the Calydonian Boar Hunt. The Iliadic tone can be tied in with the idea that Coriolanus is driven by his rage or wrath—this is especially true in Plutarch, which makes Achilles and his tent an especially appealing parallel for Coriolanus and his exile. The hero punishes his own side, and eventually himself, in the

37 Evans (1991) 27. By extension I would be minded to disagree with Duff (1990) 215, who draws the same conclusion from the end of the mother’s speech in Plutarch, except the tensions in that narrative are quite different. Ahlrichs (2005) and Pelling (1996) xxii–xxxv are the most detailed comparisons between Dionysius’ and Plutarch’s versions.

38 καὶ διὰ ταῦτα εἰποῦσα ἔρριψεν ἑαυτὴν χαµαί (‘saying these things she threw herself to the ground’).

39 A further dramatic allusion in the mother’s speech, this time to Plutarch’s version, is suggested by Bonjour (1973) 173, who introduces then qualifies a comparison with the similar scene at Eur. Phoen. 432–4, when Jocasta attempts to reconcile her sons. The point for Bonjour is that Plutarch portrays the mother as fundamentally Roman (‘elle est l’incarnation littérale de la mère romaine’).

40 Gould (1973) 85–90.


42 Pelling (1997/2002) 38, who understands the overriding emotion of Plutarch’s Coriolanus as wrath rather than rage, ‘rage’ being Perrin’s Loeb translation of θυµός (see further Pelling ibid. 399–400).

43 Freyburger (2001) 37–40 discusses the vocabulary of anger in Dionysius, Plutarch and later authors (ἀφρηγία, 38; θυµός, absent from Dionysius but present in the tradition as late as Tzetzes, 39–40).
face of a perceived slight, Coriolanus by fighting, Achilles and Meleager by refusing to do so.

Another Iliadic parallel is at work in the *Antiquities*, namely Agamemnon, when he addresses the assembly εξ ἕδρης or *ex cathedra* (*Iliad* 5.76–7):

τοῖσι δὲ καὶ μετέειπεν ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαµέµνων αὐτόθεν εξ ἕδρης, οδὸν μέσσοισιν ἀναστάσ.

And among them spoke Agamemnon, lord of men, too, from the place where he sat, and did not stand up in their midst.

The dynamics are not identical, but in each case uncertainty arises because the seating and speaking arrangements betray the fact that normal rules do not apply in this situation. In the first instance, Agamemnon, wounded from battle, remains in his seat and does not occupy the centre as the speaker normally would. His position in the council is therefore undercut by his inability to conform to its rules of address. This lack of clarity adds to Agamemnon’s defensiveness, which shines through when he asks not to be interrupted (*Iliad* 5.79–80). Coriolanus, on the other hand, neither obeys his mother nor asserts authority over her. Veturia asks him (*παρεκάλει*, 8.45.2) to sit in the seat from which he dispenses justice.⁴⁴ Coriolanus does not sit exactly where his mother asks, but has his seat brought down to be on a level with her. The consequent lack of clarity leads Coriolanus to interrupt his mother when she first attempts her speech.⁴⁵ In the Dionysian dialogue, Veturia is also at fault, because she starts her speech inappropriately. In the first part of her speech, she speaks about the other women in the embassy, who are not related to Coriolanus, and he interrupts her: the interruption has occurred because the

⁴⁴ 8.45.2: η δὲ … παρεκάλει τ’ αὐτόν, ἐν φ’ καθεζόµενος εἰώθει χωρίῳ δικάζειν τοῖς ὀχλοῖς, ἐν τούτῳ καθίσσαι. (‘She … bade him be seated where he was wont to sit when administering justice to his troops.’)

⁴⁵ 8.47.1: ἐτι δ’ αὐτής λεγούσης ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Μάρκιος εἶπεν … (‘While she was yet speaking, Marcius interrupted her and said …’).
lines of authority have not been clearly agreed. That is why, when Veturia speaks again, this time at length about her relationship with Coriolanus, the tie which binds them becomes clear, and Coriolanus does not interrupt her.

The Iliadic parallel works insofar as just as things are different for Agamemnon now that Achilles has returned, so are things different for Coriolanus now that his mother has arrived. So rather than specific heroic or tragic references, we are instead loaded with a wealth of references from both, as Coriolanus’ situation is raised to heroic levels. This heroic level is reinforced when Veturia refers to the Furies and to Coriolanus feeling shame before the guilt of matricide, τὸ μητροκτόνον ἄγος αἴδούµενος (8.51.2). The language of shame and matricide is thunderously heroic. It also demonstrates the nearing of the fulfilment of a prediction made by Minucius at 8.28.3, that Coriolanus would be called μητροκτόνος. Minucius had surely not anticipated that Coriolanus’ own mother would use that term against him; the human prophecy is right, but in an unexpected way. Yet it is only when it is used by Veturia that the threat is effective. At 8.33.4, when Minucius says it, Coriolanus insists that the Furies will only pursue him if he abandons his new allies. The parallel with Orestes is obviously ironic, as it is exile which draws Coriolanus towards matricide, while it was matricide which forced

46 On the appellation of Coriolanus as a hero in the Antiquités, see Freyburger (2001) 31, who suggests that when ἄνὴρ is attached to Coriolanus, it might (‘pourrait’) best be translated by hero, which in turn might best be translated ‘champion’, as she goes on to argue in detail; I am not sure that ἄνὴρ does not simply function as the Greek for vir in this instance. On the importance of manliness to the tradition of Coriolanus, which is especially present in Plutarch’s version, see, e.g., Duff (1999) 210 and subsequent discussion.

47 All instances relate to the Atreids: A. Ag. 281, 1281; Eum. 102, 202, 427, 492, 595; Eur. Or. 587, 1559, 1649; El. 975; cf. Or. 48, 887; Iph. Taur. 1200 and Troad. 363; in Latin, Cic. Q. Fr. 1.2.2 (it is plausible that Dionysius may have seen some of Cicero’s published letters: Nep. Att. 16.2-4; Shackleton Bailey (1965) 59-76). There is an excellent parallel (itself much cited) at Cassius Dio 66.16.6, of Nero, bringing in Alcmeon too (cf. Suet. Ner. 21; Aus. De XII Caes. 35).
Orestes into exile. In the end, and directly as a result of his mother’s long speech and supplication (8.48–53), Coriolanus calls off the campaign before he can become a μητροκτόνος.

Let us return to the beginning. Personal and public space are now accompanied by personal and public grief. Coriolanus and his mother struggled to reconcile their own natures with the demands placed upon them by being Roman. Personal and public concerns coincide until the personal finally swallows the public. Dionysius plays these Roman tensions against a backdrop of a heroic and tragic Greece. He plays inventively with speech to show the genuine affection mother and son each had for the other; and through these means, we saw why the son finally obeyed.

Cranleigh School
danhogg1@gmail.com
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A LITERARY PASSAGE: POLYBIUS AND PLUTARCH’S NARRATOR*

Eran Almagor

Abstract: This article deals with the presence of Polybius in the narrative world of Plutarch’s works. It assumes that the explicit references made by Plutarch’s narrator to Polybius have artistic, literary, and historiographic aims (to shed light on the protagonist of Life or on the narrative). Four passages in Plutarch’s works are examined which correspond to passages within the extant complete five books of Polybius: Aratus 38; Cleomenes 25 and 27; and De fortuna Romanorum 12.

Keywords: Polybius, Plutarch, Narrative World, Unreliable Narrator, Aratus of Sicyon, Cleomenes III, Antigonus III Doson

Polybius is a man of numerous shifts and transitions. Coming from Greece but residing a great deal of his adult life in Rome, he best exemplifies the era called the ‘Hellenistic period’, chronologically placed between two ages in Greek history, namely, the Classical era and the rise of Rome in the Mediterranean and the Greek-speaking world. Polybius, however, was much more than that. In Greece, Polybius was a man of action or a historical agent (the hipparchos of the Achaean League, 169/8 BC) as well as a

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minor writer (Philopoemen’s encomium);\(^1\) in Rome he became an eminent historian and man of letters. As is well known, only five of forty volumes comprising his immense project, the *Histories*, survive in their entirety; the rest is found in fragments, references and citations preserved in other works.\(^2\) This situation imposes another transition on Polybius, from a writer of his own work to a tenant residing in other authors’ writings and collections. Herein lies another shift, i.e., that between historical writing and the works of other literary genres, like declamatory orations or, more interestingly, biography. Polybius finds himself in the land of *bios*.

This is our starting point: Polybius’ appearances in Plutarch’s writings, the biographies in particular. Plutarch’s *Lives* defy a clear-cut generic categorisation.\(^3\) In one well-known passage at the beginning of the *Alexander*, Plutarch claims that he is writing biographies and not histories (*Alex. 1.1*: οὔτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφοµεν, ἀλλὰ βίους).\(^4\) Yet, in many other places he treats his work as history (*Cim. 2.5*: τῇ ἱστορίᾳ; *Demosth. 2.1*: τῷ … σύνταξιν ὑποβεβληµένῳ καὶ ἱστορίαν; cf. *Aem. Paul. 1.1; Thes. 1.2; Lyc. 1.1; Tib.-Gai. Gracch. 1.1*).\(^5\) A Plutarchian biography tells the story of a hero’s life, but does not do so in the manner of history, which conveys

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\(^2\) Whilst fragmentary, Polybius’ *Histories* (like the similar cases of Diodorus, Appian, Cassius Dio) did not enter Jacoby’s project of lost Greek historians (*FGrHist*), as opposed to Polybius’ monograph on the Numantian War (= *FGrHist 173*).

\(^3\) See discussion in Duff (1999) 13–51.

\(^4\) This may be a rhetorical commonplace: cf. Pol. 10.21.8, on history vs encomium. The direct influence on Plutarch may come from Nepos, *Pelop. 1*: iveror, si res explicare incipiam, ne non vitam eius narrare, sed historian videar scribere … (‘for I fear that if I begin to give a full account of his actions, I may seem, not to be relating his life, but to be writing a history …’).

\(^5\) In *Galb. 2.3* the relation of biography to history is presented as subtler: cf. Beck (2007) 307: ‘[Plutarch’s] awareness includes the perception that his is a different form of historical writing’.
each detail. To use Aristotle’s expression (Poet. 9.1, 1451b1–8) in his famous differentiation between history and poetry, a Plutarchan biography seems rather to aim at describing the general (τὰ καθόλου). The Life is interested in the character which is embodied in the historical statesman, and in the way such character develops and reacts to certain circumstances. On the other hand, Plutarch addresses actual occurrences and deals with real historical figures; he does relate what Alcibiades did or what was done to him. Thus, the issue of genre remains elusive. A related question pertains to Plutarch’s citation of other authors and historians. As these are not always mentioned by name, it would seem justified to ask why they sometimes are. Another point of interest is the fact that the reference to specific authors suggests research done prior to writing; this practice, which appears to tally with the conventions of history, still does not make the mode of presentation of facts in the bios a historical work.

The present paper proposes a way to deal with this question, assuming that Plutarch’s narrative is basically a literary construction affiliated with the writing of history. It is only appropriate to examine this issue by exploring Plutarch’s mentions of Polybius, the most representative of Greek historiographic trends at the very cultural juncture which Plutarch saw himself as occupying. Plutarch is


7 In this Plutarch is not different from many other writers in antiquity. Cf. Barrow (1967) 153 and Jones (1971) 84 on this convention. Russell (1973) 54–5 points out that the lists in the first volume of Pliny’s Naturalis Historia are outstanding exceptions. Shipley (1997) 48 believes that the fact that Plutarch does not mention his sources indicates his wish to appear autonomous. Cf. Stadler (1989) lxxv.

8 Russell (1973) 54 believes the literary conventions of the Lives admit, or indeed require, a certain amount of reference to sources.


10 Plutarch probably saw himself as resembling Polybius in terms of his cultural position in Rome. At the beginning of Book four of the Quaestiones Convivales (QC 4.659E) Plutarch mentions the political advice
unique among his contemporaries in his sustained interest in the Hellenistic period. He is also notable in his constant use of the historical writings of this time, principally those of Polybius. This paper will not draw a comparison of all relevant passages in Plutarch and Polybius, but will tackle explicit references and mentions of Polybius in Plutarch’s works. Polybius is explicitly mentioned twenty six times in Plutarch’s extant corpus. Most of these references cite Polybius as an author, the others refer to him as a historical agent. Our study will examine the passage of Polybius from his place in his own *Histories* to Plutarch’s writings. For this

that Polybius gave to Scipio the Younger (cf. *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* (199F, 200A), namely, never to return from the forum without a new friend. In the QC Plutarch addresses his friend and benefactor, Sosius Senecio, with this very anecdote. The parallel between Polybius’ position and that of Plutarch is made evident in *Præcepta gerendae reipublicae* (18.814C), where Plutarch mentions the advantage gained from the friendship of leaders (καρπὸν ἐκ φιλίας ἡγεµονικῆς) for the welfare of the community, as Polybius and Panaetius had, through Scipio.


13 There may be reason to believe that he was mentioned in the lost *Life* of Scipio, regardless of the identity of the Roman general in question. The so called ‘Lamprias Catalogue’ has two entries: one is the lost pair *Epaminondas–Scipio* (no. 7) and the other is the solitary *Scipio* (no. 28). Geiger (1981) 87 n. 6 assumes that the solitary *Life* was written previously to the paired one. For Africanus Major in the *Parallel Lives*: Peper (1912) 128–31; Ziegler (1949) 258–9; and Georgiadou (1997) 7–8. For Aemilianus Africanus Minor: Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1926) 260 and Herbert (1957) 83–8.
purpose, four sections in the corpus of Plutarch will be studied here, in which (a) Polybius' name is explicitly mentioned; and (b) we possess the corresponding paragraphs in our extant complete text of Polybius (Books 1 to 5) with which we can compare Plutarch’s reading. We shall explore Plutarch’s way of using the figure of Polybius in his narrative world and gain insight into how Polybius’ text is employed to create this very narrative world.

1. Plutarch’s Narrator and the Narrative World

First, let us examine the world Polybius is made to step into. The assumption of the following discussion is that Plutarch’s mention of historians and writers in his works is not only intended to show his erudition and his wide reading, nor simply to substantiate his assertions.\textsuperscript{14} Rather, these references also have artistic, literary and historiographic aims, namely, to shed light on the protagonist, on the narrative, and on Plutarch’s views concerning the course of history or the development of historiography and its significance.\textsuperscript{15} In order to explore these notions, we will not study the relation of Plutarch the author to his sources (a difficult inquiry in itself), but more precisely the one that subsists between Plutarch’s narrator and the authors he mentions, as presented in the text. While it is true that ancient literary criticism did not establish a complete differentiation between author and narrator,\textsuperscript{16} ancient oratory was in fact not far off in its awareness of the process by which a persona could be adopted in the deliverance of a

\textsuperscript{14} See the options mentioned in Barrow (1967) 153, namely, divergence from his main authorities, asserting superior credibility of one version as against others, or for the purpose of authenticating statements.

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. Almagor (2013) 22.

\textsuperscript{16} Nünlist (2009) 132–3. The difference between the narrator and his characters was also usually not observed, but could be found whenever it suited the argument. Cf. Hunter and Russell (2011) 197; see also Whitmarsh (2013) 63–74.
Therefore, despite recent doubts about this narratological orthodoxy and its applicability to classical texts, we shall adopt the distinction between the narrator, who tells the story and is the one who has a voice in the narrative world, and the author, who has no voice in it.

Elsewhere, I have tried to show the great advantage in the comprehension of Plutarch’s works which this differentiation brings, especially in fathoming his irony. When the narrative is delivered with coherence and consistency, we would say that the narrator is in agreement with the author, and is seen to be his mouth-piece. When we are in doubt whether the narrative is sincere, we would tend to think that there is some divergence between the narrator and the author. In this case, the narrator’s descriptions and observations are made to convey one (explicit) meaning, while the author is seen to impart a divergent, implied one by the voice of his narrator. The narrator tells us a certain thing while showing us a different idea altogether, which we understand to be the author’s true message. This is the structure of verbal irony, in which a speaker conveys both meaning A and meaning B to his audience. In that case, the narrator cannot be trusted in his utterances; he is unreliable.

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19 In Booth’s scheme there is an implied author, i.e., the ideal image of the real writer, and his set of values or norms: cf. Booth (1983) 74–5: “The “implied author” chooses, consciously or unconsciously, what we read; we infer him as an ideal, literary, created version of the real man; he is the sum of his own choices”; cf. 73. See the discussion whether the ‘implied author’ is necessary in Genette (1988) 93–107; Rimmon-Kenan (1983) 86–7; Kindt and Muller (2006).

20 Almagor (2013) 20; id. (2018) 7–8, 10. Cf. Booth (1974); Wilson and Sperber (1992). Irony involves insincerity in that the speaker is pretending to be different from what he actually means or is; this is eironia in its literal meaning, i.e., a pretence of ignorance (cf. Arist. EN 4.4.1127a22), showing no opinion at all (the dissimulatio of n. 17).
The notion of an ‘unreliable narrator’ was proposed by Wayne Booth and has dominated the discourse of narratology ever since. After Booth, scholars developed the role of the reader in the perception of the narrator’s unreliability. It is now believed that the unreliable narrator is actually a reading strategy to make sense of a text, calling for the reader’s response in detecting its incompleteness and in completing its meaning through interpretation. The notion has been applied to several classical authors, yet needs to be explored more in Plutarch.

The world the narrator is describing (or narrating) is the narrative world. It is called diegesis when it is the actual ‘spatio-temporal universe designated by the narrative’ (the fictional world), and exegesis when it is the stratum of narration and of the ‘narrator’s comments, explanations, reflections and metanarrative remarks that accompany a story’ (the fictional story). Strictly speaking, the entire fictional universe is a ‘represented’ one created by the author, with the narrator being just as much part of it as the characters and the narrative. The narrator may not be part of the fictional world, the diegesis, but he is as fictional as the exegesis that is made from his narrative, comments, etc. Yet in order not to overburden reading with these distinctions, let us now call the entire fictional sphere the...

21 See Booth (1983) 158–9: ‘I have called a narrator reliable when he speaks for or acts in accordance with the norms of the work (which is to say the implied author’s norms), unreliable when he does not … If [the narrator] is discovered to be untrustworthy, then the total effect of the work he relays to us is transformed.’ On this concept see Nünning (1999), Phelan and Martin (1999), Yacobi (2001), and Olson (2003).
‘narrative world’ (or ‘universe’) in a broad sense.\textsuperscript{27} When Polybius steps into this world (upon being mentioned by the narrator), he is one of the characters, no different from the other figures in this respect. Moreover, even though Plutarch’s narrator belongs to a different level within this world, the one of \textit{exegesis} and not of \textit{diegesis}, that narrator does not differ from the other characters since he is a fictional construct. As de Jong notes à propos of the Homeric poems, the narrator is ‘a creation of the poet like the characters’,\textsuperscript{28} and Rabel even claims that the poet makes the narrator another character.\textsuperscript{29} It is for this reason that the narrator is able to resemble other characters in the fictional universe.\textsuperscript{30} The inclusion of Polybius, an author who had used a narrator in his own works, within the narrative world of Plutarch establishes a special connection between these two ‘creatures’ of the narrative world, i.e., the narrator and his story.

Just as external to the fictional universe as the author are the texts he uses to build it; within it are the narrator and the figure Polybius. The latter, although presented as an author and being on a different level than the story’s characters, is nevertheless still part of this world, and is described by the narrator. Let us see how the mention of Polybius’ name by Plutarch’s narrator is instrumental in enabling the biographer to highlight aspects of the narrative world, and how the use of his predecessor’s text helps Plutarch build the narrative world.

\textsuperscript{27} Cf. Ryan (2009) 422; see Gerrig (1993); Almagor (2018) 9–11.
\textsuperscript{28} de Jong (2004) 45; see also Richardson (1990) 180; Rabel (1997) 19.
\textsuperscript{29} Rabel (1997) 19.
\textsuperscript{30} The notion that the narrator can resemble or be identified with the characters in the narrative universe is an astute suggestion made by Booth (1983) 155: ‘In any reading experience there is an implied dialogue among author, narrator, the other characters, and the reader. Each of the four can range, in relation to each of the others, from identification to complete opposition’, etc.
2. Polybius 2.47–8 and Aratus 38

In the first passage, the citation of Polybius echoes the tenor and phrases of the original passage. Plutarch asserts (Arat. 38.11):

Aratus says everything he can in explaining the necessity that was upon him. Polybius, however, says that for a long time (ἐκ πολλοῦ), and before the necessity arose, Aratus anticipated (ὑπορώµενον) the daring temper of Cleomenes and made secret overtures (κρύφα) to Antigonus, besides putting the Megalopolitans forward to beg the Achaeans to call in (ἐπικαλεῖσθαι) Antigonus.\(31\)

This is derived from Polybius, who claims (2.47.4–8.7) that Aratus foresaw what would happen (προορώµενος Ἀρατος τὸ μέλλον) after Cleomenes III had turned the constitution of Sparta into a despotism and was waging war with ability and audaciousness (χρωµένου δὲ καὶ τῷ πολέµῳ πρακτικῶς καὶ παραβόλως). Fearing the boldness of the Aetolians as well (information absent in Plutarch), Aratus decided to frustrate the plans of Cleomenes well in advance (πρὸ πολλοῦ). Aratus, according to Polybius, chose to enter into friendly relations with Antigonus, but had to conceal this appeal to the Macedonian enemy to avoid the dismay and opposition of the Achaeans. By telling a different story, Aratus publicly hid his real design (ἦµελλε τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐµφασιν ὑποδεικνύων ἐπικρύψεθαι τὴν οἰκονοµίαν). He saw that the people of Megalopolis would be more ready than others to seek the protection of Antigonus, being exposed to Spartan attacks, and secretly instructed two men, Nicophanes and Cercidas, to induce the citizens of that city to send them as envoys and make this application to the Macedonian king (παρακαλεῖν πέµπειν πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον).\(32\)

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\(31\) This and the following translations of Plutarch are those of B. Perrin in the Loeb Classical Library with slight changes.

\(32\) See Walbank (1957) 246–9; cf. id. (1933) 74–80, 164–5.
Plutarch’s narrator then proceeds to relate that this very description offered by Polybius, namely, that Aratus devised his attack on Sparta well before the dramatic onslaught of Cleomenes, was given by Phylarchus. The narrator hesitates, but claims that had it not been for the testimony of Polybius, one would not have trusted this account (ὡς μὴ τοῦ Πολύβιου μαρτυροῦντος οὐ πάντα τι πιστεύειν ἄξιον ἦν). In effect, Polybius is presented by the narrator as contradicting the portrayal of the events by Aratus.

The image of Aratus we receive in Plutarch’s description is in accordance with his character observable throughout the biography, i.e., an irresponsible and impetuous hero who undertakes surprising actions (cf. Arat. 5.4, 6.4–5, 8.5, 10.3–4, 19.3, 27.1, 29.3–4, 31.3, 31.5, 36.2) and a person who often relinquishes all accountability. The introduction of the Macedonians, Aratus’ enemies, into the Peloponnesian scene (cf. Arat. 43.2) is an example of this behaviour. A schematic division of sources would place Phylarchus among Aratus’ accusers for misbehaviour and show Aratus’ own apologetic Memoirs as excusing his deeds out of necessity. In this

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34 In fact, Polybius admits that Aratus spoke and acted contrary to his real views (παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώµην), and that he did not even mention these details in his Memoirs (2.47.10). Walbank (1957) 247 acknowledges the possibility that Polybius follows Phylarchus here (in spite of 2.36.1–2); another option is that the historian uses an independent Megalopolitan source connected with his own circle; cf. Walbank (1933) 12, 191; id. (1984) 461–2; cf. Porter (1937) lxxii; Bikerman (1943) 298; Africa (1964) 27. It is to the credit of Plutarch’s sensitive understanding of Polybius to observe that in this instance the historian appears to reflect a depiction not far from that of Phylarchus. See Koster (1937) 104.
35 Cf. Almagor (2014) 281–2. This is evident in his response to Cleomenes to the effect that he does not control events but is controlled by them (Arat. 41.7), and can be found throughout the biography, e.g., in the mention of Fate or chance (Arat. 9.3, 12.5), or in Aratus’ tendency to blame others (e.g., Erginus: Arat. 33.3) for his own deeds.
36 See Walbank (1933) 4–12. Phylarchus: Pol. 2.56.1–63.6; Plut. Arat. 3.12; cf. Walbank (1957) 259–60 and Africa (1961) 27–30, 32, 35–7. Aratus’ Memoirs: Walbank (1957) 228; id. (1933) 7–8, 161. See Pol. 1.3.2, 2.40.2, 2.47.11, 2.56.2, 4.2.4; Plut. Cleom. 16.4 [Ag.-Cleom. 37.4]; Arat. 3.3,
scheme, Polybius would appear to play a middle ground: while acknowledging the secrecy and duplicity in Aratus’ conduct (as Phylarchus would have it), the motive he imputes to Aratus tallies with this statesman’s own approach (i.e., the danger that Cleomenes posed).37

Plutarch’s narrator adopts this middle position of Polybius.38 In the first part of the chapter (Arat. 38.5) he mentions that Aratus was criticised for surrendering his generalship at this crucial stage, and asserts that the reason usually provided, that is, Aratus’ anger at the people, is not convincing; the real reason (αἰτία δὲ ἀληθῆς) for this act was rather the precarious situation of the Achaeans (τὰ περιεστῶτα τοὺς Ἀχαιούς). Thus, he absolves Aratus from indulging in rash behaviour by pointing at the necessary contingency—the unrestrained nature of Cleomenes’ new invasions.39 Yet in the rest of the chapter, the choice of alliance with Antigonus is reprimanded as an act done without any consideration of the (Spartan) past or (Greek) future. This coalition is tantamount to a ‘barbarisation’ of the Peloponnese (τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐκβαρβαρῶσαι),40 set
opposite to a people whose ancestors were the Heracleidae. Having mentioned that Aratus justified himself with reference to necessity (ἀπολογιζόµενος τὴν ἀνάγκην), Plutarch’s narrator then brings in Polybius to show the complete opposite, i.e., that no necessity was involved in the decision (ἐκ πολλοῦ φησι καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης). Plutarch lets the narrator undermine his own initial position by his citation of Polybius.\(^{41}\)

Through the mention of Polybius and the employment of his text, Plutarch’s narrator thus mimics Aratus. Firstly, he introduces a version which suggests the contrary of what he has just said. This behaviour accords well with Aratus’ reversal of his lifelong policy of battling against the Macedonians by cooperating with them. Secondly, Plutarch’s narrator relinquishes responsibility for his surprising acceptance of this contradictory version by stating that Polybius also seems to have supported it.\(^{42}\) He is almost obliged to do so. Presenting himself as following the lead of Polybius, Plutarch’s narrator changes our perception of the Megalopolitan. We now note that similarly to Aratus’ sudden change of policy, Polybius also appears to contradict himself in the depiction of the Cleomenean War. He explicitly claims to pursue the account of Aratus and not which eventually served to weaken the independent states and cities and by which Achaeans led Macedonians (Aratus) and later on Romans (e.g., Diophanes; cf. Philop. 16.3) into the Peloponnese. In this sense, the mention of ‘barbarisation’ might imply not only the army of Antigonus, but also the Romans. Although the biographer does not explicitly describe the Romans as barbarians, this is sometimes insinuated by Plutarch: see Flam. 2.5, 11.7: ἀλλόφυλοι. Cf. Pyr. 16.7 ἐλευθερίαν (pace Swain (1989a) 298). For Polybius, cf. Champion (2000).

\(^{41}\) One should note Plutarch’s correct use of πρόφασις as the unconvincing excuse voiced to explain Aratus’ resignation highlighting Polybius’ ἐμφάσις here (2.47.10) as the professed insincere story Aratus made publicly to conceal his true intentions (cf. Pol. 5.63.2, 6.5.3, 28.4.8). On πρόφασις in Polybius as a pretext to be distinguished from cause (αἰτία) and first event (ἀρχή) see 3.6; 22.18; Walbank (1957) 305–6; Sacks (1981) 124, 193; Baronowski (2011) 73–7; on Polybius’ theory of causation see Pédech (1964) 75–98.

\(^{42}\) Cf. Pelling (2002) 146, 163 n. 16 on Plutarch following the details which Polybius does not criticise.
that of Phylarchus (2.56.2). Yet Polybius surprisingly introduces a report which a writer of a different historiographic inclination (like Phylarchus) would have approved of. One may find in Polybius’ depiction the precise vice which the Megalopolitan attributes to his predecessor (‘statements at random and without discrimination’, εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν εἴρηκεν, 2.56.3). In content and argumentation, therefore, Plutarch’s narrator appears to claim that Polybius brought Phylarchus into his own portrayal—paralleling Aratus who introduced the Macedonians into the Peloponnese. In the correspondence Plutarch’s narrator finds between Polybius and Phylarchus, there may even be a subtle criticism directed against Polybius in that his style absorbs features which he denounces in his ancestor, in particular the sensational or so-called ‘tragic history’, with the aim of stirring the emotions of the readers to pity.

43 Cf. Walbank (1957) 259–70. Cf. Ferrabino (1921) 260–8 on two different traditions which Polybius is following.

44 Cf. 3.32.4: the vice of ‘not writing similar descriptions on the same matters’ (μὴ ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν γράφειν).

narrator himself brings Polybius into his account to undermine Aratus’ explanation. Both Polybius (who seemingly introduces a Phylarchan version) and Plutarch’s narrator (who introduces Polybius) are thus made to resemble Aratus who unexpectedly introduces the Macedonians, his sworn enemies, into the Peloponnese.

In this example, the narrator presents the two Achaeans, Aratus and Polybius, as inconsistent. His ambivalent position towards both statesman and historian is actually part of his very imitation of these unpredictable figures. Since the versions of Aratus and Polybius are set against each other, the readers are provided with no real motive for the Achaean-Macedonian agreement and are left to wonder about it; at the same time, they are led to observe that Plutarch’s narrator is unreliable. It would appear that here the literary unreliability of Plutarch’s narrator effected through the mention of Polybius both stresses this character trait of unreliability in Aratus as politician and underlines the historiographic shortcomings of Polybius.

3. Polybius 2.64 and Cleomenes 25

The same theme and literary device recur in Cleomenes 25 [Ag.-Cleom. 46] where Plutarch’s narrator seems to echo the original words of Polybius while commenting on his qualities as a historian. Plutarch’s narrator recounts (25.4–8 [46.4–8]) that Cleomenes’ attempt against the Argolid (autumn 223/2 BC) was thought to be a deed of excessive Polybius, and Marincola (2013) 80–5 for Polybius’ attempt to raise his readers’ emotions, and the use of vividness and of reversals of fortune.

It will not do to address this problem by adopting just one version and follow only part of Plutarch’s presentation, as in Walbank’s initial description (1933) 73–77, 164, 190–4 that the Megalopolitan messengers were first sent to Antigonus Doson as early as 229 BC (and not in 226/5 BC), i.e., before the coup d’état in Sparta and ‘the complete revelation of Cleomenes’ ambitions’ (191), deeming it an act ‘both farsighted and courageous’ (164). Later on, Walbank (1957) 246 corrected his view. See the criticism of Treves (1935) 24–5; Porter (1937) lxiii–lv; Fine (1940) 137–9; Bikerman (1943) 295–6.
and desperate daring (τετολµήσθαι), but was really done with great forethought, ‘as Polybius says’ (ὡς φησι Πολύβιος). Cleomenes was aware that the Macedonians were dispersed among the cities in winter quarters, and that Antigonus had only a few mercenaries. The Spartan king therefore invaded the territory of Argos, calculating (λογιζόμενος) that Antigonus would either be drawn into fighting for fear of appearing cowardly and weak, and would consequently be overpowered, or, in case he did not dare to fight, ‘would be hated by the Argives’. Indeed, when Cleomenes was destroying the country (διαφθειρόµενης τῆς χώρας) and robbing it, the Argives called upon Antigonus to fight or yield the leadership to his betters. Antigonus, however, ‘as became a prudent general’ (ὡς ἔδει στρατηγὸν ἔµφρονα), thought that disgrace lay in endangering his security and would not leave the city, keeping to his original plans. Cleomenes came with his army up to the very walls of the city, wrought havoc, and then withdrew unharmed.47

Polybius (2.64) has the same description of Cleomenes’ invasion of the Argolid. According to the historian, most people deemed the attack a rash and risky action (τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐδόκει, παραβόλως καὶ τολµήσως) because of the strong fortifications on the frontier, but those who were capable of judging (ὡς δὲ τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζοµένοις), considered it safe and sensible (ἀσφαλῶς καὶ νουνεχῶς).48 In Plutarch’s account, Cleomenes’ reasoning is presented in reverse order to that provided in Polybius’ original passage, which has the following: since Antigonus had already dismissed his forces, Cleomenes thought he would surely pass through the country without risking himself, and speculated that the Argives would be roused to indignation.

47 See Kromayer and Veith (1903) 209–10. The second invasion of the Argolid [Plut. Ag.-Cleom. 26 [47] is clearly a doublet of the first, taken from another source (probably Phylarchus, cf. FGrHist 81 F 57); see Walbank (1933) 109; id. (1957) 271.

48 In 2.47 Polybius attributes to Aratus the depiction of Cleomenes’ demeanour as παραβόλως (cf. Plut. Arat. 35.6 and 27.1; Walbank (1957) 246). In 2.64 he seems to oppose this view. This may mean he is not following Aratus in the latter passage and distances himself from him.
against Antigonus, after the Spartans laid waste their lands up to their walls (τῆς χώρας καταφθειρομένης ἕως τῶν τειχῶν). He also surmised that in case Antigonus offered battle, Cleomenes’ army could easily beat him. Antigonus was indeed not swayed to change his strategy and remained inactive, ‘like a wise general and king’ (λιαν ἠγεμονικῶς καὶ βασιλικῶς). 49 The Spartan king thus retreated safely home (ἄσφαλῶς εἰς τήν οἰκείαν ἐπανῆλθεν) after having terrified his enemies. 50

Polybius refuses to see the actions of Cleomenes and Antigonus as influenced by impulses or anxiety (like ‘most people’ in the case of Cleomenes), but rather assigns judgement and calculation to both. Plutarch’s narrator appears to follow the interpretation of his predecessor in the latter part of the chapter (Cleom. 25.4–8 [Ag.-Cleom. 46.4–8]). Yet he seems to adopt a completely different approach in the first part of the chapter (Cleom. 25.1–3 [Ag.-Cleom. 46.1–3]), describing the attack on Megalopolis. Here, the authorial voice depicts Cleomenes as enraged and embittered (τραχυνθεὶς καὶ ἀγανακτήσας) at Philopoemen’s rejection of the Spartan offer to join his cause, to such an extent that he destroys and plunders the city. 51 He returns home in fear (φοβούµενος) of Antigonus and the Achaeans. His enemies, however, do not fight; their joint assembly at Aegium dissolves, and although Antigonus initially offers

49 Walbank (1957) 271 believes this praise of the Macedonian king comes from Aratus, brushing away Plutarch’s important note that the Achaean statesman’s Memoirs contained abuse of Doson (Ag.-Cleom. 16.4 [37–4]).

50 More plausibly, Walbank (1933) 108–9 attributes different motives to Cleomenes and basically claims that he could not have acted otherwise. Since Cleomenes was aware that the next season ‘must inevitably bring with it a Macedonian invasion of Laconia’, he had to strike first.

51 See also Cleomenes’ later appreciation of his own acts in Megalopolis as done to satisfy his anger (Cleom. 26.2 [Ag.-Cleom. 37.2]: ἵνα ὀργῆς).
assistance, he nevertheless orders his forces to remain in place.52

Both parts of the chapter ostensibly present the same series of actions and results: Cleomenes attacks, ravages a city and a region (Megalopolis, Argos), Antigonus does not fight him, Cleomenes retreats. Outwardly, they look similar. The only difference is the motivation: in the first half, action is largely dictated by emotions, while in the latter it is ascribed to logical calculations. The two sections appear to undermine each other as explanations of the actions taken by Cleomenes and Antigonus. It is astonishing that this tension is present in Polybius as well: in 2.55.7 he emphasizes Cleomenes’ outstanding emotional hostility (δυσµενῶς), while in 2.64 he underlines the Spartan king’s cold calculation. In between the two passages, Polybius inserts his own censure of Phylarchus, an author who would rather be happy with the latter, sophisticated portrayal of Cleomenes.53

Both parts thus seem to present a similar sequence of actions, yet these are really different mostly because they have different motivations: in one case they stem from irrational reasons; in the other, they derive from rational calculations. This differentiation between outer impressions and reality appears throughout Plutarch’s chapter. For

52 This could not possibly come from Phylarchus, pace Walbank (1957) 258 and Africa (1964) 36 even though the historian did write about the sack of Megalopolis (Pol. 2.61–2). Phylarchus did not present his protagonist in such unfavourable colours (on the contrary: Pol. 2.61.4: τὴν Κλεοµένους µεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ µετριότητα πρὸς τοὺς πολεµίους). Pol. 2.55.2–7 (esp. 2.55.7: πικρῶς διέφθειρεν καὶ δυσµενῶς) is also not from Phylarchus. It is more reasonable to believe that this horrid depiction comes from a source hostile to Cleomenes, possibly Aratus himself (Polybius admits to using Aratus in 2.56.2). Presumably, the description of the Spartan atrocities in Megalopolis (and Aratus’ weeping) was meant to counter the impression left by the Achaeans brutality at Mantinea (Pol. 2.57; Plut. Arat. 45.4).

53 Cf. Africa (1961) 58. 2.64 may even be Polybius’ own sentiment. As in 2.70.7 (Polybius’ favourable treatment of Antigonus, cf. 2.64.6), the positive description of Cleomenes can come from the Megalopolitan historian himself; cf. Wallbank (1957) 287.
instance, there is a suggestion of dishonesty on Aratus’ part. While his behaviour in disclosing the calamity in Megalopolis as depicted by Plutarch’s narrator is entirely in character with Polybius’ Aratus (cf. Pol. 4.8.5, 7), there are certain innuendos that Aratus, as presented by Plutarch, is not being entirely honest:54 his weeping is prolonged, he holds his mantle to cover his face (i.e., covers the truth rather than unveiling it) and only speaks when the people are amazed, being all the more filled with trepidation at the disaster.55 Plutarch’s narrator thus subtly exposes Aratus’ insincerity.

We saw that according to Polybius, Cleomenes’ actions are said to appear to be derived from whims or emotions but in fact stem from calculations and strategy. Plutarch’s narrator appears to be adopting this description of Polybius. Yet by viewing the two sections of the chapter side by side—the exact format we noticed in the first case above (Polybius 2.47–8 and Aratus 38)—his readers may get the impression that they are not given a correct portrayal, and may doubt the imputation of motivation. Is Plutarch’s narrator right in describing Cleomenes’ daring as the result of a great foresight (μετὰ πολλῆς προνοίας), and can Cleomenes’ retreat be indeed characterised as one without fear (ἀδεῶς ἀνεχώρησεν)? After all, Cleomenes was wrong in his reasoning: Antigonus did not fight the Spartans, but did not lose his standing with the Argives because of his inaction. Moreover, Cleomenes did not dare to wage battle but only reached as far as the city walls. Plutarch’s narrator thus exposes Polybius’ inadequacy as well as his own

54 Cf. Pol. 2.47.10: ἡναγκάζετο καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἑκτός, δι’ ὧν ἦμελλε τὴν ἐναντίαν ἔμφασιν ὑποδεικνύων ταύτην ἐπικρύψεις τὴν οἰκονομίαν.

55 One also notes that Aratus stands on a stage (ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα). Besides being a raised place or platform for speakers, the βῆμα was associated with the theatre and the theatrical. Cf. IG II’ 5021; IG II’ 13293 (βῆμα θείτρων); LSJ, s.v. II.3.
limitation in reporting or accounting for the events; he is
again seen as unreliable.\footnote{Incidentally, Polybius himself criticises Phylarchus for his inadequacy in the imputation of motives (2.56.13–16).}

In a sense, all the figures of the narrative world in the
chapter (Aratus, Cleomenes, Antigonus, Polybius and Plu-
Arch's narrator) fail to deliver and they frustrate the hopes
of their respective communities or readers. Like the internal
audience of Argives dismayed at Antigonus (Cleom. 25.6
[Ag.-Cleom. 46.6]), who was brought by Aratus especially for
the sake of fighting Cleomenes but failed to do so at this
critical moment, the external readers may be similarly
disappointed with the explanation advanced by Polybius
suggesting another motivation (derived from Phylarchus?)
and with Plutarch's narrator for introducing it into his
narrative.\footnote{One reader, namely, Walbank (1933) 108–9, indeed proposes
other motives for Antigonus' inaction: 'knowing that until his troops
arrived he was no match for Cleomenes'.}

The relation of Plutarch’s narrator to Polybius can be
seen in what the former does with the text of his prede-
cessor. There are verbal echoes (e.g., Polybius: τῆς χώρας
καταφθειροµένης; Plutarch: διαφθειροµένης τῆς χώρας).
While Polybius claims that a sound analysis of Cleomenes’
action was offered by people capable of calculating matters
(λογιζοµένοι), in Plutarch, it is Cleomenes who does the
calculating (λογιζόµενος) in his own analysis of the presumed
conduct of Antigonus. Cleomenes thus turns from an object
that undergoes historical interpretation to one that inter-
prets others. Moreover, Polybius has Cleomenes imagining
the choice Antigonus would be making: either risking
fighting with his present forces (διακινδυνεύον τοῖς
παροῦσι) or remaining with his (original) plans (ἐµµε
ίνας τοῖς λογισµοῖς) and not doing anything, thus enabling
Cleomenes to retreat safely (ἀσφαλῶς ὑπέλαβε ποιήσασθαι
τὴν ἀναχώρησιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν). Plutarch’s narrator,
however, transfers these thoughts to Antigonus himself; the
Macedonian king considers possible disgrace in undertaking
illogical risks and casting away safety, and therefore remains
with his previous plans (ὁ δ’ Ἀντίγονος … τὸ κινδυνεύσαι
παραλόγως καὶ προέσθαι τὴν ἄσφαλειαν αἰσχρὸν … ἵγονι
μένος … ἐνέμενε [ἐν] τοῖς αὐτῷ λογισμοῖς). In a Platonic
move, as it were, Plutarch’s narrator shifts from the impres-
sions others fathom of the historical individual to the
genuine and real article: from others to Cleomenes and
from Cleomenes to Antigonus. Yet this progress from image
to the real item (almost analogous to the movement in
Plato’s parable of the cave) is accompanied by Plutarch’s
narrator’s producing an image (his own text, as an historical
interpretation), and attempting to imitate the text of
Polybius.

What we have here are basically two different attitudes
to the Histories of Polybius. One is a treatment of the text as
a literary model, containing expressions and phrases too
well known to be ignored. Plutarch’s narrator incorporates
them in his account, yet while ostensibly echoing the
original text, he changes their importance by imparting
them to different characters and altering the perspective.
The second approach is that of a historian. Plutarch’s
narrator goes beyond the text, now deemed merely an
image or impression, to the real figures described in that
text. He thus uses the text to undermine itself. This can be
seen in the mention of safety (ἄσφαλῆς, ἄσφαλεια). Cleome-
nes is certain of his safe return according to Polybius (and
others see his action as safe and sensible). By challenging the
text, and deliberately not being truthful to its form,
Plutarch’s narrator mentions the safety of Antigonus. He is
almost insinuating the eventual winner in the clash between
the figures, and in actual fact sees the truth outside the text.

This attitude of Plutarch’s narrator to Polybius’ text,
involving an apparent repetition of Polybius while com-
pletely altering the original significance, or a formal change
in an effort to attain the reality of the matter, echoes the
character of the protagonist of this particular Life. The
narrator mimics the Spartan king, who appears to revert to
the letter of the Lycurgan constitution (Cleom. 10, 16.6–7, 18 [Ag.-Cleom. 31, 37.6–7, 39]) while changing its spirit.\(^{58}\)

4. Polybius 2.65–70 and Cleomenes 27

The second instance in the Cleomenes where Plutarch’s narrator mentions Polybius occurs almost immediately afterwards (Cleom. 27 [Ag.-Cleom. 48]). Ostensibly, Plutarch repeats the historian’s view (2.65–70) that Antigonus triumphed in the battle at Sellasia (summer of 222 BC) thanks to his resources and because Fate was on his side.\(^{59}\)

Concerning the first factor, Plutarch writes that Antigonus, who waged war with large funds, wore out and exhausted Cleomenes, ‘who could only meagerly and with difficulty provide pay for his mercenaries and provisions for his citizen-soldiers’. Cleomenes’ shortage of money thus compelled him to enlist only 20,000 men in comparison with Antigonus’ 30,000, ‘as Polybius says’ (ὡς Πολύβιός φησι).

Fortune, Plutarch’s narrator further comments, ‘decides the most important affairs by a minor detail’ (ἡ τὰ µέγιστα τῶν πραγµάτων κρίνουσα τῷ παρὰ µικρὸν τύχη), and in this case did not favour Cleomenes, since it was only once the Battle of Sellasia had been fought out and decided that messengers appeared to tell Antigonus of problems in Macedonia (a clash with Illyrians), news that without doubt would have terminated his intervention in the Peloponnesian.\(^{60}\)

These two factors are definitely present in Polybius’ description. Antigonus’ army, so the historian reports, numbered 28,000 infantry soldiers and 1,200 horsemen; Cleomenes’ host numbered 20,000 men (2.65.3). Yet Poly-

\(^{58}\) On Cleomenes’ subverting of the Spartan constitution see Pol. 4.81.12–14; Mendels (1978).

\(^{59}\) On the battle, its location, and date see Pol. 2.65–9; Plut. Cleom. 28 [Ag.-Cleom. 49], Philop. 6. See Kromayer and Veith (1903) 266–77; Kromayer (1910); Bettingen (1912) 43–51.; Ferrabino (1918–9); Honigmann (1923); Walbank (1957) 272–9 (correcting Walbank (1933) 103, 108–10, 195–6: 223 BC); Pritchett (1965) 59–70.

\(^{60}\) On these eastern Illyrians (Dardanians) see Fine (1936) 23.
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Polybius seemingly maintains that this fact was irrelevant: Antigonus perceived that the Spartan king placed his soldiers well on the strategic points on the two hills Euas and Olympus on either bank of the river Oenous (2.65.8–11). Moreover, Polybius asserts that the two commanders were gifted and their hosts were almost identical in magnitude (2.66.4: παραπλησιοὺς). Consequently, while the numbers are indeed present in Polybius’ work, Plutarch’s narrator allots more importance than does Polybius to the divergence in the figures as the reason for the Macedonian-Achaean triumph.

Polybius also refers to Fate’s part in this battle: first of all, in causing the two armies to clash with each other (2.66.4: ἡ τύχη συνέβαλε τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας) and second, exactly as Plutarch describes, as the reason for the postponement of the arrival of the update on the Illyrian assault of Macedonia (2.70.1)—thus determining the outcome, against all reason, as Polybius emphasises: ‘thus almost always Fortune is accustomed to decide the greatest of affairs [in a way which seems to human beings] outside of reason [the sphere of rational analysis]’ (2.70.2: οὖτος άεί ποθ᾽ ἡ τύχη τά μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων παρὰ λόγον εἰσθαήνειν). Plutarch’s narrator alters Polybius’ original words παρὰ λόγον into παρὰ µικρὸν (‘a slight change’, ‘an imperceptible change’)64 ironically creating a slight change himself to modify the meaning altogether.65 The modification is signif-

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61 Cf. LSJ s.v., A.3; Polybius also claims that nothing was wanting with respect to defence and attack (2.65.12: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπέλειπε τῶν πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν ἄμα καὶ φυλακὴν; cf. 2.66.3). See Walbank (1957) 279.

62 Usually Polybius attaches great significance to the numbers of armies. See his criticism of Timaeus (12.26a = FGrHist 566 F 31b) on Timoleon’s exhortation to his soldiers to disregard the fact that they were outnumbered.

63 Walbank (1957) 289.

64 LSJ s.v., III.5.c; cf. Pol. 15.6.8, ἡ τύχη as the subject: ἡ τύχη καὶ παρὰ µικρὸν εἰς ἐκάτερα ποιεῖ µεγάλας ῥοπάς (Hannibal’s address to Scipio on the eve of Zama). Cf. Walbank (1967) ad loc.

65 There is no requirement to alter the MSS into ὀλίγον simply because of Plutarch’s variant, pace Wunderer (1894) 62 and Walbank (1957)
icant, and would appear to readers acquainted with the original text as tongue-in-cheek, suggesting that the actual cause for the conflict’s ending is not, after all, external to the realm of rational thinking, but rather in line with the difference of the armies’ strengths and other factors. Plutarch’s misquotation of Polybius (eight words are virtually identical and more or less in the same order), while apparently reiterating his precursor’s words, is expressed in a manner that challenges that very understanding and provides another cause for the outcome. Polybius’ allusion to an erratic Fortune may derive from Phylarchus.\(^66\) His ‘tragic’ history was partially made up from these references to baffling reversals of Fate.\(^67\) The statement accredited to Phylarchus that Antigonus’ Fortune was like that of Alexander’s (\(FGrHist\) 81 F.46 = Athen. 6.251d) may offer the primary setting for this proclamation.\(^68\)

Another element in Polybius’ account which could derive from Phylarchus is the mention of funding (or rather lack thereof in the case of Cleomenes). According to Polybius (2.63.1), Phylarchus related that ten days before the battle, a messenger from Ptolemy III informed Cleomenes that he was withdrawing his subsidy to Sparta, and asked

289, and despite the fact that the combination is found nearby (2.55.4). Polybius’ phrase as quoted also appears nearby (2.38.5; cf. 2.37.6); cf. 12.22.4, 29.22.2, 33.17.5 and cf. \(\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\) (\(\sigma\in\)) \(\lambda\omicron\gamma\sigma\omicron\mu\omicron\nu\) (29.21.5), quoting Demetrius of Phalerum on \(\Upsilon\nu\epsilon\zeta\). The explanation Walbank offers, namely, that ‘Doson’s victory is not irrational [like the novel behaviour of \(\Upsilon\nu\epsilon\zeta\) in letting the Macedonians rise to dominion [in 29.21.5]’ forces an interpretation on Polybius (and note the rise of Macedonians in both cases). Assuming that Polybius meant that Doson ‘merely won by a small margin, as Plutarch correctly has it’ makes no allowance for artistic variation on the biographer’s part. In any case, this was probably the version known to Plutarch. Moreover, there is no need to believe that Polybius made a careless reproduction of Phylarchus’ text.

\(^{66}\) See Ullmann (1942) 41; cf. \(FGr Hist\) 81 F.26.


\(^{68}\) See Africa (1961) 77 n. 72. The same sentiment appears in Just. 28.4. Cf. the resemblances between Justin and Phylarchus: F 16 ~ Just. 26.3.6; F 30 ~ Trog. \textit{prosl} 27, Just. 27.2.10; F 48 ~ Just. 25.4. Alternatively, this may relate to Antigonus’ premature death.
Cleomenes to reach an agreement with Antigonus. Upon hearing this news, Cleomenes ‘gambled on all’ (ἐκκυβεύειν τοῖς ὅλοις) and quickly (τὴν ταχίστην) decided to give battle before his soldiers would hear this, ‘since he had no hope of being able to pay their salary out of his own resources’ (διὰ τὸ μηδεµίαν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις πράγµασιν ἐλπίδα τοῦ δύνασθαι μισθοδοτεῖν).

This explanation of Phylarchus for Cleomenes’ defeat is justly termed by Walbank as the ‘stab in the back’ thesis (cf. Cleom. 28.1 [Ag.-Cleom. 49.1]), referring to Ptolemy’s betrayal of the Spartan king.

The series of examples Plutarch’s narrator brings (Cleom. 27.1–2 [Ag.-Cleom. 48.1–2]) to prove the importance of financial backing to the conduct and outcome of wars does more than that. It attests to the constant internal quarrelling and divisions among the Greeks. These squabbles are present within the cities, like the rivalry between the Athenian orators (the mention of Demades), as well as in the intercity strife, like that between Athens and Sparta (the allusion to Archidamus). In a sense, this brings out the explanation of Phylarchus concerning the treachery of Ptolemy in that there was no united front in the Greek speaking world against Antigonus. Macedonia’s triumph can thus be explained against this background. Furthermore, the mention of Polybius neatly placed at the end of the chapter may also allude to Polybius’ life story and the fact that this same internal division in Greece eventually brought about the

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69 See also Pol. 2.62.9–63.4. The claim that Phylarchus thought Cleomenes in possession of 6,000 talents he had gained as loot from Megalopolis is probably the result of an error in transmission. See Walbank (1957) 267–70; Africa (1961) 33–4. The theme of Cleomenes’ shortage of money recurs in Plutarch’s biography (Cleom. 22.7 [Ag.-Cleom. 43.7], 23.1 [Ag.-Cleom. 44.1]).

70 Walbank (1957) 270.

71 Incidentally, the saying attributed to Archidamus is ascribed elsewhere, in Plut. Demosth. 17.3, to the orator Hagesippus (Crobulus) and thus to have an Athenian context as well.

72 For the saying, cf. Crass. 2.7–8; cf. Regum et imperat. apophth. 190A, 219A.
victory of Rome over Macedonia and Greece.\textsuperscript{73} Thus, the Greek tradition of inner conflict may seem sufficient to clarify the result of the battle.

One could assert, however, that the battle was decided by another factor, namely, the respective abilities or flaws of the generals. Like the narrator in the biography, Polybius also declares that had Cleomenes postponed battle for a few days, he would have saved his rule (\textit{2.70.3}: \textit{Κλεομένης, εἶτε τὰ κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον παρεῖλκυσε τελέως ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ... διακατέσχεν ἃν τὴν ἀρχήν}),\textsuperscript{74} for the messengers would have arrived to reveal the calamity in Macedonia. Plutarch’s narrator’s acceptance of Polybius’ utterance regarding the possible turn of events highlights the rash nature of the Spartan king, and implicitly explains his downfall as caused by his own shortcomings.

Polybius, Phylarchus, and Plutarch’s narrator seem to propose different reasons for Cleomenes’ failure: funding, Fate, and fervid character. In resourceful creativity, Plutarch lets his narrator imitate both Cleomenes and the working of Fate’s pendulum, as he moves between these different explanations for the defeat.\textsuperscript{75} In imitation of the fluctuations of Fate, \textit{Τύχη} is introduced by Plutarch’s narrator only to be instantly disregarded as a suitable reason for the occurrence.\textsuperscript{76} This portrayal is inconsistent and might imply an impulsive narrator, mimicking the character of Cleomenes in general.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{73} Cf. Almagor (2014) 284, 288.

\textsuperscript{74} Since Antigonus would have returned home because of the troubles in his country. The details may come from Phylarchus. On this counterfactual conditional see Zhang (2008) 95–6.

\textsuperscript{75} It would appear that Plutarch’s \textit{ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις} (\textit{Cleom. 27.11} \textit{[Ag.-Cleom. 48.11]}) focusing on Cleomenes’ army and funding loosely echoes \textit{τοῖς ὅλοις} of Polybius 2.63.2, indicating the Spartan king’s recklessness.

\textsuperscript{76} This passage is not found in Swain (1989a), but perhaps it is close to his third significance of \textit{Τύχη}; cf. 277: ‘there is no discernible trace of Polybian influence in Plutarch’s writings’.

\textsuperscript{77} On Cleomenes’ rashness see \textit{Comp. Ag.-Cleom. T. et G. Gracch.} 4.2 (\textit{ϑρασύτερον}). This characterisation is noticed in \textit{Cleom. 4.10} \textit{[Ag.-Cleom. 25.10]}, 26.3 \textit{[Ag.-Cleom. 37.3]} (\textit{τὸ θράσος}); cf. Cleomenes’ daring, Pol. 5.36.7: \textit{τόλμαν}. The influence of Stoic philosophy proved dangerous on
If someone were to say that all other reasons were set in motion by Tyche or that the combination of such factors itself constitutes Tyche, working at different levels, then this would surely have been an acknowledgement that the reference to Fortune is redundant. Tyche cannot be tantamount to other factors; here, the whole would surely be more than the sum of its parts. Oftentimes, Tyche is mentioned when there is no other explanation. Polybius himself appears to resent the turning to Tyche (or divinity at large) in elucidating occurrences and condemns those who assign events to Fate. Elsewhere, he asserts that people should take responsibility and not ascribe everything to Tyche here, the whole would surely be more than the sum of its parts. Oftentimes, Tyche is mentioned when there is no other explanation. Polybius himself appears to resent the turning to Tyche (or divinity at large) in elucidating occurrences and condemns those who assign events to Fate. Elsewhere, he asserts that people should take responsibility and not ascribe everything to Tyche.

This differentiation of causes may portray Polybius’ own turn to Fortune as redundant, thus placing doubt on the Megalopolitan’s historical acumen. Polybius’ notorious dual approach to causality in introducing both divine and human causes for actions is highlighted by Plutarch’s narrator in yet another display of the biographer’s artistic skills. The narrator may allude here to the two sides in Cleomenes’ character, between ideological pursuits on the one hand and pragmatic realism on the other. Plutarch’s narrator may also insinuate that Polybius’ reference to Tyche entailed a certain blindness to the situation, similar to that of Cleomenes, whose attack was undertaken prematurely.

an ‘impetuous nature’ (προοικκαίνα τῆν ϕιλοτιµίαν, Cleom. 2.3 [Ag.-Cleom. 23.3]).

78 Compare the conclusions of Walbank (1937) 17–18 and Pédech (1964) 336–7 with Hau (2011) 188.

79 For the appearance of Fortune in Polybius’ explanations see Walbank (1937) 17–21, esp. 18 on the episode treated here. In some sense it is a force effecting occurrences, especially those that are utterly external to human control (and whose causes cannot be deciphered by rational means). Cf. Fowler (1903); De Sanctis (1916); Roveri (1982); Hau (2011), esp. 186–92.

80 See Roskam (2011) 214: ‘laudable balance between energetic decisiveness and respect for philosophical principles’. In this he was slightly different from Agis IV; cf. Roskam (2004).
Moreover, the delay in Plutarch’s narrator’s storytelling (narration) between his alleged quotation of Polybius’ text and the moment he brings the quotation back home to Polybius by explicitly mentioning the Megalopolitan’s name at the end of the chapter is made to correspond to another delay in the chapter, i.e., that between the events in Macedonia and the call for Antigonus to return back home and deal with the situation. This allegory can be seen more clearly in our last case.

5. Polybius 2.18 and De fortuna Romanorum 12

The last passage with which we shall deal here is another reference to an extant passage in Polybius’ text. In fact, it is the most precise of the allusions made by Plutarch. The essay On the Fortune of the Romans (De fortuna Romanorum), which discusses the part Fortune takes in Rome’s prominence, could be seen as a consideration of the role Τύχη is assigned by Polybius in guiding affairs of the world and making Rome bring together nearly the entire inhabited world under its control (cf. 1.4.1). It is no surprise to discover the historian’s name in the essay, near its end (325F–326A), in an explicit reference. As this is not strictly a narrative, but a declamation, we are not dealing with a narrator but rather with the persona of an orator delivering a speech. The orator brings an example of Fortune’s succour to the city and mentions the fact that after seizing Rome, the Gauls had to leave for their own country (εἰς τὴν χώραν) when they had received news of the attack of neighbouring barbarians (τῶν προσοίκων βαρβάρων). The invaders had to arrange for a peace agreement (εἰρήνην θέμενοι) with Camillus and depart. Plutarch asserts that this report is to be found in the second book of Polybius (ὅπερ Πολύβιος ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ βίβλῳ), and concludes that there can be no disagreement that Fortune was the cause of Rome’s pro-

81 Cf. Swain (1989b) 513.
82 Pelling (1979) 74 n. 6 rightly claims the use of a book number implies first-hand knowledge of the work on the author’s part.
tection, by diverting (περισπάσασα) her enemies or by removing (ἀποσπάσασα) them from Rome unexpectedly (ἀπροσδοκήτως).

The reference is to Polybius’ claim (2.18.3) that the Gauls, having seized Rome except for the Capitol were deterred (ἀντισπάσατος) when the Veneti invaded their own country (εἰς τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν); consequently, they made a rapid treaty with the Romans (τότε μὲν πολεμάμενοι συνθήκας) and returned home. The two passages may seem to convey the same picture, yet to learned and attentive readers Plutarch’s passage may appear in an entirely different light. Firstly, the employment of the form ἀπροσδοκήτως together with τύχη suggests Plato’s stipulation in Leg. 11.920d that someone is pardonable when breaching contracts if he or she is forcibly thwarted from realising them because of an unforeseen fate (ἀπὸ τύχης ἀπροσδοκήτου τις ἄκω κωλυθῇ). In Plato’s picture, Fortune is accountable for breaching an agreement; in Plutarch’s essay, by contrast, Fortune is responsible for generating a treaty. This is certainly not unintentional. In using a vocabulary that calls to mind the role of τύχη in terminating an outcome within a passage that describes its role as causing this very result, Plutarch’s narrator/speaker may insinuate the ineffectiveness of allusions to τύχη in the historical clarification of events.83

How, then, did Rome achieve its greatness? The presenter of this declamation may insinuate the answer he proposes by the very act of referring the reader to Polybius’ text. The information Plutarch gathered from other sources was incorporated in the declamation. In a way, the new composition absorbed previous texts and authors, Polybius included. The overt allusion to Polybius (with the exact book number) may appear as a call to the audience/readers to turn to that text, which was previously and autonomously present. Particularly in a declamation, this invitation to check another text may be seen as a

83 Cf. Shorey (1921) 280 on the great role of Týche in human events according to Polybius (cf. Plat. Leg. 4.709a–b).
performative act, elucidating the content of the speech. If the call is understood symbolically, the reference to another, outward book, which is the origin of the discourse at hand, operates as an invitation to go elsewhere, back to the previous depiction. This impact on the listener/reader (even if the action of checking Polybius’ text is not really accomplished), is an emulation of the oration’s content, with the Gauls leaving Rome for their own country when hearing of occurrences there. Furthermore, this reference to another text indicates some kind of corresponding presence of the speech at hand and of an external text, implying a certain partition. Indeed, the language Plutarch’s narrator uses here alludes to the Greek notion of stasis. This diversity or split which exists between Greeks also subsisted among barbarian Gauls. The cause of Rome’s rise to prominence while facing its enemies is now clear: it is because of the division among its foes that Rome prospered.

Seeing this outcome as the work of τύχη might look like the act of an unreflective author. Plutarch’s narrator/orator may be subtly criticising his predecessor. His playful allusion to Polybius’ ἀντισπάσµατος with different prefixes and an alliteration (περισπάσασα and ἀποσπάσασα) may point to a certain scepticism with regard to Fortune’s role in effecting events. While Polybius makes the Gauls being deterred by an event in the realm of human affairs, Plutarch’s presenter of the oration makes a divine element (τυχή) an active agent in human history, in correspondence with the declamation’s overall theme. Polybius makes the turn of events entirely explicable on the human plane. This comparison makes the allusion of Plutarch’s narrator/orator...

84 Plutarch seems to be using the same narratological technique in Art. 6.9, when the narrator vows to provide his readers with information in a different place (χώρα) in the text, mimicking Cyrus the Younger who promises to supply the Spartans with villages or cities (6.3). See Almagor (2018) 39–40.

85 See the phrase τῶν προσοίκων βαρβάρων, taken from Thuc. 1.24.5 (Epidamnus). Cf. Hornblower (1991) 68.

86 Polybius himself appears to doubt that the rise of Rome was because of Tyche (1.63.9).
orator to Fortune appear exaggerated, and as in the case of Cleomenes’ defeat (above), may signify that the belief in the interference of an external power is not needed.\(^7\) Indirectly, this presentation has a bearing on Polybius’ account and his turn to Fortune elsewhere in his work. Perhaps Plutarch is also implicitly casting doubt on Polybius’ description by the way he structures his citation: \(ει \ δι', \ οπερ \ Πολύβιος \ ε\ ν \ τη \ δευτέρα \ βιβλιον \ ... \ \ιστὸρηκε \ ... \ \αλθες \ εστιν.\)

6. Conclusions

Our brief examination of just a fraction of Plutarch’s explicit references to Polybius has dealt with all the places where these mentions can be compared with our extant text of the Megalopolitan. It yields the following results:

\((a)\) In all the sections, the mention of Polybius by Plutarch’s narrator (or orator) marks the transition between material from another source (or sources) to employment of Polybius’ text. This stresses the portrayal of Polybius as being introduced into the narrative world Plutarch creates, almost as a late arrival and never as the first option within a chapter or a treatise. This feature is made in each case to correspond to a dramatic appearance in the fictional world (the \(\deltaι\varepsilon\gamma\ς\)) in that Polybius is comparable to the entry of Macedonians to the Peloponnese, the arrival of messengers from Macedonia or the arrival of news concerning the land of the Gauls. Presumably, in order for this narratological device to work, the trait of Polybius as a person subsisting between worlds plays a part.

\((b)\) It is interesting that all of the sections in Polybius’ extant first pentad, which correspond to the parts in Plutarch’s works where he is mentioned, i.e., the sections discussed here, come from Book 2 of the \(\textit{Histories}\). This section concludes the introduction or preliminary part (\(\pi\rho\οκ\α\tau\a\k\varepsilon\nu\varepsilon\nu\nu\)) of his work (2.71.7), just before the main

\(^7\) For Swain (1989b) 514, Plutarch’s example is a clear instance ‘of the interrelation of divine and human causality’, but this does not ostensibly appear in Plutarch’s text.
period Polybius sets out to explore, on the eve of the Second Punic War, the verge of the Social War in Greece, and the eve of the Fourth Syrian War in the east; it ends with the death of three kings, Antigonus, Ptolemy III Euergetes, and Seleucus II Callinicus. It thus can be said to function as a transitional book, between the end of an old period (classical) and the beginning of a new one (Roman), corresponding to the personal transition Aratus and Cleomenes were probably perceived to embody, and before the great change in the fortunes of the world, whose parts now gradually were interwoven.

The complexity of Polybius is underlined through the use of the literary device of an unreliable narrator, who elects to use Polybius’ report together with a competing version, misquotes (or allegedly quotes) him, or adds another interpretation of his text, ungrounded in the original. By doing so, Plutarch (the author) shows his readers some of the inadequacies in Polybius’ work. The ensuing irony, existing in Plutarch’s narrator’s tongue-in-cheek references to Polybius but so clearly absent in Polybius’ portrayals in his historical composition, highlights another failing of the Megalopolitan, who downplays the inner contradictions in his own account.

Corresponding to the dualities so prevalent in Polybius’ life, Plutarch’s attitude towards his forerunner is ambivalent. If our interpretation is correct, Plutarch surprisingly shows a low appreciation of Polybius’ work as a historian, despite using it. This attitude is in line with other passages in which he doubts Polybius’ numbers and figures. He seemingly rejects Polybius’ inconsistency, his failure to deliver a plausible causal explanation, his carelessness and disregard of real motives or causes, and his partisanship. In a tour de force of biographical writing, Plutarch lets his narrator show forth these faults in Polybius and implicitly compare them with the character traits of his protagonists, who were also the subject matter of Polybius’ writings.
The transition of Polybius' historical work into the realm of other literary genres is made easy by the fact that all tell a story or employ a narrative. It would seem that in using the example of Polybius, Plutarch puts forward the view that history writing interconnects not only with the historical period in which it is written but also with the one that receives it. In this way, Polybius' journey into the works of Plutarch forever alters the manner in which his historical narrative is judged.

Jerusalem  eranalmagor@gmail.com

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18 Polybius is aware of the weight of future reception. Adopting a rhetorical commonplace, he asks (16.20.8) his readers to criticise him if they catch him ignoring the truth. Cf. Africa (1961) 36.
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