ASPECTS OF LEADERSHIP IN XENOPHON


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Although Xenophon of Athens wrote in a dizzying array of genres, recent scholarship has done much to highlight model leadership as a recurrent object of enquiry that unifies the author’s various philosophical, historiographic and didactic explorations. Much of this work, culminating in Vivienne Gray’s recent monograph, *Xenophon’s Mirror of Princes* (Oxford 2011), has sought to abstract Xenophon’s unique portrait of the ideal leader, isolating the particular set of virtues that he associates with this figure. What has emerged is a consistent image of the model leader as one who wins the willing obedience of his followers through displaying a selfless devotion to cultivating their material and ethical prosperity. Gray and others have shown how Xenophon advocates such leadership throughout the many contexts that his works inhabit, from the expected political-military realm to such unlikely venues as the Greek wife managing domestic slaves or a groom tending his master’s horse.

The purpose of the present volume, which grew out of a panel on the same theme at the 2014 meeting of the American Philological Association in Chicago, is to build on Gray’s foundation and advance research on Xenophontic leadership beyond her definitional project. The six papers here represent a cross-section of approaches grounded in the close reading of different areas of Xenophon’s corpus. Topics addressed include how the author understood ‘bad’ historical leaders (Pownall) and the degree of nuance that he allowed in their depiction (Tamiolaki); neglected dimensions of Xenophon’s leadership model, in particular piety (Flower) and practices of honouring (Keim); and historical questions pertaining to the exercise of leadership over the Cyreans, whether seeking clarity about the army’s more shadowy sub-commanders (Huitink and Rood) or the
influence of its historical novelty as a mercenary force on Xenophon’s leadership theory (Buxton).

In the spirit of Gray’s monograph, the collection’s papers range freely across Xenophon’s output, with several tackling his entire oeuvre (Flower, Keim) and others focusing on particular Socratic (Tamiolaki for the *Memorabilia*) or historiographic works (Buxton, Huitink and Rood for the *Anabasis*; Pownall for the *Hellenica*). Readers will note that multiple authors often treat the same figures and passages, for example the polyvalent Jason of Pherae (Buxton, Flower, Keim, Pownall) or the performative role of sacrifice in the leader’s establishment of his authority (Flower, Keim, Pownall). The complementary and conflicting readings on offer suggest the richness of Xenophon’s treatment of leadership and historical leaders: the same scene can impart multiple and mutually reinforcing lessons about successful management, or serve to add nuance to the author’s presentation of his theory’s most prestigious exemplars.

John Dillery, author of *Xenophon and the History of His Times* (London and New York 1995), a fundamental contribution to the study of Xenophon’s political-didactic aims and methods, concludes the collection with a response to the six papers. Dillery is ideally suited both to evaluate the merits and shortcomings of new work on leadership in Xenophon, and to synthesise and expand the most important themes suggested by the authors. It is the editor’s hope that these papers, taken both individually and as counterpoints to one another, will stimulate further rewarding work on an area of Xenophon’s enquiry that the author himself famously deemed ἀξιολογώτατον (*HG* 5.1.4).

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ATHENIAN LEADERS IN
XENOPHON’S MEMORABILIA

Melina Tamiolaki

Abstract: This paper studies three categories of Athenian leaders in Xenophon’s Memorabilia: Socrates’ notorious pupils, Critias and Alcibiades; Pericles and Themistocles, illustrious democrats; and potential future leaders. Against the common view that Xenophon was hostile towards Critias and Alcibiades, we show how Xenophon’s account mitigates their initially negative characterisations. Xenophon’s treatment of Pericles and Themistocles reveals subtle criticism of their policies and assimilates their positive qualities to Spartan or Persian models. Finally, prospective leaders seem insufficient compared with their renowned ancestors or Socrates, but possess important dialectical skills that allow them to highlight both the benefits and limitations of Socratic political teaching.

Keywords: Athenian leaders, Memorabilia, Critias, Alcibiades, Pericles, Themistocles, Xenophon’s political thought.

Xenophon’s relationship to Athens is rather a neglected topic. His admiration for Spartan institutions, his friendship with Agesilaus, and his participation in the expedition of Cyrus the Younger have directed scholarly attention to his affinities with Sparta and

* I would like to thank Richard Fernando Buxton and John Marincola for inviting me to the APA panel on Xenophon and leadership, as well as to contribute to the present volume. The anonymous referees for Histos and the editor provided helpful comments and suggestions for the improvement of this article. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the financial support for my research by the Foundation for Education and European Culture, IPEP (Athens, Greece). Translations of Xenophon’s Socratic works are from the Loeb edition of Marchant, Todd and Henderson, often with modifications; translations of Thucydides are from Lattimore; translations of Herodotus are from Greene; translations of Plutarch are from the Loeb edition of Perrin.
Persia; his exile further complicates the task of tracing more precisely his bonds with his native city. In his study about the image of Athens in the Hellenica, Ernst Badian observed:

Xenophon never portrays the Athenians (except for the Thirty) in an unfavourable light. Their commanders, on the whole, are skilful, patriotic and honest, and even demagogues are not charged with accepting bribes.¹

This investigation deserves to be expanded and qualified. The Memorabilia constitutes an apt place for further exploration: it stands out among Xenophon’s works not only because it promotes a specific image of Socrates, but also because of its Athenian setting. Other Xenophontic works, such as the Revenues and the rest of the Socratic corpus (namely the Symposium, the Apology, and the Oeconomicus) are also associated with Athens, but the Memorabilia gives a more eloquent picture of Athenian life and sets forth with great acuity thorny political and social issues of Xenophon’s time.²

The Memorabilia is admittedly a complex work, which, like all of Xenophon’s works, has undergone a period of underestimation and rehabilitation.³ Xenophon’s apparent aim in this work is to defend his beloved master, Socrates, against the accusations of impiety and corruption of the youth that led to his trial and condemnation. At the same time, however, the Memorabilia is pervaded by themes that

² The Memorabilia has been mostly approached from a philosophical perspective. For recent studies that focus on social and political issues, see Tamiolaki (2013), Bevilacqua (forthcoming).
³ For a summary of the fate of Xenophon’s works, see Flower (2012) 10–12 (with previous bibliography). Concerning the Memorabilia, its main critics maintained that it does not meet the (Platonic) standards of philosophical sophistication and therefore presents a predictable and conventional Socrates. On the contrary, the rehabilitation of this work, mainly undertaken by Louis-André Dorion and followed recently by several other scholars, relies on an appreciation of Xenophon’s originality both on a philosophical and on a political level. See Dorion (2000) XX–CXVIII; cf. Johnson (2005).
preoccupied Xenophon himself: virtue and knowledge, self-mastery, willing obedience, order, friendship, piety, gratitude, and ambition belong to the agenda of topics that Socrates discussed and are also recurrent in all Xenophontic works. Instead of trying to resolve the insoluble dilemma of ‘the first influence’ (e.g. is Socrates the main source of inspiration for Xenophon’s political thought or does Xenophon project his own political ideas onto Socrates?), it would be more fruitful, in my opinion, to admit that Xenophon pursues two agendas in the Memorabilia: an apologetic/defensive one and a political one. He is interested both in defending his master and in promoting his own political ideas (regardless of whether they are Socratic or not). Sometimes these two agendas seem inseparable and blurred, but in certain instances the political aspect prevails and the reader tends to forget the apologetic purpose of the work.

Leadership occupies a central position in the Memorabilia. Not least, Socrates himself is portrayed as a sort of ideal leader: he does not actively engage in politics, but he constantly gives advice to his fellow-citizens, politicians or not, about several political issues. This study will focus on the Athenian leaders (except Socrates) who appear in the Memorabilia. It will analyse their role, place and function in this work. It will attempt to answer the following questions: How are Athenian leaders inscribed into Xenophon’s double agenda? Is Xenophon consistent in his presentation of them? Why does Xenophon choose specific Athenian leaders as Socrates’ interlocutors? My analysis will fall into

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4 For example, Gray (2011) 7–24 believes that Xenophon is inspired by the Socratic theory of leadership. Dorion (2006) LXX–XCIX discusses in more detail the issue of Xenophontic ‘projections’ and explains why this dilemma is rather insoluble.

5 In this latter case, we can speak with greater certainty about ‘projection’. I have analysed some examples in Tamiolaki (2014) and (forthcoming, a).

three parts devoted respectively to the different categories of Athenian leaders detected in the *Memorabilia*: the first part will treat Socrates’ notorious disciples, Critias and Alcibiades; the second part will deal with the illustrious leaders of the Athenian past, Themistocles and Pericles; the third part will focus on future and prospective Athenian leaders (anonymous and named) with whom Socrates converses in the third book of the *Memorabilia* (3.1–7).  

1. Critias and Alcibiades: Negative or not so Positive Models of Leaders?

Critias and Alcibiades figure prominently in the first book of the *Memorabilia* (1.2.12–46). Xenophon takes pains to refute the charge formulated by Socrates’ accuser, according to which Socrates, as a teacher of Critias and Alcibiades, should be (indirectly) held responsible for the suffering those two individuals caused to the city of Athens. The section devoted to Critias and Alcibiades can be divided into two parts: in the first (1.2.12–28) Xenophon attempts to defend Socrates on a theoretical level. His line of defence relies on two elements: (a) Critias and Alcibiades approached Socrates in order to profit from his political teaching, but were not at all attracted by his moral premises or his way of life (1.2.15–16); (b) as long as the two pupils stayed with their teacher, they remained prudent; their vicious actions took place after they abandoned Socrates’ company.

7 In this paper I focus on the Athenian leaders of the third book, because their conversations with Socrates provide a more coherent picture of the political concerns of Xenophon’s time and Socrates’ impact on them. I leave out Crito and Euthydemos. Both these individuals have political ambitions, but the former’s discussion with Socrates concentrates on friendship (2.6.37–8), while Socrates’ political advice to the latter (4.2.11: definition of βασιλικὴ τέχνη; 4.2.37–9: definition of the demos) is part of a broader concern on behalf of Socrates to prove Euthydemos’ ignorance on many topics (politics included).

8 The accuser to whom Xenophon responds in the first book of the *Memorabilia* (1.2.9–61) is Polycrates, who published a pamphlet around 392. For attempts to reconstruct the content of this pamphlet through the text of Xenophon, see Dorion (2000) 79–81, Waterfield (2012) 284–7.
Consequently, Socrates should be credited with restraining them while they were under his influence (1.2.24; cf. 1.2.39). The second part (1.2.29–46) is intended to offer a confirmation of the theoretical defence through specific examples from the lives of Critias and Alcibiades. In this part Xenophon stages two conversations: the first revolves around the decision of the Thirty to forbid Socrates from teaching the youth; the second focuses on Alcibiades, who is presented discussing the nature of law with the well-known Athenian leader Pericles.

In what follows I will examine the portraits of Critias and Alcibiades as they are depicted in the first book of the Memorabilia. According to scholarly consensus, Xenophon wished to convey an absolutely negative image of these leaders. However, upon closer inspection a more nuanced picture emerges. I will argue that Xenophon operates at two levels in this section of the Memorabilia: The first part is more clearly apologetic and focuses on moral matters; Xenophon gives a rather unified portrait of the two individuals, by concealing the negative traits of their personalities. The second part, on the contrary, deals with political issues, some of which go beyond the defence of Socrates.

1.1 Memorabilia 1.2.12–28

I begin my analysis with the first part of the section, the theoretical defence of Socrates. This part is marked by a strong apologetic zeal. Xenophon builds his argument by taking into account an imaginary opposition, represented either by the accuser or by other people who may not be convinced by his thesis. His authorial 'I' appears more emphatically here than in any other section of the Memorabilia:10

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10 In the second part, Xenophon’s authorial ‘I’ intervenes only twice: 1.2.31 and 39.
But, his accuser argued (ἀλλ᾽ ἐφη γε ὁ κατήγορος), having become associates of Socrates, Critias and Alcibiades did a great deal of harm to the city ... Now if these two individuals did harm to the city, I have no intention of apologising for them (ἐγὼ δὲ ... οὐκ ἀπολογήσομαι); but I will explain how they came to be with Socrates. (1.2.12–13)

Seeing this and being such men as I have indicated, is it to be supposed that these two wanted to adopt the simple life of Socrates, and with this object in view sought his company? Did they not rather think that by associating with him they would attain the utmost proficiency in deeds and words? For my part I believe (ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἠρώτημαι) that, had heaven granted them the choice between the life they saw Socrates leading and death, they would rather prefer to die. (1.2.15–16)

But somebody could object (ἴσως οὖν εἴποι τις ἄν πρὸς ταῦτα): Socrates should have taught his companions self-control before politics. I do not deny this (ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἀντιλέγω); but I find that all teachers show their disciples how they themselves practise what they teach, and persuade them by argument. And I know that it was so with Socrates ... (1.2.17)

But many among those who pretend to exercise philosophy could reply (ἴσως οὖν εἴποιεν ἂν πολλοὶ τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφεῖν) that a just man can never become unjust; a prudent man can never become wanton; in fact no one having learned any kind of knowledge can become ignorant of it. But I do not hold this view concerning these issues (ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ τούτων οὐχ οὕτω γιγνώσκω). (1.2.19)

My testimony agrees with theirs [i.e. the testimonies of the poets] (κἀγὼ δὲ μαρτυρῶ τούτως); for I see that (ἀρώ γάρ), just as poetry is forgotten unless it is often
repeated, so instruction, when no longer heeded, fades from the mind. (1.2.21)

Xenophon’s apologetic ardour signals the difficulty of the task he has undertaken; it may also indicate that he is not very confident in the defence he proposes. It is this apologetic ardour that accounts for the image of Critias and Alcibiades in this part of the Memorabilia. In fact, although Xenophon states that he does not intend to apologise for their actions, he offers a rather sympathetic portrait of the two individuals, which could potentially serve as an apology for their actions as well.

At first sight a striking contrast can be observed between the characterisations of Critias and Alcibiades, on the one hand, and Xenophon’s subsequent presentation, on the other hand. Critias is initially labelled as ‘the greediest and most violent among those in oligarchy’, while Alcibiades is ‘the most licentious and hubristic among those in democracy’. However, Xenophon’s ensuing account mitigates these negative judgements and thus runs counter to the popular opinion about these two individuals. First of all, Xenophon employs negative superlatives only once,

11 The passage in the Memorabilia (1.2.12–13) goes as follows: ἀλλ’ ἐφη γε ὁ κατήγορος, Σωκράτει ὁµιλητὰ γενοµένω Κριτίας τε και Ἀλκιβιάδης πλείστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην. Κριτίας µὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πάντων πλεονεκτίστατός τε καὶ βιαιότατος ἐγένετο, Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ δηµοκρατίᾳ πάντων ἀκρατέστατός τε καὶ ὑβριστότατος. ἐγὼ δ’, εἰ µέν τι κακὸν ἐκείνῳ τὴν πόλιν ἐποιησάτην, οὐκ ἀπολογήσοµαι. The crucial point is how we interpret the phrase introduced by the particle γάρ. Either we take γάρ to expand the point of the accuser (or Xenophon to transmit and share the point of view of the accuser, by means of embedded focalisation) or we consider the second phrase to be Xenophon’s own addition and explanation. Although both possibilities seem plausible, I think that the former option is preferable, because Xenophon’s view appears emphatically immediately afterwards (ἐγὼ δὲ …). If this interpretation is accepted, the whole section appears more coherent, since it is divided into two parts: in the first part Xenophon reports the accusation (ἀλλ’ ἐφη … ὑβριστότατος) and in the second part (ἐγὼ δὲ) he expresses his own opinion. Danzig (2014b) 14–15 makes a similar point and also concludes that the superlatives are more likely to belong to the accuser.
when he refers to the period of youth of Critias and Alcibiades (1.2.26): ‘And does he [i.e. Socrates] deserve no word of praise for having controlled them in the days of their youth, when they would be, as expected, most reckless and licentious (ἀγνωµονεστάτῳ καὶ ἀκρατεστάτῳ)?’ It is implied that, since Critias and Alcibiades did not commit serious injustices during their youth, Socrates should be credited with restraining them. Regardless of whether this line of apology is effective, it is important that Xenophon presents the negative qualities of the two individuals as incidental and deriving from their young age.

Furthermore, again contrary to the initial characterisations, the quality on which Xenophon chooses to insist is ambition. He underlines the ambitious nature of Critias and Alcibiades in the following way (1.2.14): ‘Both of them had a most ambitious nature (φύσει φιλοτιµοτάτῳ): no Athenian was ever like them. They were eager to get control of everything and to outstrip every rival in celebrity.’ Philotimia, however, is not conceived of as a negative quality in the works of Xenophon. It is the quality par excellence, which leaders should possess, a significant prerequisite for success and distinction. Cyrus the Great and Agesilaus are characterised as ‘most ambitious’ (φιλοτιµότατος: Cyr. 1.2.1, Ages. 10.4). The same goes for the Athenians collectively, as a people (Mem. 3.3.13, 5.3). The works of Xenophon also attest to a theoretical defence of philotimia: it is viewed as a noble quality that distinguishes men from animals (Hier. 7.3, Oec. 13.9). The emphasis on

12 In my opinion, Xenophon’s apology is flawed in many respects in this section, but analysing this is beyond the scope of this paper.

13 The concept of philotimia is recurrent in all Xenophontic works (see Keim in this volume), but the Cyropaedia has attracted more scholarly attention. See Reisert (2009); Sandridge (2012) 21–44, who analyses it in conjunction with Cyrus’ philanthropia; Vandiver (2014), who stresses its positive character.

14 On the contrary, philotimia is employed by Thucydides with negative connotations. See, for instance, his comment on the causes of the stasis in Corcyra (3.82.8): πάντων δ’ αὐτῶν αἰτίων ἀρχῆς ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιµίαν.
the ambitious nature of Critias and Alcibiades thus corresponds to an acknowledgement on Xenophon’s part that these two individuals were intrinsically inclined to become successful leaders. This implication has an apologetic dimension (since it could prove that Socrates chose individuals of noble nature as his students), but it also serves Xenophon’s political agenda: the two leaders are placed side by side with the ambitious leaders whom Xenophon admires.

Finally, it is noteworthy that Xenophon does not give details about the reproachable political actions of Critias and Alcibiades. Gabriel Danzig aptly observes that the hypothetical εἰ at 1.2.13 (ἔγω δ’, εἰ μὲν τι κακὸν ἐκείνῳ τὴν πόλιν ἐποιήσατην, οὐκ ἀπολογήσομαι; see n. 11) potentially casts doubts on the criminal actions of Critias and Alcibiades.15 Moreover, we hear nothing about Critias’ initiative and leading role in the assassinations during the reign of the Thirty at Athens. Xenophon states generally that the Thirty Tyrants assassinated good people (1.2.32: οἱ τριάκοντα … οὐ τοὺς χειρίστους ἀπέκτεινον).16 Nor are we informed about Alcibiades’ treasonous attitude towards his native city. Instead, Xenophon relates laconically Critias’ activities in Thessaly, comments with indulgence on Alcibiades’ personality and offers a generalising conclusion about both (1.2.24–5):

But when they parted from him [sc. Socrates], Critias fled to Thessaly and began to associate with men who put lawlessness before justice; while Alcibiades, on account of his beauty, was hunted by many great ladies, and because of his influence at Athens and among her allies he was spoiled by many powerful

15 See Danzig (2014a) 514.

16 On the contrary, Xenophon highlights Critias’ leading role in the Hellenica (2.3.15): ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν προπετής ἦν ἐπὶ τὸ πολλοὺς ἀποκτείνειν. In an excellent discussion of the divergent portraits of Critias in Plato and Xenophon, Danzig (2014a) argues that Xenophon’s negative depiction of Critias in the Hellenica could be a response to Plato’s overall mild portrait of the tyrant.
men: and as athletes who gain an easy victory in the games are apt to neglect their training, so Alcibiades neglected himself (ὡσπερ οἱ τῶν γυµνικῶν ἀγώνων ἀθληταὶ ρᾴδιως πρωτεύοντες ἀµελοῦσι τῆς ἀσκήσεως, οὕτω κακεῖνος ἦµέλησεν αὑτοῦ). Such was their fortune: and when to pride of birth, confidence in wealth, vainglory and much yielding to temptation were added degeneration because of all this and long separation from Socrates, what wonder if they grew overbearing?

This presentation again implicitly qualifies the initial characterisations: Xenophon acknowledges positive qualities in Critias and Alcibiades (noble birth, wealth, power, popularity). These traits are not of course incompatible with historical reality; but they represent values that Xenophon himself and his Socrates also cherish. Xenophon further attributes the moral failure of Critias and Alcibiades to their arrogance, which is supposed to have grown after they abandoned Socrates. In this way, the actions of the two individuals are inscribed into the well-known pattern of the fall following hubristic behaviour. This scheme, however, does not only concern vicious people, but can also accommodate sympathetic figures, as Greek tragedy and Herodotus amply show. The recourse to this pattern concerning Critias and Alcibiades can thus potentially arouse pity rather than indignation for their actions. Moreover, Xenophon’s generalising comment on

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17 For the aristocratic origins and connections of Critias and Alcibiades, see Davies (1971) and Nails (2002) s.v.v.

18 The conversation between Socrates and Aristippus in the second book of the *Memorabilia* (2.1.1–34) clearly illustrates the importance Xenophon’s Socrates attributes to the combination of all these factors as constituents of happiness. See for this conversation Dorion (2011) ad loc., with further bibliography.

19 For the scheme of pride going before a fall in Xenophon, see Hau (2012), who shows the ambivalent meaning of the terms deriving from *phon*-compounds (such as *mega phronein*, *kataphronesis*, etc.). Hau does not include in her analysis the term ὑπερήφανος, which is used only twice by Xenophon (for Critias and Alcibiades in the passage quoted above and at *Cyr*. 5.2.27: ὑπερήφανον).
the shared *philotimia* of the two individuals and his unifying conclusion about their destructive pride creates a misleading assimilation between them and distracts attention from Critias’ atrocious actions.

Concerning Alcibiades, more specifically, it would not be far-fetched to concede that he is shown in a rather positive light: the comparison with an excellent athlete, who, nevertheless, precisely because of his excellence, neglects his training, suggests that Alcibiades ceased to be excellent (and therefore risked losing his superiority over others), not necessarily that he became bad. It is also telling that Socrates himself employs the same comparison with regards to Athens (3.5.13):

> My own view is that as a consequence of their great superiority the Athenians grew careless of themselves and have thus fallen into decline (*ἀµελῆσαι ἑαυτῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χείρους γεγονέναι*), much as athletes who are in a class by themselves and easily win the championship are apt to grow slack and fall behind their rivals.

This comparison is not derogatory either for Alcibiades or for the Athenians, nor does it in any way hint at the harm Alcibiades inflicted on his native city. It conveys a belief in change: if they train again, they will recover their excellence.²⁰

### 1.2 Memorabilia 1.2.29–46

We can now turn to the second part of the section, the conversations in which Critias and Alcibiades participated, which are meant to confirm the theoretical part of the defence: the first one takes place under the reign of the

²⁰ Although Alcibiades does not meet Socratic moral standards (see Tamiolaki (2012) 568 for his classification with regards to his virtue), it is interesting that Xenophon seems to be sympathetic towards him in the *Hellenica* as well: he describes in detail the positive sentiments of the Athenians towards him (1.4.13–16), while he devotes only one phrase to those who criticise him (1.4.17).
Thirty and involves Socrates, Critias, and Charicles, while the second one, between Pericles and Alcibiades, is placed during the period of the former’s rule in Athens, a little before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. This part of the Memorabilia raises some intriguing questions: Do these conversations eventually confirm the characterisations about Critias and Alcibiades? Why is Socrates present only in the first conversation? Why does Xenophon choose Pericles as Alcibiades’ interlocutor?

To begin with, these conversations could be viewed as an elaboration on the expressions ‘among those in oligarchy’ (τῶν ἐν ολιγαρχίᾳ) and ‘among those in democracy’ (τῶν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ). But, again, they do not provide sufficient evidence for Critias’ violence and greediness or Alcibiades’ intemperance and ἕβρις. Through these conversations Xenophon implicitly comments on constitutions: respectively, the oligarchy of the Thirty and the connection between law and constitutions. The first issue also has an apologetic dimension, while the second is predominantly political.

Concerning Critias, it is interesting that Xenophon insists on his relation to law, commenting on his legislative activity during his leadership of the Thirty as follows: ‘when he was one of the Thirty and was drafting laws (νομοθέτης) with Charicles … he inserted a clause which made it illegal to teach the art of words’ (1.2.31; cf. 1.2.33: νόµον ἐδεικνύτην). This account gives the impression that Critias’ authority was recognised and creates no doubts about the legality of the regime of the Thirty. Not even Socrates challenges Critias’ authority to draft laws; he is only interested in ridiculing the law he issued against him. This

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21 Xenophon states that Alcibiades was less than twenty years old when this conversation took place. Given that Alcibiades was born around 450 and Pericles died in 429, the dramatic date of this conversation should be placed a little between 435 and 431.

The presentation is compatible with Xenophon’s account in the *Hellenica*: Xenophon states that the Thirty were elected in order to draft new laws (2.3.11).

The second trait of Critias on which Xenophon chooses to insist is his irascible character. He traces the beginning of the tension between Socrates and his pupil to an emotional incident: Socrates had once urged Critias not to adopt a servile attitude towards his potential *erōmenos*, Euthydemos (1.2.29–31). Because of this advice Critias hated Socrates (1.2.31: ἐµίσει) and hence decided to issue the law that would forbid him to teach. Similarly, in the subsequent conversation between Socrates and the two tyrants Critias and Charicles, when Socrates starts posing a series of bewildering questions which show his disrespect and even mockery of them, Xenophon stresses twice that he thus provoked their wrath (1.2.35: καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς ὀργισθεὶς αὐτῷ; 1.2.38: ἐνθα καὶ δῆλον ἐγένετο ὅτι … ὀργίζοντο τῷ Σωκράτει). In brief, Critias is depicted as a legitimate leader who, however, suffers from an irritable character.

This presentation also has an apologetic dimension. By emphasising Critias’ bad temper, Xenophon minimises an important political issue, Socrates’ intellectual affinity with the oligarchy, and thus leaves aside more pressing questions: Why did Socrates stay in Athens under the Thirty? Since he did not follow the orders of the Thirty, why was he not punished or at least forced to obey?23 It would be tempting to compare this section with Thucydides’ digression on the fall of tyranny in Athens (6.54–9): Thucydides had also privileged the emotional over the political motive in his version of the events by emphatically claiming that the love affair between Harmodius and Aristogeiton (δι’ ἐρωτικὴν ξυντυχίαν) rather than the Athenians’ alleged love of freedom was the decisive

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23 It is possible that Socrates was initially among those who believed that the Thirty would install the καλλίστη πολιτεία, a reformed aristocratic constitution (*HG* 2.3.34). For the problems posed by Socrates’ stay in Athens during the reign of the Thirty, see Waterfield (2012). Cf. also Ober (2005), who ingeniously explains why the legal system in Athens allowed Socrates to disobey the law of the Thirty.
factor which led to the overthrow of tyranny in Athens.\textsuperscript{24} Xenophon may have adapted the technique of his predecessor to serve his apologetic agenda.

Concerning Alcibiades, his conversation with Pericles contains some peculiar features. Leo Strauss has rightly observed an asymmetry in Xenophon’s treatment of Critias and Alcibiades: ‘He gives no example of Socrates rebuking Alkibiades, to say nothing of a conflict between Socrates and Alkibiades.’\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, Xenophon does not comment on Alcibiades’ notorious sexual license;\textsuperscript{26} nor does he inform us about his close association with Socrates. The dialogue between Pericles and Alcibiades has often been taken to indicate that Alcibiades employs in a perverted way the dialectical skills that he has learned from Socrates.\textsuperscript{27} Kirk Sanders has recently suggested a different interpretation: according to his view, the phrase πρὶν εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν εἶναι (1.2.40) shows that Alcibiades displayed these dialectical qualities \textit{before becoming the pupil of the famous master} and therefore serves to exonerate Socrates.\textsuperscript{28} This interpretation is attractive, but disregards the context of this conversation: Xenophon’s emphasis is not on \textit{when exactly Alcibiades began his relationship to Socrates}, but on the fact that Alcibiades, from a very early age, was strongly preoccupied with political matters. Now the question that arises is why Xenophon does not present Alcibiades conversing with Socrates on

\textsuperscript{24} Thucydides’ digression is a complex and controversial topic. For a recent assessment and bibliography, see Tamiolaki (2015a).

\textsuperscript{25} Strauss (1972) 14.

\textsuperscript{26} See Dorion (2000) 98 n. 116, who comments on the paradox that we hear about Critias’ license instead. According to Bevilacqua (2010) 298 n. 60, Xenophon’s comment on Critias’ sexual license is a hint at his tyrannical profile, since tyrants are usually described in ancient sources as sexually intemperate.

\textsuperscript{27} Gigon (1953) 63; Gray (1998) 115–16; Dorion (2000) CLVIII–CLXIX. This use of dialectics has been also seen as a confirmation of the characterisation ἑβδομάδαρας, but I doubt that Alcibiades displays \textit{hybris} in his discussion with Pericles. See below. Cf. also Danzig (2014a) who concludes, on the contrary, that Xenophon does not intend to convey a negative image of Alcibiades.

\textsuperscript{28} Sanders (2011) 351–54.
these matters: a possible explanation could indeed be that he had not yet become a pupil of Socrates. But still some questions remain open: Why does Xenophon choose Pericles as Alcibiades’ interlocutor? Is Pericles associated with the apology for Socrates? I would like to suggest that this conversation mainly reflects Xenophon’s political agenda and interests, and is thus only loosely connected with the apologetic purpose of the *Memorabilia*.

It is remarkable that the connections of Pericles and Alcibiades with democracy are not emphasised. The expression προστάτης τῆς πόλεως (1.2.40), which is used for Pericles, is the only hint at a democratic background. Yet the conversation revolves around an important political issue, the association of law with constitutions. Alcibiades asks Pericles to give a definition of the law. As a democratic leader, Pericles answers based on what a democratic law is (1.2.42): ‘Laws are all the rules approved and enacted by the people in assembly, whereby they declare what ought and what ought not be done.’ The choice of Pericles as a representative of democratic law is not surprising: in the funeral oration (*Epitaphios*) reported by Thucydides, Pericles praises the obedience of the Athenians to the laws, written and unwritten (2.37.3). Moreover, democracy, more than any other constitution, took pride in its laws. What seems peculiar (if not paradoxical) is the fact that, although Pericles is a democratic leader, through Alcibiades’ questions he is led to contest even the nature of democratic law: he admits very readily that oligarchs or tyrants are equally entitled to write laws (1.2.43). While this would not be an astonishing observation concerning oligarchy, as we saw before, the idea of a law-abiding tyrant runs counter to a prevalent tradition in Greek thought, according to which the tyrant incarnates the violation of law.

29 The most usual expression is προστάτης δήµου. For the connotations of this term, see Connor (1971) 111–15, Ober (1989) 316–17.


31 See, for instance, Otanes’ description of the tyrant in Herodotus (3.80.5): τὰ δὲ δὴ µέγιστα ἔρχοµαι ἐρήμων· νόµαια τε κινεῖ πάτρια καὶ
alarmingly, when, in the course of the conversation, Alcibiades comes to identify lawlessness with violence, Pericles again appears prompt to admit that, if the laws of democracy do not receive the consent of everybody, they are also violent (a precursor perhaps of the Tocquevillian *tyrannie de la majorité*?). This thesis is not only anti-democratic; it also challenges the very concept of the law, which can accommodate constraint as an inherent part of itself.\(^{32}\) Of course the two interlocutors admit in the end that their conversation has resulted in intellectual acrobatics (ἐσοφιζόµεθα). Yet the interpretation according to which this conversation is only meant to show Alcibiades’ inclination to sophistry does not seem sufficient.

In fact, neither the choice of Pericles and Alcibiades as interlocutors nor the topics discussed seem accidental. Besides the family connections of the two individuals, which could add more credibility to their conversation, the two men share some important features: both were influential leaders under the democracy and both were accused of tyrannical aspirations. Thucydides had described Pericles’ rule rather elegantly by characterising it as the ‘rule of the first man’ (ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή, 2.65.9), but the comic poets openly compared Pericles with tyrants.\(^{33}\) Similarly, it is well known that Alcibiades’ presumptuous character and extravagant way of life had triggered an anti-tyrannical hysteria in Athens at the beginning of the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. 6.15).\(^{34}\) If we take into consideration these common traits, it becomes evident that Xenophon, in this conversation, elaborates on the tyrannical associations of the two individuals: building on Pericles’ reputation as a tyrant, he presents the Athenian leader conceding that the laws of the tyrants can potentially be just and, conversely, βιᾶται γυναῖκας κτείνει τε ἀκρίτως. For tyranny in Herodotus, see Dewald (2003).

\(^{32}\) Cf. Dorion (2000) 105-6. For the inherent connection of the law with violence, see also Pindar, fr. 169.

\(^{33}\) See in detail Christodoulou (2013), who suggests that Thucydides’ portrait of Pericles can be seen as a response to these charges.

\(^{34}\) Rhodes (2011) 39-54.
that the laws of democracy can be violent. And, of course, it is no surprise that he discusses these issues with Alcibiades, a man who, despite his democratic background, did not show loyalty to a specific constitution, but was ready to accept any of them if it served his own interests. The choice of the specific individuals in this particular setting further gives Xenophon the opportunity to raise some important political issues. For instance, the idea of a law-abiding tyrant is a topic that preoccupies Xenophon himself: in his work *Hiero* the possibility is envisaged that a tyrant could be transformed into a benevolent and lawful king. Even Critias is presented as drafting (oligarchic) laws. The *Cyropaedia* also often attests to a blurring of boundaries between kingship and tyranny. Finally, if there is a connection with Socrates in this conversation, this does not concern the period during which Alcibiades started conversing with him, but rather Socrates’ attitude towards the law: Socrates had made fun of the law of the Thirty, just as Pericles and Alcibiades question the law of all constitutions. Taken together, these conversations highlight the fluid nature of the law or at least the necessity for its better circumspection.

To sum up, our analysis has shown that the initial negative characterisations of Critias and Alcibiades are not fully supported by Xenophon’s ensuing account. In our

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35 In fact, the image of Alcibiades in the conversation of the *Memorabilia* is compatible with the image offered by Thucydides: in the speeches of Alcibiades reported by Thucydides, the Athenian leader shows off his sophistic skills. For instance, he presents his treason as an act of love for his polis (6.92.2–5). Moreover, he does not hesitate to express his loose faith in democracy, which he characterises as an acknowledged folly (6.99.6). And, of course, his overall career, the siding with the Spartans and the assistance he offered later to the Persian king, amply prove that he was far from committed to the Athenian democracy.

36 For the blurring of kingship and tyranny in Xenophon, see Tamiolaki (2013b).

37 For legal relativism in Xenophon, see Danzig (2009) and Johnson (2012), who focus on the problem of whether the lawful is (or should be) identified with the just.
opinion, this is due to Xenophon’s double focus (moral and political) in the *Memorabilia*. It seems that the two parts of the section devoted to Critias and Alcibiades correspond to the different agendas pursued by Xenophon. The first part is more in tune with the apologetic agenda: it concentrates on moral issues and gives a sympathetic portrait of the two individuals by stressing their ambitious nature and their fall as a result of their pride. In the second part, Xenophon’s political interests appear more prominent, while the apologetic ardour recedes. On the one hand, Critias is presented as a legitimate tyrant, while his problems with Socrates are ascribed to his irascible character. Xenophon refrains from stating whether there were also ideological disagreements between Socrates and the Thirty. The conversation between Pericles and Alcibiades, on the other hand, reflects more openly Xenophon’s political agenda. Pericles and Alcibiades, two individuals who were accused of tyrannical aspirations, are presented as open to discussing tyranny and law. This conversation promotes a more open attitude towards the relationship between law and constitutions. Pericles and Alcibiades convey a relativist message regarding this issue: like the art of ruling (the so-called βασιλικὴ τέχνη), which is not specifically attributed only to one constitution, the law is not (and should not be) the privilege or the possession of democracy. Alcibiades’ sophistry thus results in provoking reflection on a topic that interests Xenophon himself.

2. Leaders of the Athenian Past: Pericles and Themistocles

Pericles and Themistocles were eminent leaders of the Athenian past. They occupied an important position in the

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For the definition of βασιλικὴ τέχνη, see *Mem.*, 4.2.11. See Dorion (2013) and some qualifications in Tamiolaki (2015b).

Danzig (2014a) focuses more on the apologetic dimension of this conversation, but he also characterises the discussion as ‘a triumph of Socratic political thought’ (22).
collective memory because of their (democratic) ideas about the importance of naval power and also because of their intelligent decisions during the wars in which they participated. It is thus no coincidence that they have inspired Xenophon: the two leaders are mentioned in several instances in the *Memorabilia*. It is also interesting that contrary to Plato, who mentions in his works other Athenian leaders as well, even of aristocratic background, such as Cimon or Miltiades (*Grg.* 515b–17a, 519a; *Men.* 93c–e, 99b), Xenophon chooses to focus on the most illustrious democratic leaders. More specifically, Pericles appears three times in the *Memorabilia*: as a character of a dialogue in the conversation with Alcibiades that we saw above (1.2.40–6); as a leader of the Athenian past mentioned by Socrates in his conversation with Critobulus in the second book (2.6.13); and as the father of Pericles II, who is Socrates’ interlocutor in a lengthy conversation in the third book (3.5.1–28). Themistocles, by contrast, does not appear among the characters of the *Memorabilia*, but Socrates does refer to him three times: together with Pericles in the conversation with Critobulus (2.6.13); in the conversation with Glaucon (3.6.2); and in the advice he gives to Euthydemus (4.2.2).

Xenophon’s attitude towards Pericles and Themistocles has sparked some controversy: while Xenophon is usually taken to adopt a positive stance towards Themistocles, scholars are divided as to his evaluation of Pericles. Furthermore, Bernhard Huss has suggested that Aeschines was Xenophon’s model for his positive assessment of Pericles and Themistocles. In what follows I will analyse closely the references to Pericles and Themistocles and argue that Xenophon expresses a subtle criticism of Pericles, while he offers a no less ambivalent portrait of Themistocles. In order to complete my analysis, I will also take into account another joint reference to the two Athenian leaders that we find in Xenophon’s *Symposium*.

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40 See Dorion (2011) 204–8 for an overview of the relevant bibliography, and also below. Dorion subscribes to the thesis that Xenophon’s evaluation of Pericles is positive.

(4.37). It will emerge, I hope, from my analysis that Xenophon has his own agenda and proceeds to his own adaptations of the Athenian past, which is why it is rather unlikely that he followed Aeschines (or any other model) in his depiction of the Athenian leaders.

### 2.1 Pericles

I start with references to either of the two leaders individually. Pericles is introduced for the first time in the conversation with Alcibiades about law and constitutions. As we saw above, Xenophon avoids the Thucydidean superlatives and simply characterises the Athenian politician as ‘leader of the city’ (προστάτη δὲ τῆς πόλεως), an expression which points to his democratic affiliations. Regardless of the political implications of Pericles’ conversation with Alcibiades that we analysed above, the image of a mature leader being carried away by a young man in perverting (and even denying) the democratic principles about the law is admittedly not very flattering for the famous Athenian. In this conversation Xenophon reduces the leader Pericles to a passive recipient of Alcibiades’ views and sophisms.

The second individual reference to Pericles does not contribute to the correction of his image. Pericles is mentioned alone for the second time in the third book of the *Memorabilia*. Xenophon introduces the conversation between Pericles II (the son of Pericles) and Socrates by stating that Pericles II was the son of the ‘great Pericles’ (Περικλεῖ δὲ ποτὲ τῷ τοῦ πάνυ Περικλέους υἱῷ διαλεγόµενος, 3.5.1). Scholars usually comment on the weakness and ignorance of Pericles II, who is presented as a shadow of his famous father, soliciting Socrates’ advice on how to lead Athens to its past glory.\(^{42}\) This interpretation, however, overlooks the ironical dimension of the expression τοῦ πάνυ Περικλέους. Despite the apparent contrast between the ‘big’ and ‘small’ Pericles, the fact that Xenophon again avoids

\(^{42}\) McNamara (2009) 253: ‘The younger Pericles is a decent man, but he clearly lacks the talent and rhetorical skill of his great father.’
giving a more precise and detailed positive characterisation for Pericles creates some doubts as to the sincerity of praise implied in the expression τοῦ πάνυ Περικλέους. Furthermore, Pericles is never mentioned again in the conversation that follows between Socrates and his son. More alarmingly, Pericles II is led to question the policies of his father and praise Spartan institutions and practices instead (3.5.14–16). These Sparto-centric ideas add important nuances and qualifications to the expression τοῦ πάνυ Περικλέους. It is thus more probable that Xenophon wished to express a subtle criticism of the democratic leader, who after all exemplifies the destructive imperialist impulse of Athens.43 It would also be tempting to see Xenophon here engaging again with Plato: in the Meno Plato had reflected on the fact that illustrious fathers usually produce less illustrious children, because they do not take care of their education (Men. 93c–e; cf. Alc. I 118d–e, Prot. 319c–20a; cf. Plu. Per. 36.1–3, who comments on Pericles’ incompetence in domestic affairs). Xenophon seems to agree with Plato regarding the insignificance of Pericles’ son and his lack of education, which is why he presents Socrates as an ideal educator for him. But he goes even further than Plato by illustrating more radically, through the words of Pericles’ son, that the ‘great’ Pericles may not have been in the final analysis so great.44

Xenophon’s critical stance towards the famous Pericles can be further confirmed by the content and orientation of the conversation between Socrates and Pericles II. Scholars


44 The adverb πάνυ is usually accompanied by verbs or adverbs, while the expression ὁ πάνυ + noun is rare; see L&J, s.v. For πάνυ as meaning ‘actual, real’ in Thucydides (8.1.1, 8.89.2), see Gomme–Andrewes–Dover (1945 81), ad loc. In modern Greek the adjective ὁ πολύς (the very) + proper name, e.g. ὁ πολύς Περικλῆς, is very often used with ironical connotations. The expression τοῦ πάνυ Περικλέους in the Memorabilia is not, I think, entirely unrelated to its modern equivalent.
have already noted some connections between this conversation and Pericles’ funeral oration. I would like to complete this analysis and pursue this line of argument further: Xenophon seems in fact to propose an anti-
Epitaphios, a rewriting of Athenian history based on un-
Periclean principles.

The background of the conversation in the Memorabilia bears some resemblances to the context of the Periclean 
Epitaphios: both take place in a period of war. In the 
Epitaphios Pericles praised the Athenians who had died 
during the first battles of the Peloponnesian War; in the 
Memorabilia Pericles II deplotes the defeats of the Athenians 
in their fighting with the Thebans. Moreover, like his father, 
Pericles II praises the ancestors of the Athenians (3.5.3): ‘none have inherited a past more replete with great deeds 
than the Athenians (καὶ µὴν προγόνων γε καλὰ ἔργα οὐκ ἔστιν οἷς µεῖξω καὶ πλεῖω ύπάρχει Ἡ Ἀθηναῖοι); and many 
are heartened by such a heritage and encouraged to care 
for excellence and prove their gallantry.’ Again like his 
father, he establishes a threefold distinction between distant 
ancestors, more immediate predecessors and the present-
day Athenians (Thuc. 2.36.1–3: προγόνων, πατέρες, ἡµεῖς; 
Mem. 3.5.9: τοὺς παλαιτάτους προγόνους, 3.5.11: οἱ ἐκείνων 
µὲν ἀπόγονοι, οὐ πολὺ δὲ πρὸ ἡµῶν γεγονότες).

However, important differences also emerge. The 
Athenians of the era of Pericles II do not take pride in their 
(contemporary) achievements like the Athenians of Pericles’ 
time. Xenophon illustrates this juxtaposition by adapting 
themes that Pericles had commented on in his Epitaphios. 
For instance, the use of the word ἐπιτηδεύµατα in the 
Memorabilia alludes to the word ἐπιτήδευσις of the Epitaphios. 
But whereas Pericles had talked about the ἐπιτήδευσις of 
contemporary Athenians (Thuc. 2.36.4), his son comments 
on the ἐπιτηδεύµατα of Athenian ancestors (3.5.14): ‘If they 
find out the practices of their ancestors and practise them as

45 Bevilacqua (2010) 519 n. 27 points out that this conversation can 
be seen as an ‘ironic (and ferocious) palinody of the famous funeral 
oration’; cf. also Strauss (1972) 66–8.
well as they did (ἀλλ’ εἰ µὲν ἐξευρόντες τὰ τῶν προγόνων ἐπιτηδεύµατα µηδὲν χεῖρον ἐκείνων ἐπιτηδεύοιεν), they will come to be as good as they were.’ Moreover, the strong presence of envy in the life of the Athenians, as it is described by Pericles II (3.5.16: καὶ φθονοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς µᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις), contrasts with the Periclean description of Athenian relationships as ‘deprived of negative feelings’ (Thuc. 2.37.3: ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσοµιλοῦντες). Overall, then, while Pericles had valorised his contemporary Athenians, his son denigrates them and praises either his ancestors or even the Lacedaemonians!

One could claim that these elements do not reflect a critical attitude towards Pericles, but simply highlight the opposition between the defeated Athenians of the fourth century and the glorious Athenians of Pericles’ time. However, this interpretation does not grasp the whole picture. First of all it is in my opinion telling that although Pericles II constantly praises his ancestors, he avoids praising his father’s generation: he begins his praise of Athens from Theseus’ time and ends with the ‘war of the Athenians and Peloponnesians’ (i.e. against the Persians). Pericles’ generation is completely omitted (3.5.9–12). Furthermore, Socrates, in line with Isocrates, openly praises the Council of the Areopagos (3.5.20), whose role, however, had been drastically reduced by Pericles. In this way, he tacitly criticises Periclean policy. Finally, the conversation between Socrates and Pericles II testifies to a transformation or even denial of Periclean principles. For example, in the conversation in the Memorabilia, fear is considered a positive sentiment (3.5.5): ‘Confidence brings carelessness, slackness, disobedience; fear makes men more attentive, more obedient, more amenable to discipline.’ This assertion contradicts the Periclean statement in the Epitaphios that ‘ignorance is boldness, but calculation brings hesitance’

46 See, for example, Dorion (2011) 293.

47 Delatte (1933) 54–74 argued long ago that Memorabilia 3.5 is inspired by Isocrates’ Areopagiticus, a view, however, rightly criticised by Bevilacqua (2010) 522 n. 34.
(λογισµὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει, Thuc. 2.40.3). Similarly, Socrates’ observation that the Athenians should imitate those who excel in Greece, namely the Lacedaemonians (3.5.14), clashes with the Periclean conviction according to which the Athenians, because of their excellent constitution, do not need to imitate anybody (Thuc. 2.37.1: παράδειγµα δὲ µᾶλλον αὐτοὶ ἄντες τιαίν ἦ µιµούµενοι ἕτέρους). Further, the suggestion of Pericles II that the Athenians should fall in love with their ancient virtue (3.5.7: ἀνερασθῆναι τῆς ἀρχαίας ἀρετῆς) constitutes a transformation of the Periclean advice that the Athenians should become lovers of their (present) city (Thuc. 2.43.1: πόλεως ... ἔραστας).

In sum, if we take into account that Xenophon presents both interlocutors in *Memorabilia* 3.5 as critical of Pericles, the allusions to the *Epitaphios* could be seen in a new light: by reworking themes of the *Epitaphios*, Xenophon does not only mean to suggest a contrast between the glorious Periclean Athens and the defeated Athens of Pericles’ son; more radically, he intends to show that the elder Pericles’ conception of his Athens was problematic and bound to fail.

### 2.2 Themistocles

We can now examine the individual references to Themistocles. Socrates mentions him twice in the *Memorabilia* as a model of high reputation and wisdom. Although these references seem at first sight positive, the close examination of their context reveals some ambiguity. The first one belongs to the testing to which Socrates submits Glaucon, an extremely ambitious young Athenian, who desires to enter politics before becoming twenty years old. Socrates, who eventually manages to restrain Glaucon, begins his conversation with him as follows (3.6.2):

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48 Pericles also states that because of fear the Athenians abide by their laws (Thuc. 2.37.3: διὰ δέος µάλιστα αὐτοὶ παρανοµοµένει). However, this passing reference does not amount to a positive (theoretical) evaluation of fear, like that found in the *Memorabilia*. 

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Glaucón, have you made up your mind to be the leader of our city? ... Well, there is certainly no more honourable ambition in the world; for obviously if you succeed, you will be able to get whatever you want, and you will have the means of helping your friends: you will lift up your father’s house and exalt your fatherland; and you will make a name for yourself first at home, later on in Greece, and possibly, like Themistocles, among the barbarians as well (ὁνομαστὸς δ’ ἔσει πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἔπειτα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι, ἰασὸς δ’, ὥσπερ Θεµιστοκλῆς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις); wherever you go, you will be a celebrity.

Themistocles is here mentioned at the end of an enumeration of the merits of political life and is hence considered to be a successful incarnation of it. However, this presentation is not free from some ambiguity. First of all, the phrase ὁνομαστὸς ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις recalls Themistocles’ ambivalent political career: Themistocles did not gain a reputation among the barbarians only for his victorious deeds, but also because he stayed in Persia after his exile from Athens and even became a counsellor of the Persian king (Plut. Them. Cθεµιστοκλῆς). More importantly, Socrates in this passage enumerates the individual benefits Glaucón would acquire if he obtained a high office in Athens. Socrates’ opinion, however, as it will emerge in the course of the conversation (and in other conversations in the Memorabilia) is that a good leader should be interested not only in his individual profit, but also (and above all) in benefiting his community. Consequently, the reference to Themistocles at the summit of an argument centred on individual profit eventually undermines the portrait of the Athenian leader: Themistocles ends up representing the problematic and self-interested preoccupation with politics that Socrates rejects.49

49 This presentation is not wholly incompatible with the image of Themistocles that we have from Herodotus. Themistocles used his victory for his personal profit (Hdt. 8.112.1, 3). See in detail Blösel 2004;
The second reference to Themistocles occurs in the fourth book of the Memorabilia. Xenophon describes in this section how Socrates dealt with Euthydemus, a young man who took pride in his wisdom and education. Socrates went to Euthydemus’ shop with his companions and the following conversation took place (4.2.2):

At the first visit, one of them [i.e. Socrates’ companions] asked: ‘Was it by constantly being with some wise man or by natural ability that Themistocles stood out among his fellow citizens as the man to whom the city naturally looked when it felt the want of a great leader (Θεµιστοκλῆς διὰ συνουσίαν τινὸς τῶν σοφῶν ἢ φύσει τοσούτον διήνεγκε τῶν πολιτῶν, ὥστε πρὸς ἐκείνον ἀποβλέπειν τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε σπουδαίου ἄνδρος δεηθείη)?’ In order to set Euthydemus thinking (βουλόµενος κινεῖν τὸν Εὐθύδηµον), Socrates said: ‘if in the minor arts great achievement is impossible without competent masters, surely it is absurd to imagine that the art of statesmanship, the greatest of all accomplishments, comes to a man of its own accord (εὔηθες ἔφη εἶναι τὸ οἴεσθαι τὰς µὲν ὀλίγου ἀξίας τέχνας µὴ γίγνεσθαι σπουδαίους ἄνευ διδασκάλων ἱκανῶν, τὸ δὲ προεστάναι πόλεως, πάντων ἐργῶν μέγιστον ἄν, ἀπὸ ταυτοµάτου παραγίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις).’

This conversation contains no hint of negativity towards Themistocles. However, it should be noted that it is not Socrates who praises the Athenian leader, but one of his companions. More interestingly, Socrates’ view of Themistocles runs counter to a whole tradition about the Athenian leader, according to which his success was due to his exceptional innate abilities. This tradition is eloquently transmitted by Thucydides, who stresses Themistocles’ natural talent (1.138.3):

cf. also Ferrario (2014) 100, who considers Herodotus’ presentation of Themistocles a model of ‘problematic Greek leadership’.
For Themistocles, displaying the very surest signs of natural ability (βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχύν δηλώσας), was far and away more worthy of admiration for this quality. By native intelligence, without preparing or supplementing it by study (οἰκείᾳ γὰρ ξυνέσει καὶ οὔτε προµαθὼν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἐπιµαθών), he was with the briefest deliberation the most effective in decisions about immediate situations and the best at conjecturing what would happen farthest into the future. … To sum up, this man by natural ability (φύσεως µὲν δυνάµει) with rapid deliberation, was certainly supreme in his immediate grasp of what was necessary.⁵⁰

Socrates, on the contrary, emphatically attributes Themistocles’ success not to his intelligence, but to his association with competent masters. Xenophon seems aware of the radicalness (even paradox) of this suggestion; that is why he notes that Socrates said this ‘in order to set Euthydemus thinking’. But is Themistocles’ paradigm compelling? There was no tradition in antiquity about him having received an excellent education or having associated with famous teachers, such as was the case, for instance, with Pericles.⁵¹ What, then, is Xenophon’s purpose in making this comment?

I would like to suggest that Xenophon contributes to the biographical tradition concerning Themistocles by redefining his relation to sophia. In the ancient sources Themistocles is praised for his sophia. The most characteristic references are in Herodotus (8.110.1; 8.124.1):

⁵⁰ Cf. Hornblower (ad loc).

⁵¹ Interestingly, Plutarch questions the tradition according to which Anaxagoras was Themistocles’ teacher and sides with another version concerning his education, which made him a disciple of Mnesiphilus, for whom, however, the biographer does not give a very flattering description (Them. 2.4): ‘a man who was neither a rhetorician nor one of the so-called physical philosophers, but a cultivator of what was then called sophia or wisdom, although it was really nothing more than cleverness in politics and practical sagacity.’ On the contrary, Plutarch relates in detail Pericles’ famous teachers (Plut. Per. 4–6).
They [i.e. the Athenians] had judged him before to be a clever man, but now he came out as the cleverest and best counsellor possible (ἐπειδὴ γὰρ καὶ πρῶτερον, δεδομένος εἶναι σοφός, ἐφάνη ἐὼν ἀληθέως σοφός τε καὶ εὖβουλος) and they were ready to listen to anything he said.

Themistocles was proclaimed and thought to be far the cleverest of the Greeks through all the land (Θεµιστοκλέης ἐβώσθη τε καὶ ἐδοξώθη εἶναι ἀνὴρ πολλὸ ν Ἑλλήνων σοφότατος ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα).

The Greek word *sophia* covers a wide range of meanings: it usually refers to intelligence, dexterity, or even technical skill, while in Plato it acquires the metaphysical meaning of (superior) philosophical wisdom that is related to the knowledge of the good. In the *Memorabilia* the term encompasses all of these different nuances. It is no wonder that Socrates knows the meaning of the true *sophia*, which he characterises as the most important good (뮤εγιστον ἀγαθόν, 4.5.6). More importantly, Socrates is presented as knowing how to dispose of his *sophia*: not by receiving money from anyone, like the sophists, but by choosing the most gifted natures as his students (1.6.13). Consequently, if Socrates’ *sophia* is related to his teaching and is thus superior to conventional cleverness, it becomes more intelligible why Themistocles’ *sophia* is not emphasised in the *Memorabilia*. His alleged association with wise men (διὰ συνουσίαν … σοφῶν) constitutes a disguised hint at his well-known *sophia* (cleverness), which is thus transformed from innate talent to acquired (Socratic) knowledge. Xenophon

For the concept of *sophia* in the *Memorabilia*, see Dorion (2012), who rightly stresses that this virtue does not occupy a central place in the philosophical system of Xenophon, as in Plato. My student, Sofia Stavroulaki (2015), has offered an extensive treatment of the different meanings and nuances of the term *sophia* in the *Memorabilia* and its connections with other Socratic virtues, such as temperance and self-mastery.
seems to recognise Themistocles’ skills, but rather timidly: he does not hesitate to propose an additional biographical detail regarding the Athenian leader, thus making him a (missed) student of Socrates. In this way, Themistocles, like all leaders in the *Memorabilia*, is ultimately placed in the shadow of Socrates.

### 2.3 Pericles and Themistocles

We can now turn to the most intriguing reference to the two Athenian leaders, which we find in the discussion of friendship (*philia*) in the second book of the *Memorabilia* (2.6). The discussion revolves around the techniques of acquiring good (in the sense of moral) friends. Socrates explains that a good friend cannot be acquired through force, like animals, but of his own free will. He then proposes an efficient means of acquiring friends: the use of spells and drugs (*ἐπῳδάς* ... καὶ *φίλτρα*, 2.6.10), like those with which the Sirens attempted to attract Odysseus. It becomes clear from the rest of the conversation that spells are a metaphor for praise; hence Socrates’ suggestion amounts to the use of praise as a means to attract friends. Critobulus reacts to this by observing that if praises are exaggerated and untruthful, the praised person is ridiculed. The conversation then proceeds as follows (2.6.12–14):

‘You mean, I take it, that the spell must be fitted to the listener, so that he won’t take the praise for mockery.’

‘Yes; for to praise for beauty, stature and strength one who is aware that he is short, ugly and puny, is the way to repel him and make him dislike you more.’

‘Do you know any other spells?’ (ἀλλὰς δὲ τινὰς οἴσθα ἐπῳδάς)

‘No, but I have heard that Pericles knew many and cast them on the city, and so made her *love* him (Περικλῆς πολλὰς ἐπίστατο, ἃς ἐπῴδων τῇ πόλει ἐποίει αὐτήν φιλεῖν αὐτόν).’

‘And how did Themistocles make the city *love* him (τῇ πόλει φιλεῖν αὐτόν)?’
'Not by spells: no, no (μὰ Δ' οὐκ ἐπᾴδων); but by hanging some good amulet about her.'

Based on the emphatic expression μὰ Δ' οὐκ ἐπᾴδων, which suggests a contrast between Pericles and Themistocles with regards to their technique of acquiring the benevolence of the people, Olof Gigon maintained that Socrates’ view of Pericles in this passage is negative. Gigon’s opinion has been questioned by Huss and more recently by Dorion. According to these scholars, Xenophon’s evaluation of both Pericles and Themistocles is positive. In order to contribute to the interpretation of this controversial passage, it would be worth examining more closely these references, their context and implications. At least two issues are raised: firstly, why is Pericles (and not Themistocles) presented as having recourse to spells? Secondly, why does Xenophon have recourse to the image of love for the leader?

Concerning our first question, it has already been observed that Socrates’ assertion about Pericles knowing spells points generally to Pericles’ speeches to his fellow-citizens and to the rhetorical ability which enabled him to charm his audience. However, if spells are a metaphor for praise, this passage could allude more specifically to the Ἐπιτάφια. In this speech Pericles promises to praise the dead of the first battles of the Peloponnesian War, but his speech turns out to be a comprehensive praise of the Athenians and their constitution. Like Socrates, Pericles seems aware of the risks of praise, but for different reasons: he notes that if praise is exaggerated, it may not seem credible, not because it is unworthy, but because envious people will not tolerate it (Thuc. 2.35.2). Pericles is considered a master of the art of praise, and that is why he promises to speak with moderation (μετρίως εἰπεῖν).

56 Occurrences of terms related to ἔπαινος in the Ἐπιτάφια: Thuc. 2.34.6; 2.35.1 and 2; 2.36.2 and 4; 2.41.4; 2.43.2; 2.45.1.
However, it is not clear whether Socrates shares Thucydides’ view of Pericles. When Critobulus asks him whether he knows other (i.e. positive) spells, Socrates replies that he does not. He then qualifies his answer by adding the vague assertion that Pericles knew many spells with which he made the city love him. This means that Pericles might have known both deceptive and good spells. Consequently, Pericles’ connection with spells in this passage is rather ambiguous.\footnote{For another ambiguous use of spells, see also the conversation between Socrates and the courtesan Theodote (Mem. 3.1.16–17): Socrates seems to comically appropriate the technique of using spells, but this is not entirely compatible with his ideal of acquiring friends.}

We can now examine the second central idea of this passage, the love for the leader. Socrates and Critobulus agree that both Pericles and Themistocles managed to obtain the love of their city, the former through spells, the latter through benefaction. Strikingly, however, the image of love of the Athenians for either Pericles or Themistocles is not corroborated by ancient sources. Thucydides recounts in detail the ambivalent attitude of the Athenians towards Pericles and eloquently describes their turbulent relationship as follows (2.65.8):

The reason [for his success] was that he, influential through both reputation and judgement and notable for being most resistant to bribery, exercised free control over the people and was not led by them instead of leading them (κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο µᾶλλον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε), because he did not speak to please in order to acquire power by improper means but, since he had this through his prestige, even contradicted them in their anger.\footnote{See now Ferrario (2014) 106–20, for an analysis of Pericles’ relationship to the Athenian demos.}

In a similar vein, Plutarch also comments on Themistocles’ relationship with the Athenians (Them. 18.3):
He used to say of the Athenians that they did not really honour and admire him for himself, but treated him for all the world like a plane-tree, running under his branches for shelter when it stormed, but when they had fair weather all about them, plucking and docking him.

It is obvious then that Xenophon’s image of love for the leader is not inspired by the historical reality or the literary tradition regarding these Athenian leaders. It would be tempting to interpret the Xenophontic image of the love for the leader as another transformation of the metaphor of the lovers of the city (ἐρασταὶ πόλεως) used by Pericles in the Epitaphios. Pericles urges the Athenians to become lovers of their city and of its power (ἄλλα μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐργαθεῖσας καὶ ἐραστὰς γυγνομένους αὐτῆς, Thuc. 2.43.1). This metaphor, as Victoria Wohl has masterfully demonstrated, occupied a central position in the democracy’s ideology and united all citizens through a powerful image of male dominion.69 Interestingly, Xenophon eliminates political (democratic) eros and replaces it with political philia. This adaptation has further implications: the leader (and not the polis) becomes the object of love. In this way, the fusion between the polis and the politai implied in Pericles’ metaphor is denied: an asymmetry is established between the leader (the object of love) and the people (who are loving). We never hear of a leader loving his followers or subjects.60 Finally, and more importantly perhaps, political philia (contrary to the Periclean eros) is no longer associated with democracy. Indeed, Xenophon’s most compelling paradigms of leaders who acquired political philia are the two Persian kings, Cyrus the Great and Cyrus the Younger, who are described as the most beloved leaders (Cyr. 1.1.3, 1.6.24, 5.1.24; Ar.


60 Cyrus is characterised as φιλάνθρωπος, but this quality describes more his offers to his subordinates than the emotions he experiences towards them; cf. Eq. Mag. 6.2.
Athenian Leaders in Xenophon’s Memorabilia

1.9.28). From this perspective, Socrates’ description of Pericles and Themistocles as leaders who acquired the love of the city corresponds to a kind of Persianisation of the Athenian leaders.

A relevant passage from the Symposium can complete Xenophon’s vision of the Athenian democratic leaders. In this passage Socrates advises Callias how to gain the benevolence of Autolycos, his potential eromenos (8.38–9):

In your case, Callias, I think the gods deserve your thanks for inspiring you with love for Autolycos. ... So if you want to be in his good graces (εἰ οὖν βούλει τοῦτο ἀρέσκειν), you must try to find out what sort of knowledge it was that enabled Themistocles to liberate Greece (Θεµιστοκλῆς ἱκανὸς ἐγένετο τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἔλευθερον); you must try to find out what kind of knowledge it was that made Pericles gain a reputation for being his country’s best counsellor (Περικλῆς κράτιστος εἶδοκε τῇ πατρίδι σύμβουλος εἶναι); you must reflect further, how it was that Solon by deep thought established in his city the best laws (Σόλων φιλοσοφήσας νόµους κρατίστους τῇ πόλει κατέθηκεν); you must search out what kind of practices there are that give the Spartans the reputation of being preeminent military commanders (Λακεδαιµόνιοι ἀσκοῦντες κράτιστοι δοκοῦσιν ἁµεµόνες εἶναι).

The political relationships between leaders and their people are presented as models for private relationships. The implication is again that those leaders managed to gain the love of their followers; consequently, their paradigm should function as a model for Callias: just as the leaders’ superior knowledge led them to success and persuaded their followers, Callias should persuade Autolycos that he possesses superior knowledge in order to attract him. Leaving aside the oddity of the proposition that political models should inspire the private sphere, the selection of these four models is intriguing. Although it is difficult to find common features among all of them, it is possible to discern
two pairs: Themistocles–Pericles, Solon–Lacedaemonians.\footnote{The enumeration of these four models creates a misleading assimilation among them: Pericles and Themistocles indeed managed to acquire (at least temporarily) the benevolence of their people, but it is difficult to imagine an \textit{erastēs-eromenos} relationship for Solon and the Athenians, let alone for the Lacedaemonians and their allies or the rest of Greece!} For the first member of each pair (Themistocles, Solon), Xenophon reserves a positive evaluation, while he seems to offer a qualified judgement concerning the second member (Pericles, Lacedaemonians), by the use of the verb \textit{δοκεῖν}, which points to how these leaders are perceived by others.\footnote{I cannot follow Gray (2011) 100–5, who does not discern a difference between the verbs \textit{εἶναι} and \textit{δοκεῖν} in Xenophon. See further Tamiolaki (forthcoming, b).} We can thus surmise that Pericles and the Lacedaemonians are praised more timidly than Themistocles and Solon. This is no surprise, if we consider that both Pericles and the Lacedaemonians are leaders of empires who were met with much contestation and criticism in Xenophon’s time. Consequently, if Themistocles and Solon appear in a better light, it is because they have not been directly linked with imperialist practices.\footnote{The work of Herodotus and Thucydides shows that Themistocles could be viewed as the representative of a proto-empire. Xenophon, on the contrary, does not dwell on this aspect of his career.}

To sum up, our analysis has shown that the portraits of Pericles and Themistocles in the \textit{Memorabilia} are more complex than is usually assumed. Xenophon does not openly criticise the two leaders, but he presents some ambivalent features of them and he avoids explicit praise of them. This is certainly telling, given that he does not hesitate to praise openly leaders whom he really admires. Athenian democratic leaders are viewed positively only to the extent that they can be potentially assimilated with the Persian monarchs, who have gained Xenophon’s appreciation, or to the extent that they possess Socratic qualities. In this way, Xenophon rewrites the history of Athens by proposing a Persianisation and Socratisation of its leaders: Pericles is no longer the representative of
powerful imperialist Athens and Themistocles is not the cunning saviour of Greece who paved the way to Athens’ rise to power. Xenophon establishes a new (and rather questionable) connection between them, not as democratic leaders, but as leaders who, like Cyrus, have gained the love of their ‘followers’.


Xenophon introduces the conversations of the third book of the Memorabilia as follows (3.1.1): ‘I will now explain how he helped those who were eager to win noble things by making them qualify themselves for what they aimed for.’ This introduction, which seems only loosely connected with the defence of Socrates, is broad enough to accommodate a variety of topics. Indeed, the conversations of the third book cover many themes: politics, virtue, courage, wisdom, leisure, friendship, arts, the body, and social relationships. The first seven conversations (3.1–7) present Socrates giving political advice to Athenian individuals who have the ambition to enter into politics and hence can be examined as a coherent whole. Socrates’ political advice is of course dispersed throughout the Memorabilia, but this section of the third book enables us to form a clearer picture of the Athenian leaders who constitute Socrates’ interlocutors and their role in this work.

It is noteworthy that Socrates is not presented conversing with successful military leaders of Xenophon’s time, such as Iphicrates, whom Xenophon praises in the Hellenica (6.2.32), Conon, or Timotheus. Of the seven Socratic interlocutors of the third book, the first three are anonymous; the fourth is Nicomachides, a rather obscure figure not attested elsewhere; then follows Pericles II, the son of Pericles I, an unfortunate leader who was among the generals condemned to death after the battle of Arginusae; while the

64 Nails (2002), s.v.
last two interlocutors are individuals of aristocratic background, known also from Plato’s dialogues: Glaucus and Charmides. The group of Socrates’ interlocutors is thus far from homogeneous: it contains anonymous and named individuals, democrats and oligarchs. However, the common feature that unites all these individuals is an ambition to rule. Xenophon highlights this element by introducing in the same way Socrates’ anonymous interlocutors as people who had obtained or wished to obtain a high office in Athens (3.1.1, 3.2.1, 3.3.1):

…one of his companions wished to obtain the office of general from the state.

…one day he met a man who had been elected a general.

Again I know that he conversed with someone who had been elected leader of the cavalry in this way.

The named interlocutors also express similar concerns: Nicomachides complains to Socrates because he failed to be elected general; Socrates then gives detailed advice to Pericles II about how he will lead Athens to its past glory; he further tries to restrain Glaucus’s extreme political ambition; conversely, he encourages Charmides to cease to be shy and enter into politics.

All these individuals stand to profit from Socrates’ advice and hence serve to underline Socrates’ authority. It has already been observed by commentators that Socrates attempts to prove to all of them that their knowledge of politics is insufficient or problematic.63 In my opinion, Xenophon’s aim in these conversations is not limited to the demonstration of Socrates’ (superior) knowledge in political matters. By showing Socrates conversing with a variety of Athenian leaders, of different fame and background, Xenophon might have wished to hinder a hasty

63 McNamara (2009).
classification of Socrates as ‘democratic’ or ‘oligarchic’, based solely on the background of his interlocutors. These conversations highlight, on the contrary, the universal and paradigmatic dimension of Socrates’ teaching. At the same time, however, they can be seen as an occasion to put to the test important Socratic ideas: Socrates’ interlocutors question some of these and it is not certain that they are convinced by the whole Socratic edifice. In what follows I would like to suggest that the Athenian leaders who appear in the third book of the Memorabilia, despite their insufficiency, eventually contribute to the disclosure of some limitations of Socratic teaching and of its application in a democratic context. I will focus on this in two areas: (a) benefaction as a prerequisite to rule; and (b) Socratic analogies regarding leadership.

A pervasive element of Socrates’ teaching is that benefaction constitutes the most important prerequisite for rule. This assertion is repeated with variations in all the conversations of the third book of the Memorabilia: the aim of the military leader should be to care for the well-being of his soldiers (3.2); the aim of the leader of the cavalry should be to make his subordinates (men and horses) better (3.3); the aim of the politician should be to benefit his city (3.6); efficient people should participate in politics because this will entail profit both for themselves and for the city (3.7). Xenophon elaborates on this idea in the Cyropaedia as well: in the conversation between Cambyses and the young Cyrus, Cambyses advises his son that the only way to gain the love of his followers is benefaction (1.6.24). And, of course, all the model leaders that Xenophon admires, such as Cyrus or Agesilaus, possess this quality.

This idea is certainly compelling and Xenophon takes pains to develop it at length in various of his works. Some questions arise, however, when Socrates attempts to apply it to democratic leaders. In his discussion with the anonymous

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66 For instance, Gray (2004) considers Socrates democratic because he converses with Athenian democratic leaders.
Athenian who desired to be a general, Socrates states (3.2.2–4):

Why do you think Homer dubs Agamemnon ‘shepherd of the people’? Is it because a shepherd should care that his sheep are safe and have what they need, and that the purpose for which they are kept is achieved, and a general should take care that his men are safe and have what they need, and that the purpose for which they fight is achieved? … A king is elected (βασιλεύς αἱρεῖται) not to take good care of himself, but for the good of those who have elected him (ὅνα καὶ οἱ ἑλόμενοι δι’ αὐτῶν εὖ πράττωσι); and all men fight in order that they may get the best life possible, and choose generals to guide them to it. Therefore it is the commander’s duty to deliver this for those who have elected him as a general (τοῖς ἑλομένοις αὐτὸν στρατηγόν).

The comparison of a democratic general with a king blurs constitutional boundaries. Socrates seems here to suggest that the qualities of a good leader may not be dependent on constitutions. However, in order to defend this idea, he has recourse to a paradox: he states that the king is elected (βασιλεύς αἱρεῖται, ἑλόμενοι). Yet election is a democratic procedure par excellence, while royalty is based on hereditary rights. This paradox obscures the fundamental differences between a king and a democratic general and points to a fusion between constitutions: the democratic leader should resemble the king regarding benefaction, while the king is supposed to resemble (?) the military leader in that he is elected. This image obviously serves Socrates’ paradigm, but at the same time reveals its limitations: to what extent are kings and military leaders really comparable? This conversation is very short and we never hear whether Socrates’ interlocutor was convinced by this comparison.

We can now turn to the analogies that we find in Socrates’ conversations with Nicomachides, Glaucon and Charmides: between chorus–polis, oikos–polis, and the public–private spheres. It is remarkable that these analogies
are met with contestation from Socrates’ interlocutors. First, Nicomachides complains that Antisthenes was elected general instead of himself and questions the criteria of this election: the Athenians elected Antisthenes not on the basis of his military competence, but because he was a good chorus-trainer (chorēgos). Socrates tries to convince him that the qualities needed to be a good chorēgos or a good household manager do not essentially differ from the qualities of a good general (chorēgos, our, our, our, our): ‘If a man controls something, if he knows what he wants and can get it, he will be a good leader, be it of a chorus, an estate, a city, or an army.’ Nicomachides is not persuaded by this assertion, so Socrates undertakes to convince him by urging him to a joint inquiry on the convergences between the art of household management (οἰκονοµική) and the art of politics (πολιτική). Socrates starts enumerating some similarities between the two spheres, but Nicomachides responds that fighting is not a shared feature in them. When Socrates replies that the household manager also has enemies, Nicomachides is again not convinced (chorēgos, our, our, our): ‘But you don’t say how business capacity will help when it comes to fighting.’ Socrates rebukes his point in detail (chorēgos, our, our, our, our, our, our, our):

The good household leader, through his knowledge that nothing profits or pays like a victory in the field, and nothing is so utterly unprofitable and entails such heavy loss as a defeat, will be eager to seek and furnish all aids to victory, careful to consider and avoid what leads to defeat, prompt to engage the enemy if he sees they are strong enough to win, and, above all, will avoid an engagement when he is not ready. Don’t look down on businessmen, Nicomachides. For the management of private concerns differs only in quantity from that of public affairs. In other respects they are much alike, and particularly in this, that neither can be carried on without people, and the

67 For the chorus as a model of government, see Athanassaki (2015), who rightly observes that the paradigm of the chorus is not a viable political model.
people employed in public and private transactions are the same.

Socrates’ argumentation at this point has prompted scholars to stress the interdependence of public and private spheres in Xenophon’s thought. However, Socrates’ reply is far from satisfactory. The image Socrates employs to support his thesis is much more suitable for a general than for a household manager. He does not clarify who are the enemies of a household manager and what kind of victory he is supposed to fight and win. It seems that Socrates ‘politicises’ the household manager rather than shows his similarities with the political leader. Furthermore, it should be noted that Socrates’ conclusion about the quasi-identification of the private with the public sphere leads him eventually to justify the election of a good chorēgos as a general. This justification, however, contradicts Socrates’ conviction, amply expressed throughout the Memorabilia, according to which epistēmē, in the sense of competence in a specific field, is the most essential prerequisite for successful leadership. From this perspective, the knowledge of a good chorēgos is indeed essential for his occupation, but not necessarily transferrable to the field of politics. It is thus perhaps no coincidence that we do not hear whether Nicomachides was eventually persuaded by Socrates’ lengthy argumentation, which turns out to be fragile.

The analogy between the oikos and the polis appears also in the conversation with Glaucon. After having uncovered Glaucon’s ignorance about matters of the city, thus proving him unworthy of ruling it, Socrates proceeds to the following argument (3.6.14–16):

‘But you know, no one will ever manage even his own household successfully, unless he knows all its needs and sees that they are all supplied. Seeing that our city contains more than ten thousand houses, and it is

difficult to look after so many families at once, you must have tried to make a start by doing something for one, I mean your uncle’s? It needs it; and if you succeed with that one, you can set to work on a larger number. But if you can’t do anything for one, how are you going to succeed with many? If a man can’t carry one talent it’s absurd for him to try to carry more than one, isn’t it?’

‘Well, I could do something for uncle’s household if only he would listen to me.’

‘What? You can’t persuade your uncle, and yet you suppose you will be able to persuade all the Athenians, including your uncle, to listen to you? Do take care, Glaucon, your desire for reputation may lead you to an opposite result!’

Socrates here again establishes an analogy between persuading one person and persuading a multitude: according to his view, if somebody can persuade one person, this entails that he can also persuade many. This analogy is again questionable. Masses usually function in a very different way from individuals, and it is often easier to persuade a multitude than a single individual. Herodotus expressed this most clearly concerning Aristagoras’ request for help at the beginning of the Ionian revolution. The historian succinctly comments on the fact that the multitude of the Athenians was convinced, whereas the Spartan Cleomenes was not (Hdt. 5.97): ‘It seems that it is easier to fool many men than one; Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian was only one, but Aristagoras could not fool him, though he managed to do so with thirty thousand Athenians.’ As in the case of Nicomachides, Xenophon does not inform us whether Glaucon was eventually convinced by Socrates.

Finally, we turn to the shy Charmides. Contrary to Glaucon, Charmides is reluctant to appear in public, whereas he does not hesitate to display his qualities in private. Socrates appreciates his qualities; that is why he encourages him to enter into politics. It is interesting that in the course of this conversation, Socrates twice asserts that
Charmides’ competence in private affairs can help him with his career in public, while Charmides twice contests this assertion. Socrates offers an empirical and a theoretical explanation of his point of view (3.7.3 and 4):

**Empirical:** In your (private) associations with public men (I appreciated your qualities). Whenever they take counsel with you, I find that you give excellent advice, and whenever they make a mistake, your criticism is sound.

**Theoretical:** A man who is good at figures counts as well in a crowd as in solitude; and those who play the harp best in private excel no less in a crowd.

Charmides challenges both these assertions: ‘A private conversation is a very different thing from a crowded debate, Socrates’ (3.7.4); ‘But don’t you see that bashfulness and timidity come naturally to a man and affect him far more powerfully in the presence of a multitude than in private society?’ (3.7.5). More importantly, Socrates ends up qualifying his belief in the absolute convergence between the private and the public sphere. He proceeds to a description of the Athenian multitude, explaining to Charmides that the Athenian assembly consists of fullers, cobblers, builders, smiths and farmers, all of whom have never thought about politics (3.7.6–7). His aim is to show that in reality the people with whom Charmides converses in private are more difficult to persuade than the multitude of the Athenians who are members of the Assembly. Consequently, he should not be afraid of their criticism, since he is evidently superior to them. In this way, however, Socrates considerably nuances his conception of the analogy between the private and the public sphere: somebody who is successful in the private sphere is not automatically successful in the public sphere, as he had suggested before, in his conversation with Nicomachides; he can be successful, to the extent that the public sphere is composed of ignorant and intellectually inferior people.
According to some commentators, Charmides’ subsequent career as a member of the Thirty proves the destructive consequences of following Socrates’ advice.\(^70\) However, Socrates’ advice concerned democracy and Charmides did not literally follow it. On the contrary, he participated in a government that considerably restrained the number of the citizens in the Assembly.\(^71\) So Charmides eventually was not convinced by Socrates’ arguments and remained faithful to his principle not to interfere with the mass of the Athenians.

In brief, the Athenian leaders who converse with Socrates in the third book of the *Memorabilia* may not be so famous, but their function is to bring to light Socrates’ political teaching. More specifically, the fact that these leaders are not passive interlocutors, but react often with intelligent arguments and questions to Socrates’ ideas shows that Socrates’ teaching contained some ambivalent features that could not be easily digested. The reason for this may be that Socrates’ advice was not as easily applicable in every context as he wished to present it. For example, a tension can be observed between Socrates’ effort to advertise his ideas as universal and applicable to all constitutions and the limitations posed by democracy: the assimilation of a democratic leader with a king is subject to ambiguity, while his most cherished analogy, that between the public and the private spheres, does not immediately gain the approval of his fellow citizens and Socrates has to try hard, even with strained arguments, in order to convince them. Overall, then, the Athenian leaders, despite their insufficiencies, reveal, through their questioning of Socrates and their hesitant admission (or even denial) of his ideas, the limitations of Socratic teaching, and also highlight the difficulty of imposing these ideas in a democratic context.

\(^70\) See the discussion in Dorion (2011) 322–4.

\(^71\) For the restriction of citizens in the Assembly under the Thirty, see Krentz (1982) 64–8.
Conclusion

This study has treated the Athenian leaders who appear in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*. These leaders cover a great span of time (from Themistocles to Xenophon’s contemporaries) and are of various reputations, backgrounds, and moral standards: they are named or anonymous, democrats or oligarchs, morally good, bad or indifferent. It is time now to return to Badian’s assertion about Xenophon’s positive evaluation of Athenian leaders in the *Hellenica* and inquire whether our investigation can confirm or qualify it. Our analysis has shown that Xenophon does not adopt a hostile attitude towards any of the Athenian leaders. Even his account of the notorious Critias and Alcibiades does not fully support the negative characterisations with which he had introduced the two individuals. This could place the *Memorabilia* in line with the *Hellenica*. Unlike the *Hellenica*, however, Xenophon avoids explicit praise of Athenian leaders. On the contrary, we are acquainted with their weaknesses: Critias and Alcibiades failed to exploit the potential of their nature and origin; Pericles and Themistocles are subtly criticised or very timidly praised; the political skills of the Athenian leaders of the third book are either absent or dubious, or in the best case latent. Furthermore, despite their weak achievement in politics, Athenian leaders in the *Memorabilia* are presented as skilled in dialectic, since they actively participate in conversations about important and debated political issues (e.g. about law and constitutions, democratic leadership and kingship, public and private spheres). In sum, then, Xenophon recognises some qualities in Athenian leaders, although he does not seem to particularly admire them.

The reason for Xenophon’s presentation is related to the nature and purpose of the *Memorabilia*. In this paper I have argued that Xenophon pursues two agendas in the *Memorabilia*: an apologetic one and a political one. The apologetic agenda is related to his defence of Socrates, while the political agenda concerns the elaboration of political matters that preoccupied him and his contemporaries. Xenophon’s treatment of Athenian leaders reflects these
two agendas: on the one hand, the avoidance of explicit praise for them or the insistence on their insufficiency serves the apologetic agenda, since it underlines *a contrario* Socrates’ superiority in both moral and political matters. On the other hand, the active participation of Athenian leaders in theoretical discussions enables Xenophon to respond to contemporary political debates. These discussions are more loosely connected with the apologetic purpose of the *Memorabilia*. The fact that most of the time they are left pending illustrates Xenophon’s wish to provoke reflection on political matters of his times.

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TYRANTS AS IMPIOUS LEADERS IN XENOPHON’S *Hellenica*

Frances Pownall

Abstract: Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the consistent focus throughout Xenophon’s large and disparate body of work upon articulating a very specific set of virtues that define a good leader. I examine the reverse side of this trend in scholarship by identifying the characteristics that Xenophon employs to define bad leaders. I argue that Xenophon deliberately shaped his narrative in the *Hellenica* to portray egregiously bad leaders as tyrants, focusing in particular upon their impiety, which he presents as the crucial explanatory factor in their downfalls. Appropriating the figure of the evil tyrant from Athenian democratic ideology, he bequeaths to the later Greek historiographical tradition the *topos* of the impious tyrant.

Keywords: Xenophon, tyranny, impiety, the Thirty, Jason of Pherae, Euphron of Sicyon.

Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the consistent focus throughout Xenophon’s large and disparate body of work upon identifying and articulating a very specific set of virtues that define a good leader.¹ I intend to examine the reverse side of this recent

¹ I have benefitted from the generous comments and advice of audiences at the 2014 APA meeting in Chicago, at the Department of Classics and Religion at the University of Calgary, and at Philipps Universität in Marburg, as well as from the anonymous reviewers for *Histos* and the editor.

¹ While Xenophon’s theory of leadership has been a topic of interest for scholars since the middle of the twentieth century, beginning with the seminal work of Breitenbach (1950) and Wood (1964), and much of it focusing upon how his own military experience influenced his conception of the ideal leader (e.g. Hutchinson (2000), Buzzetti (2014), Buxton in this volume), recently there has been a more integrated approach, emphasising the unity of Xenophon’s moral and political
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trend in scholarship that is, to identify the characteristics that Xenophon employs to define bad leaders. Because this is potentially a vast topic, I will confine my observations here to the *Hellenica*. The purpose of the *Hellenica* is prescriptive, in that Xenophon employs contemporary political and military events to illustrate how to behave and, more to the point perhaps, how not to behave in political and military life.² For that reason, it offers a useful vehicle through which to examine an important but understudied facet of Xenophon’s conception of ideal leadership, his definition of the bad leader, for the isolation of the vices that constitute the bad leader offers a mirror image of the virtues that define the good leader and therefore serves to crystallise his views. Michael Flower demonstrates in this volume that the under-appreciated virtue of piety is central to Xenophon’s definition of the ideal leader.³ As I shall argue, the converse is also true, that impiety is central to Xenophon’s conception of the bad leader; more specifically, when he singles out Greek leaders as egregiously bad, he does so by portraying them as tyrants (the stereotypical bad leaders of the contemporary Greek world), and by focusing in particular upon their impiety, which he presents as the crucial explanatory factor in their downfalls.

In the *Hellenica*, it is noteworthy that Xenophon has carefully and skilfully drawn even his villains as fully fleshed-out characters in order to illustrate how their bad leadership results in disastrous consequences, particularly on a personal level.⁴ Furthermore, as scholarship of the last generation has increasingly recognised, his narrative is nuanced and sophisticated, not least in his portrayals of leaders. Melina Tamiolaki has recently argued that

Xenophon’s portrayal of leaders is ambiguous, in that even virtuous leaders are not always successful, because no political or military leader in the real world can measure up to the ideal virtue of Socrates. Her observation is convincing, in that even the better, more ideal leaders in the Hellenica have their flaws (as, for example, in Agesilaus’ scheming and ambitious path to the Spartan throne), for Xenophon does not see the world in black and white, but in shades of grey. Again, it is constructive to look at the reverse side of this observation, that is, at how Xenophon’s portrayal of bad leaders sometimes shades into the grey spectrum as well.

This ambiguity applies even to his portrayal of what the fourth-century Greeks of Xenophon’s day considered the worst type of ruler, the tyrant, for tyranny was a form of government that was by this time usually associated with barbarians (particularly Persians) and Greeks on the periphery (particularly in Sicily), and represented in general as absolute and unconstitutional rule of the most decadent and corrupt type. But on the other hand, absolute rule, of the enlightened kind naturally, also exercised a sort of appeal to Xenophon who, along with Plato, Aristotle, and other members of the intellectual elite, was opposed to democracy on the grounds that it pandered to the lowest common denominator and offered opportunities for unscrupulous demagogues to sway the crowd, resulting in at best popular sovereignty (as proponents of democracy put it) and at worst mob rule, as characterised by those who opposed democracy, whether we call them ‘dissenters’

5 Tamiolaki (2012).
6 Compare Xenophon’s account of Agesilaus’ accession in the Hellenica (3.3.1–4) with that in his encomiastic biography of the Spartan king (Agesilaus 1.3).
7 Tyranny was a slippery and therefore usefully malleable concept for the Greeks by this time. Recent scholarship has demonstrated how the term, once applied positively or at least with relative neutrality to the one-man rulers of the Archaic Age, after the Persian Wars underwent a semantic shift and began to designate oppression, unconstitutionality, and the abuse of power for selfish material gain; see esp. Anderson (2005), Lewis (2009), Mitchell (2013).
(along with Josiah Ober) or ‘discontents’ (along with Kathryn Morgan).\(^8\) Hence, it is no coincidence that Xenophon’s most sustained treatise on leadership was his *Cyropaedia*, where he articulated the qualities of the ideal leader through the figure of Cyrus the Great,\(^9\) the founder of the Achaemenid dynasty and first of a long line of Great Kings of Persia, who symbolised the absolute ruler *par excellence* as far as the Greeks were concerned and had done so since the Persian Wars.\(^10\) Similarly, Xenophon gives voice to some of the positive aspects of absolute rule in the dialogue between the poet Simonides and his patron, the Deinomenid tyrant Hiero in Syracuse, whose portrayal is somewhat ambiguous, as noted by Roberta Sevieri in her analysis of the dialogue:\(^11\)

It could be said that Hiero starts as a kind of imperfect hero, one who retains only the negative aspects of this always ambiguous figure (both to be admired and to be avoided), and ends up as the perfect hero, one who uses his somewhat dangerous power to the benefit of the community.\(^12\)

This ever-present ambiguity of both the hero and the tyrant is equally present in Xenophon’s cautionary portrayal of bad leaders in the *Hellenica*.

It is quite remarkable (and once again no coincidence) that some of the most detailed and vivid episodes in the *Hellenica* centre around Greek leaders whom Xenophon

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\(^8\) Ober (1998); Morgan (2003).

\(^9\) On Xenophon’s portrayal of leadership in the *Cyropaedia*, see the very different readings offered by Tatum (1989), Due (1989), Gera (1993), Nadon (2001), Sandridge (2012).

\(^10\) Cf., e.g., Dewald (2003) 32–5.


\(^12\) Sevieri (2004) 279. Cf. Gray (2011) 2: ‘Xenophon believed also that leaders were fundamental to the success of any organisation, but he also knew the risk of the drift toward autocracy.’ It is worth noting in this connection that the virtue of piety (unusually for Xenophon) is conspicuous by its absence in the *Hiero*; cf. Lu (2015) 107.
deliberately identifies as tyrants:13 Critias and the Thirty in Athens (2.3.11–2.4.43), the Corinthian rulers during the short-lived Argive-Corinthian sympolity (4.4.1–5.1.34, esp. 4.41–6), the Theban polemarchs who occupy the Cadmea on the Spartans’ behalf (5.4.1–13), Jason of Pherae (6.1.2–19 and 6.4.20–32), and Euphron of Sicyon (7.1.44–6 and 7.3.1–12). In Xenophon’s narrative, all these leaders serve as what Sian Lewis has called ‘textbook’ examples of tyrants,14 in that they seize autocratic power unlawfully, motivated solely by personal aggrandisement, and maintain that illegitimate rule by force, particularly through the removal of actual or potential political opponents and the appropriation of private or sacred funds for their own selfish ends. With this use of force, often bolstered by bodyguards or mercenaries, the tyrant by definition rules over an unwilling populace; thus, by the criterion which Vivienne Gray has so brilliantly demonstrated to lie at the heart of Xenophon’s theory of leadership, that is, the ability to obtain the willing obedience of the ruled,15 a tyrant is the ultimate bad leader. Presumably this is precisely why Xenophon chooses to portray all of these regimes as tyrannical (I shall return to this question at the end), although it appears as we shall see that technically they did not necessarily wield unconstitutional rule by force, and Xenophon attempts to obscure the constitutional basis to their governments in his narrative.

Whatever may have happened in the later stages of their regime, the Thirty were elected to power legally (as even Xenophon concedes at 2.3.11), and so technically they did not in fact usurp power in a tyrannical fashion. Furthermore, although Xenophon tries very hard in the Hellenica to obscure any actual political or ideological basis for their
government, the Thirty were seriously engaged in the process of political reform, remodelling the constitution of Athens into an oligarchy on the Spartan model. Nevertheless, Xenophon portrays the rule of the Thirty as arbitrary (\(\text{ὅσπερ τυραννίδος}\)), motivated only by personal advantage (\(\text{ὅσπερ τυραννίδος}\)), and explicitly equates their government with tyranny, putting into the mouth of their leader Critias the following statement addressed to his erstwhile friend turned political opponent Theramenes (2.3.16): ‘And if, because we are thirty and not one, you think it is necessary to take any less care of this government than as if it were a tyranny (\(\text{ὡς τυραννίδα}\)), you are simple-minded.’ Although Xenophon does not endorse in propria persona this equation of the Thirty with tyranny (a statement reminiscent of the Thucydidean Pericles’ and Cleon’s descriptions of the fifth-century Athenian empire), his narrative of the rule of the Thirty emphasises their stereotypically tyrannical behaviour, focusing upon their disarming of the population (a standard device of tyrants to pre-empt any attempts to remove them from power), their absolute power giving them license to act arbitrarily in whatever way they wished, and their intimidation of the Council into endorsing their measures by stationing young men armed with daggers who serve as the equivalent of the tyrant’s bodyguard. Xenophon’s narrative of the reign of terror of the Thirty is bookended by a second conversation between Critias and Theramenes, in which this time the latter refers twice to the government of the Thirty as a tyranny (2.3.48 and 49).

16 For a detailed examination of the tendentious nature of Xenophon’s narrative of the Thirty in the Hellenica, see Pownall (2012); see also Danzig (2014) 514–16.

17 This so-called ‘revisionist’ view was developed by Krentz (1982) 57–68 and Whitehead (1982/3), and has more recently been demonstrated by Osborne (2003); Shear (2011) 166–87; Pownall (2012).

18 Thuc. 2.63.2 and 3.37.2; cf. Tuplin (1993) 44 and Dillery (1995) 149. Note the distinction between Pericles’ statement that it is necessary for the Athenians to hold their empire ‘like a tyranny’ (\(\text{ὡς τυραννίδα}\)) and Cleon’s blunt reference to the empire as a tyranny.
Xenophon’s portrayal of Critias and the Thirty serves an important programmatic function in the *Hellenica*, supplying models of typical tyrants (whose rule is destined by definition to fail), as convincingly demonstrated by Peter Krentz, Christopher Tuplin, and John Dillery. But I would argue that Xenophon’s goal is not just to exemplify the failure of Sparta’s imperialism (for his narrative is certainly complex enough to have multiple messages), but also to illustrate the stereotypical features of tyranny (which simultaneously serve as an explanation for its inevitable fall). In particular, I would like to draw attention to one facet of Xenophon’s portrayal of the rise and the fall of all the leaders or regimes whom he explicitly identifies as tyrants (and singles out for special treatment in his narrative), which has received little attention, his allegation that each of them acted impiously.

One of the most dramatic scenes in Xenophon’s narrative of the Thirty occurs in the final showdown between Critias and Theramenes, when Critias violates the traditional rules of supplication by ordering Theramenes forcibly dragged away from the altar where he had taken refuge. Xenophon uses the character of Theramenes himself to underline this act of transgression against religious norms (2.3.53):

> And by the gods, he said, I am not unaware of the fact that this altar will not help me at all, but I wish to make this point clear too, that these men are not only very unjust towards humans but also very impious towards the gods (οὗτοι οὐ μόνον εἰσὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους ἀδικώτατοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ θεούς ἄσεβέστατοι).

And Theramenes is absolutely correct in this assumption, for immediately after he denounces the Thirty for their impiety, he is dragged away to his death by the Eleven led by Satyrus, whom Xenophon characterises as ‘the boldest

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and most lacking in reverence’ (τοῦ θρασυτάτου τε καὶ ἀναιδεστάτου, 2.3.54). Xenophon further highlights the injustice and impiety of Theramenes’ death by hemlock by attributing to him, with a somewhat self-conscious apology for the inclusion of this material that is not appropriate to a work of history, two quips of gallows humour worthy of Socrates himself, one directed at Satyrus and the other directed at Critias (2.3.56).

Furthermore, it is surely no coincidence that Xenophon concludes his narrative of Theramenes’ death with the only explicit statement in his own voice that the Thirty were tyrants (2.4.1): ‘Theramenes died in this way. And it now seemed to the Thirty that they could act as tyrants without fear (τυραννεῖν ἀδεῶς).’ Perhaps even more significantly, in the military campaign of Thrasybulus and the democratic resistance against the Thirty which immediately follows in Xenophon’s narrative, the hand of the gods is prominent. When the Thirty attempt to blockade Thrasybulus and his forces in the border fortress which they have occupied, an unexpected snowstorm arrives and prevents them (2.4.2–3). Xenophon emphasises the providential nature of this snowstorm by remarking first that it appeared on a clear day and second that it was the storm alone that prevented the Thirty from carrying out their goal of laying siege to Thrasybulus and his forces.

This failure to dislodge Thrasybulus represents the beginning of the end for the Thirty, and the climactic battle, which results in the death of Critias and the decisive defeat of the Thirty, soon ensues. In his speech before the battle, Thrasybulus encourages his troops by saying that the gods are clearly on their side, for they sent a storm in fair weather to help them and arranged it so that the location of the upcoming battle was favourable to them (2.4.14–15). He concludes his speech with another reference to the help his troops can expect from the gods, and promises to follow the normal battle conventions of singing the paean and chanting

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the war cry to the war god Enyalius (2.4.17). Thrasybulus’ own piety is reinforced by his obedience to the instructions of the seer to refrain from battle until one of his own men is either killed or wounded (2.4.18). The unnamed seer then duly sacrifices himself to save his fellow soldiers, an action which Xenophon suggests was divinely inspired, for he falls in battle ‘as if guided by some fate’ (ὡσπερ ὑπὸ µοίρας τινὸς ἀγόµενος, 2.4.19). Xenophon once again juxtaposes the piety of Thrasybulus and the forces from Phyle to the impiety of the Thirty in a speech by Cleocritus, the herald of the initiates of the Eleusinian Mysteries, who makes a battlefield plea for reconciliation after the victory of the democratic resistance over the Thirty (2.4.21–2):

> By the gods of our fathers and mothers … have reverence for both the gods and human beings (αἰδούµενοι καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους) and cease from committing wrongs against your country. Do not obey the most impious Thirty (µὴ πείθεσθε τοῖς ἀνοσιωτάτοις τριάκοντα), who for their own private gain almost killed more Athenians in eight months than all the Peloponnesians did in ten years of war. Even though it is possible for us to govern our city in peace, these men bring us to a war against each other that is most shameful, oppressive, impious and hateful to both gods and human beings (τὸν πάντων αἴσχιστόν τε καὶ χαλεπώτατον καὶ ἀνοσιώτατον καὶ ἔχθιστον καὶ θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις πόλεµον).

This unusually large number of references to the impiety of the Thirty is surely not accidental, coming as it does just after Xenophon’s denunciation of their regime as a tyranny and Critias’ refusal of sanctuary to Theramenes, which Xenophon has highlighted in his narrative with Theramenes’ outburst in direct speech and his own apologetic authorial comments on Theramenes’ self-possession in the face of death. The conclusion is inescapable that Xenophon intends the reader to view
Critias’ death, and by extension the downfall of the Thirty, as divine retribution.\textsuperscript{21}

I think, however, that we can go further than this fairly obvious conclusion, for this episode contains an important, but until now overlooked, dimension to Xenophon’s portrayal of tyranny in the \textit{Hellenica}, and that is the manner of Critias’ death. For the stereotypical fate of a tyrant is to be assassinated, all the more so to an Athenian audience, for whom, according to the ‘master narrative’ of the Athenian democratic tradition,\textsuperscript{22} the ‘tyrannicides’ Harmodius and Aristogeiton liberated Athens from the Peisistratid tyranny by their assassination of Hipparchus, and in doing so ushered in democracy. This strongly held, if utterly erroneous,\textsuperscript{23} founding narrative of the Athenian democracy was continually reinforced, for Xenophon’s contemporaries were accustomed to gazing upon the famous statues of the tyrannicides which were given pride of place in the Agora, singing the drinking songs celebrating the tyrannicides’ deed, and were well aware of the privileges granted to the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, the Athenians had even (in the aftermath of the oligarchic rule of the Four Hundred) enacted the decree of Demophantus, which explicitly authorised the violent assassination of tyrants by individuals in order to protect the restored democracy.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{21} Pownall (1998) 259–60.

\textsuperscript{22} The term is that of Forsdyke (2005) 242; cf. Steinbock (2013) 20 and n. 86.

\textsuperscript{23} As demonstrated by Herodotus (5.55 and 62–5); Thucydides (6.53.3–59); [Arist.] \textit{Ath. Pol.} 18–19.

\textsuperscript{24} On the Athenian foundation narrative of their democracy and the very visible memorials commemorating the so-called tyrannicides, see Pownall (2013) and Azoulay (2014), both with earlier bibliography. On the renewed public interest in the tyrannicides at the close of the fifth century in the wake of the defeat of the Thirty, see Teegarden (2014) 43–7; cf. Raaflaub (2003); Shear (2012), esp. 51–2; Azoulay (2014) 97–120.

\textsuperscript{25} On the decree of Demophantus and the role of other tyrant-killing legislation in support of democratic ideology, see Teegarden (2014); he discusses the late fifth-century historical context at 15–33.
But the manner of Critias’ death does not match the stereotypical fate of tyrants, in that he was not assassinated but died in battle, if anything, an honourable death by the standards of his day (as in the advice of Solon to Croesus at Hdt. 1.30.4–5, for example), which is underlined by Xenophon’s observation that the victorious democrats did not fully strip the corpses of their citizen opponents (2.4.19). The nature of Critias’ death in battle poses a problem for Xenophon (which is probably why he skates over it in his narrative) if, as it seems, Critias and the Thirty serve as paradigmatic examples of bad leaders, whose downfall is intended to provide a moral lesson. It is likely that the desire to provide an explanation for Critias’ ‘unusual’ death is precisely why Xenophon places so great an emphasis on divine retribution in this section of his narrative. Instead of being assassinated by an individual or a small group of conspirators, Critias is punished for his crimes by the gods. But in order for the gods to intervene, an act of impiety has to have occurred, which is why Critias’ violation of sanctuary in particular, and the rather more vague allegations of the impiety of the Thirty in general, are given such emphasis in Xenophon’s narrative.

Furthermore, Xenophon’s highlighting of impiety as an explanatory factor in the downfall of Critias and the Thirty leads us to expect it in his narrative of other Greek leaders whom he singles out as tyrants: the Corinthian rulers during the Argive-Corinthian political union, the Theban polemarchs (and their Spartan allies) who seized the Cadmea, Jason of Pherae, and Euphron of Sicyon. Xenophon further draws attention to what he suggests is the singular nature of the regimes in the cases of the Corinthian and Theban rulers by engaging in rare first person denunciation, and in the cases of Jason and Euphron by devoting not only one, but two carefully demarcated digressions from his narrative.

26 Pace Krentz (1995) 145, who views this observation as ‘another indication of the moral superiority of the democrats’.

27 Cf. Dillery (1995) 162: ‘The paradigm gives Xenophon the opportunity to set out not just his understanding of why the Thirty fell but also how any regime falls.’
to each of them, notably for both sets of cases the only places in the *Hellenica* where he does so.\textsuperscript{28}

After his programmatic narrative of the tyranny of Critias and the Thirty, the next Greek leaders whom Xenophon identifies as tyrants in the *Hellenica* are the Corinthian democrats. These men, having received bribes from the Persian king to effect the continuation of the Corinthian War, conspire with the aid of the Argives, Athenians, and Boeotians to massacre the Corinthian oligarchs, who advocate making peace with Sparta. In his narrative of this episode, Xenophon employs unusually strong language to denounce the Corinthian conspirators, condemning the timing of the massacre during a religious festival as ‘the most sacrilegious plan of all’ (τὸ πάντων ἀνοσιώτατον, 4.4.2), and referring to them as ‘utterly sacrilegious’ (ἀνοσιώτατοι) when they continued to slaughter their victims even when they took refuge at the statues of the gods in the marketplace and at the altars of the gods, an action which he explicitly characterises as impiety (ἀσέβεια) in the eyes of the law-abiding citizens who witnessed these atrocities (4.4.3). The survivors of the massacre piously obey a portent and remain in the city, which has by now undergone a full political union with Argos (4.4.4–6), but when they see that those in power are ruling as tyrants (τυραννεύοντας, 4.4.6), they summon the Spartans to liberate the city. The Spartans are successful, and in a scene replete with divine retribution (4.4.8: τύχη; cf. 4.4.7: ἐτύγχανε, 4.4.12: ὁ θεός, θεῖον) wreak terrible vengeance upon the perpetrators of the massacre.\textsuperscript{29}

Although the Corinthian democrats certainly obtained power through violent means, their rule appears to be less a ‘tyranny’ in the usual sense of the word than a victory of the


\textsuperscript{29} For discussion of this episode, see Gray (1989) 154–7, Tuplin (1993) 69–70, Pownall (1998) 284–5 and cad. (2004) 85 and 88–9; none of these scholars, however, draws the connection between impiety and tyranny.
stronger side in an episode of civil strife (a phenomenon endemic to the cities of Archaic and Classical Greece), which is presumably why Xenophon distances himself by placing the explicit identification of their government as a tyranny in the mouth of their political enemies and does not endorse it  

\textit{in propria persona}. That said, however, through the narrative strategy of ‘focalisation’, that is, presenting what the characters subjectively perceive (or, in this case, say) on the basis of their own frame of reference, Xenophon privileges, and in fact reinforces, the negative portrayal of the regime of the Corinthian democrats.\footnote{On the application of the techniques of narratological analysis to Thucydides, see Rood (1998), esp. his discussion of the term ‘focalisation’ (11–14 and 20–4), and some of the problems inherent in its application (294–6). As he observes (296): ‘the narrator selects from the information that is within the character’s field of knowledge (or ‘vision’) what is relevant for the story.’} For what it is worth, our other source for the Argive-Corinth political union, Diodorus (14.86), presents this episode straightforwardly as the result of civil strife,\footnote{Cf. Cawkwell (1979) 209, who observes that ‘the plan to unite Corinth and Argos was perhaps popular enough (cf. 5.1.34)’.} and it seems that the reference to the Corinthian democrats as ‘tyrants’ and the focus upon their impiety as the explanatory factor of their downfall are elements unique to Xenophon.

Similarly, in the only other episode in the \textit{Hellenica} where Xenophon resorts to explicit condemnation in the first person, he identifies the Theban polemarchs who handed over the Cadmea to the Spartans as tyrants, and further justifies their assassination by linking them to the Spartans’ impiety in seizing the Cadmea in contravention of the oaths they had sworn in the King’s Peace (oaths, of course, are guaranteed by the gods). The episode begins with a vehement denunciation of the Spartans for their oath breaking (dfive), which Xenophon identifies as the historical explanation for Sparta’s ultimate failure to achieve lasting hegemony of Greece.\footnote{On Xenophon’s use of the divine as a historical agent, see Dillery (1995) 179–237; esp. his observation (223–5) that in Diodorus’ account (15.1.1–3), by contrast, the gods are absent and the Spartans’ failure is} Xenophon stresses that divine
vengeance for the Spartans’ act of impiety came about through the agency of the very people whom they had wronged (i.e. the Thebans at Leuctra), and states that the Thebans who had collaborated with the Spartans in the seizure of the Cadmea were included in the Spartans’ divine punishment. Then he proceeds to narrate another of the most colourful episodes in the Hellenica, in which seven political exiles from Thebes conspire against the pro-Spartan government, gain entry to a symposium disguised as women and assassinate the Theban polemarchs once they have been plied with sufficient wine. The political supporters of the polemarchs, whom Xenophon explicitly associates with their tyranny in a later context (7.3-7), are assassinated (although they have been granted safe conduct) by the Thebans, who even kill their children (5.4.11-12).

What is particularly interesting for our purposes, however, is the juxtaposition between the Theban leaders’ impiety (by association with their collusion with the Spartans) and Xenophon’s portrayal of them as tyrants. Although as polemarchs, and therefore legally elected rulers, the Theban collaborators are surely not technically tyrants by any definition, Xenophon refers to them three times unambiguously as tyrants in his narrative of this episode, and a fourth time later on. In his introduction to the episode, in which he denounces with such vehemence the impiety of the Spartans, Xenophon comments that the Theban collaborators handed over the acropolis to the Spartans out of a desire to enslave the city so that they themselves might rule as tyrants (5.4.1: ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν). In the course of the narrative of this episode, he reinforces this portrayal of the collaborationist government as tyrants by employing once again the technique of focalisation, putting references to their ‘tyranny’ into the attributed to their own human folly. For the scattered references to the Spartans’ ‘tyranny’ in the Hellenica, see Appendix.

mouth of the Theban conspirators (5.4.2 and 9) and Agesilaus (5.4.13), whose real motivation (according to Xenophon) in refraining from the recovery of the Cadmea was not to incur the ill-will of his fellow citizens for providing military assistance to tyrants (as the expulsion of tyrants was a long-held pillar of Spartan propaganda, probably dating from the time of their expulsion of the Peisistratids from Athens). In a later context, the assassins of Euphron justify their action by referring to the death sentence meted out to the supporters of the Theban polemarchs for attempting to become tyrants (7.3.7). Once again we find impiety serving as the historical explanation for the downfall of bad rulers, whom Xenophon deliberately tarnishes with the label of tyrant.

The two other portrayals of Greek leaders as tyrants in the *Hellenica* occur in Xenophon’s two sets of paired digressions on Jason and Euphron. In the digressions on Jason (6.1.2–19 and 6.4.20–32), Xenophon provides a detailed and vivid portrayal of the Thessalian leader, to the point that the figure of Jason virtually leaps off the pages of the *Hellenica*, and he is clearly intended to represent a paradigmatic type of individual.35 Interestingly, for the whole of the first digression on Jason and for much of the second, Xenophon portrays him as a moral leader by the criteria that he has established for good leadership expressed in the *Hellenica* and elsewhere.36 But, as noted previously, Xenophon’s conception of good leadership is deliberately ambiguous, and even idealised leaders, such as Jason, are not wholly virtuous.

In the case of Jason, the idealising portrait of his leadership continues almost until the end of the second digression, where Xenophon takes the opportunity to portray him at the summit of his career, concluding with the memorable phrase (6.4.28): ‘He was in fact the greatest man of his time.’ The phrasing suggests that a *peripeteia* is

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about to follow, and indeed one does. Xenophon now jumps ahead a year to Jason’s preparations for the Pythian festival at Delphi, employing the technique of *prolepsis*, the anticipation of an event before its chronological spot in the narrative, in order to establish more emphatically cause and effect in his upcoming narrative of Jason’s downfall.\(^{37}\) Xenophon states that Jason intended, or so people said, to preside over the festival himself, but his real intentions regarding the sacred treasures remained unclear to his own day, and concludes (6.4.30): ‘It is said that when the people of Delphi asked the oracle what they should do if Jason were to seize any of the sacred funds, the god replied that he would see to it himself.’ Thus Xenophon implies that Apollo will punish Jason for his intended appropriation of the sacred treasures at Delphi, but does not vouch for the veracity of this rumour on his own authority.

Nevertheless, in the very next sentence after this speculation on Jason’s prospective impiety, Xenophon turns immediately to a dramatic description of his assassination at the hands of seven young men (6.4.31–2). The juxtaposition of Jason’s assassination with his alleged sacrilege and Apollo’s vaguely ominous reply certainly suggests that Xenophon intends us to view his fate as divine retribution. Furthermore, it is important to observe that while Xenophon makes no authorial comment either on Jason’s intended impiety or his assassination, he does conclude his narrative of this episode with the remark (6.4.32): ‘These men (that is, Jason’s assassins) were honoured in most of the Greek cities to which they came, and it was clear from this that the Greeks were greatly afraid that Jason would have become a tyrant.’

Although previously Xenophon has carefully portrayed Jason as the legally-elected *tagos* (executive officer of the four Thessalian tribal territories),\(^{38}\) it is now after speculation upon his impiety that he labels him as a tyrant, although


\(^{38}\) On the legitimate and possibly hereditary basis to Jason’s position in Thessaly, see Sprawski (1999), esp. 58–62, and (2004).
not, it should be noted, in his own voice. The impression that we are left with at the end of the Jason episode, that despite his previous good leadership, he was in fact a tyrant, is confirmed by Xenophon’s subsequent summary of the messy aftermath of Jason’s assassination (6.4.33–7), when he is succeeded to the office of *tagos* by his brothers Polydorus and Polyphron. Polydorus’ sudden death led to speculation that he was assassinated at the hands of his brother (the murder of family members is a *topos* of tyranny both in Herodotus and in Attic drama). Polyphron then, as Xenophon says, conducted himself in the office of *tagos* as if it were a tyranny (6.4.34: κατεσκευάσατο δὲ τὴν ταγείαν τυραννίδι ὁµοίαν), and exiled and put to death the most powerful men in the city, that is, he eliminated his political opponents, another stereotypical feature of tyranny, as demonstrated perhaps most vividly in the Herodotean anecdote of the advice given to the Cypselid tyrant Periander at Corinth (5.92). Polyphron too is assassinated, the proper fate of the stereotypical tyrant, as his assassin (a certain Alexander, who according to Plutarch was Polyphron’s nephew) claims (6.4.34), justifying his deed as avenging Polydorus’ death and destroying the tyranny (τὴν τυραννίδα καταλύοντος), apparently fancying himself a Thessalian Harmodius or Aristogeiton. But his murder of a family member brands him as a tyrant too, as do his ensuing lack of justice, harsh rule, and appropriation of funds for his own selfish ends (6.4.35)—or so Xenophon presents him, at least, for his political and military success and reputation outside of Thessaly suggest rather that he enjoyed widespread support. In Xenophon’s narrative, however, Alexander is employed as ‘a tyrannical cautionary tale’, and meets the appropriate fate of a tyrant, murdered in his bed by his wife and her brothers in a dramatic scene very reminiscent of Herodotus’ narration of the accession to power of Gyges of Lydia (1.8–12), the very first ruler (and, it

should be noted, an eastern foreign despot) whose rule is described as a tyranny (Archilochus F 19W), with the assassination of the reigning monarch at the instigation of a similarly nameless queen. The emphasis on tyranny in this section of Xenophon’s narrative suggests that if all of Jason’s successors as tagos were tyrants, then he too must have been one by definition, although he does stop short of referring to Jason as a tyrant explicitly in his own voice.

It seems that for Xenophon Jason’s intended crime against the gods is what constitutes the justification for abruptly transforming him from an ideal leader into a tyrant, and it is interesting that in this section of his narrative, immediately before Jason’s assassination, we find an emphasis upon Jason’s use of mercenaries (6.4.21, 22, 28) and a personal bodyguard (6.4.21 and 28), both stereotypical features of tyrannies, for they lend force to the tyrant’s regime. In the Hellenica, if one looks carefully enough, the downfall of every leader, even those portrayed as good leaders up to that point, comes as the result of some sort of moral vice. Jason’s impiety, therefore, represents the crucial explanatory factor in his downfall and makes the parallel with the other Greek leaders depicted as tyrants in the Hellenica even more pronounced.

The final example of a Greek leader whom Xenophon portrays as a tyrant is Euphron of Sicyon, the only other historical figure to be singled out in two separate digressions from his narrative (7.1.44–6 and 7.3.1–12). As in the previous examples of ‘tyrannical’ Greek leaders, Xenophon appears to be obscuring the legal basis of Euphron’s power in order to portray him as a tyrant. After gaining the support of the Argives and Arcadians, Euphron establishes an anti-Spartan democracy in Sicyon, and summoning his fellow citizens into the marketplace, orders them to elect generals (7.1.44–5). After his own (unsurprising) election as

\[42\] On the Herodotean echoes in this episode in Xenophon, see Gray (1989) 70–2.


one of the generals, Euphron creates what Xenophon characterises as a private mercenary army, which he then employs in characteristic tyrannical fashion to seize autocratic power for himself; as Xenophon concludes (7.1.46): ‘in this way he brought everything under his own control and was clearly a tyrant’ (καὶ σαφῶς τύραννος ἦν). But as Sian Lewis has observed, Xenophon also states that Euphron was legally elected by the demos of Sicyon and implies that he never lost favour with his fellow citizens, who honoured him after his assassination with a public burial ‘as if he were the founder of the city’ (7.3.12). Thus, by definition at least, Euphron is not technically a tyrant, and Xenophon has to engage in special pleading, highlighted by his use of the adverb σαφῶς (‘clearly’) to transform him into one, just as he does with the previous Greek rulers whom he portrayed as tyrants.

It is important to notice that one of the ‘tyrannical’ activities in which Euphron engages at the beginning of his regime is his appropriation of sacred money to pay the mercenaries on which Xenophon implies his power rested (7.1.46). Now Xenophon does not emphasise Euphron’s impiety here, but I do not believe that it is coincidental that the intervening narrative between this digression on Euphron and the following one is devoted to a lengthy account of the virtue of the Phliasians (7.2.1–3.1), the Sicyonians’ Peloponnesian neighbours, who receive special praise from Xenophon for their continued loyalty to Sparta in the aftermath of the battle of Leuctra. Not only are the Phliasians loyal, but Xenophon is careful to underline their piety as well. The Phliasians approach their ally, the Athenian commander Chares, and persuade him to help them attack a fort that Euphron and the Sicyonians are building on their border. Xenophon quotes a short speech in direct discourse that the Phliasians make to Chares, in which they encourage him to consult the gods with sacrifices as to whether or not to assist them, suggesting that

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45 Lewis (2004), esp. 70–2.
the gods are on their side and will encourage him to do so (7.2.20). Chares duly sacrifices, and he and an unnamed seer announce to the Phliasians that the sacrifices were favourable; then and only then do Chares’ troops join the Phliasians and rush out into battle, as Xenophon says, ‘in a kind of divine enthusiasm’ (θείᾳ τινὶ προθυµίᾳ, 7.2.21). Not surprisingly, in light of these explicit references to the support of the gods, the Sicyonian defenders of the fort flee in panic, leaving behind their provisions for the Phliasian troops to feast upon. Xenophon is careful to report the pious behaviour of the Phliasians after their victory: they pour libations for their good fortune and sing the paean (7.2.23). The clear implication is that the victory of the Phliasians is a reward from the gods for their piety. In fact, this section of Xenophon’s narrative, with its emphasis on the piety of the Phliasians, the battlefield role of the unnamed seer, and the role of the gods in the military success of the Phliasians over the Sicyonian troops, is very reminiscent of the victory of Thrasybulus and the democratic resistance over Critias and the Thirty in the battle of Munychia.

Xenophon returns to his narrative of Euphron immediately after this section on the pious behaviour of the Phliasians, Euphron’s opponents, and it will therefore come as no surprise to the careful reader that Euphron receives his just deserts for his impiety and tyrannical behaviour. When Euphron returns home after his defeat by the Phliasians, he is removed from power by an aristocratic faction, whom he succeeds in dislodging with the help of yet another mercenary army (this time from Athens), but remains unable to gain control of the acropolis, which was held by a Theban garrison. When he goes to Thebes to persuade the authorities there to hand back control of the city to him, he is assassinated by a group of aristocratic exiles (7.3.1–5). In his defence speech, one of the unnamed killers justifies the assassination to the Thebans by emphasising Euphron’s tyranny. He begins by associating Euphron with the supporters of the Theban polemarchs who collaborated with the Spartans in the seizure of the
Cadmea (7.3.7), whom the Thebans themselves justifiably condemned to death, a euphemism for the massacre that actually occurred (5.4.11–12), on the grounds that they had committed unholy acts (ἀνοσίων), were traitors, and were attempting to rule as tyrants (τυραννεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντων). He then proceeds to enumerate Euphron’s crimes, which are essentially the standard vices of a tyrant, including the liberation of slaves, the arbitrary killing and exiling of his political opponents, and the seizure of their property for himself (7.3.8). It is notable, however, that the unnamed killer also expresses strong moral indignation for Euphron’s pillaging of the sanctuaries in Sicyon. The assassin concludes his defence speech by stating that Euphon ‘was unquestionably a tyrant’ (ἀπροφασίστως τύραννος ἦν), a verbal echo that seems designed to recall the similar statement with its special pleading at the end of the first digression (7.1.46). In Xenophon’s digressions on Euphron, there is once again an explicit and emphatic connection between tyranny and impiety, and the suggestion of divine punishment for an act of sacrilege, particularly when his assassination is juxtaposed with the string of military successes experienced by his exceptionally pious opponents, the Phliasians.

The final leader whom Xenophon explicitly characterises as a tyrant is not a Greek, but a foreigner, Mania, who became sub-satrap of the province of Aeolis in northwest Asia Minor after the death of her husband. She is the subject of a lengthy and dramatic anecdote at the beginning of Book 3 of the Hellenica (3.1.10–28), and the placement of her story in Xenophon’s narrative is significant, for it comes immediately after the fall of the Thirty in Athens, when the Spartans are campaigning against the Persians in Asia Minor in order to restore their reputation among their fellow Greeks after accepting Persian gold during the final stages of the Peloponnesian

47 A hallmark of tyranny, according to Aristotle (Pol. 5.1313b32–4).
War. Mania is a good example of the ambiguity of leadership for Xenophon; although she proves herself to be an effective leader, she is nonetheless a tyrant, as indeed she must be, as an eastern despot ruling over Greek subjects for the Persian king. After the death of her husband who served as sub-satrap in the region, Mania pays a visit in person to the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, bringing gifts for him and his court, and she requests him politely to allow her a trial period as her husband’s replacement to prove her worth. When he agrees, she turns out to be more loyal and energetic than her husband had been. Nevertheless, although Mania’s leadership is well received by Pharnabazus, she does fit the Greek stereotype of an intriguing and manipulative oriental woman, and it is telling that Aristotle, in the *Politics* (1313b32), comments upon the dominance of women (as well as slaves) in the tyrant’s household. Furthermore, Mania conquers the coastal Greek cities of Larisa, Hamaxitus, and Colonae, adding them to Pharnabazus’ territory, but Xenophon subtly comments that she does so using a Greek mercenary force and looking on from a covered carriage (ἅρµαµαξα), a form of transport that he usually associates with Persian women (3.1.13). The scene of Greek mercenaries conquering other Greeks on the Persians’ behalf with Mania looking on in a carriage must have been morally repugnant. It is therefore no surprise perhaps when Mania is assassinated by her own son-in-law Meidias, who strangles her and slaughters her teenage son as well. Xenophon concludes his narrative of Mania’s murder with the comment that Meidias took advantage of his family connection to gain access to her presence, for Mania guarded herself against others, as is fitting in a tyranny (3.1.14: ὅσπερ ἐν τυραννίδι προσῆκεν). Thus, Xenophon explicitly refers to Mania’s rule as a tyranny and draws attention to one of the stereotypical features of a tyrant, the personal bodyguard.

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50 Cyr. 3.1.40 and 6.4.11; cf. Hdt. 7.83.2; cf. also Hdt. 7.41.1 and Ar. *Ach. 70*, where the emphasis is on Persians rather than women. See Krentz (1995) 164.
Now if Mania herself is a tyrant, as one would expect in a Persian environment, by definition Meidias, who has killed his own mother-in-law and usurped her position, is even more tyrannical, that is, he represents a substantively tyrannical figure as opposed to a situationally tyrannical one. Not surprisingly, retribution is swift and comes in the form of the Spartan commander in the region, Dercylidas, who arrives on the scene and retakes in a single day the Greek cities of Larisa, Hamaxitus, and Colonae; they came over to him willingly, as Xenophon tellingly observes (3.1.16). He immediately proceeds to a detailed description of a series of unfavourable sacrifices that delayed Dercylidas from undertaking any subsequent military action for a number of days (3.1.17). Xenophon makes it very clear that we are intended to view Dercylidas’ heeding of the inauspicious sacrifices as properly pious behaviour, for he observes that one of the allied commanders, impatient at the continued delay, attempted to cut off the water supply of Cebren, another Greek city that the Spartan army was attempting to recover from the Persians, but was immediately repulsed, suffering a wound in the process and losing two of his men (3.1.18). It is then that the inhabitants of Cebren voluntarily offer to surrender the city to Dercylidas, on the grounds that they would rather be on the Greek side than the barbarian one and, not coincidentally it seems, the sacrifices finally turn out favourably for Dercylidas and the city opens its gates (3.1.18-19).

It is only then that Dercylidas finally approaches the city of Scepsis, Meidias’ headquarters. Meidias immediately surrenders, because he does not trust his own subjects to defend him (ruling over unwilling subjects is of course Xenophon’s definition of a tyrant). Dercylidas then sacrifices to Athena twice in three chapters (3.1.21 and 23), which Xenophon emphasises in his narrative by including in direct discourse his conversation with Meidias about the sacrifices. Afterwards, Dercylidas dismisses Meidias’ garrison and personal bodyguard (once again, the

51 I thank the editor and one of the anonymous referees for Histos for clarifying my thinking on this point.
stereotypical attributes of a tyrant) and magnanimously spares his life, in sharp contrast to the perfidy with which Meidias murdered his own predecessor in the tyranny. While strictly speaking neither Mania nor Meidias (unlike the Greek leaders portrayed as tyrants) actually commits impiety, Xenophon’s emphasis upon the ostentatious piety of Dercylidas is clearly intended to highlight his opponents’ corresponding lack of this crucial (and particularly Greek?) virtue. It seems likely that Xenophon very deliberately dwells upon the Mania and Meidias episode just after his narrative of the fall of the Thirty in order to underline the impiety of tyranny, a form of government fit only for barbarians and unworthy of Greek leaders.

To conclude, I have argued that not only does Xenophon single out certain Greek leaders as egregiously bad by portraying them as tyrants and narrating their downfalls in particularly colourful and detailed passages, but he also emphasises their alleged crimes against the gods as the crucial explanatory factor in their downfalls. This appears to be a new development in the Greek historiographical tradition, as impiety is an aspect that is curiously underplayed in Herodotus’ depiction of the Greek tyrants. As Carolyn Dewald has recently demonstrated, the Greek tyrants in Herodotus are generally portrayed as harsh and violent, and increasingly as what she describes as ‘potential wicks drawing foreign domination and real, systemic autocracy . . . down into Greece’. But instances of impiety associated with Greek tyrants in Herodotus’ narrative are few, isolated and generally contain no whiff of divine retribution, such as Pheidon’s usurpation of the presidency of the Olympic Games from the Eleans (which Herodotus characterises at 6.127.3 as ‘the greatest act of hybris’), Periander’s necrophilia and violation of nomos in stripping the women of Corinth of their clothing at a festival as an offering to the ghost of his dead wife (5.927), and perhaps Peisistratus’ ruse of dressing up a tall and striking woman as Athena in order to establish himself as tyrant for

the second time, which leads Herodotus to comment upon the gullibility of the Athenians, rather than offering any explicit denunciation of Peisistratus’ action in and of itself (1.60.3‒5). And Thucydides, as Simon Hornblower has observed, generally neglects to inform us on the religious dimension to the Peloponnesian War,53 and so it is not surprising that he comments only on the desire for personal aggrandisement of both the Greek and Sicilian tyrants (1.17). He does not mention impiety as a characteristic of tyranny, but instead mentions in passing the concern for cult and ritual by both Peisistratus and Polycrates (3.104.1–2; cf. 1.13.6). Perhaps most famously Thucydides dismisses the popular conception that the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries on the eve of the Athenian departure for Sicily in 415 were an oligarchical or tyrannical conspiracy designed to sabotage the expedition, using the example of the Peisistratid tyranny to show how little the general population in Athens knew about its own history, for as he demonstrates it was not actually oppressive at all until the assassination of the tyrant Hippias’ brother Hipparchus (6.53.3–60.1; cf. 1.20.1–2).

It is only with Xenophon that impiety becomes one of the standard topoi of tyranny, and serves as the crucial explanatory factor for the downfall of the tyrant. The association of tyranny and impiety is not particularly surprising, for condemnation of the impious is certainly one of the organising principles of the Hellenica.54 What is perhaps more surprising, however, is Xenophon’s deliberate portrayal of bad leaders as tyrants. As noted above, hatred of tyranny was a particular concern of Athenian democratic


54 Pownall (1998). That is perhaps why the link of tyranny with impiety (curiously) seldom appears elsewhere in Xenophon, even in the Hiero, where one might expect it (apart from the reference to the tendency of tyrants to rob temples to satisfy their desire for money at 4.11; a point not made, however, in a similar context at Smp. 4.36); generally Xenophon associates tyranny with unwilling subjects; see, e.g., Mem. 4.6.12 and Oeo. 21.12, as well as implicitly throughout the Hiero. Cf. n. 12.
ideology, according to which the tyrant-slayers Harmodius and Aristogeiton were credited with the expulsion of the tyrants and the foundation of Athenian democracy. Furthermore, Athenians of all social classes regularly witnessed tyrants being brought to life on the tragic and the comic stage.\(^{55}\) It is interesting, therefore, that Xenophon, who was writing for the educated elite, deliberately shaped his narrative to portray bad leaders as tyrants, thereby employing the ideology of the Athenian democracy (which generally comes off in a very bad light in the *Hellenica*). It may be, as Kurt Raaflaub simply puts it, that ‘tyranny was good to think with’.\(^{56}\) For someone who was as interested in leadership as Xenophon was and who was thoroughly imbued with the ideology of Athenian democratic culture (even if he did not necessarily agree with it), the paradigm of the tyrant offered the very best negative *exemplum* for the bad leader, and was a useful as well as a familiar tool for his aim of preparing the elite to play a more socially responsible and constructive role in contemporary political leadership.\(^{57}\) Furthermore, the desire to dissociate oligarchy from tyranny, to which the concept had become inextricably linked by the end of the fifth century, as Thucydides’ misguided Athenians illustrate, was at the forefront for Xenophon.\(^{58}\) By portraying those individuals whom he considered the worst possible leaders as tyrants who exemplified impiety, the worst of the vices as far as

\(^{55}\) Tragedy: Seaford (2003); Comedy: Henderson (2003) and McGlew (2006). Rosenbloom (2012) has recently argued that late fifth-century Athenian drama was intended to subvert the democracy and restore the oligarchic elite to political power, a goal shared, not coincidentally, by Xenophon himself (Pownall (2004) 111–12 and (2012) 13–15).


\(^{58}\) On the conceptual link between tyranny and oligarchy in Greek popular thought, see Mitchell (2006).
Xenophon was concerned, he could provide a clear separation between the two constitutional forms of oligarchy and tyranny, and open the door to a rehabilitation of government by the educated elite. In so doing, Xenophon appropriates the figure of the evil tyrant, central to democratic ideology, for his own subversive purposes, and introduces the *topos* of the tyrant’s impiety, one that becomes especially useful to later fourth-century and Hellenistic historians.

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Appendix:

Xenophon’s Usage of the \( \tau \upsilon \rho \alpha \nu \nu\)-root in the *Hellenica*

(compiled with the *TLG*)

\( \tau \upsilon \rho \alpha \nu \nu \omega \sigma \) 

1. Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse (2.3.5, but section is an interpolation).
2. Theban exiles announce death of Theban polemarchs (5.4.9).
3. Agesilaus on the Theban polemarchs (5.4.13).
4. The Greeks feared that Jason would become a tyrant (6.4.32).
5. The Spartans appeal to Athens in 370 on grounds that they had helped expel the Peisistratid tyrants (6.5.33).
6. ‘Euphron was clearly a tyrant’ (7.1.46).
7. The assassin of Euphron: ‘Euphron was unquestionably a tyrant’ (7.3.8).
8. The assassin of Euphron, more generally (7.3.10).

\( \tau \upsilon \rho \alpha \nu \nu \epsilon \nu \) 

1. Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse (2.2.25, but section is an interpolation).\(^{59}\)
2. Theramenes on Critias and the Thirty (2.3.48).
3. The Thirty (2.4.1).
4. Theban speech to Athenians at beginning of Corinthian War; Greek cities ‘tyrannised’ by harmosts and decarchies established by Lysander (3.5.13).
5. Opponents on the Corinthian rulers during the Argive-Corinthian sympolity (4.4.6).
6. The ‘Theban polemarchs who occupy the Cadmea on the Spartans’ behalf’ (5.4.1).
7. The assassins of Euphron in reference to Euphron himself as well as the supporters of the Theban polemarchs (7.3.7).

τυραννίς.
1. Critias to Theramenes on the Thirty (2.3.16).
2. Mania (3.1.14).
3. Theban exile on the Theban polemarchs occupying the Cadmea (5.4.2).
4. Autocles accuses the Spartans of imposing decarchies and boards of thirty (6.3.8).
5. Polyphron, successor to Jason (6.4.34).
6. Alexander of Pherae on Polyphron (6.4.34).

τυραννικός
1. Theramenes to Critias (in opposition to δηµοτικός), referring to oligarchy (the Thirty? the Four Hundred?) (2.3.49).
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Tyrants as Impious Leaders in Xenophon’s Hellenica

PIETY IN XENOPHON’S THEORY OF LEADERSHIP∗

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Abstract: The central theme in Xenophon’s writings is to isolate and articulate the qualities of the ideal leader. His ideal leader secures consent to his leadership, treats his followers as friends, and works for their mutual success as a group with shared interests. An additional essential aspect, however, has escaped the attention of most modern scholars. This aspect is Xenophon’s emphasis on the leader’s piety and on his ability to maintain a proper relationship with the gods. He principally does this by securing their advice and goodwill through sacrifice, divination, and the avoidance of impious actions. In this article the stress on the leader’s piety as the sine qua non of effective leadership is traced through Xenophon’s corpus.

Keywords: Xenophon, piety, leadership, divination, seer, sacrifice.

The December 15, 2013 issue of the New York Times Sunday Book Review contains a review the likes of which no scholar would ever wish to receive. It is of a book by Alain de Botton and John Armstrong called Art As Therapy (2013) and begins:

Who’s afraid of Alain de Botton? At 43, he’s already an elder in the church of self-help, the master of spinning sugary ‘secular sermons’ out of literature (‘How Proust Can Change Your Life’), philosophy (‘The Consolations of Philosophy’), architecture (‘The Architecture of Happiness’). He has a remarkably guileless face and a friendly, populist vision of art. Why then do I keep checking my pockets? And why the

∗ I would like to thank Harriet Flower and John Marincola for their help and suggestions, and especially Richard Fernando Buxton for his exemplary editing of this paper.
grumbles that he condescends to his subjects and regards his readers .... as ‘ants’?¹

This review immediately brought to mind Xenophon, whom one might call the Alain de Botton of his time. And it especially brought to mind his Memorabilia and Cyropaedia, which are chock full of ‘sugary sermons’. But not all of those sermons are secular, and that may help to explain why so many modern readers, and especially Anglo-American philosophers, are afraid of Xenophon.

1. The Centrality of Piety

Xenophon spent his literary career pursuing a number of main ideas, or key themes, that thread their way through his large and varied corpus of writings. One of those themes was to isolate and articulate the qualities of the ideal leader. Xenophon’s ‘theory’ of leadership has, of course, been the subject of considerable scrutiny, most recently and most thoroughly by Vivienne Gray (²). She and others have isolated the principal criteria for effective leadership in Xenophon’s corpus.² His ideal leader secures consent to his leadership, deals decisively with insubordination, treats his followers as friends, knows what is best for them, and works for their mutual success as a group with shared interests. He also exhibits self-control on all occasions, and shares the toils of those under his command. One essential aspect, however, is missing from this list, and, in our secular age, has naturally escaped the attention of many modern scholars.³ That missing item is Xenophon’s emphasis on the leader’s piety and on his ability to maintain a proper relationship with the gods. He principally does this by

¹ Sehgal (2013).
³ An important exception, however, is Dillery (1995) 179–242, a ground-breaking study of Xenophon’s Hellenica.
securing the advice and goodwill of these gods through sacrifice, divination, and the avoidance of impious actions.

The proper modes of human-divine interaction, which would have been self-evident to Xenophon’s readers in general terms, are strategically elucidated throughout his corpus: sacrifice is principally animal sacrifice, divination is asking the gods for advice, and impious actions are doing things unpleasing to the gods (like breaking oaths, defiling temples, or committing heinous crimes). Xenophon sometimes refers to consultations of Delphi, and occasionally reports god-sent dreams and bird omens (oιωνοι, often translated as ‘auspices’). But the primary means of getting advice from the gods is by a method that just about anyone can do at home or in the field, although usually and most authoritatively with the assistance of a professional seer (mantis). That is by killing a victim, usually a sheep, and then examining the shape, colour, and texture of its liver.

The Greek word that Xenophon employs to refer to the results of this type of divinatory sacrifice is ta hiera, usually translated as ‘signs’ or ‘omens’. This can be confusing since in a sacrificial context ta hiera may denote the sacrificial rite, the particular parts of the sacrificial victim that are examined for signs, or the signs themselves that emerge from examination (the difference between the last two meanings is often blurred). The hiera are either favourable

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5 The bibliography on divination in Greek religion is vast. For Xenophon in particular, see Parker (2004) and Flower (2012). For the role of divination in Greek society, see Johnston (2008) and, especially for the role of the seer, Flower (2008). The techniques of liver divination (hepatoscopy) are well described by Collins (2008).

6 See Jameson (1991) 200–1. I will not be discussing the battle-line sacrifice (called sphagia), in which the seer slit the victim’s throat (a goat or ram) while observing its movements and the flow of blood.
or unfavourable, depending on the appearance of the victim’s liver.

The standard procedure was to sacrifice a single victim, and then, if the omens were unfavourable, to sacrifice a second one. If the omens were still unfavourable, one could sacrifice yet a third victim on that day, but no more. On two occasions in the *Anabasis*, however, Xenophon sacrifices two victims in a row as part of the same consultation. This is not because one of them is merely held in reserve in case the answer is either unclear or unfavourable during the first sacrifice; for the wording indicates that Xenophon has sacrificed both victims (6.1.22–4; 7.6.43–4). Rather, we need to infer that Xenophon asked different questions of each victim as a type of checking: while sacrificing one victim he must have asked ‘is it better to do x?’, and while sacrificing the other, ‘is it better to do y?’ Only the sequence ‘yes-no’ or ‘no-yes’ would count as a reliable answer.\(^7\)

Before proceeding any further it is necessary to raise a difficult question. To what degree are Xenophon’s views on leadership and piety essentially those of his social class, his own original contribution to political thought and leadership theory, or predominantly based on his recollections (such as they were) of Socratic teaching? This is not an easy question to answer with certainty; but surely Xenophon’s views emerged from a combination of all three elements. Socrates is in many ways the perfect leader, and Xenophon opens his *Memorabilia* with a demonstration that Socrates’ religious attitudes, including his use of divination, were completely traditional, even if strongly held (1.1.6–9).\(^8\) Nonetheless, as far as we can tell, Xenophon’s account of Socratic religion contains novel ideas and emphases (such as the insistence that the gods are both omnipresent and

\(^7\) See Parker (2004) 150–1 who cites the Azande poison oracle as a parallel. The use of the poison oracle by the Azande (a people of the southern Sudan), administered to chickens in a type of checking, is remarkably similar to what is implied in Xenophon’s account.

\(^8\) For attempts to reconstruct the historical Socrates’ religious views, see McPherran (1996) and (2011), Calvo-Martinez (2008), Powers (2009).
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omniscient), and some of these may well be Xenophon’s own attempt to harmonise traditional Greek beliefs about the gods. One should also leave space for the impact on Xenophon’s theories of his own personal experience as a general in command of mercenaries and as a soldier serving under the command of others (principally Cyrus the Younger and Agesilaus).

So given Xenophon’s unusual life experiences and Socratic education, the religious dimension of the leadership theory articulated in his writings, although in some respects traditional and normative, is unlikely to map directly onto the beliefs and practices of his contemporaries. In other words, Xenophon appears to be offering something distinctively new. Yet even if one is not willing to ascribe as much originality to Xenophon’s views as I would like, it has recently been demonstrated in impressive detail that he no longer can be perceived as the naive and unthinking purveyor of popular beliefs; rather, across his large corpus of writings Xenophon has constructed a theologically consistent and philosophically sophisticated account of the relationship between gods and mortals as mediated through divination.

However that may be, the importance of piety as a primary characteristic of Xenophon’s ideal leader is actually not very difficult to demonstrate. Piety, or eusebeia, as Jon Mikalson has recently pointed out, means ‘proper respect’ towards both gods and other people (whereas the adjective eusebēs means ‘properly respectful’). Since ‘piety’ is the standard and convenient translation, I will continue to

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9 See Dillery (1995) 184–5, with Mem. 1.1.19 and 1.4.18, Sphinx. 4.48, Cyr. 8.7.22.

10 Bruit-Zaidman (2013) stresses the influence of Socrates on Xenophon’s religious views. Dorion (2000) LXX, however, suggests the possibility (which I find attractive) that Xenophon, in a process of transposition, has attributed to Socrates the virtues, values, ideas, and interests that were dear to himself.

11 Cf. Buxton in this volume.

12 Labadie (2014).

deploy it, while keeping in mind its culturally specific connotations, when used in a religious context, for Xenophon and his contemporary audience.

The concept of showing proper respect towards the gods (which encompasses serving them and honouring them as well as consulting them and obeying them) runs throughout Xenophon’s corpus and always receives special emphasis. A good place to start is with the ‘sugary sermons’ of the Memorabilia. Right at the beginning we are told that Socrates advised his close friends, ‘that if an action was unavoidable, to carry it out as they thought best, but where the result of an action was uncertain, he sent them to use divination to see if the action should be taken’.\textsuperscript{14} He said that anyone who proposed to run a household or a city efficiently needed the help of divination’ (\textit{Mem.} 1.1.6). Obviously, consultation of the gods is going to be especially important for anyone who manages not only their own affairs, but also those of others. According to Xenophon, the ideal leader is the one who can make his followers ‘happy’ or \textit{eudaimones} (\textit{Mem.} 3.2.4–5). This is not ‘happiness’ (\textit{eudaimonia}) in the modern emotional sense of feeling good, but in the material sense of ‘living well’ or ‘faring well’.\textsuperscript{15} Making one’s followers and subjects happy, as the history of humankind sadly demonstrates, is much easier to accomplish in theory than in practice. And that is why, in Xenophon’s view, the role of divine guidance becomes indispensable.

It has been well pointed out that the three fundamental and enduring beliefs of Greek polis religion are that the gods exist, that the gods pay attention to the affairs of men, and that there is reciprocity between men and gods.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14}‘To use divination’ is often misleadingly translated in this passage as ‘to consult the oracle’ (although that is a possible rendering, it is unlikely that Socrates is recommending repeated trips to oracular sanctuaries such as Delphi). Xenophon employs the future participle \textit{manteusomenous} from the Greek verb \textit{manteuesthai}, which also can mean either ‘to practise divination’ or ‘to consult seers’, as at Aristophanes, \textit{Birds} 593 and 596.

\textsuperscript{15}Mikalson (2010) 7–9.

\textsuperscript{16}Yunis (1988) 38–58.
Xenophon’s Socrates takes these beliefs to a new level. Near the beginning of the *Memorabilia* and once again near its end (1.4 and 4.3), Xenophon gives the first ever account of a theory that engendered a theological and philosophical debate that is still raging today. I am referring to the theory now called Intelligent Design. One of Xenophon’s proofs that the gods have designed the universe for the benefit of humankind is the fact that they are willing to act as our advisors. He claims: ‘In so far as we are unable to foresee what is advantageous for the future, the gods themselves work with us, indicating through divination to those who consult them what is going to happen and teaching them how to obtain the best results’ (4.3.12; cf. 1.4.15–18). Intelligent Design is likely to be Xenophon’s own novel contribution to philosophical and theological thought. Its relevance to leadership theory is that it provides an objectively valid basis for the programme of religious and ethical behaviour that Xenophon advocates.

It is essential to emphasise that for Xenophon piety is not a secondary, second-class, or peripheral characteristic of the successful leader. Thus *How to Be a Good Cavalry Commander* opens with this exhortation (1): ‘Your first duty is to sacrifice and to ask that the gods grant you to think and do and say those things that might make your exercise of command most pleasing to them, as well as being most acceptable, most reputable, and most useful for yourself, your friends, and your city.’ In today’s world, despite the invocations of ‘God’ in political rhetoric, no military handbook would begin with an appeal to prayer and sacrifice. The centrality of piety in the list of a leader’s virtues is made explicit at the end of Xenophon’s *Agesilaus*, where he summarises the king’s virtues in order that they may be easier for the reader to remember. Piety is placed first. He starts with specific examples of Agesilaus’ piety and then notes (11.2): ‘He never stopped repeating that he believed the gods took no less

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18 Note, in particular, *Mem. 1.4.2 and 19; 4.3.2 and 16–18*. 

pleasure in pious deeds than in unblemished sacrificial offerings. Whenever he was successful, he did not look down upon his fellow men, but gave thanks to the gods. And he offered more sacrifices when confident than prayers when in doubt.

A specific example of the king’s piety in action is repeated in both the Agesilaus and in the Hellenica (Ages. 1.27; HG 3.4.18). Xenophon has just described Agesilaus’ method of training his army at Ephesus in 395 and then adds: ‘And one would have been heartened by also seeing this, first Agesilaus, and then the other soldiers, proceeding from the gymnasia with garlands on their heads and dedicating their crowns to Artemis. For wherever men reverence the gods, practise the craft of war, and practise obedience to their commanders, how is it not likely that there all things are full of good hopes?’

Agesilaus must have done more than merely leave a wreath for the goddess; he even seems to have dedicated a column in her famous temple. For an inscription has been found on the fragment of a column base from the temple of Artemis at Ephesus that bears the name ‘Agesilaus’.19 So we can easily imagine the king, who always had a keen sense of how to project an image of himself, doing just what Xenophon describes him as doing. Other passages in the Agesilaus (2.13; 3.2; 11.1–2) also testify to the image that the king wished to project of himself as a person of exceptional and consistent piety. And image-making aside, Agesilaus, like Xenophon himself, surely believed that he could win not only the goodwill of men, but also of the goddess herself, by this act of devotion.

19 See Börker (1980). The inscription was later partially erased. Wesenberg (1981) suggests that it was intentionally mutilated after the conclusion of the King’s Peace in 387/6 as an expression of resentment after Sparta had abandoned the Greeks of Asia.
2. Seeking the Gods’ Advice

Xenophon’s emphasis on Agesilaus’ piety as a central virtue is in keeping with his overall theological view of the reciprocal relationship between gods and mortals. This reciprocal relationship is made especially manifest in the rites of divination, and in several of his works Xenophon states explicitly that the gods give signs specifically to ‘those whom they favour’. In the *Cyropaedia* (1.6.2 and 46) Cyrus’ father Cambyses says to the young prince that he had him instructed in the art of divination in order that he should not be dependent on seers and so that he should always be able to seek advice from the gods, since they know all things. The strongest statement of this position is when Cambyses asserts to his son at the very end of their long conversation (1.6.46):

> Human wisdom does not know how to choose what is best any more than if someone were to draw lots and do as the lot fell. But the gods, my son, who always exist, know all things, both the things that have taken place, the things that are, and whatever shall come to pass as a result of each past and present event. And when men consult them, they indicate in advance to those whom they favour both what they ought to do and what they ought not to do. But if the gods do not wish to advise everyone, that is not surprising. For there is no necessity for them to care for those whom they do not wish to.

Yet who is it that ‘the gods favour’? It is those who serve them (through prayer and sacrifice) in good fortune as well as in bad (*Cyr*. 1.6.3–4) and who do not pray for things that are ‘unlawful’ (*ta athena*, *Cyr*. 1.6.6). Moreover, Xenophon’s conception of the proper relationship between gods and mortals serves to model the kinds of interactions that ideally underpin mutually beneficial relationships in the human realm (the young Cyrus was instructed to treat his friends in the very same way he did the gods: 1.6.3–4 and 6). The programmatic nature of these passages about the necessity
of cultivating divine favour and guidance is clearly marked. It is not just that they are emphatically placed at both the beginning and end of Cambyses’ advice to his son. Their importance is also underscored by the fact that virtually the same advice is given by Socrates in the Oeconomicus (5.19–20) and by Xenophon himself at the end of How to Be a Good Cavalry Commander (9.8–9):

If someone is surprised that I have frequently mentioned working with god, let him recognise that if he should often find himself in danger, this will be less surprising, and if he considers that in time of war enemies plot against one another but seldom know whether these plots are well-laid. It is impossible to find any other advisers in such matters except the gods. They know everything and they give signs in advance to whomever they wish through sacrifices, birds of omen, voices, and dreams. And it is likely that they are more ready to give advice to those who not only ask what they should do when they happen to be in need, but even in good fortune serve (therapeuein) the gods in whatever way they are able.

The message, therefore, for current and future leaders is crystal clear. If you want the gods to look out for you and to communicate their advice to you, then you need to attend to them, as did Cyrus the Great, both in good fortune and in bad. Moreover, one must not expect the gods to assist one in committing acts that are unjust or wicked. The efficacy of this message is reaffirmed at the end of the Cyropaedia in a nice example of thematic ring-composition: at the end of his life Cyrus gives thanks to the gods for his many successes, the guidance that they gave him through divine signs and omens, and their care (epimeleia) for him (8.7.3). His father’s instructions on how to interact with the gods, delivered at the start of his military career, have been completely validated.

Now all of this is fine in theory (and, in the case of the Cyropaedia, in fiction); but how does it work out in practice?
In the modern world, those leaders who appeal to divine guidance most often and who display the most conspicuous piety are not necessarily the most effective and successful at making their constituents ‘happy’. I am thinking, in particular, of two Presidents of the United States who would appear to be on opposite poles of the political spectrum (Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush), both of whom left office deeply unpopular. So should we conclude that piety is a characteristic of the successful leader only in self-help books (Memorabilia), eulogies (Agesilaus), and historical fiction (Cyropaedia)?

To answer that question we should turn to Xenophon’s more concretely historical works, the Anabasis and Hellenica. In the Anabasis, Xenophon has constructed his own role as the exemplary type of the wise, resourceful, pious, honest, and selfless leader, who constantly refers important decisions to divination. Although Xenophon was not himself a seer (mantis), he claims that he sacrificed frequently and knew a good deal about how to interpret the results (5.6.29). We also see him deciding by himself on the meaning of dreams (3.1.11–12; 4.3.8) and signs (the sneeze at 3.2.9). Diogenes Laertius, who composed a short biography of Xenophon, describes him as pious, fond of sacrificing, and competent to interpret the omens from sacrifice (2.56). Even if this is merely an inference from Xenophon’s own writings, it sums up very well the image that the author Xenophon has constructed of Xenophon the character. The opinion of a professional seer, however, was always more authoritative than Xenophon’s own interpretation of god-sent signs. For that reason he frequently employed the services of the seers present on the expedition concerning both military operations and personal matters.

As depicted in the Anabasis, when Xenophon was deciding issues that affected his own future, and by association that of the entire army as well, he made these difficult and perplexing decisions by sacrificing a victim to the gods and then examining its entrails. These decisions

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included whether to discuss with the soldiers the founding of a colony (5.6.16–17), whether to accept sole command of the army (6.1.19–24), whether to return home to Athens (6.2.15), whether to lead the army to the Thracian prince Seuthes (7.2.14–15), and whether to remain with Seuthes in Thrace or to move on with the Ten Thousand (7.6.43–4). Even though divination is a means whereby the gods give advice, not orders, the constant referral of these important decisions to divine arbitration tends to legitimise and validate Xenophon’s decisions.  

At the same time, however, the appeal to divination tends to mitigate Xenophon’s personal responsibility for the consequences of his choices. An especially egregious example appears at the very end of the *Anabasis* where Xenophon, trusting in favourable omens from sacrifice, leads a nearly catastrophic raid on the fortress of the Persian grandee Asidates (7.8.8–23). But, due to considerable luck, Asidates is eventually captured and the narrative concludes with the simple words: ‘And this is how the earlier omens turned out.’ Appealing to god-sent instructions can be useful both in narrative and in real life, and is a much more effective face-saving device than merely asserting that ‘mistakes have been made’.

Thus Xenophon can and does use piety to gloss over his own bad decisions and questionable actions. And he can do the same for his heroes as well. Agesilaus is called ‘a perfectly good man’ (*Ages. 1.1*), and his piety is stressed in Xenophon’s eulogy. But besides the fact that he actually oversaw the collapse of the Spartan hegemony, his personal life was not spotless. Greek leaders did not need to worry about being caught sending salacious emails to admirers of either sex; nonetheless, there were socially prescribed limits on behaviour. In Agesilaus’ case, his involvement with a handsome Persian boy seems to have caused him some embarrassment. In Xenophon’s *Agesilaus* (5.4–7) we are told that Agesilaus was passionately in love with Megabates, the son of Spithradates; yet he displayed remarkable self-control.

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21 Park (1963) is a classic study of the social function of divination.
and refused to be kissed by him.\textsuperscript{22} The length (a whole page in the Oxford Classical Text) and tone of Xenophon’s treatment suggests that this relationship was a cause célèbre. The \textit{Hellenica Oxyrhynchia} merely states rather matter-of-factly that ‘Agesilaus was said to be extremely infatuated with him’ (21.4).

Now, one major feature of Xenophon’s theory of leadership is that the leader should be the master of his desires and passions, including that for sex (\textit{Memorabilia} stwo:olçstyl"son":olçstyl"son":olçstyl"ssix:olçstyl"–stwo:olçstyl"son":olçstyl"stwo:olçstyl"son":olçstyl"ssix:olçstyl"son":olçstyl"s"iòht:olçstyl", I suspect that Xenophon lingers on this incident because he is trying very hard to prove that Agesilaus had not had a physical relationship with Megabates, despite rumours to the contrary. He makes a point of emphasising that Agesilaus could not possibly have acted improperly because when abroad he always slept in temples, where it is impossible to do such things, or in public places. Readers of Herodotus (\textit{Hellenica} 9.116–21) will remember, of course, that the Persian Artayctes, a very bad man indeed, did have sex with women in the shrine of Protesilaus and suffered crucifixion as his punishment. Thus Xenophon’s proof of the king’s self-control is based on a rather circular argument: Agesilaus did not have sex with Megabates because he slept in temples and pious people, like Agesilaus, would never do anything impious in a temple.

\textbf{3. Divine Intervention in Human Affairs}

Apart from providing advice and guidance, the Greeks also believed that the gods could take a more active hand in human affairs, especially by punishing the wicked and assisting the pious. In other words, winning the goodwill of the gods meant much more than simply securing favourable

\textsuperscript{22} On this passage see Hindley (1994) and Pontier (2012). Hindley (2004) 126 and n. 8, argues that Agesilaus’ ‘caution arose from political, not moral grounds’; but this assessment is decisively refuted by Pontier (2012) 618 n. 25, who observes (pointing to \textit{Ages.} 5.4 and 11.10) that the episode is meant to demonstrate the \textit{enkrateia} (self-mastery) of Agesilaus. I would add that moral and political considerations are not easily separated.
omens from them before undertaking a battle or some other venture. Both in the Agesilaus and in the Anabasis, Xenophon speaks of making the gods one’s allies through proper conduct (such as not breaking one’s oaths, plundering temples, or using force on suppliants). This is essential because ‘the gods are capable of quickly making the great small and of easily preserving the small, even if they are in difficulties, whenever they wish to do so’ (An. 3.2.10).

Xenophon repeatedly asserts in his own speeches in Book 3 of the Anabasis that the gods will be hostile to the Persians as oath-breakers but be allies of the Greeks since they kept their oaths (3.1.21–2; 3.2.10). In some incidents we can glimpse divine agency at work, such as in the dream that roused Xenophon to action after the arrest of the generals by Tissaphernes (3.1.11–13) and in the spontaneous house-fire that saved the Greeks when they were trying to escape from the Drilae, a tribe dwelling near to the Black Sea (5.2.24). One of the most explicit acknowledgements of divine intervention in the Anabasis occurs when Xenophon rallies his men to save the Arcadians (who have detached themselves from the rest of the army) when these are surrounded by Thracians and on the verge of annihilation. Xenophon tells his troops that ‘Perhaps it is the god who is bringing this about, in his wish to humble those who boasted of their superior wisdom, and to give us the position of greater honour, since we begin with the gods’ (6.3.18). The meaning seems to be that the Arcadians found themselves in this dangerous predicament precisely because they had acted without first consulting the gods.

The idea that omitting to consult the gods can by itself contribute to failure appears also in the Hellenica. In 367 representatives from the warring Greek cities (Thebes, Theban allies, and Sparta) convene in Delphi for a peace conference, but fail to reach an agreement (7.1.27): ‘When they arrived they did not at all consult the god as to how peace might come about, but they took counsel amongst themselves.’ People who begin with the gods, who make the gods their starting point by consulting them through the rites of divination, are those who trust in divine guidance
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rather than in their own mere human wisdom. This is true even in private life: Ischomachus, who owns and manages a sizeable estate, is successful in all of his pursuits because he always ‘begins by serving (therapeuōn) the gods’ (Oec. 11.8).

Xenophon is depicting himself in these passages from the *Anabasis* as a leader who has been specially selected, and continually aided, by the gods. Moreover, he is mindful that one needs actively to solicit the support of the gods. The example of good leadership that he exhibits in the *Anabasis* is matched by his presentation not only of Agesilas (whose various personal faults—principally anger and partiality—are not concealed in the *Hellenica*), but especially of Cyrus the Great. This Cyrus is very much Xenophon’s own creation (even if he drew on various sources, Greek and Persian), and this means that he illustrates the virtues that Xenophon considered most important in a leader while lacking any conspicuous faults. Like Xenophon himself, Cyrus too always begins an enterprise by consulting the gods.

In a very remarkable and unprecedented passage in Greek literature, Cyrus performs an elaborate set of rituals before invading Assyria (Cyr. 3.3.21–2), which go far beyond the border-crossing sacrifices performed by Spartan kings (which were made to Zeus and Athena) or Agesilaus’ attentions to Artemis at Ephesus:

Cyrus first sacrificed to Zeus the King and then to the other gods, asking them that they, being propitious and

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22 For Persian elements in the *Cyropaedia* (which seem to be minimal), see Tuplin (1990), (1997) and (2013).

23 Dorion (2009) 105 points out that Cyrus the Great, Agesilas, and Socrates share the same ‘characteristics, virtues, and doctrines’. Tamiolaki (2012a), however, maintains that the virtue of other leaders is often ambiguous while that of Socrates alone is uncontested and unambiguous.

24 *Lac.* 13.2–3.
well disposed, be leaders for the army, good defenders, and allies and advisors for good things. And he also called upon the heroes who lived in Media and were its guardians. When he had obtained favourable omens from his sacrifices and his army was assembled at the borders of Assyria, then amid favourable auspices he invaded the enemy’s country. And as soon as he had crossed the border, there again he propitiated the Earth with libations and the gods with sacrifices, and appeased the heroes who dwell in Assyria. After this, he again sacrificed to Zeus, the god of his fathers, and if other gods were made known, he neglected none of them.

Elsewhere Xenophon points to the efficacy of winning the goodwill of the gods before the enemy do. For instance, in the Constitution of the Spartans, he says that when a Spartan king is on campaign he always begins his sacrifice before dawn, ‘wishing to seize in advance the good will of the god’ (13.3). But this passage from the Cyropaedia is his fullest illustration of how a model leader might go about doing it. There is some Persian colouring here, and that might explain why the prayers and sacrifices are so luxuriantly extensive. Yet given that no one ever ruled a greater empire of willing subjects, as Xenophon emphasises at the beginning of the Cyropaedia (1.1.3), there must also be a lesson here that Xenophon is imparting to his readers. It is not possible, it seems, to pay too much respect to the gods: as Socrates tells Euthydemus in the Memorabilia, it is by honouring the gods to the fullest extent of one’s power that one can expect the greatest benefactions in return (4.3.17).

Quite apart from winning and maintaining the good will of the gods, the successful leader also employs religion to boost the morale of his troops. This may seem like cynical manipulation only if we divorce belief in the existence of the gods, and their interest in human affairs, from the leader’s need to employ effective rhetoric. Here the speeches that Xenophon puts in the mouths of his leaders are strikingly different from those composed by Thucydides.
mentioned above, in his speeches in Book 3 of the Anabasis, Xenophon rallies the dispirited troops by repeatedly asserting that the Greeks will have the gods on their side because of their piety in abiding by their oaths in contrast with the Persians’ impiety in breaking theirs. By comparison, Nicias’ speech to his troops in their pathetic flight from Syracuse in 413 is of a much different tenor than Xenophon’s. Whereas Xenophon is full of optimism that the gods will help them despite their seemingly hopeless predicament, Nicias can merely say that the gods have punished them enough for what they did wrong and that they have become ‘fitter objects for their pity than their jealousy’ (Th. 7.77.4).

It is not only Xenophon himself who knows how to deploy divine assistance as an effective rhetorical device. The elder Cyrus actually highlights the morale-boosting effects of winning divine approval in his very first speech as a military leader (Cyr. 1.5.14): ‘This too, moreover, I think makes you more confident—the fact that I have not neglected the gods as we depart on this expedition. For you have been with me enough to know that not only in great things but also in small, I always try to begin with the gods.’ The nature of the gods’ approval is made explicit in the first sentence of Cyrus’ speech to the Persian peers before engaging the Assyrians (3.3.34): ‘Men, the gods, as both the seers say and as it also seems to me, are announcing that there will be a battle, are granting victory, and are promising safety, as revealed in the omens from sacrifice.’ By contrast, the king of the Assyrians makes no mention at all of the gods in his own pre-battle harangue (3.3.43), and that hardly seems coincidental.

Later on in the story, before the major battle with Croesus, Cyrus addresses his generals, beginning and ending his speech with predictions of divine support: ‘Friends and allies, the gods are revealing the very same omens from sacrifice as when they gave us our previous victory’ (6.4.12). Then at the speech’s close, he says to them, ‘If you think that we still need anything more, tell me. For with the assistance of the gods, we shall lack nothing’
(6.4.19). This may seem like a façon de parler, but appeals to divine assistance before battle had a powerful valence, as is demonstrated both in fictional narratives such as the Cyropædia, in instructional tracts such as How to Be a Good Cavalry Commander, and in more distinctly historical accounts, such as the Hellenica and Anabasis.

4. The Fate of Impious Leaders

Piety then is a powerful weapon as well as being an essential virtue. It allows leaders to get expert advice from the gods, who know everything, as well as to defer blame, at least by implication, onto the gods when things go wrong. It is also a means for rallying the troops under one’s command and boosting their confidence. Yet the implications of how we should assess leaders who seemingly lack piety are sometimes left implicit, apart from the obvious case of those who perjure themselves or ignore unfavourable omens.27

Cyrus the Younger, as portrayed in the Anabasis, is an interesting case study. I have elsewhere argued that although he is almost always taken by modern scholars to be a latter day version of Cyrus the Great, he lacks certain of his namesake’s virtues, such as self-control, humanity (philanthropia) and, most noteworthy of all, piety.28 He is caught unprepared on the day of the battle of Cunaxa in 401 and throws away his victory, as well as his life, when he ‘loses control of himself’ and rashly charges his brother with only a few followers (1.8.26). There are even some cues in the following laudatory obituary that might raise a red flag for members of the original Greek readership.29 For instance, Xenophon says of Cyrus, ‘Nor would anyone be able to say this, that he permitted criminals and the unjust to laugh at him, but he punished them most unsparingly of


29 Higgins (1977) 83 is astute on this point.
all. Along the well-travelled roads it was often possible to see people who had been deprived of their feet, hands, and eyes (1.9.11–13). That kind of mutilation (whether of a corpse or of a living person) was considered barbaric by Greeks: it is noteworthy that Cyrus the Great never does anything like this in the Cyropaedia. Did Xenophon intend his readers to notice the difference between the two men and to reach the conclusion that the younger Cyrus was a greatly inferior version of his namesake? In what follows I give a fuller explication of this controversial reading of the text.

It has been argued that Xenophon’s theory of leadership, as exemplified by Cyrus the Great, can be reduced to three fundamental character traits: the love of humanity (philanthropia), the love of learning (philomatheia), and the love of being honoured (philotimia). It is significant, therefore, that only one of these traits is attributed to Cyrus the Younger, either in his lengthy obituary or anywhere else in the Anabasis. This is his ‘love of learning’; and even that is conspicuously limited to his training in archery and javelin throwing (1.9.5). Piety should be added to this list as a fourth fundamental trait of Xenophon’s successful leader.

As we have seen, Xenophon often stresses that every successful leader needs to possess the virtue of being pious. The elder Cyrus, like Xenophon himself, is depicted as someone who puts the reverence due to the gods above all other considerations and who seeks their counsel through constant sacrifice (Cyr. 1.5.14). Although the younger Cyrus had his Greek seer perform the customary sacrifices before battle (1.7.18; 1.8.15), there is no indication of his personal piety. Indeed, as has been well pointed out, Xenophon never mentions that Cyrus had been able to benefit from

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30 When the Spartan general Pausanias is urged to mutilate Mardonius’ corpse following the battle of Plataea, he responds, ‘These things are more fitting for barbarians to do than for Greeks, and we begrudge this even to them’ (Hdt. 9.79.1). For Greek attitudes, see Hall (1989) 158–9.


the least sign sent by the gods. In other words, he is the only one among Xenophon’s ‘paradigmatic’ leaders (Cyrus the Great, Socrates, Agesilas, and Xenophon himself) who is unable to profit from divine favour and assistance. Given the repeated emphasis that Xenophon gives to a leader’s ability both to receive divine signs (the gods send them to those whom they favour) and to interpret them correctly, it is not to the younger Cyrus’ credit that he grossly misinterprets his seer Silanus’ divinatory sacrifice in the lead up to the battle of Cunaxa (1.7.18–20). Silanus had predicted that the King would not fight within ten days. Cyrus incorrectly inferred from this that the King would not fight at all. As a consequence, he marched ‘rather carelessly’ on the day before the battle and was caught with his army out of formation on the day of the battle itself.

Leaving aside his mistake and his negligence (which are bad enough in themselves), it is also implied that the failure of his expedition was due to his impiety in attempting fratricide. Cyrus plots against his elder brother, King Artaxerxes, because he feels dishonoured by him (1.1.4). Any reader who was familiar with Xenophon’s other works would see this motive as being deeply problematic. In Memorabilia 2.3 Socrates argues at length that nothing in life is more useful or more beneficial to a person than a brother; and he encourages a younger brother to take the initiative in seeking reconciliation with his elder sibling by doing him a good turn. The Cyropaedia ends with the elder Cyrus, on his deathbed, enjoining his own two sons, in the strongest possible terms and at considerable length, to honour and love each other.

In my ‘ironic’ interpretation we are meant to infer that the gods did not give their support to Cyrus when he most needed it because he was not worthy of their care. I believe that contemporary readers of the Anabasis would have noticed that the younger Cyrus was lacking the virtues of the elder Cyrus; for it seems likely that the Anabasis and

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34 See below.
Cyropaedia were written very close to each other in time (the 360s). To be sure, there are more straightforward cases in which neglect of the gods, impious actions, and even the mere intent to act impiously, contribute to a leader’s undoing. However, in what follows, I am for the most part going to pass over all of those many references to the impiety of Persian leaders in breaking their oaths, and concentrate on Greek leaders.

First of all, one of the most reckless things that a leader can do, even though it does not involve an unjust act per se, is to ignore omens sent by the gods. This is made absolutely clear in the programmatic advice that Cambyses delivers to Cyrus the Great (Cyr. 1.6.44): ‘Learn this too from me, my son, which is the most important thing—never run any risk either to yourself or to your army contrary to the sacrificial omens (hiera) and the auspices (oĩnous).’ This lesson is so important not just because the gods know in advance what is going to take place, but also because they actually punish those who do not follow their advice. Thus Hermogenes asserts in Xenophon’s Symposium that he has never regretted obeying signs and omens sent by the gods, but that there were occasions when he was punished for disobeying them (4.48). Here too one can cite Socrates’ advice to Euthydemus that there is no better way to please the gods than by obeying them as fully as possible (Mem. 4.3.17).

In his more historical works, Xenophon provides several apparently unambiguous examples of where disregarding a seer’s advice leads to disaster. In the Hellenica (3.1.17–19) we are told that in 399 the Spartan commander Dercylidas was forced to delay his assault on the city of Cebren for four days due to unfavourable sacrifices (hiera), even though he was in a great hurry. Nevertheless, one of his subordinate officers, thinking that the delay was stupid, rushed into action and found his company defeated and himself wounded. Later in the Hellenica the Spartan Anaxibius contemptuously ignores unfavourable sacrifices (hiera), and then falls into an ambush in which he and many of his men
are killed (4.8.35–9).\textsuperscript{35} In the \textit{Anabasis} (6.4.23–4), the general Neon leads out 2,000 men on his own initiative despite sacrifices that were unfavourable for leaving camp. Five hundred of them were then cut down by a cavalry force that, unbeknown to the Greeks, had been sent by the Persian satrap Pharnabazus.\textsuperscript{36}

On the other hand, in the \textit{Anabasis} we are given a conspicuous example of the Greek generals collectively obeying divine guidance even contrary to the army’s self-interest (5.5.1–4). They desired to attack the fortresses of the Tibarenians, which were relatively weak, in order to ‘get some profit for the army’, even though the Tibarenians were offering them gifts of hospitality. Nonetheless, ‘After many victims had been sacrificed, all of the seers finally declared the opinion that the gods in no way permitted war.’ The generals then accepted gifts of hospitality and the army proceeded through the territory of the Tibarenians without plundering it. This passage may serve various narrative functions (such as demonstrating that the Ten Thousand were not mere brigands);\textsuperscript{37} but one of its purposes is surely to provide a paradigmatic example of pious obedience to the gods.

Let us now turn from errors of omission (failing to take signs and omens seriously) to those of commission (committing impious acts). It goes without saying that the most impious rulers in the whole of Xenophon’s corpus are the Thirty at Athens, and especially their \textit{de facto} leader Critias, since their crimes involved the wholesale execution and banishment of their fellow citizens for the sake of private gain. As Theramenes proclaimed as he vainly clung to the altar of the public hearth for safety, the Thirty were both most unjust towards men and most impious towards the gods (\textit{HG} 2.3.52–3). Their subsequent overthrow is due to a combination of divine intervention and human

\textsuperscript{35} Gray (2007) 342–4 offers a close reading of the sequence.

\textsuperscript{36} On these and similar incidents, see Flower (2008) 143–4, 170–2.

\textsuperscript{37} So Flower (2008) 170–1. For other explanations, see Parker (2004) 146.
resistance, as the democratic leader Thrasybulus makes explicit in his speech before the battle in which Critias is killed and the Thirty are routed (2.4.14–15). Thrasybulus can point to two tangible interventions: the gods previously caused a snow storm in fair weather, thus disrupting the Thirty’s plan to besiege the democratic exiles in the fortress of Phyle (2.4.2–3), and now the gods have placed his forces in an extraordinarily favourable location for the battle that is about to take place.

At several points in the *Hellenica* the narrative touches upon the despoiling of sacred funds. Xenophon reports speculation that in 370 the dynast Jason of Pherae was planning to take control of the Pythian games at Delphi, and adds that ‘his intention concerning the sacred treasures is unclear even today. It is said that when the people of Delphi inquired what they ought to do if Jason should seize the treasures belonging to the god [i.e., Apollo], the god answered that he would take care of it’ (6.4.30). The very next sentence reports Jason’s assassination, a man whose grand designs and outstanding personal qualities as a leader of men, Xenophon had just narrated at considerable length. What is particularly interesting here is that Jason is punished by Apollo for the impiety that he was merely thinking of committing rather than for something that he had actually done. A few years later (in 368–6) Euphron of Sicyon seized the sacred treasures of his city in order to pay mercenaries (7.1.46; 7.3.8). Like Jason, he was the victim of assassination. The implication is that the gods punish all those who break oaths and rob temples, and that leaders who do such things cannot be successful themselves or benefit their followers.

On the level of collective piety, Xenophon’s most explicit statement about divine punishment comes in a much-discussed passage of the *Hellenica* (5.4.1). He there gives a theological explanation for the failure of the Spartan

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40 Cf. Pownall in this volume.
hegemony in the early fourth century,\(^{41}\) claiming that the Spartans were punished by the gods for their hubristic act of seizing the acropolis of Thebes in 382. For this illegal seizure was in contravention of the terms of the King’s Peace of 386, which guaranteed the autonomy of the cities of mainland Greece:

One might be able to mention many other examples, both Greek and barbarian, where the gods do not overlook those who are impious or who do unholy things. But now I shall speak of the example that lies before us. Even though the Spartans swore that they would permit the cities to be autonomous, they occupied the acropolis in Thebes and were punished by the very men who had been wronged, although they had not previously been conquered by anyone.

What Xenophon does not say explicitly, but which the previous narrative had revealed, is that king Agesilaus, who appears as a model of the pious leader in Xenophon’s encomium, was implicated in this impiety. He had decisively intervened on behalf of Phoebidas, the Spartan commander who had seized the Theban acropolis, when Phoebidas was charged with acting without orders. Although the ephors and most Spartans were angry with Phoebidas, Agesilaus argued that the main consideration should be whether Phoebidas’ actions were ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for Sparta (5.2.32).

To make matters worse, the contrast with Agesilaus’ earlier behaviour is remarkable and could hardly have escaped Xenophon’s notice when he narrated these events. Upon arriving in Asia in 396 on his campaign to liberate the Greeks of Asia, he made a truce with the Persian satrap Tissaphernes.\(^{42}\) Tissaphernes, for his part, immediately violated the truce and used it as a breathing space in which


\(^{42}\) Ages. 1.9–13; HG 3.4.5–6 and 11. Overlapping accounts in these two works are nearly identical.
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Agesilaus, on the other hand, abided by it, proclaiming that Tissaphernes had acquired the gods as enemies by committing perjury, while making them allies to the Greeks. In the subsequent narrative this prediction indeed comes to pass: Agesilaus defeats Tissaphernes in a battle near Sardis, and the King then has him beheaded. When back in Greece, however, Agesilaus seems to have sacrificed his convictions for what he perceived as Sparta’s self-interest, and the result was the near total collapse of Spartan hegemony at the battle of Leuctra in 371. It was obvious to Xenophon, as it should have been to Agesilaus, that as soon as leaders begin to violate sworn agreements and to define justice in terms of what is most expedient for themselves and their communities, disaster is bound to follow. In the type of belief system in which Xenophon participated, the gods are indeed mindful of impious acts.

5. The Leader and the Seer

One surprising result of this discussion is the light that it sheds on Xenophon’s conception of who was the best and most effective mediator between divine and human knowledge. For him it was not so much the priest (hieréus) or the professional seer (mantis) as it was the kind of leader who knew how to make the gods’ advice profitable both for himself and his followers. Any leader who lacks proper respect for the gods, quite apart from incurring divine punishment, is also one who is hardly likely to respect his followers. For this reason, piety was not a secondary or derivative aspect of effective leadership, but was actually a litmus test for success in Xenophon’s theory of leadership. Nonetheless, it has been understandably easy for modern

43 Ages. 1.29–35; HG 3.4.20–25.
44 For the history of this period, see Cartledge (1987), Hamilton (1996), Jehne (1994).
Xenophon, however, clearly believed that divination is a teachable craft that any intelligent person can learn. Xenophon himself knew how to read the entrails of a sacrificial victim, as he claims in the *Anabasis* (5.6.29). And in the *Cyropaedia* he has Cyrus’ father say to the young prince that he had him instructed in the art of divination in order that he should not be dependent on seers, who might wish to deceive him, and in order that he should not be at a loss how to read the divine signs if he ever found himself without a seer (1.6.2). Nonetheless, Xenophon is not saying that professional seers are unnecessary. Rather, he is asserting that a commander needs to be able, if the circumstances should require it, to act without one. Even Cyrus the Great, after all, never seems to have dismissed his seers, as one of the passages quoted above reveals (*Cyr.* 3.3.34: ‘as both the seers say and as it also seems to me’).

Why then did Xenophon put so much emphasis on the ability of the commander to interpret the omens from sacrifice without having to rely on a professional seer? Might this have been related to his own experiences when acting as one of the generals of the Greek mercenaries in the *Anabasis*? His interactions with the seer Silanus, who slandered him to the army, were fraught (5.6.15–34). Additionally, might he have been influenced by his knowledge of one of the most tragic incidents in Greek history?

Every Athenian of Xenophon’s generation would have known something about the disastrous attempt of Athens to conquer Sicily in 415–13. Xenophon in particular must have been familiar with the detailed account of these events in Books 6–7 of Thucydides’ history; for the first part of the *Hellenica* is a continuation of Thucydides’ unfinished account of the Peloponnesian War. In 415 the Athenians and their allies set sail for Sicily with a huge armada, eventually comprising 207 warships (triremes) and some 50–
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60,000 men, only a very few of whom returned home alive. When the siege of Syracuse was going badly, the Athenian generals Nicias and Demosthenes finally decided to return home. Their plan was to do so as secretly as possible and at a given signal, obviously in order to escape the notice of the Syracusans. But just as the Athenians were on the point of embarking on their ships, there was a total eclipse of the moon. The date was August 27, 413. The historian Thucydides, in his terse account, primarily lays the blame for the Athenian reaction on Nicias (7.50.4):

> When everything was ready and they were on the point of sailing away, the moon, which happened to be full, was eclipsed. Most of the Athenians, taking it to heart, urged the generals to wait, and Nicias (who indeed was somewhat too much given to divination and the like) said that he would not even still discuss how the move should be made until they had waited thrice nine days, as the seers were prescribing. For this reason the delay came about for the Athenians who had been about to depart.

Needless to say, the Athenian decision to delay their departure proved fatal. This famous passage, perhaps more than any other in Greek literature, reveals the influence that seers could have, for good or ill, on the outcome of events. Nevertheless, although a general might turn to a seer for advice, it was up to him to decide when and how often the seer would sacrifice. And no matter what the results of those sacrifices were, the ultimate decision of when and where to attack resided with the general. In the words of Plato (Laches 199a): ‘the law enjoins that the general rules the seer and not the seer the general.’ For that reason it was necessary for Greek leaders, both in theory as well as in practice, to be able to read the signs from sacrifice and to determine the meaning of unsolicited omens, even if the professional seer

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66 A full treatment of this episode is in Flower (2009a) and (2008) 114–19; Stephenson and Fatoohi (2001) describe what the eclipse would have looked like.
was a highly paid and indispensable religious specialist. The Athenian polymath Philochorus (c. 340–260), who was himself a seer, believed that Nicias’ seers had misinterpreted the meaning of the eclipse, and we may well imagine that Xenophon would have agreed.47

6. Them and Us

Xenophon might seem to be urging a much more comprehensive, consistent, and (one might even say) intimate relationship between gods and mortals than was the norm in Classical Greece. But I suspect that he was merely at one end of a spectrum that could be found in all Greek communities during the Classical period. He was certainly not reflecting a particularly Spartan religious mentality, even if the majority of leaders who perform divinatory sacrifices in the Hellenica happen to be Spartans.48 It is simply the case that the focus of his Hellenica is largely on the rise and fall of the Spartan hegemony, and for that reason Spartan commanders appear more often than those from other cities.49 Very few Greeks would have openly ridiculed the efficacy of prayer and sacrifice, and those who did so were not likely to be chosen as leaders in Athens, Sparta, or any other Greek polis. Alcibiades mocked religious ritual in private and paid a heavy price. Other Athenian generals, including Tolmides, Cimon, Nicias, and

47 FGrHist 328 F 135, quoted by Plutarch, Nicias 23.5–6: ‘And indeed the sign, as Philochorus says, was not obnoxious to fugitives, but indeed very favourable: for deeds done in fear are in need of concealment, whereas light is an enemy to such deeds.’

48 For Spartan religion, see Flower (2009b) and Richer (2012). Every form of divination practised by Spartans is found in other Greek cities: the only exception is a border-crossing sacrifice called diabatēria, although elsewhere it simply may have been called by a different name; see Naiden (2013) 106, 342, 345. For the diabatēria, see Richer (2012) 209–12.

49 As Tuplin (1993) 41 points out, only about 25% of the Hellenica from 2.3.11–7.5.27 concerns events which did not directly involve Spartan citizens.
even Pericles, are known to have formed virtual partnerships with seers whom they especially trusted. A close working relationship with a particular seer can also be documented for Greek commanders from many other cities, such as Dion from Syracuse, Timoleon from Corinth, the Theban Pelopidas, and the Macedonians Philip and Alexander.\(^50\) It was standard practice throughout the Greek world for generals to consult the gods before leaving camp and before beginning battle, and it would have been highly anomalous not to do so.

Ever since Marx called religion the opium of the people, it is not uncommon to be suspicious of political leaders who use religion to justify or validate their decisions or policies. One need only think of a very recent US president. According to some British and American news agencies, George W. Bush allegedly told Palestinian leaders in June 2003 that he was told or inspired by God to invade Iraq in order to bring peace to the Middle East.\(^51\) Even if this report is false, it is interesting that anyone could have thought it credible. Xenophon’s leaders are never vouchsafed instructions that are so far reaching: in the case of sacrificial divination, the markings on a liver normally indicate only ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to specific questions. Furthermore, for most Greeks the answer is ‘advice’ rather than a ‘directive’, in the sense that the gods were not guaranteeing success should their recommendations be followed.\(^52\) And that may be the reason why divine guidance generally worked better for the Greeks than it does for us. Sometimes, as in the case of Nicias and the lunar eclipse of 413, or of Cyrus and Silanus’ prediction, divine messages

\(^{50}\) The evidence for these relationships and further discussion can be found in Flower (2008) 176–83.


\(^{52}\) For instance, Xenophon claims that before the battle of Cunaxa he was told by Cyrus himself that ‘both the camp-ground sacrifice (hiera) and the battle-line sacrifice (sphagia) were favourable’ (An. 1.8.15). See further Jameson (1991) 205 and Flower (2008) 165–9.
could be disastrously misinterpreted. But for the most part leaders could use the arts of divination to boost morale, avoid indecision, and validate plans of action. Perhaps this could be the topic of Alain de Botton’s next best-selling self-help book for all of us ‘ants’: Divination and the Art of Leadership.

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HONOUR AND THE ART OF XENOPHONIC LEADERSHIP

Benjamin D. Keim

Abstract: Throughout his wide-ranging corpus Xenophon portrays the desire for honour as a fundamentally human characteristic, one commonly attributed to rulers and commanders and yet also found among other individuals, regardless of their sex or social status. Here I explore how the motivations of honour, and the award of instantiated honours, are to be negotiated by Xenophon’s ideal leader. Every leader is in a position of honour: in order to be successful the good leader must first establish, by properly honouring the gods and his followers, the context within which he may then distribute honours effectively, thereby helping train his followers and achieve their mutual flourishing.

Keywords: Xenophon, honour, leadership, philotimia, awards, incentives.

ἀλλ’ ὃν ἂν ἰδόντες κινηθῶσι καὶ µένος ἑκάστῳ ἑµπέσῃ τῶν ἐργατῶν καὶ φιλονικία πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ φιλοτιµία κρατιστεῦσαι ἑκάστῳ, τοῦτον ἐγὼ φαίην ἂν ἔχειν τὶ ἰθὺν βασιλικὸν.

But if they have caught sight of their master and are invigorated—with strength welling up within each worker, and rivalry with one another, and the ambition to be the very best—then I would say that this man has a rather kingly character.

Xenophon, Oeconomicus 21.10

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1 Compare Socrates’ remarks on ἀρετὴ … βασιλικὴ (Mem. 4.2.11).
The following surveys Xenophon’s thoughts on the nature and functions of honour, in order that we might better understand the importance, for anyone practising the art of Xenophontic leadership, of properly negotiating honour in its myriad material and non-material guises. I begin by unpacking Ischomachus’ arguments within the final chapter of *Oeconomicus*, an unfortunately neglected passage that preaches good Xenophontic orthodoxy while emphasising the psychological aspects of leadership.\footnote{The brief discussion of the *Oeconomicus* in Caster (1937) 51–2 was rightly praised by Breitenbach (1950) 88 n. 143, and his remarks remain the most perceptive consideration of Ischomachus’ peroration. Arguing that the treatise’s ‘véritable sujet’ is ‘qu’est-ce qu’un chef?’, Caster elaborates how ‘[l]e chapitre final du dialogue montre bien sa pensée’.} Ischomachus’ review of successful coxswains, generals, and overseers will help us chart our own study of honour, as it is negotiated within communities of leaders and led, and of honours, as they are used to incentivise desirable behaviours and dispositions.

Ischomachus embarks on his final voyage by conjuring up triremes sailing across the open sea (Oec. 21.3). These triremes are distinguished not by their build or by their rowers, but by the practical intelligence (γνώμη) of their coxswains.\footnote{As Pomeroy (1994) ad loc. notes, the κελευστής served as the conduit between the commands of the κυβερνήτης and the rowers’ exertions. On the use of subordinate officers for the assessment and distribution of honour, see at n. 63 below.} Some coxswains have the ability, through their own words and actions, to hone the spirits of their men and prepare them for the efforts at hand, while others lack this intelligence (ἀγνώμονες) and are unable to inspire their rowers. There are practical implications that arise immediately from these officers’ differing abilities: drenched in sweat as they eagerly pull upon their oars, the motivated rowers reach their destination in half the time of their unmotivated colleagues. Ischomachus’ vocabulary and syntax also attest implications for the continuing relationships between these officers and those they are leading. Whereas the successful coxswains and their rowers
disembark and immediately begin praising one another (ἐπαινοῦντες ἀλλήλους), their celebrations reinforcing their small communities of leader and led, the unsuccessful coxswains and their rowers are estranged from one another by their mutual hatred (µισοῦντες τὸν ἐπιστάτην καὶ µισούµενοι). While Ischomachus merely notes the character (τουαίτα) and not the content of the words with which able coxswains motivate their men, this naval illustration portrays the intelligent leader rousing his men’s spirits and enabling their success, while the ignorant officer simultaneously destroys his men’s morale, productivity, and relationship with their leader.

As he turns from coxswains to generals, Ischomachus elaborates on the ramifications of this practical intelligence (Oec. 21.4–8). Bad generals do not merely destroy their followers’ willingness to work hard and to obey orders, but inadvertently encourage mutinous challenges to their own command. That their leadership yields shameless troops is unsurprising, since communal ties have been undermined and there are no restraints upon the individual. Under the watchful command of the good leader, however, these relationships and the obedience they engender may be rapidly restored, for under such leadership the ends of individual and community are aligned, and everyone recognises that obedience is superior to disgraceful behaviour. Just as the able coxswain rouses the spirits of his rowers, so the able general ensures ready obedience and spirited (οὐκ ἀθύµως) pursuit of his troops’ objectives. But what is it, exactly, that so rouses men’s spirits and directs their energies? Good commanders (ἀγαθοὶ ἄρχοντες) are able to inspire a love of work and, more importantly, ‘an ambition to be seen by their commander when they are doing something good’ (τὸ φιλοτιµεῖσθαι ὁφθῆναι καλὸν τι

4 Compare the relieved celebrations, pointedly shared by the officers and their men, as the Ten Thousand finally caught sight of the sea (An. 4.7.25).

5 On the necessity of this alignment, see Bruit-Zaidman (2005). The best Xenophontic example of an individual leader quickly rehabilitating the character of those he leads occurs with Dercylidas’ troops (HG 3.2.7).
ποιοῦντας ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρχοντος). Within this compact phrase we find the essence of Xenophontic leadership. Indeed, Ischomachus continues, ‘when followers have this sort of relationship with their commander, it is indeed these men who become the strongest commanders’ (21.7). In this way practical intelligence (γνώμη) is shown to be more important than bodily strength (ῥώµη), as Ischomachus puns (21.8; cf. Mem. 3.3.13).

Ischomachus’ final illustration considers those private endeavours pursued on the farm or within the workshop (Oec. 21.9–12). While the master (δεσπότης) whose men disregard his presence—and (dis)incentives—cannot be envied, the master possessing ‘a rather kingly character’ inspires competitiveness and love of honour within each of his servants (φιλονικία πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ φιλοτιµία κρατιστεῦσαι ἑκάστῳ). Although Xenophon does not cite Hesiod here, this kingly master may be seen as instilling (and thereafter inspiring) the good Erís that, by setting ‘potter against potter and carpenter against carpenter’, increases productivity and thereby wealth (Op. 20–6). Xenophon does not elaborate on the rewards that such followers might receive, but simply explains the manner in which the ideal leader, within the context of a good relationship with his men, ought to cultivate, and then employ, their desires for recognition.

Inspired by the rivalries and ambitions fostered by these good leaders, I will now trace the interwoven paths of honour and leadership across the entire Xenophontic

6 Compare Cyr. 8.1.39, with comments by Gray (2011) 322.

7 Compare Lycurgus’ use of erís at Sparta discussed below at n. 74.

Examination of the vocabulary of competition (e.g. ἐρεῖς, φιλονικία, φιλονεικία, φιλοτιµία) within the Xenophontic corpus reveals an overwhelming emphasis on the positive, beneficial aspects of competition. Xenophon is not unaware of the potential downsides of competition—consider poor Marysas, flayed after daring to compete with Apollo (An. 1.2.8)—but his own authorial intentions lead him to focus on, and teach about, the positive.
corpus. Throughout his works Xenophon portrays honour as an integral feature of human psychology and politics, with individual and community flourishing rooted in good leaders’ careful nurturing and cultivation of honour. Although the Greek vocabulary of τιµή features prominently throughout this chapter, study of Xenophontic honour must be sensitive to a far wider range of Greek expression and activity, as well as the many diverse, simultaneous resonances of τιµή. Three particularly important, overlapping resonances—of psychology, position, and practice—may be noted briefly here. First, the psychological aspect of honour, the desire—natural for Xenophon’s humans and yet also able to be nurtured—to receive recognition and reward for achievements. Thus the men chosen for the front ranks of the Athenian cavalry were those ‘ambitious both to do and to hear something good’ (φιλοτιµοτάτων καλὸν τι ποιεῖν καὶ ἀκούειν, Eq. Mag. 2.2). Second, honour as it relates to leadership and positions of authority. Such positions and political offices were themselves considered honours, and were usually accompanied by subsidiary honours and privileges. Thus the Spartans bestowed double rations upon their kings, as a means both of honouring their leaders and enabling those men to honour others as they saw fit. Third, the regular practice of honouring individuals for their efforts, whether with non-material honours such as praise or material, instantiated prizes. As with those ambitious Athenian cavalrymen, here internal motivations may be linked with external incentives in order to encourage the satisfaction of

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8 On the methodological importance of reading the Xenophontic corpus as a whole, see (e.g.) Dillery (1995) 7-8, and Tamiolaki (2012) 364. Hobden and Tuplin (2012a) 16 remark on the ‘dialogic’ nature of Xenophon’s various presentations of leadership, a reality that again encourages reading broadly and comprehensively across the corpus.

9 As Aristotle suggests (Pol. 1281a32): τιµὰς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὸς ἄρχας.

10 On these double portions see Lec. 15.4 and Hdt. 6.57; Agesilaurus felt that his duty to honour others required the distribution of both portions (Ages. 5.1).
such individual desires for recognition through accomplishments benefiting both individual and community. Bearing this tripartite division in mind, I will first survey Xenophon’s remarks on honour and human psychology, then assess the negotiation of honour within the relationships that provide the context for leadership, and finally examine Xenophon’s lessons on honorific practice within these relationships.

Although scholars have commented previously on particular honour-related passages or themes, the broader landscapes of Xenophontic honour have been neither surveyed nor explored sufficiently. My exploration of the tripartite manner in which the psychologies, positions, and practices of honour shape good leadership has been written as a prolegomenon encouraging additional scrutiny of these themes throughout Xenophontic thought and practice.

1. The Psychology of Honour

Fifty years after Neal Wood’s essay on Xenophontic leadership sought ‘to indicate something of the intellectual originality of the ancient Greek soldier and country squire’, we are no longer surprised by the image of an imaginative and innovative Xenophon. Fifteen years earlier H. R. Breitenbach had already suggested that Xenophon should

11 Particularly notable is the treatment in Breitenbach (1950) 82–7 of the ‘Wettkampf-Preis-Prinzip’ and ‘Topos ἀγῶνες-άθλα’ (to which may be added Wilms (1995) 186–9), and the summary remarks on ‘les distinctions honourifiques’ by Azoulay (2004) 99–107. The remarks of Gauthier (1976) 83 on Vect. 3 are in many ways typical, inasmuch as they recognise the importance of honour(s) to Xenophon’s thoughts yet do not explore its broader ramifications and resonances. Straussian readings, such as Higgins (1977), regularly acknowledge individuals’ love of honour (philotimia), yet rarely set this ambitiousness in conversation with other aspects of individual and institutional honour. Although Gray (2007) comments compellingly on honour within Hiero, the concept is regularly mentioned but rarely discussed in her magisterial study of Xenophontic leadership (2011).

12 Wood (1964).
be acknowledged as the ‘first military psychologist’; more recently, and with greater sensitivity to the breadth of our author’s observations, Emily Baragwanath has chronicled Xenophon’s early emphasis on the ‘leader’s expertise in human relations’. Xenophon’s status as an innovative observer of human relations should be connected to his complementary interest in honour as a fundamentally human motivation. While leaders are especially sensitive to honour’s appeals, he suggests, every human may be motivated by honour; since humans are the building blocks of every endeavour, good leadership requires not merely awareness of this reality, but proper attention to its negotiation.

Xenophon regularly acknowledges leaders’ sensitivity to honour: many are explicitly noted as φιλοτιµοτατοί or as motivated by φιλοτιµία, while others are clearly sensitive to honour’s allure. His two greatest heroes were innately φιλοτιµότατος, the elder Cyrus with regard to his soul (Cyr. 1.2.1: ψυχήν) and Agesilaus naturally (Ages. 10.4: πεφυκώς); two of his greatest villains, Alcibiades and Critias, were singled out amongst their countrymen as particularly desirous for honour (Mem. 1.2.14: φιλοτιµοτάτω πάντων

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13 Breitenbach (1990) 87: ‘So haben wir zweifellow das Recht, Xenophon den ersten Militärpsychologen zu nennen…’

14 Baragwanath (2012) 647 n. 55, with citations of earlier bibliography. For additional support of this broader ‘political’ focus, see Tamiolaki (2012) 567 n. 13, rejecting earlier arguments that emphasised the military roots of Xenophon’s theory of leadership (especially those of Wood (1964), but see also Dillery (1995) 94).


16 Azoulay (2004) 99 n. 34 is more emphatic: ‘Tous les héros de Xénophon sont épris de gloire, philotimolatoi.’

17 Due (1989) 182 notes that ‘Cyrus’ whole life, his career and his success bears witness to his φιλοτιµία. On φιλοτιµία within the Cyropaedia, see now the extended discussion by Sandridge (2012), who prefers an understanding of the concept that emphasises Cyrus’ ‘desire for [his followers’] fondness’ (92) and ‘desire to fit in, to win the approval and gratitude of one’s peers, those in authority, and those who are good people…’ (120).
Within *Hellenica* Peisander (3.4.29), Lycomedes (7.1.23) and Epaminondas (7.5.19) are noted for their love of honour, while Pharnabazus’ refusal to ally with the advancing Agesilaus—so long as the King retains the satrap in his current station—is explicitly attributed to his philotimia, an explanation readily accepted by his Spartan adversary (*HG* 4.1.37–8). Although no philotimoi are identified within the *Anabasis*, we learn that ‘most people’ attributed the sudden departure of Xenias and Pasion, after their troops defected to Clearchus and Cyrus refused to intervene, to these officers’ aggrieved sense of honour (1.4.7–9: φιλοτιµηθέντες). Little may be said about Chaerophon, whose status as a philotimos is merely suggested in passing by Socrates (*Mem.* 2.3.16), but the celebration of the successful pankratiast Autolycus portrays an accomplished athlete willing and able to bestow honours on anyone who encourages his own pursuit of honours (*Smp.* 8.37). Athenian phylarchs are very sensitive to the force of honour, we are told, since it was their own desire for glory and honour that originally encouraged them to become cavalry officers (*Eq. Mag.* 1.23: οὐ γε φυλαρχεῖν ἐπεθύµησαν δόξης καὶ τιµῆς ὀρεγόµενοι; cf. *Hier.* 7.1); thereafter, they are keener than regular soldiers to distinguish themselves by some notable action, for example, and they handle commands more quickly (*Eq. Mag.* 2.6). If the Xenophontic leader is likely marked by a philotimos nature, for good or for ill, we have already encountered within Ischomachus’ peroration the suggestion that the ideal leader is he—whether Cyrus the Great or an individual farmer—who is able to inspire philotimia within the souls of his charges.

Against this backdrop let us consider Xenophon’s remarks about the nature and attractions of honour. Located at the very heart of a treatise that aims at

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18 On the Athenians as inherently philotimoi, see *Mem.* 3.3 and 3.5, discussed at n. 56 below.

understanding and pursuing true honour, Simonides’ celebration of τιµή within the Hiero offers the most exclusive limits on philotimia (7.3):

I think that the real man differs in the following way from other animals (διαφέρειν ἄνὴρ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων), in his yearning for honour (τῷ τιµῆς ὀρέγεσθαι). While all creatures seem to derive similar enjoyment from food and drink and slumber and sex, the love of honour (ἡ δὲ φιλοτιµία) occurs naturally neither within dumb beasts nor within every human (ἐν ἄπασιν ἄνθρωπος). But those in whom the lust for honour and praise (τιµῆς τε καὶ ἐπαίνου ἔρως) takes root, these are the ones who differ most from cattle, these are judged to be real men and not merely humans (ἄνδρες δὲ καὶ οὐκέτι ἄνθρωποι μόνον νομιζόμενοι).

Here the motivations of honour are said not merely to separate humans from animals, but to mark out ‘real men’ from mere ‘humans’. Despite this traditional association of honour with ‘real men’, evidence from elsewhere throughout the corpus indicates that all humans may fall under honour’s sway. Declining the troops’ invitation to serve as the sole leader of the Ten Thousand, ‘Xenophon’ describes his pleasure, as an anthrōpos, at being so honoured by his men (An. 6.1.26: ἥδοµαι µὲν ὑφ’ ὑµῶν τιµώµενος, εἴπερ

20 As Gray (2007) ad Hier. 9.1–11 rightly suggests, the transformation from tyrant to good ruler occurs when Hiero recognises that if he ‘wants his share of honour, he must arrange for others to secure theirs’.

21 Xenophon is consistent in never ascribing honour to animals; thus at Oec. 13.6 animals learn by being ‘corrected’ (κολάζεσθαι) and ‘treated well’ (ἐὖ πάσχειν), and at Eq. 8.13 one should ‘show kindness’ (ἀντιχαρίσῃ) to horses when they are well-behaved and ‘correct’ (κολάζῃς) them when disobedient.

22 Compare Agesilaus as ἐκ παιδὸς ἐρασθεὶς τοῦ εὐκλεῆς (Ages. 10.4).

23 Note the Arcadians’ belief that the boastful Lycomedes alone was a real man (HG 7.1.24: µόνον ἄνδρα), as well as—albeit without similar rhetorical force—Ischomachus’ use of ἄνὴρ φιλότιµος (Oec. 14.10).
Within the *Cyropaedia*, young Cyrus repeatedly acknowledges the importance of fostering *philotimia* within all of his troops (1.6.26), even the lowliest foot soldier (ἲδιώτης, 2.1.22).

Understanding a broader human sensitivity to honour is further encouraged by the recognition that, as *ἀνθρώποι*, women may also worry about their honour, not merely in the reductive sense of chastity but with regard to their own standing in the eyes of their communities. Ischomachus acknowledges his wife’s fears that she might over time become less honoured by him, and thus encourages her by describing the ways through which she might become even more honoured (*Oec.* 7.42: ἀτίµατα ... τιμιωτέρα). As a leader within the *oikos*, Ischomachus’ wife must be able to manage the administration of honours and corrections within the domestic sphere (*Oec.* 9.14), a responsibility that attests to not merely her own sensitivity to honour but also that of their servants and slaves, whether male or (as with their carefully-recruited *tamias*) female (*Oec.* 9.11–13).

Xenophon’s other significant consideration of feminine honour occurs within the *Cyropaedia’s* ill-fated romance of Panthea and Abradatas. As their story unfolds, Panthea thanks Cyrus for not keeping her as a slave under a ‘dishonourable name’ (ἀτίµῳ ὄνοματι, 6.4.7); later, after Abradatas’ death, Cyrus promises that his fallen officer will never be without honour (7.3.11: ἀτίµος) and that he will also, in recognition of her many virtues, always honour his wife (7.3.12: τιµήσω). Although their activity within the broader political community was limited, Xenophon nonetheless shows women as very capable of recognising and negotiating honour.

24 On the continuing negotiations of honour between Xenophon and the Ten Thousand, see at n. 48.

25 Although there are other queens mentioned by Xenophon, and Ischomachus suggests that his wife’s distribution of honours and corrections is a regal task (*Oec.* 9.14), perhaps the clearest example of a woman’s political authority occurs with Mania, the wife of Zenis, who briefly succeeded her husband as an official under Pharnabazus (*HG* 3.1.11). As Xenophon recognises, there is much more to honour than
One additional note may be provided on the basis of Xenophon’s remarks regarding the eunuchs whom Cyrus employed as his personal staff (Cyr. 7.5.60–5). Cyrus chose these eunuchs because he believed that they, bereft of other ties of *philia* and in need of a master, would be especially loyal; moreover, his consideration of parallels within the animal kingdom suggested that the eunuchs’ castration would not impact their usefulness. Indeed, we learn that neither the eunuchs’ military efficiency nor their status as *philotimoi* was impacted: both on campaign and on the hunt they revealed the rivalrous fervour they retained within their souls (7.5.64: τὸ φιλόνικον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς).

Thus, despite Simonides’ rhetorical emphasis on ‘real men’, the distinction emerging across the Xenophontic corpus is that human beings are distinguished from other animals by their potential sense of honour.26 This sensitivity to honour extends across men and women, young and old, regardless of social and political status: Xenophon regularly comments on metic’s awareness of honour (Vect. 2, Eq. Mag. 9), while Ischomachus readily identifies some of his slaves as ‘lovers of honour’, others as ‘lovers of profit’ (Oec. 13.9, 14.10). This two-fold categorisation reminds us that while every human may theoretically be moved by honour, in practice not everyone will be motivated by the same desires. The good leader will be aware of these possibilities as he works alongside and encourages those under his command, always striving to help his followers improve themselves and their communities, thereby securing honour for himself and for them all.27

political status or office, and both the ability and the desire of women to negotiate honour must be acknowledged. On the literary and epigraphic evidence for Athenian women’s engagement with τιµή and regular negotiation of honour(s), see Keim (forthcoming).

26 And from the gods, who have their own allotted honour(s); see n. 36 below.

27 Throughout this chapter I refer to the generic Xenophontic leader and his followers as ‘he’; this usage is not meant to occlude Xenophon’s remarkable, if less frequent, perspectives on female leadership.
2. The Honour of Leading

Every leader occupies a position of honour, and the quality of his leadership relies on his careful negotiation of honour. This negotiation involves both positional and practical elements, the former concerning the ongoing relationships between the gods, the leader, and the community, the latter comprising that adjudication of honour and distribution of honours by which the leader trains and encourages his followers. Here I explore four ways in which honour shapes the contexts of leadership, and discuss (a) the honours associated with leadership, the manner in which honour shapes the leader’s relationships with (b) the gods and (c) those whom he is leading, and (d) the subsequent importance, within this context, of his distribution of honours.

(a) The Honour of Leadership

Leadership is an honour that, by resituating the leader within one (or more) communities, transforms his relationships with other individuals and with other honours. Cambyses prepares the young Cyrus for campaign by acknowledging that while the leader must show himself able to endure every sort of toil and discomfort, both the honour (τιµή) of his position and the public scrutiny of his every action lessen the weight of these burdens (Cyr. 1.6.25). The non-material honour of office and its attendant prestige (τιµή) are usually accompanied by privileges and material honours (τιµαί): thus the Spartan kings received double rations, as we saw above, and officers promoted under Cyrus' meritocratic scheme are promised honours (τιµαί) befitting their rank (Cyr. 2.1.23; cf. 3.3.7). As we shall see below, Polydamas’ lengthy remarks on Jason of Pherae suggest that the measure of a leader may be taken by assessing whom he honours, and why and how he honours them (HG 6.1).28

28 On Polydamas’ remarks see at n. 66 below; the obituaries in Anabasis (1.9, 2.6) are additional texts in which leaders’ honorific
Although Xenophon often acknowledges leaders’ *philotimia*, such eager pursuit of honour is not necessarily good: some individuals may pursue authority and honour simply to advance their own desires (*Mem. 2.6.24*).  

Xenophon’s obituary for the fallen general Meno of Thessaly warns that he was eager ‘to lead so that he might obtain more wealth, and to be honoured (*τιµᾶσθαι*) so that he might profit (*κερδαίνοι*) even more’ (*An. 2.6.21*).  

While Agesilaus’ character was reportedly unaffected by the honour, power, and sovereignty that he enjoyed (*Ages. 8.1*), Alcibiades, like a wayward athlete, neglected his training after he was honoured by the Athenians (*Mem. 1.2.24*; cf. 3.5.15). Not every leader responds, in the manner of Xenophon’s Cyrus the Great, by redoubling their own pursuit of excellence.  

There is also a supernatural aspect to the honour of leadership. Within his peroration Ischomachus twice invokes the gods, first suggesting that the ideal leader must have a touch of the divine about himself (*Oec. 21.11: θεῖον*), then opining that the leadership of those who willingly obey has a similarly divine aspect (*21.12: οὔ ... ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι ἄλλα θεῖον, τὸ ἐθελόντων ἀρχεῖν*). On the grounds that goods bestowed by leaders are always valued more highly by their recipients, Simonides argues that leaders are practices are used as a means of expressing their character. On Jason as a paradigmatic individual, see Dillery (1995) 171–6.

29 On the ambiguities of *philotimia* and their management at Athens, see Whitehead (1983).

30 On the rhetoric and (in)accuracy of this assessment of Meno, see Brown (1986).

31 Xenophon also recognises that the desire for recognition is not itself sufficient for success: thus the unprepared *philotimos* Peisander accomplishes nothing when he is put in charge of the Spartan fleet (*HG 3.4.29*), while Coeratadas of Thebes, ‘afflicted with a desire to serve as general’, failed to provide provisions and soon faded away (*An. 7.1.33*).

32 Dillery (1995) 242 considers Ischomachus’ tripartite foundation of leadership in *Oec. 21.11–12* to be education (*σωφροσύνη*), a noble right nature (*φῶις ἀγαθῆ*), and this touch of the divine (*θεῖον*). The sole mention of this chapter by Gray (2011) 186 examines 21.10 as an example of ‘the topos of willing obedience’ within a non-military context.
accompanied by ‘a certain honour and grace from the gods’ (ἐκ θεῶν τιμή τις καὶ χάρις συμπαρέπεσθαι, Hier. 8.5). The very appointment of leaders (ἔπιτακτῆρας) over other men is, according to Cyrus, a divine means of ameliorating the inability of some men to seek their good (Cyr. 2.3.4).

(b) Honouring the Gods

Besides possessing a certain divine tincture, good leaders maintain good relationships with the gods through their regular bestowal of the appropriate honour(s) upon them, and also ensure that these relationships are recognised by those under their command. For Xenophon, as Robert Parker argues, ‘it makes sense to honour the gods: it is the reasonable, the natural thing to do’. Thus his Socrates repeatedly affirms the importance of honouring the gods, and even acknowledges that ‘honouring the gods’ is the first unwritten law among all peoples (Mem. 4.4.19–20; cf. 1.4.10, 4.3.14–17). If everyone ought to honour the gods on the grounds that they are ‘men’s greatest friends’, leaders ought to be especially scrupulous, out of gratitude for their honoured status and their desire to lead successfully.

The primacy and character of the good leader’s relations with the supernatural are reiterated throughout Hipparchicus, a treatise that begins by prescribing sacrifice and ends by encouraging enthusiastic worship of the gods (9.9: θεραπεύωσιν ὅ τι ἂν δύνωνται τοὺς θεούς). As Xenophon advises his countrymen (1.1):

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33 For a similar point on the value added to a gift by the exalted identity of the giver, see Cyr. 2.1.13.
34 I am not concerned here with Xenophon’s personal beliefs, although I incline towards the view of Parker (2004) over Bowden (2004). Among the key Xenophontic principles enumerated by Dillery (1995) 15 is ‘divine providence’.
37 For a recent overview of this treatise, see Stoll (2012).
First it is necessary to sacrifice to the gods (θύοντα χρὴ ... θεοὺς) and pray that you might think, speak, and do those things by which you may lead most acceptably before the gods (θεοῖς ... κεχαρισµενῶτα), and also most pleasingly, gloriously, and advantageously (προσφιλέστατα καὶ εὐκλεέστατα καὶ πολυωφελέστατα) for yourself, your friends, and your city.

This sacrifice marks a continuing relationship of reciprocity with the gods, a relationship that is necessary for the pursuit of those material and non-material goods that denote success. Such piety is necessary yet not sufficient for good leadership, since these gods help those who help themselves: only after the gods are propitious (θεῶν δὲ ἢλεων ὄντων), however, should the commander turn his mind towards his men and their horses.

Leaders’ attentiveness to ritual extended well beyond sacrifices. As he records the splendour of Agesilaus’ ‘workshop of war’ at Ephesus, Xenophon offers the following endorsement (HG 3.4.18; cf. Ages. 1.27): ‘For wherever men reverence (σέβοιντο) the gods, train themselves in the ways of war, and carefully obey their leaders, their every endeavour is full of good hope.’ The catalyst for this celebratory remark was the procession of Agesilaus and his army from their training ground to the sanctuary of Artemis, where they dedicated their garlands in honour of the goddess. A similar example occurs within Hipparchicus’ discussion of overseeing festival processions ‘worthy of being beheld’ (ἀξιοθεάτους, 3.1). Staged within a religious context, these processions within the Agora should begin from the Herms and feature the cavalry ‘honouring the gods’ (τιµῶντες τοὺς θεοὺς) by riding in a circuit around

38 Cf. on Hie. 8.5 at n. 33 above.
39 For additional discussion of Xenophon on sacrifice, see Parker (2004).
40 On Xenophontic processions and their relation to their Hellenistic descendants, see Dillery (2004).
their shrines and statues (3.2). Such piety embellishes performance and reinforces community spirit.

The practical significance of piety is elaborated on within Anabasis. In his initial address to the Cyrean officers, Xenophon twice acknowledges their dispiritedness (An. 3.1.40: ἀθύμως ... ἀθύμως), then encourages the officers to turn their soldiers’ minds (γνώμας) and thereby enhance their morale (3.1.41: εὐθυμότεροι):

> For you understand that neither the multitude nor strength of soldiers secure victories on the battlefield, but rather whichever of the two opposing sides, aided by the gods, march with more vigorous spirits (ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐρρωµενέστεροι) against the enemy; for their opponents will rarely stand still and face these troops. (3.1.42)

Just as enthused spirits enabled the success of Ischomachus’ rowers, so also with the Ten Thousand. Although there are various, complementary ways of enhancing morale—such as diligent provisioning, rigorous training, and collegial competition—we should not discount Xenophon’s subsequent exhortation as his hoplites march out to rescue the stranded Arcadians. Perhaps some god has arranged matters this way, he muses, so that ‘we, who always begin with the gods, should enjoy greater honour than those men’ (ἡµᾶς δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἀρχοµένους ἐντιµοτέρους ἐκείνων καταστῆσαι, An. 6.3.18). These remarks should not be read as cynically manipulative, but rather as an honest statement revealing our author’s—and perhaps a great many of his troops’—understanding of a rightly-ordered existence (cf. Oec. 8.3, Eq. Mag. 1.24). They suggest ‘spiritedness’ and morale may result from the soldiers’ recognition of their leaders’ proper tending to the honour of the gods through

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41 At Dracontius’ games an altar serves as the start/finish for the horse race (An. 4.8.28).

42 On the relation between leaders’ piety and followers’ morale, see also Flower in this volume.
rituals, observances, and general piety. Indeed, besides merely inspiring his troops, such piety offers the leader—whether he is a Persian monarch or a democratically-elected Athenian hipparch—the opportunity to reveal his awareness of the honour due towards others, and thus the limits of his own privileges. All Xenophontic leaders are also being led, and the good leader must be capable both of leading and of being led well.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{(c) Honouring Leaders and Led}

Xenophon considers the relationship between the leader and those whom he leads as ‘the secret of success in any community’.\textsuperscript{44} This relationship is often described in terms of friendship: thus the daring, spontaneous rescue of Cyrus by an aide-de-camp reveals ‘how valuable it is for the leader to be loved (φιλεῖσθαι) by those around him’ (Cyr. 7.1.38; cf. \textit{An.} 1.9.28, 4.2.21), while \textit{Hipparchicus} asserts that no leader can accomplish anything with his men unless they regard him affectionately and good-naturedly (6.1–2: φιλικῶς, εὐνοϊκῶς; cf. Cyr. 2.4.10). We must also acknowledge the frequency with which these critical relationships are denominated and negotiated in terms of honour. Reflecting on the occasion when Socrates encourages the impoverished Archedemus to undertake the anti-sycophantastic efforts that would elicit both friendship and honour from Crito’s circle (\textit{Mem.} 2.9.8: υπὸ τῶν άλλων Κρίτωνος φίλων ἐτιµᾶτο), Vivienne Gray concludes that ‘friends receive honour from each other in the usual operation of the dynamics of friendship’.\textsuperscript{45}

Friends and family comprise an immediate and important community within which honours (civic, familial, and otherwise) may be displayed and recognised, and their

\textsuperscript{43} See, e.g., the remarks of Clearchus (\textit{An.} 1.3.15) and of Chrysantas (Cyr. 4.1.2–4, 8.1.1–4).

\textsuperscript{44} Gray (2011) 4.

\textsuperscript{45} Gray (2011) 310–11. The entirety of her Chapter 6 explores the dynamics of friendship, with her characteristic emphasis on rebutting more negative, ‘manipulative’ interpretations of the text.
significance as such for individuals’ honour is regularly attested. Pondering the possibility of leading the Ten Thousand, Xenophon notes that accepting this appointment would bring him ‘greater honour amongst his friends’ (τὴν τιµὴν µείζω οὕτως ἑαυτῷ γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, An. 6.1.20). Hiero’s laments that he has been cut off from friends and other well-minded individuals (Hier. 6.3–4) are followed almost immediately by his claims that he receives no real honour, since the fear of his subjects means that their services and recognition cannot truly be accounted as honours (τιµαί, 7.5–8). The rivalry between Agesilaus and the now-eclipsed Lysander, who smarts from the dishonour (τῇ ἀτιµίᾳ) shown him, reaches its climax with the king’s rebuttal that he does, in fact, know how to honour his friends, or, at least, those who intend his advancement (HG 3.4–9: τοὺς δὲ γε αὐξοντας εἰ µὴ ἐπισταίµην ἀντιµᾶν, αἰσχυνοίµην ᾗ). Nor are the ranks of friends and family closed: Xenophon’s proposal for material and non-material commercial incentives in Poroi are proffered in the hopes that merchants will not merely hasten to Athens, but come ‘as if to friends’ (ὡς πρὸς φίλους, 3.4).

Let us now examine how honour was reciprocated and negotiated between leaders and followers by considering four lengthier passages. Clearchus’ tearful address to his men at Tarsus reveals not only the ‘reciprocal relationship between commander and commanded’, as John Dillery has rightly argued, but also emphasises, in its framing and vocabulary, the centrality of honour to that relationship (An. 3.3–6). After Clearchus’ men pelt him with stones, on the grounds that they are being lied to and are being led out on campaign against the King of Persia, he addresses them with tears in his eyes. Clearchus explains his actions and his resolve in terms of honour, for he finds himself caught between his obligations to Cyrus and to his men. On the one hand, Cyrus befriended (ξένος) the exiled Clearchus, not only honouring him (ἐτίµησε) but also bestowing 10,000

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darics for his troops’ support. After campaigning in Thrace and the Chersonese, Clearchus marched out in support of Cyrus in order to reciprocate these benefits. The troops’ refusal to march forces him to choose between Cyrus’ friendship and his position of leadership. Clearchus suggests he will abandon his Persian friend and remain with the troops: since they are unwilling (οὐκ ἐθέλετε) to follow or obey him, he will instead follow along with them, in the belief that with them he will be honoured (τίµιος) wherever they are. The success of this initial stage of Clearchus’ address, utilising the shared vocabulary of honour and reciprocity to explain his actions and restore his own relationship with his agitated soldiers, cannot be separated from the negotiation of honours with which he frames and structures his remarks. His soldiers understood the claims made by such ties, and were appeased once they were persuaded that Clearchus valued his relations with them more than his ties to Cyrus.

Ariaeus reveals these ties of honour through their breach. After the death of Cyrus and the assassination of the leading Cyrean officers, Cleanor rebukes Ariaeus for disregarding the gods, failing to reverence Cyrus’ memory, and trying to harm Cyrus’ surviving friends, despite the fact that he had been greatly honoured by the living Cyrus (An. 3.2.5: οὔτε Κῦρον τεθνηκότα αἰδεσθείς, τιµώµενος µάλιστα ὑπὸ Κύρου ζῶντος). Ariaeus’ response stands in stark contrast to that of Artapates, Cyrus’ most faithful chamberlain, who died over his master’s body while wearing all sorts of gold ornaments, tokens with which he had earlier ‘been honoured by Cyrus for his good-naturedness and faithfulness’ (ἐτετίµητο … δι’ εὔνοιαν τε καὶ πιστότητα, 1.8.29); indeed, the obituary of Cyrus suggests that ‘all his friends and companions’ except Ariaeus died at his side. Unlike these other retainers, bound to Cyrus by their reciprocal ties of honour and affection,

47 Note the later authorial remark that it was shame before their peers (δι’ αἰσχύνην) that led the Cyreans to carry onwards towards Cunaxa (An. 3.1.10).
Ariaeus trampled upon those ties and was found wanting by his former colleagues.

Later in the *Anabasis* Xenophon repeatedly comments on the honour uniting leader and led. He encourages the Cyreans to remain together by emphasising the honour (ἔντιµοι) and provisions they may secure *en masse*, advantages that will be lost should they divide (5.6.32).\(^4\) Subsequent morale-sapping rumours are attributed to rivals who are jealous of Xenophon because he is honoured by the troops (5.7.10: ἕφ᾽ ὑµῶν τιµῶµαι). Forced to address accusations of *hybris*, Xenophon concludes his successful defence by invoking the many benefits he had provided for his men, including praising (ἐπῄνεσα) them for a deed well done, and honouring good men (τινα ἄνδρα ὄντα ἄγαθὸν ἐτίµησα) as much as he was able (5.8.25). When he eventually declines sole command of the army, Xenophon, as we have seen, admits his delight at being so honoured by the soldiers (6.1.26: τιµώµενος). Finally, throughout his negotiations with the deceitful Seuthes, Xenophon refuses to ignore or abandon his men, on the grounds that he is honoured by them (7.7.41: τιµώµενον ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων; cf. 7.7.50–2). If the apologetic aspect of Xenophon’s self-presentation within *Anabasis* can never be fully untangled, any idealising aspects of that self-presentation simply underscore such negotiations of honour as a hallmark of good leadership.

Finally, we may observe how the elder Cyrus once persuaded his officers to remain willingly (ἐθελοντάς) at his side and campaign with him (Cyr. 5.1.19–29). After the jealous Cyaxares suddenly recalls his forces, Cyrus argues that these officers went on campaign neither for gain nor to assist Cyaxares, but because they wished to do Cyrus a favour (βουλόµενοι τοῦτο χαρίζεσθαι) and honour him (ἐµὲ τιµῶντες). Because Cyrus cannot currently repay their efforts, nor offer more than empty promises about future

\(^4\) Compare *An.* 6.6.16, where Xenophon encourages the soldiers to acknowledge Spartan hegemony (and obey Cleander’s orders), and to avoid jeopardising the praise and honour (ἐπαίνου καὶ τιµῆς) they anticipated on their return home.
returns, he simply says that he shall continue, with or without these officers, in such a way that they would praise him (ὑµᾶς ἐµὲ ἐπαινεῖν). After Artabazus, Tigranes, and then the Hyrcanians and the Medes express their continued willingness to remain under his command, Cyrus prays to Zeus in a very cryptic fashion, asking that the god ‘grant that I, doing well by them, may surpass the honour they have shown me’ (δὸς τοὺς ἐµὲ τιµῶντας νικῆσαι με εὖ ποιούντα). While the good leader need not honour his followers exactly as he would like them to honour him, he must nonetheless ensure that they are honoured and cared for appropriately.

(d) Managing Honours and Punishments

Socrates, consoling the would-be general Nicomachides, notes that one responsibility of every leader is ‘correcting bad men and honouring good men’ (τὸ τοὺς κακοὺς κολάζειν καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιµᾶν, Mem. 3.4.8). Similar remarks occur throughout the corpus: Ischomachus charges his wife to maintain the order of their household by praising and honouring (ἐπαινεῖν δὲ καὶ τιµᾶν) those who are worthy and scolding those who need correction (Oec. 9.14–15), while Cyrus, within the νίκα concluding his childhood education, suggests that ‘in every endeavour the best prescription for obedience is: praise and honour the obedient, punish and dishonour the disobedient’ (τὸ τὸν πειθόµενον ἐπαινεῖν τε καὶ τιµᾶν, τὸν δὲ ἀπειθοῦντα ἀτιµάζειν τε καὶ κολάζειν, Cyr. 1.6.20). While more might be said elsewhere about Xenophon’s rhetoric of honour and correction, in the remainder of this chapter I will focus on the positive portion.

49 On Mem. 3.4 and the universality of Xenophontic leadership, see Gray (2011) 22–4.

50 A similar contrast between honouring and dishonouring—rather than the more common honour and punishment/correction—is found within the description of Persian education at Art. 1.9.4. Elsewhere, as he overhauls the Persian army, Cyrus remarks on the utility of weeding out bad soldiers: witnessing their dishonour (indeed, expulsion from the community: ἀτιµασθέντας) will make those soldiers who are already noble even more spirited seekers of excellence (Cyr. 2.2.27).
of these remarks, as we move from the relational context of leaders-led (a positional question) to the content of how the good leader goes about honouring those under his command (an issue of practice).

3. Honouring Successfully

Although the adjudication and distribution of honours was a responsibility for every leader, within the household or within the infantry ranks, Xenophon rarely specifies the exact honours that might be awarded. While we occasionally learn about Ischomachus rewarding his better slaves with superior cloaks and shoes (Oec. 13.10) or Jason offering a golden crown for the finest bull at the Pythian festival (HG 6.4.29), more typical of our author is the suggestion that his proposed Guardians of the Metics would be suitably incentivised by the award of ‘some honour or another’ (τιµή τις, Vect. 2.7). Rather clearer are five lessons that Xenophon teaches about the effective bestowal of such rewards. In order to honour successfully the good leader should (a) know those whom he leads, (b) regularly use their names, (c) rely on his subordinates’ knowledge and assistance, (d) ensure that everyone is aware both of his desired standards and of the available rewards, and (e) bestow these rewards fairly.

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51 This lack of detail should be unsurprising, and recalls his authorial characterisation of Ἡππαρχικόν not as a treatise but as a collection of tips and reminders (g.v. ὑπομνημάτων; cf. 1.9, 3.1). Throughout his writings Xenophon sketches the outlines of a theory of leadership and occasionally fills in some of the broader details, but almost always the specifics, should his lessons be employed, are left up to the abilities and circumstances of the individual leader.

52 Similarly, while there were certain golden gifts that only the King could bestow (Cyr. 8.2.8), Cyrus regularly encourages the pursuit of excellence by awarding ‘all sorts of honours’, including ‘gifts and offices and seats of honour’ (καὶ δώρως καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἐδραῖς καὶ πάσαις τιµαῖς ἐγέραιερεν, Cyr. 8.1.39; cf. Oec. 4.8).
(a) Know Your Followers

Leaders should know the individuals under their command personally, and should also familiarise themselves with the history and shared values of their community.53 The importance of knowing individuals, and thus their particular motivations, is emphasised in Ischomachus’ account of how he trains his own slaves to lead others. Those who are drunkards, lazy, or ‘love-sick’ are incapable of leading, while individuals who desire either profit or recognition may be taught (Oec. 12.11–14; cf. Cyr. 8.1.43). Prompted by Socrates, Ischomachus explains that lovers-of-profit may be made useful foremen simply by showing them the material gain they will enjoy by carrying out their responsibilities diligently; those desiring recognition may be trained by offering correction for their errors, and by honouring and praising them when they are attentive (12.15–16: καὶ ἐπαινῶ καὶ τιµᾶν πειρῶµαι αὐτούς). While some slaves are best incentivised with material rewards of food, those who are lovers-of-honour (αἱ δὲ φιλότιµοι τῶν φύσεων) are better motivated by praise (13.9), and so in addition to bestowing material rewards Ischomachus honours them ‘as if they were kalokagathoi’ (14.9).54 Although such familiarity may be achieved only within smaller communities such as the oikos or the infantry company, every leader may enhance their position by striving to recognise, and respond to, their charges’ particular personalities and motivations.55

Although there is a strong cross-cultural element to Xenophon’s instruction, with the practices of the Spartans and Persians held in particularly high esteem, the leader

53 Compare Xenophon’s praise for Hermocrates of Syracuse, who daily gathered together and consulted with the best men under his command (HG 1.1.30).

54 Ischomachus’ description of the distinguishing characteristics of the philotimos slave echoes Socrates’ description of the philotimos pancratist Autolycus (Smp. 8.37), and stands in stark contrast to the common contemporary view of slaves as ‘mere bellies’.

55 On the necessity of subordinates, see below. On the dynamics of the lochos and syskenia within the Cyrean army, see Lee (2007) 80–108.
may also benefit from consideration of his own community’s history and values. The significance of recognizing a common cultural milieu appears on several poignant occasions within Memorabilia and Hipparchicus, as Xenophon encourages would-be Athenian leaders to remember, resuscitate, and rely on their countrymen’s innate love of honour. After encouraging one recently-elected hipparch to excite his men’s spirits so that they will be more courageous (Θήγειν δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς … ἀλκιμωτέρους), Socrates explains the splendour of the Athenian choruses sent to Delos, a splendour that he attributes not to his countrymen’s mellifluous singing nor to their imposing stature but to their love of honour (φιλοτιµίᾳ). Led by this hipparch, the Athenian cavalry could be just as successful as these choruses if, by drawing their attention to the praise and honour (ἐπαίνου καὶ τιµῆς) on offer, their new leader roused the cavalrymen’s competitive desires (Mem. 3.3.7–15). Later, encouraging the younger Pericles to try and restore Athenian greatness, Socrates flatly states that the Athenians are ‘more ambitious and more high-minded than everyone else’ (φιλοτιµότατοι γε καὶ μεγαλο-φρονέστατοι πάντων, following Cobet’s emendation), and recounts the glories achieved by their ancestors. This ancestral excellence, he says, may be restored by recovering the ancestral ways and thereby restoring order and glory (Mem. 3.5.3). Within Hipparchicus Xenophon regularly invokes Athenian love of honour, whether with regard to cavalry officers (1.22–6), hoplites (so long as they are well-trained, 7.3–4), and cavalrymen, whether citizens (9.3) or metics (9.6). Recognising the nature, traditions, and values of those whom one is leading—on the individual and on the communal levels—may help enable individual and corporate success.

56 Compare, in a manner echoed by Demosthenes (4.36–40), Mem. 3.5.18–19 on the disorder of the infantry and cavalry, contrasted with the orderliness of athletic, choral, trierarchic, and Areopagite matters.

57 Spartan or Persian (or other) leaders could benefit from similar knowledge of their own community’s mores, while the many ‘Persian paideia’ passages suggest that (Xenophon’s presentation of) Persian
(b) Use their Names

Xenophon encourages leaders to learn and employ the names of those under their command. Such acknowledgement can be an easy and effective means of bestowing recognition: the younger Cyrus regularly summoned his companions for conversations so that he might publically acknowledge those whom he honoured (An. 1.9.28: τοὺς φίλους ... ὡς δηλοίη ὃν τιµᾷ). Calling out individuals’ names also serves as a means of encouragement, as when soldiers simultaneously remind their comrades of their physical presence and mutual watchfulness. Later in Anabasis, as his troops attempt to cross a treacherous ravine amidst Bithynian attacks, Xenophon encourages them to ‘Follow Heracles the Leader and encourage one another by name’ (ὁνοµαστί, 6.3.24). Here, as with Cyrus’ Persians marching into battle against the Assyrians, the soldiers’ invocation of each other’s names enhances their courage and steadfastness, just as their joint invocation of the god or recitation of the paean reminds them of their shared ties with the gods (Cyr. 3.3.59).

The elder Cyrus makes ideal use of this lesson. Within his paideia we see the future king engaging with his friends as they go out hunting together, kidding one companion and praising another, urging each of them on by their own names (Cyr. 1.4.15: παρακαλοῦντι ὀνοµαστὶ ἕκαστον). Later, as the allies march out in support of Gadatas, Xenophon elaborates on the theory and practice of Cyrus’ use of names (5.3.46–51). As the allied officers return from their meeting they marvel at Cyrus’ familiarity as he announced their positions for the march, specifically his ability to call each of them by name (ἀνοµιάζων). Xenophon suggests that Cyrus paid particular attention (ἐπιµελείᾳ) to this matter,

mores could be of use to all leaders. Aristotle’s lengthiest definition of τιµή (Rhet. 1361a28–b2) explicitly acknowledges such variety, albeit with a more euergetistic focus.

58 Lee (2007) 92 considers the ties of bravery within the lochos.

on the grounds that it would be foolish not to know the names of those whom he was commanding (τῶν ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ ἡγεµόνων τὰ ὀνόµατα), since these same men were the instruments (ὀργάνοις) by which he might capture or defend a position. Three particular functions are mentioned: first, and most significantly, whenever Cyrus wished to honour (τιµῆσαι) someone, he thought it proper to address the individual by name (ὄνοµαστί). Second, his regular use of his officers’ names made his subordinates more sensitive to his presence, and thus even more eager to be seen doing something good. Third, Cyrus used specific names (ὠνόµαζεν) whenever he issued commands, as those individuals’ fear and shame of failure meant that such targeted orders were more effective.⁶⁰

Once the troops began their nocturnal advance against the Assyrians, Cyrus mounted his horse and rode along reviewing the ranks. When he saw troops marching in good order, he would ask who they were and then praise (ἐπῄνει) them; when he encountered others making a commotion, he would try to correct it quietly (ἐπηρειλε). His focus on these latter occasions is not on those individuals who are failing, but rather on discerning the causes of their failure and correcting them. From this particular celebration of Cyrus we learn that the good leader will strive to know the names and temperaments of those under his command, will personalise his praise of the worthy, and may choose to anonymise correction.⁶¹

(c) Use Subordinates

Since no one, not even the idealised Cyrus,⁶² is capable of knowing every man within an entire army or of observing

⁶⁰ Amidst Cyrus’ praise for Chrysantas (Cyr. 4.1.3) is the detail that when the King called out by name for Chrysantas to stop fighting, he did so immediately.

⁶¹ Elsewhere public correction may be viewed positively: see n. 50.

⁶² As the previous passage subtly indicates, there were limitations on Cyrus’ familiarity with troops other than the officers immediately under his command. While he could easily rattle off his officers’ names and the desired dispositions of their troops within the staff meeting, he had to
them constantly and carefully, Xenophontic leaders must rely on their subordinates to help them identify and encourage those worthy of honour. Ischomachus’ estate-management becomes much easier once he has trained his wife (Oec. 9.14) and foremen (13.2), and allows them to shoulder the responsibilities of motivating the household.\textsuperscript{63} Within military contexts subordinate officers should encourage and manage competitiveness amongst their own charges (e.g. Athenian phylarchs, Eq. Mag. 1.21; Abradatas’ charioteers, Cyr. 7.1.18) in order to enhance troops’ performance and assess other potential officers (Eq. Mag. 2.2–6, An. 5.2.11). Although born out of human limitations, such delegations of honorific practice are themselves part of the honour, both crown of recognition and spur of encouragement, associated with leadership positions.

After Cyrus returned to Media (Cyr. 3.3.6–7), he distributed funds to each of his taxiarchs so that they might themselves honour (τιµᾶν) those of their men who pleased them, and thereby ensure that the entire army, comprised of units worthy of praise (μέρος ἀξιέπαινον), would fare well. Addressing as friends (φίλοι) those officers and notables whom he himself wishes to honour (ἐτίµα), Cyrus acknowledges their present good fortune, which allows them both to honour (τιµᾶν) those whom they wish and to be honoured (τιµᾶσθαι) as each is worthy (ἕκαστος ἄξιος ᾖ). Later (8.4.29–30), Cyrus divides the spoils of Sardis among his soldiers, giving the choicest bits to his myriadarchs and aides-de-camp, then dividing the remainder and instructing those myriadarchs to distribute it to their men just as he had, according to merit. Thus they scrutinised (δοκιµάζων) their subordinates and conveyed similar instructions, until finally the ‘six-man-men’ had examined and rewarded their handful of private soldiers as they deserved (πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν ἀξίαν rely on these subordinates in order to learn the names of those whom he wished to praise for their good marching.

\textsuperscript{63} There are limitations to such delegation: while Xenophon encourages the surviving Cyreans to join with their officers and help ‘correct’ any of their colleagues who err, he does not mention any positive bestowal of honour(s) by the soldiers (An. 3.2.31).
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ἐκάστῳ; cf. 7.3.1–2). Within these distributions of campaign spoils, as within his orders to the newly-minted satraps that they adopt his methods of honouring and incentivising their subordinates (8.6.10–14), Cyrus remains the central fount of honour, but as he distributes honour he relies heavily on subordinate officers as assessors and distributors of that honour to those whom they know are worthy.64

(d) Publicise the Honours Offered and Awarded

Leaders must ensure that other individuals know about the honours on offer, so that they may be properly encouraged to act accordingly. Three examples of such publicity will suffice. First, immediately after Cyrus’ meritocratic reform of the Persian honour system, we encounter a series of stories portraying the King as both judge and able administrator of honours. Pleased by both the ‘clods vs. cudgels’ war games and the ‘careful practice’ routines employed by certain junior officers, Cyrus expressed his approval by publicly honouring these officers and their men with invitations to dinner (Cyr. 2.3.17–21).65 This gesture of approval led immediately, if indirectly, to the adoption of these practices by other companies. Cyrus’ careful management of honours yields his troops’ mimesis of desirable activities.

Second, Polydamas of Pharsalus’ address at Sparta introducing Jason of Pherae contains an elaborate description of that leader’s engagement with those under his command (HG 6.1.6). Jason tests his troops on a daily basis, discharging those who are unfit and honouring (τιµᾷ) those who serve well with double or triple pay. He provides for

Simonides (Hier. 9.3) would be displeased by this arrangement, since he encouraged Hiero to monopolise the distribution of honours and other goods, and to deputise the administration of punishments and corrections.

Compare Cyrus’ explicit instructions to his satraps regarding mimesis (Cyr. 8.6.12). As Tatum (1989) 208 argues: ‘The text of the Cyropaedia dissolves in mimetic replication of Cyrus, with his lieutenants and satraps doing what Xenophon’s readers may now do in turn: imitate Cyrus.’
their care when they are ill, and for their funerals when they die. As a result of such actions, Polydamas emphasises, all of Jason’s mercenaries know (ὥστε πάντες ἴσασιν) that their continued displays of martial skill will bring them a very honoured (ἐντιµότατον) and plentiful existence.66 Finally, Simonides, encouraging Hiero to reinvent himself as the fount of Syracusan honour and to distribute all manner of awards for all sorts of activities on behalf of the civic good, insists that if these incentive structures are made clear (εἰ δὲ φανερὸν γένοιτο, ἐµφανές), and thus it is revealed that the man introducing any good thing will not be without honour (οὐκ ἀτίµητος), then many individuals will be encouraged (ἐξορµήσειεν) to act on behalf of the community (Hier. 3.9–10). It is not enough simply to offer incentives for good performance; the standards, and thereafter the fair distribution of the rewards earned, must be announced to, and accepted by, those whom the leader wishes to incentivise.

(e) Award Honours Fairly

Xenophon regularly emphasises the importance of fairly distributing honours.67 While this usually refers to the meritocratic distribution of goods, democratising extensions of this principle may be seen in Ischomachus’ recognition of certain honour-loving slaves, or in the elder Cyrus’ allowing his quartermasters an equal share in everything (ἰσοµοίρους πάντων), since he thought it was fair to show equal regard (τιµᾶν) for the purveyors of the army’s stores as for heralds or envoys (Cyr. 2.1.31).68

66 Dillery (1995) 172 emphasises that Jason’s excellence is presented ‘very much in Socratic terms’. For the elder Cyrus’ refusal to leave the side of casualties after the Cadusian prince’s ill-advised sortie, see Cyr. 5.4.18; on rewards for martial skill compare the presentation of the younger Cyrus at An. 1.9.14–15.

67 A related Xenophontic theme is that the would-be honorand must have benefitted the source of honour, be it the community (Mem. 2.1.28, 3.6.3; HG 6.1.15) or family members (Mem. 1.2.55).

68 A similarly democratising tone is struck by Cyrus when he urges Gobyras to stop undervaluing (ἀτίµαζε) his camp followers and
Incentive structures work only when ends and means are properly aligned: the failure to wield either carrots or sticks appropriately simultaneously undermines the structure and obstructs the pursuit of desired ends. The elder Cyrus’ reform of the Persian honours system is the ideal embodiment of the meritocratic principle, with its formulaic proclamation that each would be honoured as Cyrus—and his delegates—deemed him worthy (Cyr. 2.3.16: ἔδοξε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τιµᾶσθαι ἕκαστον, Κῦρον δὲ τὸν κρίνοντα εἶναι; cf. 3.3.6–7, 7.2.11). If means and ends fall out of alignment, discouragement and diffidence will result. While Ischomachus uses superior garments to reward and encourage good workers, he acknowledges the dispiritedness (ἀθυµία) that results when the same rewards are given both to those workers enduring toils and dangers and to those who avoid them (Oec. 13.11). Chrysantas, speaking in support of the Persian reform, self-deprecatingly acknowledges his own shortcomings as he worries that undesirable outcomes may ensue if the noble and able members of the community become dispirited (ἀθύµως ἕξουσι) by others sharing unjustly in the rewards (Cyr. 2.3.6). Because individuals are sensitive to honour in both its material and non-material forms, such fairness is necessary not merely for success, but for maintenance of the community.

The distribution of rewards must not only be done fairly, but also be known to be done so. Within his eulogy for the younger Cyrus, Xenophon points out that he was widely acknowledged for honouring the ‘noble in battle’ especially (ἀγαθοὺς εἰς πόλεμον ὁμολόγητο διαφερόντως τιµᾶν). Not only were the noble thus the most fortunate, but they were seen to be so, while the cowardly appeared worthy to be their slaves (An. 1.9.14–15). Here we learn both about what values and actions Cyrus honoured, and that he was known to honour such behaviour as it deserved. This attentiveness to honour may not provide the entire explanation for recognise the tactical contributions made by their sheer numbers (Cyr. 5.2.36).
Cyrus’ good leadership, yet such sensitivity explains its character.

4. What To Do With Honours

Once the leader has established a suitable rapport with those he is leading, he may cultivate his followers’ desire for recognition (and reward) in order to accomplish desired ends. Xenophon suggests three broad categories of accomplishments: (a) completing specific tasks, (b) acquiring necessary skills and, most importantly, (c) honing appropriate dispositions.

(a) Accomplish Specific Tasks

Leaders may offer awards in order to achieve or expedite specific tasks. As the Ten Thousand completed a complicated series of fording manoeuvres in Carduchia, Xenophon encouraged his soldiers by reminding them that ‘he who reached to the other side first would be the best man’ (ἄριστος … πρῶτος, An. 4.3.29; cf. Cyr. 3.3.62). Material rewards may also be offered, as when the Spartan commander Dercylidas ordered his troops to build a defensive wall across the Chersonese. After dividing the 37-stade course into sections and assigning each section to a group of soldiers, Dercylidas promised them he would give prizes (ἆθλα) to the first men to complete their sections (τοῖς πρῶτοι ἐκτειχίσασι) and also to the others, to each according to his merits (ὡς ἑκαστοι ἄξιοι εἶεν). Although they only began in the spring, much to Xenophon’s amazement these suitably incentivised troops completed the wall before late summer (HG 3.2.10).

Other commercial and military endeavours might be similarly encouraged by more widely broadcasting the available honours. Xenophon envisioned the promise of honours as well as profits attracting merchants to a revitalised Athens, and suggested that wealthy foreigners would readily invest in Athens, should their names be inscribed on a public memorial (Vect. 3.3, 11; cf. Hier. 9.9).
Cyrus offered similar awards for those merchants accompanying his army with the largest stock of goods (Cyr. 6.2.38: δώρων καὶ τιµῆς τεύξεται). When the outbreak of the Corinthian War led the Spartans to recall Agesilaus from his Asian campaign, he resolved to return home with the most useful army (HG 4.2.2–8). Thus Agesilaus, wanting to take back with him as many of the best soldiers as he could, set out prizes for whichever city would send the best army, and for whichever mercenary commander would supply the best-prepared company of hoplites, archers and peltasts. He also told the cavalry commanders that he would give a prize (νικητήριον) to whomever should provide the best-horsed and best-prepared company.

What is unusual about this passage is not Agesilaus' methods but rather Xenophon's detailed description of these prizes, consisting 'for the most part of exquisitely crafted hoplite and cavalry arms, as well as golden crowns. The cost of all the prizes was not less than four talents'. Elsewhere—from Hermogenes' acknowledgement that 'praising the gods costs nothing' (Smp. 4.49) and Simonides' remarks on the cheapness of prizes (Hier. 9.11) to the impoverished Athenians employing various honours as a thrifty way of jumpstarting their economy (Vect. 2–3)—Xenophon stresses the affordability of prizes. The apparent discrepancy may be resolved by his suggestion that in this fashion 'arms worth a vast sum of money were provided for the army'; if not cheap, these prizes still provided a sound return on Agesilaus' investment. Rather than simply encouraging excellence amongst a standing army, these prizes recruited and mobilised a new army in a manner

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69 By obeying these orders Agesilaus, as we would expect the ideal leader to do, set aside his personal aspirations and thoughts of honour (HG 4.2.3: καὶ οἶνον τιμῶν καὶ οἶνον ἐλπίδων ἀπεστερεῖτο).
reminiscent of the crowns awarded to Athenian trierarchs for the speedy and thorough preparing of their triremes.\textsuperscript{70}

\textbf{(b) Develop Skills}

Another, broader use of honours was modelled by Agesilaus earlier in his Asiatic campaign within the ‘workshop of war’ he inspired at Ephesus (\textit{HG} 3.4.16; cf. \textit{Ages.} 1.25; also cf. \textit{Cyr.} 2.1.22):

\begin{quote}
At the very beginning of the spring he gathered his entire army together at Ephesus. Wanting to train (\textit{ἀσκῆσαι}) the army, he set out prizes (\textit{ἆθλα}) for the fittest company of hoplites and best company of cavalry. He also set out prizes (\textit{ἄθλα}) for those peltasts and archers who were best at their respective tasks. As a result, one could see the gymnasia full of men exercising, the track full of men galloping on horseback, and the javelin-men and archers practising carefully.
\end{quote}

Although Xenophon does not detail the specific prizes offered, Agesilaus’ expectations were readily apparent and soon accomplished. The good leader should deploy prizes, as appropriate, to encourage not merely particular achievements but also the development of skills that will, in turn, enable those particular achievements.\textsuperscript{71} Agesilaus’ careful motivation of his troops at Ephesus worked: when this army subsequently marched against the Persians, they were a most formidable opponent (3.4.24).

Similarly instructional is Iphicrates’ command of the Athenian fleet (\textit{HG} 6.2.27–30). As the triremes embarked on their campaign around the Peloponnese, Iphicrates offloaded their main sails so that his men would be forced to

\textsuperscript{70} Compare Cyrus’ announcement to his new satraps that he will ‘honour (\textit{τιµήσω}) as a valuable ally and fellow-guardian of Persia’ whoever has the highest \textit{per capita} number of chariots and of very fine cavalry (\textit{ἀρίστους ἱππέας}, \textit{Cyr.} 8.6.10–11).

\textsuperscript{71} On this passage see Gray (2011) 99, and on the ‘\textit{Τοπος ἄγωνες-ἄθλα}’, see n. 11.
row more and improve their fitness. He also staged regular morning or evening races among his fleet, with the winners (the first to reach shore) enjoying easier provisioning and an earlier meal, while the losers were penalised both by their defeat and by their subsequent scarcity of provisions and time to recuperate. As they rowed onwards Iphicrates also had them training en route by altering formations. Xenophon explicitly praises Iphicrates for this swift, and yet educational, transit that did not require significant outlay yet harnessed the sailors’ own competitiveness to help them train for their present and future toils (6.2.32).

The broadest endorsement of offering incentives for training comes from Simonides, who suggests that the appropriate offer and distribution of prizes may enhance every human endeavour (Hier. 9.5–6). Noting that all communities (πόλεις) are divided into sub-communities that may be posed as rivals, one against the other, Simonides suggests that

If someone should offer prizes (ἄθλα) to these groups for displays of well-maintained equipment, good discipline, horsemanship, courage in battle and fair business dealings, then all of these things would, on account of rivalry, be keenly pursued (εἰκὸς καὶ ταῦτα πάντα διὰ φιλονικίαν ἐντόνως ἀσκεῖσθαι).

Even agriculture, the endeavour least marked by rivalry, would be enhanced if prizes (ἄθλα) were offered to those farms and villages that produced the finest harvests (9.7). Simonides’ emphasis on the universality of this process, rather than its applicability to any particular skill or endeavour, brings the underlying aspects of its character, the stoking of (good) competitiveness and rivalry, to the fore. Whether tending vines, plundering enemies, or rowing

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72 While the setting of this Iphicrates narrative recalls Ischomachus’ ideal coxswain (Oec. 21.3, discussed above), it stands in immediate juxtaposition (and contrast) with Xenophon’s negative portrait of Mnesippus of Sparta (HG 6.2.17–26). On this leaderly diptych see Dillery (1995) 164–71.
across the wine-dark sea, leaders may lay the foundations for success by carefully suggesting incentives, thereby stoking first their followers’ individual desires for honour(s) and thus a competitiveness with one another that will be fairly rewarded for achievements benefiting the community.

(c) Foster Rivalry, Carefully

Thus, as Ischomachus originally suggested, the most fundamental reason for a leader to distribute honour(s) is to encourage the rivalrous ambitions of those whom he is leading. Within *Hipparchicus* Xenophon suggests that prizes (ἀθλα) be awarded, by illustrious judges, for all of the manoeuvres that would be performed publicly; these prizes would stoke the competitiveness (φιλονικία) of every Athenian cavalryman and ensure their excellence (1.26). Agesilaus, amongst his many preparations before Coronea, inspired his troops’ competitiveness (φιλονικία) so that each wished to appear the best (Ages. 2.8: ἄριστοι φαίνοιντο). And Lycurgus, as he completely reformed Spartan society, noted that where φιλονικία is strongest, ‘there the choruses are most worth hearing and the athletic contests afford the finest spectacle’. If he could manoeuvre the ephebes into rivalrous competition for excellence (εἰς ἔριν περὶ ἀρετῆς), they would reach the heights of manliness (ἀνδραγαθία). This is the ‘most divinely-pleasing and most citizenly strife’ (ἡ θεοφιλεστάτη τε καὶ πολιτικωτάτη ἔρις), which keeps every member at his best and all ready to support the polis (LP 4.2–6).

73 The exalted identity of the judges adds to the honour of victory. Compare the meritocratic reforms of Cyr. 2.3, with Cyrus established as the judge; Xenophon’s suggestion to the Ten Thousand that their current campaign was a contest, with the gods as αγονοθεται (An. 3.1.21); and Plutarch’s account of Sophocles’ first dramatic victory, when Cimon and the nine other generals were pressed into service as tragic judges (Cim. 8).

74 Compare Socrates’ similar remarks on Athenian choruses and innate philotimia at n. 56 supra.
An excellent example of such rivalry in practice occurs amongst the Ten Thousand shortly before they glimpse the Black Sea (An. 4.7.2–12). Xenophon and several lochāgoi were contemplating the road ahead, their path obstructed by the boulders tumbling down from the Taochian stronghold. Callimachus, the head lochāgos that day, decided to draw the Taochians’ fire by darting out from the tree line before quickly retreating to safety. Suddenly rivalrous emotions take hold of Agasias, another lochāgos, who fears that Callimachus will be the first to run across the stronghold. Thus, Agasias ‘dashed forward himself and proceeded to go past everybody’, at least until Callimachus seized the rim of his shield and allowed Aristonymus of Methydrium to move ahead, followed by Eurylochus of Lusi. Xenophon explains by noting that ‘these four men were contending rivalrously for valour (ἀντεποιοῦντο ἀρετῆς) and continually striving with one another (διηγωνίζοντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους); and by contending (ἐρίζοντες) in this manner they captured the stronghold, for once they had rushed in not a stone came down more from above’. As their leaders ponder what course of action would be best, these soldiers—individually motivated by their desire to surpass the excellence of their colleagues, yes, but also acting within a context in which they know their actions will be evaluated and rewarded accordingly by their superiors—expose themselves to dangers and, by storming the stronghold, secure the provisions and security that ranked foremost amongst their traveling community’s goods.

Yet the fostering of such ambitions had a downside, and not simply because sudden, rivalry-fuelled sorties might be unsuccessful and potentially disastrous. On three occasions Xenophon records commanders’ desires to achieve ‘some...
brilliant deed’ (λαµπρόν τι), and on each occasion the subsequent sorties—Herippidas’ antagonism of the Paphlagonian allies (HG 4.1.21–8), Phoebidas’ seizure of the Theban Cadmea (HG 5.2.28), and the Cadusian prince’s attack on the Assyrians (Cyr. 5.4.15–22)—end badly. The Herippidas affair in particular reveals the complexity of honour-related challenges that leaders might be forced to negotiate. Eager to distinguish himself, Herippidas marshalled the several thousand troops allotted by Agesilaus and successfully attacked Pharnabazus’ camp; when he arrogantly seized the allies’ share of the booty, however, the Paphlagonians defected to Ariaeus. The subordinate’s arrogant ambition and the allies’ resultant dishonour (ἀτιµασθέντες) precipitated, Xenophon reports, the worst moment of Agesilaus’ impressive campaign.

Just as the philotimia of individual leaders could destroy companies or tear communities apart, the competitiveness of enlisted soldiers could be similarly ruinous. In the build-up to the battle against the Assyrians, Xenophon has Cyrus issue an executive summary of his troops’ condition and urge them into battle (Cyr. 3.3.9–10; cf. 1.6.26). They are physically fit, they have contempt for the enemy, they are skilled in the tactics for their armour, and they are trained to obey their leaders (πείθεσθαι … τοῖς ἄρχουσιν). Another reason for attacking, however, is that they are so rivalrous (φιλοτίµως) that they were beginning to be jealous (ἐπιφθόνως) of one another. Engagement with common dangers would extinguish any jealousy towards those wearing decorations on their armour or striving for glory (τοῖς δόξης ἐφιεµένοις); soldiers would then praise (ἐπαινοῦσι) and adore their fellow soldiers even more, because they see one another as fellow workers (συνεργοί) for the common good (ἀγαθόν). Thereafter Cyrus’ army marches into battle against the Assyrians rapidly and in good order, following on courageously (ἐρρωµένοις) in no small part because of their rivalries with one another (διὰ τὸ φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς ἄλληλους); once they are underway,

77 Gray (2011) 320 compares Cyr. 3.3.10 and LP 4.
their love of honour once again becomes positive (3.3.57, 59). This passage reveals the potentially deleterious aspects of ginning up rivalries amongst the troops, which leaders are called on to do and which even the lowest-level soldier is called on to embrace (Cyr. 2.1.22). The good leader must use his relation to, and knowledge of, his men to motivate them, so that by ensuring both the proper spirit and the proper skills they may, individually and collectively, achieve their common ends.

**Conclusion**

Xenophon viewed honour as a fundamental aspect of human psychology and therefore of every human relationship. The successes enjoyed by good leaders—whether or not they were themselves particular lovers of honour, whether they were leading an army or a handful of fieldworkers—were built on the foundations of relationships denominated in honour and were reinforced by incentives for honourable actions and comportment. I conclude by considering the symposium convened by Cyrus after the fall of Babylon (Cyr. 8.4), an occasion that offers Xenophon’s idealised leader the opportunity to stage, and to explain, a dynamic display of honour that may serve as a microcosm of the broader picture explored above.78

On this occasion Cyrus invited a handful of his leading associates, all of them friends (φίλοι) distinguished by their desire for their leader’s advancement (αὔξειν) and for their continued honouring of him in a good-natured manner (τιµῶντες εὐνοϊκώτατα, 8.4.1).79 This symposium thus marks and encourages the reciprocation of honour within this small community: as these Persians and allies have

78 Gera (1993) 132–91 considers ‘The Symposia of the Cyropaedia’, with 132–5 and 183–90 focusing on this passage; although sensitive to the ‘theme of rivalry or competition’ (133), she says little about the dynamics of honour discussed here.

79 Compare Agesilaus’ presentation of his friends’ actions, for which he reciprocates honour (HG 3.4.9).
honoured Cyrus, so they are repeatedly honoured here by Cyrus’ invitation and subsequent rewards.

The King and his companions are not entirely alone on this occasion: as the very first word of the chapter (θύσας) suggests, Cyrus has begun once again by remembering the gods and offering them the appropriate honours. As the guests arrive they are not allowed to sit wherever they wish, but are carefully seated in accordance with their relative standing.\(^{80}\) The significance of this visual display is twice stressed as Cyrus’ theory and practice is related: by clearly revealing how much he honoured each guest (σαφήνευε μὲν τοὺς κρατιστεύοντας παρ’ ἑαυτῷ) Cyrus reiterated his own status as the adjudicator of honours, reminded these honorands that he was attentive both to their motivations and their actions, and thereby both warded off the diffidence that undermines good competitive rivalries (οὐ φιλονίκως πρὸς ἀλλήλους) and stoked their individual desires to continue striving for superiority (προδημότατα φανεροὶ εἰσὶν ἁγιωτάτους πάντες, 8.4.4). Whether they were mingling before dinner, being seated, or being recognised thereafter, at every moment Cyrus was able to make a display of those whom he felt were most deserving (8.4.5: οὗτος ἔσαφηνε μὲν τοὺς κρατιστεύοντας παρ’ ἑαυτῷ).\(^{81}\) In order to keep the flames of his guests’ ambitions burning keenly, there was no fixed seating: those who accomplished noble deeds between symposia might be moved to a more honourable seat (εἰς τὴν τιμιωτέραν ἑδραν), while those who were lazy or dissolute would find themselves dishonourably demoted (εἰς τὴν ἀτιμιωτέραν).\(^{82}\)

\(^{80}\) Although honour was the main factor in determining the seating arrangements, Cyrus’ protection from treacherous attacks was also considered (Cyr. 8.4.3). Gera (1993) cites Xerxes’ similarly hierarchical seating arrangements for his commanders before Salamis (Hdt. 8.67), while Xenophon’s presence alongside Seuthes forms part of another significant negotiation of honour (An. 7.3.19, 29).

\(^{81}\) Compare Cyrus the Younger (An. 1.9.29).

\(^{82}\) Gray (2011) 258 n. 17 cites Cyr. 8.4.5 (pace Nadon (2001) 184) as proving that Cyrus ‘honoured only good deeds’.
Cyrus’ position as the fount of honour is undisputed, and is defensible not merely on grounds of justice, but also beneficence. Besides assessing his guests and assigning their seats, Cyrus bestows additional gifts on each in accordance with that seat, these additional honours further confirming the honour already afforded by their placement. Moreover, any guests who are dismayed by their appointed position may appeal to the King for an explanation. Midway through the symposium Cyrus, prompted by Hystaspas’ dissatisfaction at the preference shown for Chrysantas (εἰς τιµιωτέραν ἐµοῦ χώραν), is allowed to explain—in his characteristically winsome, persuasive, and inspirational way—how this dynamic system of honours works. Chrysantas was preferred because his service was even better than the good service provided by Hystaspas; Cyrus’ careful recounting of Chrysantas’ several merits not only provides support for his earlier decision, but also endorses the sorts of behaviours Cyrus wished to honour and encourages those, such as Hystaspas, who would like to receive greater honour. As this system of honour is challenged and defended, Cyrus reveals the continued dynamics of honour within this specific honour-group, with the intention of spurring each of these leaders on in their pursuit of excellence. Within his dinner-parties, as within his more vigorous contests, Cyrus, as we would expect of the ideal Xenophontic leader, does not merely elicit good εἰς, but also smoothly, rationally, persuasively, and productively channels such competitiveness and desire for honour towards the good of his community.

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83 Besides the legal grounds of the meritocratic reform (2.3.16), there is his explanation of why Hystaspas is not being treated unjustly (8.4.11: οὐκ ἀδικοῦµαι).

84 Compare Cyrus’ availability as adjudicator of the Babylonian spoils (Cyr. 7.5-35).

85 Tatum (1989) 203 notes Cyrus’ emphasis on Chrysantas’ intellectual abilities.
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NOVEL LEADERS FOR NOVEL ARMIES: XENOPHON’S FOCUS ON WILLING OBEDIENCE IN CONTEXT*

Richard Fernando Buxton

Abstract: Although the universalising bent of Xenophon’s leadership theory shows Socratic influence, its prioritisation of the general and the author’s fame for leading the Cyreans suggests an equal foundation in his battlefield experiences. In particular, the theory’s focus on securing willing obedience can be understood as a response to the novel fourth-century challenge of uniting ethnically disparate forces of free-agent mercenaries as an army, an issue central to Anabasis 5–7. Not only was Xenophon familiar with such a force, but he also shows an interest throughout his works in the advantages of mercenary professionalisation and specialisation, particularly with Jason of Pherae.

Keywords: Xenophon, leadership, mercenaries, Anabasis, xenia, Jason of Pherae.

Recent work on Xenophon’s theory of moral leadership, culminating with Vivienne Gray’s 2011 monograph, has succeeded admirably in establishing both the core tenets of the author’s theory and the universalising scope that he sets for its application throughout his polygeneric opus.1 Described succinctly, the Xenophontic leader is one who can inspire the willing and

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enthusiastic obedience of his followers through presenting himself to them as, on the one hand, a competent and nurturing champion of their prosperity and, on the other, a visible partner in the labours needed to secure this prosperity. The *Hipparchicus* contains one of Xenophon’s most concise formulations (6.1–4):

One would be unable to fashion anything as one wished it, unless the materials from which it were to be fashioned should be disposed to obey the will of the craftsman. Nor especially in the case of men, unless they, with god’s help, will be willing in this same way both to be disposed in a friendly manner (φιλικῶς) towards the one commanding and to consider him more sensible than themselves as regards trials against their enemies. It is thus likely that those being ruled will display goodwill (εὐνοϊκῶς) from the following: when he behaves in a friendly-minded fashion (φιλοφρόνως) towards them and appears to display foresight. … And in short they would least scorn a commander if he himself should appear to perform however many things he enjoins upon these men better than they.

Although the battlefield commander is the most frequent manifestation of the Xenophontic leader, the author advocates a similarly benevolent approach to management in all fields of group endeavour, from politics to oversight of household domestics, as the analogy with the craftsman hints at already.²

Despite the ubiquity of the model leader in Xenophon’s writings, only tentative steps have been taken towards identifying the sources informing his paradigm, particularly those that shaped the author’s distinctive and moralising focus on securing willing obedience through beneficial acts. Older critics, such as George Cawkwell and Hans Breitenbach, disposed of the question by focusing on the

traditional character of the moral sentiment animating Xenophon’s model, which they lumped with his piety as ever so much Hellenic boilerplate. Breitenbach also posited a strong Socratic influence, as have to varying degrees Roger Brock, John Dillery and Eric Buzzetti; a position that has seemed increasingly plausible as the theory’s universalising bent has been elucidated. But Xenophon’s Socratic expansion of model leadership beyond the battlefield does not alter the fact of the military general’s conspicuous priority in the author’s investigations of the topic. This, in turn, implies that his paradigm must have to some significant degree been forged in that context.

The elephant in the room, then, is Xenophon’s own experience as the general who led the remnants of the Ten Thousand—the Cyreans—safely to Pergamum, and Neal Wood long ago drew attention to the consistent coincidence between the author’s paradigmatic leaders and his own self-portrait in the Anabasis. Despite the ancient reception of

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3 Cawkwell (1979) 43–6; Breitenbach (1950) 144 and 147, who nonetheless attributes the author’s pronounced militärisch psychologische Interesse to his personal experience of command.

4 Breitenbach (1950) 144; Brock (2004) 236–7; Dillery (1995) 5–6, who adds Cyrus the Younger and Agesilaus as the two other figures key to understanding the development of Xenophon’s thought; Buzzetti (2014).

5 This priority naturally reflects a generic bias in the political-military works and Hipparchicus, which is, however, not insignificant in itself. At the same time, the military commander remains not just a common analogy for other forms of leadership in Xenophon’s Socratic corpus, but rather the default reference point in discussing the larger art of command; e.g. Mem. 3.1.4, cited above, and, most striking, Ischomachus’ frequent parallel between a good oikonomos—both male and female—and the Xenophontic general (4.12, 5.15–16, 8.4–8, 9.15, 20.5–10, 21.2–9).

6 Wood (1964) 59–60, who nevertheless attributes Xenophon’s universalisation of this leadership figure to Socratic influence; cf. Luccioni (1947) 44–56, who places equal emphasis on military and Socratic influences. Gray (2011) 7–8 advances the alternative hypothesis that it was Xenophon’s experience running his estate at Scyllus and his ability to draw lessons for it from his first-hand observations of the political-military leadership of Cyrus, himself and Agesilaus that led the author to formulate a universalising theory of management; but cf. 12,
Xenophon as a philosopher first and foremost (D.L. 2.48–59), his achievements as a general in safely delivering the army were also a key aspect of his reputation, as Arrian’s Alexander (An. 2.7.8–9), Plutarch’s Marc Antony (Ant. 45), Polybius (3.6.10), Maximus of Tyre (15.9; 22.5; 36.6) and the Emperor Julian (264C) all attest. Xenophon too indicates an awareness of the fame that the Cyreans’ return had already won him (An. 7.6.33; HG 3.4.2 and 6.1.12). This suggests that a strong experiential foundation to the author’s leadership-model would have been attractive to both him and his audience. Moreover, critics are fond of pointing out the author’s habit of warping his material to stay within his personal experiences and hobbies, regardless of genre: horsemanship, an idealised Persian monarchy, quality hunting grounds, beautiful boys, estate management, clever stratagems, Socrates and incessant sacrifice all join battlefield commanders as staples across the Socratic, historical and technical works. Similarly, Xenophon’s coverage of Greek affairs is notorious for concentrating on areas and sources near where the author happened to have been.

I would like to take Wood’s argument a step further and suggest that the specific character of Xenophon’s model leader—namely, his concern to gain willing obedience—is decisively informed by the particular and, in the fourth century, novel form of generalship that the author had practised: command over a mercenary army rather than a civic militia. Although Greek mercenaries already played a

where Socrates’ influence on Xenophon’s command of the Cyreans is also emphasised.

7 Tuplin (1999) 27: ‘For most people Xenophon was a general or a philosopher’, with relevant ancient testimonia in n. 55. Cicero, in fact, describes Scipio Africanus as an admirer of the Cyropaedia primarily for its insights on military leadership (Tusc. 2.62).

8 As Tuplin puts it in his OCD entry on the author: ‘The clearest common features [of his works] are (1) intimate relationship with Xenophon’s personal experiences and (2) taste for didactic discourse.’

supporting role in Greco-Persian affairs by the late fifth century, ancient and modern authors agree that a sharp increase in their use and importance was a hallmark of the fourth-century Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{10} The Cyreans, in fact, represent a watershed moment, setting a precedent for hired forces of over ten thousand.\textsuperscript{11} However, mercenary service is a complex phenomenon: the sources alternately view it as an honourable and lucrative occupation to be pursued freely (X. An. 6.4.8; Isae. 2.6), and as an ignoble refuge for those economically and politically displaced by the period’s incessant mainland conflicts and their collateral staseis (Isoc. 4.146 and 167–8; X. An. 2.6.13).\textsuperscript{12}

Further, as Matthew Trundle has usefully pointed out, military service for hire in Classical Greece was actually of three distinct types.\textsuperscript{13} First, there were mainland hoplites, recruited mostly from Arcadia, and primarily providing garrison or infantry forces to potentates in the Persian sphere and Sicily. In the course of the fourth century, mainland Greek poleis—including Athens (Isoc. 8.44–8; Aeschin. 2.168; D. 4.24) and Sparta (X. HG 5.2.21)—also began hiring such men (Aen. Tact. 13), culminating with the massive force assembled by the Phocian Philomelus in the Third Sacred War (D.S. 16.30.1–3). Hired hoplites were organised as separate contingents, each under its own stratēgos and subdivided into companies (lochoi) under lochāgoi. These stratēgoi and lochāgoi represent a mercenary officer-class that provided well-connected adventurers an opportunity to exploit their aristocratic networks of xenia in recruiting fighters and connecting them to ambitious

\textsuperscript{10} The following discussion is deeply indebted to Trundle (2004) and Roy (2004), the two best recent surveys of mercenary service in Classical Greece, which supersede Parke (1933) and synthesise each author’s earlier articles.

\textsuperscript{11} Trundle (2004) 7 and 45.

\textsuperscript{12} Bonner (1915) provides a still useful survey of the diverse economic and political backgrounds among the individual Cyreans discussed in the Anabasis, even if Xenophon privileges the army’s more affluent members and their less desperate motives; see Dillery (1995) 73–7.

\textsuperscript{13} Trundle (2004) 40 and 47–54.
Second, there were auxiliary peltast, cavalry and light-armed contingents, hired mostly by mainland poleis to supplement their citizen hoplites from regions along the peripheries of Greece that were noted for each type of fighting, particularly Thracian peltasts and Rhodian slingers. Such contingents were rarely recruited for service in the east where, unlike hoplites, native contingents were already available. Finally, there were rowers for fleets in the Aegean, which were hired mainly from the islands and Ionia.

A final complication is that states like Sparta regulated the supply of mercenaries from surrounding territory (D.S. 14.44.2 and 58.1) and effectively leveraged them as an extension of their foreign policy, for instance coordinating the activity of the Cyreans with the Spartan navy (X. HG 3.1.1, D.S. 14.19, X. An.1.4.2–3). Nevertheless, ancient authors, including Xenophon, possess a largely unified, if reductive, vision of the contemporary mercenary. First, despite their frequent role as an extension of state foreign policy, ancient authors tend to caricature all mercenaries as destabilising free agents ‘who, whenever someone gives them a greater wage, will serve with them against us’ (Isoc. 8.44); there also never seems to have been a shortage of supply for well-funded employers. Second, despite their different areas of specialisation and origin, ancient writers grouped mercenaries together by virtue of the unique degree of professionalisation that their paid full-time service allowed, often obscuring whether hoplites or auxiliaries are meant in individual passages. Thus Aristotle juxtaposes the superior experience, equipment and training of the mercenary with the citizen soldier (EN 116b.10–20): ‘they fight as if trained athletes against amateurs’ although ‘they are the first to flee, whereas citizen forces die holding their place.’ It is precisely this environment of a professionalised force that otherwise lacks any natural ties or developed

sense of shared purpose, which, I will argue, Xenophon consistently portrays as placing a premium on the leader’s ability to inspire unity and obedience.

**Model Generals and Technical Innovation**

Suggesting a direct connection between the mercenary warfare of the fourth century and Xenophon’s ideal of the selfless commander is complicated by what one must admit, with Cawkwell, is the highly conventional nature of many of this paradigm’s core elements. Greek literature, after all, effectively begins with Achilles criticising Agamemnon as a bad leader for not setting an example of superior or even equal effort (Hom. *Il.* 1.225–31).16 Similarly, Cicero’s description from three centuries after Xenophon of what a typical candidate for office with a military record makes clear the uncontroversial character of Xenophon’s model (*Mur.* 38):

He nursed me back to health when I was injured, he provided me with plunder; when this man was general we captured the camp, we joined battle; this man never imposed more labour on a soldier than he undertook himself; he was not only brave but also fortunate.

At the same time, an emphasis on cultivating the good will (*εὔνοια*) of followers was a staple of fourth-century thought about relations between a hegemon and its allies, particularly in Isocrates.17 These ideas, in turn, map comfortably onto Xenophon’s applications of his leadership theory to the realm of interstate relations.18 Nevertheless,

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17 de Romilly (1977) 63–9. Gray (2000) 146–51 traces similarities between the political thought of the two authors without speculating about crosspollination or a common origin in the teachings of Socrates.

18 Lendon (2006), who sees Xenophon’s political theory as systematising Greek conventional wisdom.
Xenophon’s leadership theory is, in military contexts, frequently paired with a pronounced interest in technically innovative war-making, which quite often involves what the author highlights as novel uses of mercenaries. This repeated association suggests that the former may have been, in his mind, a particularly effective catalyst for the latter.

The intersection of Xenophon’s interests in model leaders and the growing importance of mercenary warfare can best be seen in the *Hellenica*. Although there is a frustrating scarcity in this work of direct authorial commentary or generalising reflection, most of the author’s few remarks work to focus the audience’s attention on instances of model leadership that appear in contexts devoid of larger political-military significance.¹⁹ The most explicit and programmatic example occurs when the author defends including his loving description of the heartfelt farewell that the soldiers of the Spartan nauarch Teleutias spontaneously provide him at the end of his rather routine tour (5.1.4). Xenophon admits that the event seems trivial in political-military terms, but claims it is important to consider ‘what exactly it was that Teleutias had done to dispose the men he commanded to act in such a way,’ foregrounding his didactic interest in voluntary obedience. Such interventions, as Vivienne Gray well argues, train the reader to detect important lessons about benevolent leadership even in low-key contexts (cf. *Smp.* 1.1), justifying thereby the many similar digressions throughout the work, even when these lack explicit signposting.²⁰

Less remarked upon are Xenophon’s fewer but equally significant historiographical summations that direct the reader’s focus to technical innovations in combat. As with the Teleutias apologia, these serve to bring attention to his


²⁰ Gray (2003), especially 112–14, who agrees correctly with Tuplin against Pownall and Rahn (see previous note) that this does not represent a new moralising focus in historiography so much as a self-consciously broader and more nuanced appreciation for what elements of history can prove useful for political-military didaxis.
commentary on such issues throughout the *Hellenica*, for example in describing the decisively deeper Theban left at Leuctra (6.4.12). In addition to novel tactics, much of Xenophon’s coverage in this area focuses on leaders who create and deploy specialised contingents of mercenaries. The most important example serves as the introduction to two successful peltast campaigns during the Corinthian War helmed by the Athenian Iphicrates, which culminate with his mercenaries defeating a regiment of previously unassailable Spartan hoplites at Lechaeum (4.4.14):

The large armies of each ceased, and sending garrisons instead, one side’s to Corinth and the other’s to Sicyon, the cities were guarding their walls. However, each side, possessing mercenaries, waged war vigorously through these.

The passage and the episodes it introduces are perhaps the *locus classicus* for tracing the growing use of hired peltasts from sporadic but important appearances in the Peloponnesian War to a mainstay of Greek warfare in the fourth century. Similarly, Xenophon notes that a turning point for the Spartan king Agesilaus in his Asian campaign is the recruitment of a mercenary cavalry to match the superior horse of the satrap Pharnabazus (3.4.15). Xenophon himself in the *Anabasis* likewise creates slinger and cavalry units to combat native analogues (3.3.16–20).

21 For Xenophon’s recurrent focus on strategic acumen and clever stratagems, see Breitenbach (1950) 57–60 and 88–101; Wood (1964) 47–9.

22 See the commentary of Crawford and Whitehead (1983) 489–90. The watershed significance of Iphicrates’ peltast victory at Lechaeum is axiomatic in the ancient sources (Plu. *Ages*. 22; D. 4.24), perhaps even leading Diodorus (15.44.3) and Nepos (*Iph*. 11.1.3–4) to misunderstand it as the point when peltasts supposedly replaced hoplites entirely; see Best (1969) 102–10. Xenophon’s unmarked transition from discussing mercenaries in general to Iphicrates’ peltasts in particular demonstrates well the degree to which ancient authors thought of different types of hired soldiers as representing a single phenomenon.
and proves highly astute in exploiting preexisting peltasts (see below).

All three of these figures—Iphicrates, Agesilaus and Xenophon—are held up elsewhere in Xenophon’s historiography as prime examples of model leaders who inspire the willing devotion of their soldiers and match their efforts on the battlefield. That all of them are also singled out for the successful incorporation of novel and specialised mercenary units suggests a close association between the cultivation of willing obedience and the ability to exploit the battlefield potential of such auxiliaries. Nevertheless, it is not yet clear whether the two factors are complementary tools available to the Xenophontic commander or directly interrelated elements. In either case, however, the importance that Xenophon attaches to a model leader’s capacity to exploit new forms of combat suggests a strong contemporary dimension in this figure’s formulation, rather than a slavish traditional moralising.

Model Generals and Professionalisation

The Cyreans, of course, not only contained specialised mercenary contingents formed by Xenophon, but were also themselves already an army made up entirely of mercenaries. Such forces, as noted, became a staple of mainland, Persian-sphere and Sicilian warfare in the fourth century, representing a transitional stage in Greece between the dominance of citizen militias and that of the professional armies of Philip II and his successors. Although Xenophon is largely unconcerned with the activities of such armies outside of the mainland apart from the Cyreans, he nevertheless displays a keen awareness of the disruptive

23 In a similar vein, Xenophon notes how Thrasybulus, another model commander, exploits the high ground of Munychia so as to allow his light-armed troops to effectively neutralise the enemy’s superior number of hoplites (HG 2.4.10–19, esp. 12 and 15–16).

24 There is a nice parallel in the contrast between the apparently traditionalising content of Xenophon’s works and the innovative generic forms in which they appear.
power of this military novelty in his depiction of the
Thessalian strongman Jason of Pherae. Jason is a complex
figure in the *Hellenica*, appearing as both a model general to
his men and a distrusted potential tyrant to his Greek
neighbours (6.4.32). On the eve of his assassination in 370,
Xenophon deems him ‘the greatest man of his age’ due to
an unparalleled military strength based on a combination of
allies and, especially, mercenaries ‘thoroughly trained to be
the best possible’ (6.4.28).

The *Hellenica* contains a long digression on Jason, in
which Polydamas of Pharsalus describes to the Spartan
assembly the nature of his hired force and the existential
threat that it presents to both the rest of Thessaly and, in
the medium term, Greece itself. The centrepiece of
Polydamas’ speech is his retelling of a recent conversation
with Jason, in which the latter extolled the virtues of his
mercenaries (6.1.5):

*You know that I possess around six thousand
mercenaries, against which, as I see it, no polis would
be able easily to do battle. For even if from somewhere
else no smaller a number of men might set out, the
armies from poleis contain those already advanced in
years and no longer at their peak. Moreover, a very few
in each polis train their bodies (σωµασκοῦσι), while in
my company no one earns a wage who is not capable
of working to a degree equal to me.*

Polydamas goes on to describe how Jason inspires his men
to put up with his demanding training routine, drawing
attention to a host of devices associated throughout the
Xenophontic corpus with model leadership and its
cultivation of enthusiastic obedience (6.1.6 and 15): Jason
drills his men incessantly; he incentivises physical excellence
by conspicuously rewarding outstanding effort with higher
pay and other honours so that *they have all learned that*

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25 On Xenophon’s ambivalent presentation of Jason, see Pownall
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from toils are also born the finer things; his complete self-control prevents him from making careless mistakes; and, just as Xenophon recommends in the *Hipparchicus*, Jason not only displays superior strategic foresight, but also can best his men in physical performance in order to both earn his superior position in their eyes and create solidarity with them.

Such moves are hallmarks of Xenophon’s various model commanders, recommended across his works as, for example, in the programmatic dialogue between Cyrus the Great and his father about generalship. Here, both embrace setting prizes for the soldiers in contests over their various military skills as a way of keeping the army ‘especially well trained (μάλιστ’... εὖ ἀσκεῖσθαι) in each’ so that the commander can ‘make use of men who are prepared, whenever he might need them’ (*Cyr*. 1.6.18). But in the *Hellenica*, Jason’s arsenal of leadership practices are associated particularly with mercenary environments and exercised most frequently by those commanders shown as adept in exploiting specialised mercenary contingents. Thus, on being ordered home from Asia to fight in Greece, Agesilaus offers prizes to the *lochāgoi* able to raise the best quality companies of hoplites, archers and peltasts to accompany him (4.2.5). Xenophon provides Teleutias with a speech to his men, in which he details the leadership qualities that had so endeared them to him, especially his commitment to set an example of hard work that is always clearly linked to a specific longer-term benefit (5.1.15).

These men, rowers in the Spartan fleet, are of course mercenaries, as were increasingly the majority of rowers in the Athenian navy, a type of service that had in any case always been tied to quasi-mercenary specialised training and remuneration. Accordingly, in a long digression on a

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26 On Jason as a model Xenophontic general, see Breitenbach (1950) 60, 62, 73, 75; 6; cf. Pownall (2004) 100–1.

27 For Xenophon’s remarks at 5.1.4 as pointing forwards proleptically to this sequence, see Gray (2007) 344–7; Tuplin (1993) 82; Pownall (2004) 79 and 81.

Novel Leaders for Novel Armies

later naval command of Iphicrates (6.2.27–32), Xenophon carefully details and explicitly praises (6.2.32 and 39) the rigorous training programme that the commander institutes for his rowers, including the use of prizes to build their efficiency and speed (6.2.28). Iphicrates thereby insures men ‘trained (ἠσκηκότες) and knowledgeable about all things relating to naval warfare’ (6.2.30).

Jason’s form of leadership is thus not different in kind because he commands mercenaries. Instead, Xenophon emphasises the unique level of professionalism that mercenary forces can achieve, but he also stresses a correspondingly elevated degree to which success in such a context depends on the commander’s ability to inspire willing obedience. Willing obedience within a mercenary army has, in fact, a twofold importance. Explicitly, it is the necessary precondition for unlocking the professional skill that can make mercenary forces qualitatively superior on the battlefield. Implicitly, the commander’s benevolence, in large part because of the results that this delivers, is the only glue holding the mercenaries together, since its members are otherwise free agents without an obligation or incentive to fight, unlike a citizen militia. Agesilaus, for instance, marching back to Greece with his Asian-Greek mercenaries, feels compelled to lie to them about the outcome of the battle of Cnidus, aware that these troops are only fair-weather companions (HG 4.3.13). Similarly, in the Anabasis, the harsh mercenary commander Clearchus has trouble holding on to men, since, unless they are serving with him under orders from their polis, there is nothing to stop his soldiers from abandoning him for any number of alternative employers (2.6.12–13). Xenophon portrays this same problem as preoccupying naval commanders, who know that a better or steadier wage on the other side can easily peel off their rowers (HG 1.5.4–7), hence Iphicrates’ stratagem of hiring out his rowers as farm labourers when no lucrative naval operations are available to finance their employment (6.2.37; cf. 2.1.1). In Weberian terms, Jason’s
authority is characterised as charismatic by necessity, since it has no institutional foundation.\textsuperscript{29}

The Xenophon of the \textit{Anabasis} displays a similar appreciation for the distinctive professionalism of the Cyreans upon their arrival on the Greek fringe of the Black Sea’s southern coast, ‘observing the many hoplites of the Greeks, and observing the many peltasts and archers and slingers and horsemen, and that these were already especially capable on account of constant practice (τριβήν)’ (5.6.15).\textsuperscript{30} It is a professionalism, moreover, which the author has been careful to show his younger self building up through a Jason-like programme of setting a personal example of selflessness and superior effort (3.4.44–8, 4.4.11–12; cf. 3.1.37), demonstrating exceptional strategic skill (3.3.16–18, discussed above; 4.8.9–12; cf. 3.1.36), recognising the value of fostering competitions for martial excellence (4.7.12, 4.8.27; cf. 4.1.27–8), and conspicuously rewarding valour (4.3.29, the retrospective 5.8.25; cf. 7.8.11).\textsuperscript{31} At the same time, the last three books of the \textit{Anabasis} dramatise the difficulty in keeping such a force united and the outsize role played by a charismatic general in doing so, creating a negative complement to the portrait of Jason that again foregrounds the indispensability of willing obedience.

\textbf{Willing Obedience and the Problem of Unity in Anabasis 5–7}

The arrival of the Cyreans at Trapezus (4.8.22), the first of the Greek poleis along the Black Sea, marks a new phase, in which the army’s focus shifts from the goal of simple survival to the procurement of a lucrative reward for each

\textsuperscript{29} Weber (1994) [1919].

\textsuperscript{30} Although the Cyreans’ professionalism is a product of their long experience in the \textit{katabasis} from Cunaxa, Cyrus already had insisted on recruiting distinguished men (1.1.6), allowing him to dispense with training; see Roy (2004) 270–1.

\textsuperscript{31} Anderson (1974) 123–33.
soldier’s homecoming (6.1.17–18; cf. 5.6.30 and 6.6.38). This, in fact, represents a return to the original objective of the mercenaries, which had been sidelined by more existential concerns after the death of the younger Cyrus. If a less desperate situation, it is nevertheless a more complex one, where the generals of the Cyreans and the various contingents that they head have available multiple and mutually exclusive paths to achieving separately their common ambition. Much of the action consequently revolves around Xenophon’s struggle to maintain the army’s unity as, he argues, the most effective means to achieving its purpose: not merely the immediate acquisition of wealth, but the possibility of possessing it safely. In this environment the lessons of Xenophontic leadership continue to appear. However, there is a new emphasis on the commander cultivating the army’s loyalty through conspicuous displays of his selflessness to insure both the leader’s position and the leverage of a united army in securing benefits. It is therefore in this most characteristically mercenary of environments—in the sense that the Cyreans, like Jason’s men, can again act as largely

32 Dillery (1995) 77–81. Xenophon seems to project the desire of the officer class to return to the mainland with a substantial reward onto the Cyreans as a whole, most of whom were content with the more modest outcome of finding steady employment serving in or around the Greek world; see Roy (2004) 280–8. Still, the potential for realising either possibility upon reaching the Black Sea represents a significant shift in circumstances.

33 Waterfield (2006) 160–1: ‘Their arrival at the sea was meant to change the focus of the army. Their worst dangers seemed to be past; there was no longer the unrelenting psychological pressure on each man of fearing imminent death. They expected to be safe, and as a result unity no longer seemed as essential as before.’

34 In this way Xenophon fulfils the Xenophontic leader’s primary function of securing εὐδαιµονία: a maximum degree, given present circumstances, of sustainable flourishing for himself and his subordinates as defined by their mutual goals; see Gray (2011) 11–15. The able generalship that Xenophon displays on the march to the Black Sea is therefore only one element in meeting the larger challenge of successful mercenary command, namely monetary reward and a safe return.
free agents—that Xenophon dramatises himself most fully embodying and exploiting the distinctive core of his leadership model. It is an environment, moreover, where Xenophon’s model is put under tremendous strain, but in which he depicts it emerging from these challenges as the only plausible path to success.

A recurrent motif in the closing books is the threat of faction. In four separate episodes, Xenophon’s long-term plans are undermined by a rival’s disastrous appeal to shorter-term gains that threaten to undercut the Cyreans’ collective strength. Through invoking his record of benevolent foresight or further displays of it in action, Xenophon manages on each occasion to reunite a willing army under his leadership in a manner that better secures its survival and its capacity to exact lucrative booty.

Almost programmatic is the first episode set at Cotyora and involving Neon, the lieutenant left in charge of the Spartan contingent while Chirisophus—effectively the senior partner to Xenophon in leading the Cyreans to the Black Sea (4.6.3)—is away negotiating with the nauarch Anaxibius (5.7). Attempting to bolster his authority, Neon incites a mob against Xenophon with the rumour that he and several other generals are secretly planning to settle the army along the river Phasis rather than return to Greece. As the army begins breaking up into smaller groups ready to take matters into their own hands (5.7.2), Xenophon heads off its disintegration by quickly calling an assembly. He there refutes Neon’s charge on the grounds of its impracticability, before lecturing the soldiers on the danger of factionalism and the breakdown of order it entails. Memorably, Xenophon pictures this process as a rabies-like frenzy (5.7.26: λύττα) that threatens to undercut the force’s collective leverage in exacting concessions from those who

36 In a similar manner, Flower (2012) 141 highlights how the last three books are organised around a repeated narrative pattern of an accusation against Xenophon followed by his lengthy and successful apologia, which together serve to focus attention on the quality of his leadership.
can aid or harm its progress. Xenophon then submits to a public review of his leadership (5.8), which allows him the chance to emphasise the disinterested nature of his actions as a general, inspiring spontaneous affirmations from the ranks that represent the reestablishment of trust.

Afterwards, when the army decides at Sinope to elect a single overarching general to bolster its effectiveness in collecting booty (6.1.17–18), Xenophon sidesteps a potential stasis (6.1.29) between himself and the supporters of Chirisophus by deferring publicly and without reservation to the latter. Defending his decision, Xenophon points out that all paths out of the Black Sea are controlled by Spartans. Thus cultivating their goodwill will prove critical, which appointing the Spartan as leader could achieve, whereas selecting him, an Athenian, would doubtless provoke mistrust (6.1.26–8). His speech serves to placate his own followers, refocus the assembly on the importance of prudent collective action, and bolster his reputation as a disinterested leader in the assembly, even if it involves the concession of battlefield deference to Chirisophus. There is, again, an emphasis on both the practical benefits of consensus and the effectiveness of appeals to it as a rhetorical strategy for winning willing support. Indeed, as regards the latter, the support for Xenophon’s candidacy actually grows after his speech (6.1.30).

Xenophon’s exploitation of rhetorical theatre before a sovereign assembly and the metaphor of stasis play into the frequent modern interpretation of the Cyreans as a sort of

37 Xenophon’s speeches have already touched on this theme, if more briefly, at 3.1.38, 2.29; 5.6.32.

38 Rood (2004) 324: ‘The positive qualities of his leadership (his maintenance of discipline and morale, for instance) are not left to be inferred from the narrative, but are presented as such in a speech, and acknowledged by his internal audience.’ Cf. especially 5.8.12, where Xenophon’s apologia for beating an insubordinate soldier is depicted as not only gaining acceptance, but also resulting in the assembly spontaneously crying out that he should have thrashed the man even more than he had.

quasi-polis.\textsuperscript{40} Doubtless, the highly political dimension of Xenophon’s experience and success as a general helped suggest the universal scope of his leadership ideas. But the Cyreans are not a polis, as Xenophon’s fantastic failure to found a new community with them on the Black Sea makes clear (5.6.17–19; cf. 5.6.36–7.2; 6.4.1–7 and 14). Instead, their concern is not the protection of a territory and its resources, but the effective appropriation of these from that of others with a view towards an eventual reintegration into their own home communities (6.4.8). Simon Hornblower has also drawn attention to the fact that the Cyreans’ deliberative assemblies are only the most developed example of what is a recurrent feature in depictions of Greek armies, particularly those that involve coalitions.\textsuperscript{41} The latter, I will argue below, are another favourite area for Xenophon to explore model leadership. The political dimension of Xenophon’s leadership and its prioritisation of winning willing obedience, therefore, develop in the \textit{Anabasis}—and thus, I would argue, historically—within a specifically military context. Moreover, it is one that is heightened due to the prevalence of centrifugal forces affecting the Cyreans once they reach the Black Sea. Before this assembly, meetings are less common, and it is only now, when the means and ends of the army as both parts and whole are no longer straightforward, that the problem of unity and the negotiation of it in assemblies become frequent.\textsuperscript{42}

Despite the move towards greater unity at Sinope, the most serious and prolonged division within the army occurs shortly afterwards at Heracleia, when the Achaean general Lycon persuades the Arcadian and Achaean hoplites to break off as a separate force (6.2). Lycon, complaining of the army’s shortage of provisions and revenues, persuades the assembly to send him into Heracleia in order to extort money by threatening it, which results only in the

\textsuperscript{40}\textsc{Nussbaum (1967) and, with modifications, Dalby (1992).}

\textsuperscript{41}\textsc{Hornblower (2004).}

\textsuperscript{42}\textsc{Lee (2007) 9–11, who offers a penetrating critique of the Cyreans as a polis.}
inhabitants shutting their gates and market to the Cyreans. Chrisiphsophus and Xenophon, characteristically taking a longer-term view, had opposed the move on the grounds that alienating a friendly Greek community would prove unwise (6.2.6). Attempting to save both face and influence, Lycon accuses Chrisiphous and Xenophon of sabotaging his embassy. He then appeals to the numerical superiority of the Arcadians and Achaean—combined, they form more than half the Cyreans (6.2.10 and 16)—to argue that they should take orders from no one except their own generals, who, moreover, are willing to set out immediately to find booty (6.2.11 and 17). Matters deteriorate further when Neon convinces Chrisiphous to detach his loyalists and seek their own deal with the Spartans, leaving Xenophon with the leftover forces.

However, the Arcadian-Achaean army quickly runs into trouble while pillaging the nearby Bithynian Thracians. It is left to Xenophon to convince his men to go to their rescue, which he does by arguing that the dire straits of the Arcadian-Achaean demonstrate that it is only as a united force that any may hope to escape Bithynia (6.3.12–18). Xenophon’s pragmatic generosity towards the Arcadians and Achaean produces the desired effect, leading to a warm reunion at Calpe Harbour where the two sides ‘welcome each other as brothers’ (6.3.24) and join an expedition under Xenophon to bury the Arcadian-Achaean dead (6.4.9). Chrisiphous’ forces re-join the army for the latter, having failed to make contact with the Spartan authorities and lost their general to disease. Moreover, at a subsequent assembly influential Achaean lochagei and older Arcadians initiate a measure to return to the status quo and punish with death any future suggestions of division (6.4.10–11).

The message of the scene is clear: not only has Lycon been discredited, but also the Arcadians and Achaean

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43 For the number of Arcadians (greater) and Achaean (lesser) in the Cyreans, see Roy (1967) 308–9. For the centrality of Arcadians in Classical mercenary armies, see X. HG 7.1.23; Hermippus fr. 63 (Kassel-Austin); Roy (2004) 271–6; Trundle (2004) 53–4 and 58–9.
themselves recognise the superior strategy helmed by Xenophon, to which they commit eagerly.\textsuperscript{44} At the same time, the sequence as a whole emphasises the degree to which ethnic loyalties represent a unique challenge for the mercenary commander, which he can best overcome through displays of conspicuous benevolence.\textsuperscript{45} It also combines this contextually conditioned strategy with an equally mercenary-appropriate focus on the advantages of specialised contingents: the author is careful to make clear in this episode that the Cyreans’ united strength is not a question of numbers alone, but also of combining different types of forces. Thus the Arcadian-Achaean army, made up only of hoplites, is too slow to prevent the Thracian peltasts and cavalry from escaping and reforming to harass them effectively with sorties (6.3.4 and 7).\textsuperscript{46} Meanwhile, Xenophon’s rescue depends on deploying his own cavalry and peltasts at night to set fires quickly over a great distance in order to simulate a larger army, thereby scaring off the Thracians (6.3.19).

The closing chapters of the \textit{Anabasis} find Xenophon once again using his record of selfless leadership to head off a

\textsuperscript{44} For this narrative strategy of the validating internal audience, see the note on 5.8 above.

\textsuperscript{45} Ethnic identity proves powerful enough that even Arcadians and Achaecans serving in the contingents of Xenophon and Chirisophus abandon them (6.2.12). Lee (2004) 67–71 downplays the strength of ethnic loyalties among the Cyreans, but even he admits that ‘open ethnic faction occurred late in the expedition, at a point when the soldiers faced little external threat, had plenty of time on their hands, and were disposed to question their existing leadership’. Disunity thus becomes an issue as the Cyreans’ circumstances come more closely to approximate those of the stereotypical mercenaries of Aristode and Isocrates (see above). Such divisions had already plagued coalition forces of the fifth century, memorably before the battle of Lade, when the other Ionians rebelled against the demanding training regime of the Phocaean general Dionysius (Hdt. 6.12), arguing that the small number of ships supplied by his polis for the allied navy meant he was not entitled to give orders to everyone else.

\textsuperscript{46} This is the exact same strategy that Xenophon depicts Iphicrates as employing in his famous peltast victory at Lechaecum over an unaccompanied regiment of Spartan hoplites (\textit{HG} 4.3.13 and 15).
destabilising challenge to his authority and furthering the army’s interests by doing so. Ambassadors from the Spartan general Thibron arrive to recruit the Cyreans for Sparta’s incipient war in Ionia against the satrap Tissaphernes (7.6.1), encountering an army that has spent the winter fighting for the Thracian warlord Seuthes, who now refuses to pay them. Xenophon had hired the army out to Seuthes after the Spartan harmost of Byzantium, Aristarchus, conspired with the satrap Pharnabazus to keep the Cyreans out of Asia Minor and made them only a vague offer of employment helping Sparta in its war in Thrace (7.1–2). The offer had involved travelling to the Chersonese, where the army could be easily isolated (7.2.15), and followed Aristarchus’ enslavement of four hundred stray Cyreans found lingering in Byzantium (7.2.6) and an unsuccessful attempt to have Xenophon arrested (7.2.14). Seuthes, by contrast, offered ready pay on set terms in the face of impending winter and only withdrew his generosity as the Cyreans’ initial victories attracted enough new followers that the hired army became dispensable (7.5.15–16).

Seuthes brings the ambassadors before the army without introducing them to Xenophon or the other generals, hoping thereby that the impoverished soldiers will immediately accept the Spartan offer and depart, abandoning their leadership before it can organise them to exact back pay (7.6.2–3). Not only does the army accept Sparta’s terms, but revanchist Arcadian elements also take the opportunity to suggest that Xenophon be stoned for turning down the earlier occasion to serve with Sparta in Thrace and involving them instead with the duplicitous Seuthes (7.6.8–10). Xenophon then makes yet another long speech (7.6.11–38), in which he puts the decision to follow Seuthes in context, emphasises that he has suffered as much as if not more than the army, and reminds them how they had once recognised him as both a father and a euergetēs (7.6.38). Whereas Seuthes had told the Spartan ambassadors that Χενοφόνθος was a φιλοστρατιώτης (‘friend to the soldier’) and ‘because of this things are worse for him’ (7.6.4), his ability to demonstrate this very quality wins him the respect
of not only the army but also the Spartans. Emphasising the point through ring composition, the author has the ambassadors repeat Seuthes’ remark about Xenophon as φιλοστρατιώτης to the army, recasting it as a compliment (7.6.39). Xenophon is then able to use his influence with the Spartans to have them keep the Cyreans in Thrace and send him as an ambassador to Seuthes until he simultaneously shames and threatens him into providing the owed balance in booty (7.7.13–56).

This final sequence is interesting for providing three key insights into Xenophon’s leadership strategy. The first is the emphasis on philia as a defining element of Xenophon’s generalship that inspires loyalty beyond simple strategic effectiveness, which nicely dovetails with the author’s insistence on reciprocal philia between leader and followers in the Hipparchicus passage. Second, when Xenophon convinces the Spartans to allow the Cyreans to remain in Thrace until he can cajole Seuthes into paying them, Xenophon hints at the pragmatic as opposed to altruistic motives for doing so (7.7.14): ‘I think … that you might recover for the army the pay that is due if you should say … that the troops say that they would follow you enthusiastically in case they should obtain it.’ The Cyreans were already happy to abandon Seuthes for Thibron, but Xenophon points to this extra benevolence as a shrewd investment in fostering a positive connection between army and employers in the long term, even if it involves a temporary delay.

This squares nicely with the third important insight, from Xenophon’s subsequent speech to Seuthes, where he reproaches the warlord’s broken word not just on moral grounds, but also as a pragmatic miscalculation in his role as a leader. The danger of duplicity is that it undermines the foundations of trust that allow a leader to persuade

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47 This is the culminating virtue of the ‘Socratic king’ in Buzzetti (2014) 239–94.
48 Flower (2012) 163–4, who notes the use of another validating internal audience.
49 Xenophon repeats the idea to Seuthes at 7.7.31.
followers to carry out his wishes without resort to coercion (7.7.23–4). Trust is both more economical, as coercion ties up military resources (7.7.33), and allows a leader to request help from his followers on faith, as Seuthes’ initial goodwill had convinced the Cyreans to begin campaigning for him on credit (7.7.25). Moreover, a united and loyal army is critical when one is occupying hostile territory, since unwilling subjects are constantly seeking to exploit weaknesses and gain confidence from perceived divisions (7.7.29–32); an analysis as apt for the expansionist Seuthes as for the troubles of the Arcadian-Achaean army in Bithynia.

Together, the climactic confrontations of Xenophon with the Cyreans and Seuthes make a point about leadership very similar to what Xenophon puts into the mouth of Cyrus the Great when describing the king’s strategy to make the conquered warrior-aristocrats of his empire friends rather than subjects: Cyrus confidently claims that ‘by making men wealthy and doing them favours, I get from them loyalty and friendship (philia), and from these I reap security’ (Cyr. 8.2.22; cf. Mem. 1.2.10). The leader’s kindness, then, is ultimately a form of self-interested insurance, which if it cannot avoid dissension entirely can at least mitigate it effectively. It is a lesson with wide application, as Xenophon’s speech to Seuthes demonstrates, but one that the Anabasis suggests the author first and most fully developed in the context of his experiences keeping the Cyreans together along the Black Sea. Moreover, this was an environment that simultaneously placed a premium on the technical aspects of professionalisation and specialisation, which are the complementary prescriptive focus of

50 See Wood (1964) 60–5; Gray (2011) 315–17; Hirsch (1985) 14–38, who reads the Anabasis as a study in the negative individual and social consequences of false conduct. The pragmatic benefits of benevolence over coercion are also a major theme in Simonides’ advice in the Hiero.

51 Xenophon is everywhere clear that virtuous leadership raises the chances of an enterprise’s success, although it does not guarantee them, explicitly in the case of Epaminondas (HG 7.5.8–10), and implicitly with Jason and Cyrus the Younger (but cf. Flower in this volume).
Xenophon’s leadership thought to his insistence on willing obedience.

**From Cyrus the Younger to Xenophon: Generalship as Xenia**

If the experience of the Cyreans along the Black Sea was an ideal environment for Xenophon to develop his ideas about the importance of fostering *philia* between leader and follower, the practice had already been modelled for him by the younger Cyrus. In his eulogy of the expedition’s original leader, the author draws attention to how Cyrus cultivated mutually beneficial partnerships with both his Persian and Greek allies through conspicuous generosity in order to leverage combined strength (1.9.20–1):

As for friends (*philoi*), however many he made and knew to be good-willed (*εὔνους*) and judged to be capable partners for whatever he happened to wish to accomplish, it is agreed by all that he was in fact the greatest at looking after them. And in fact this same thing for the sake of which he himself considered that there was need of friends, namely so that he might have partners—he himself also undertook to be the greatest partner to his friends in whatever he perceived that each desired.

Friendship here is, of course, the term of art for the ties binding the prince’s network of Persian and Greek aristocrats, the latter containing those influential *xenoi*—Clearchus, Aristippus, Proxenus, Sophaenetus and Socrates the Achaean—who could recruit large numbers of quality mercenaries for his expedition (1.1.9–11).52 It is this elite circle on which Cyrus explicitly concentrates his generosity, ‘for the *stratēgoi* and *lochāgoi*, who sailed to him for the sake of money, came to know that to obey Cyrus in a noble

manner produced more gain than their wage each month’ (1.9.17). The equivalence between *philia* and xenia comes across most clearly when the author explains his own reasons for being among the Cyreans: although Xenophon was not himself a *stratēgos* or *lochāgos*, Proxenus, ‘who was an old *xenos* of his,’ had promised great benefit by making him a *philos* of Cyrus (3.4.1). Only when the army discovers the true purpose of its expedition and is on the point of mutiny does Cyrus turn his attention to the rank and file, bribing them to continue on with promises of pay and a half (1.3.21) and, later, a bonus upon victory (1.5.11–13).53

Xenophon’s innovation, therefore, seems to have been to expand the scope of aristocratic friendship from the army’s leadership to its entire complement, adapting the logic of enlightened self-interest to the general-soldier relationship that he had observed operate in the euergetism between a dominant aristocrat and his network.54 Thus, like Jason, but unlike Cyrus, Xenophon’s rhetorical self-presentation positions him as a first among equals vis-à-vis the entire soldiery. For example, during the blizzard in Western Armenia he forces himself to get up before the rest and set to making a fire, motivating his peers by example to escape succumbing to the numbing cold (4.4.11–12), just as Jason takes the lead in the exercises he demands of his hoplites. Cyrus, by contrast, builds a reputation for channeling his vast wealth to those aristocrats who are proactive in advancing his interests as a means to motivate Greeks and Persians alike to perform spontaneous services in his presence (1.4.13–17 and 1.5.7–8, respectively). He is here an observer rather than a partner. Very different is Xenophon’s cultivated air of openness, allowing any


54 Here one might detect a first—and applied—instance of Socratic universalising in Xenophon’s thinking about leadership. Portraying the Cyreans as *philoi* may also be another instance of the author attempting to recast his mercenary activity for aristocratic peers as something more elevated than warrior banausia, which Azoulay (2004) 295–304 has argued is a central purpose of the *Anabasis* (cf. the poor view of the expedition at Isoc. 4.146 and 5.90).
subordinate to offer advice or opinion useful to the army (4.3.10); a quality that he shares with Teleutias (HG 5.1.14). This creates a striking contrast not just to Cyrus, but also to the strong division between officer and soldier first seen in Iliad 2.212–77. Here, during an assembly, Odysseus is cheered after beating the vagabond Thersites for daring to offer advice, even though it is substantively similar to earlier remarks of Achilles. Xenophon, meanwhile, must justify at length his beating of a mule driver to an angry assembly as being punishment for his trying to murder a sick comrade (5.8.1–12).

The gulf between Xenophon and Cyrus, however, represents more than anything else the former’s adaptation of the latter’s model to the poorer economic condition and more egalitarian Hellenism of the independent Cyreans. Nevertheless, it was an adaptation that by accident or design proved better suited to the particular circumstances of Greek mercenary warfare. Indeed, to the degree that he can, Xenophon still positions himself as a new Cyrus to the army’s surviving officer class: he directs Seuthes to rechannel any personal gifts to his stratēgoi and lochāgoi (7.5.2–4); on the way to turning the Cyreans over to Thibron he organises a lucrative pillaging raid for those lochāgoi and other philoi who had most helped him (7.8.11); and the Anabasis ends when Xenophon is finally enriched ‘with the result that he was now able even to do kindness to another’ (7.8.23). Revealingly, Xenophon portrays his ideal mercenary commander, Jason, as both a Xenophon-like hands-on leader and one whose wealth allows him to inspire martial excellence by offering Cyrus-like honours for conspicuous displays of devotion. These, however, are now targeted at the rank and file instead of only the officers (HG 6.1.6). Nevertheless, all three men are linked by the use of patronage to unify a potentially heterogeneous community through defining a common interest for its members that is

55 Cf. Hermocrates of Syracuse at HG 1.1.30 and Cyrus the Great at Cyr. 7.5.46.
best achieved in concert through the leader’s material and intellectual resources.

**Anabasis: Apologetic or Didactic?**

Any attempt to trace the evolution of Xenophon’s leadership ideal from the details of his experiences in the *Anabasis* must take into account the work’s clearly constructed nature or risk plunging into unsophisticated biographical criticism. In particular, the last three books, with their recurrent foregrounding of Xenophon’s elaborate and successful speeches defending his conduct as general, have been seen as serving an apologetic function meant either to amplify or justify the author’s role in events.\(^{56}\) The persuasiveness of such readings is often influenced by the assumption that the Cyreans’ period along the Black Sea represents a sordid devolution into rapine from the inspirational Panhellenic unity of the journey back from Babylonia, from which Xenophon wished to disassociate himself.\(^{57}\) Without discounting such interpretations or necessarily contradicting them, there is also a case to be made for distortions resulting from the work’s didactic agenda insofar as the *Anabasis* is, at least in part, a prescriptive essay on leadership.\(^{58}\)

From extant parallels to episodes narrated in the *Hellenica*, one can observe Xenophon’s tendency to simplify historical events in order to create more effective and elegant didactic schemata. Xenophon’s account of the Thirty at Athens, for instance, is organised into two sections tracing, respectively, the consolidation of the regime’s power (2.3) and its overthrow by Thrasybulus’ democratic insurgency (2.4). The hinge between the two is the trial and execution of Theramenes, whose defence speech casts him

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\(^{57}\) Dillery (1993) 59–98.

as a moderate member of the Thirty seeking to curb the despotic abuses that he claims will forfeit the regime’s legitimacy and create opportunities for successful rebellion (2.3.35–49, especially 37–44). The juxtaposition of Theramenes’ dubiously legal execution and the immediately following start of Thrasybulus’ insurgency serves to position the former’s defence as a programmatic explanation for the latter’s success. However, the account in the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians claims that Thrasybulus’ campaigns actually preceded the execution of Theramenes (37), while Lysias provides an entirely different and less sympathetic account of Theramenes’ speech (12.77).\textsuperscript{59} The relative merits of each author as against Xenophon’s account are open to debate, but the Hellenica’s discrepancies suspiciously align to make the narrative more amenable to a central Xenophontic leadership lesson: the need for political regimes, like effective generals, to win the willing obedience of their followers through selfless actions.\textsuperscript{60}

On analogy, the character Xenophon in the Anabasis doubtless represents a simplified and more schematically elegant version of the author’s leadership ideal than his historical self, as do the other model leaders in the text. One indication of this is Xenophon’s emergence as a convenient synthesis of the contrasting leadership styles that he sketches out in the obituaries of his most important predecessors (\textit{An.} 2.6): the disciplined but overly harsh Clearchus (2.6.13: ‘he possessed no followers due to friendship (φιλίᾳ) and goodwill (εὐνοίᾳ)’), and the generous but indulgent Proxenus.\textsuperscript{61} Here, as in the example from the Hellenica, there

\textsuperscript{59} Krentz (1995) 132 and 140.

\textsuperscript{60} Gray (1979) makes a similar argument about the Hellenica’s version of the battle of Sardis in contrast to that in the Hellenica Oxyrhyncha and Diodorus.

\textsuperscript{61} Flower (2012) 166; cf. Wood (1967) 51–2. Similarly, his focus in the third obituary on Meno’s obsession with quick gain (‘the shortest path’ of 2.6.22) and contempt for genuine friendship foreshadows the shortsighted plans from which Xenophon portrays himself as constantly rescuing the army.
is a careful juxtaposition of types, although the parallel tradition about Clearchus in Diodorus (14.12.9: ‘Clearchus possessed daring and a prompt boldness’) confirms that Xenophon’s *modus operandi* is heightening for didactic effect rather than drastic revision.

It is reasonable to assume a kind of virtuous circle or feedback loop in Xenophon’s depiction of himself as a model leader. The particular conditions of service with the Cyreans, both under Cyrus and in their journey to Pergamum, presented the author with situations in which technical specialisation and willing obedience proved particularly fruitful. These were qualities that Xenophon observed other leaders exploit, most especially individuals like Jason and Iphicrates, whose innovative mercenary forces in important ways resembled the diversified and potentially fractious Cyreans of the Black Sea journey. In depicting these leaders across a series of works that shared a universalising theory of leadership, Xenophon—whether consciously or not—emphasised the common features of each that fit into his paradigm to strengthen its apparent didactic authority. But this didactic force also depended on the perception of Xenophon himself as an authority on the style of leadership that he advocated. The congruity of his model’s most distinctive features with the circumstances in which his own strongest claim to outstanding leadership emerged thus argues for the paradigm’s strong biographical foundation, regardless of the undeniable narrative manipulations of the *Anabasis*. This is all the more so given the author’s predilection, mentioned at the beginning, to dwell on material that was proximate to his own experiences.

**Xenophontic Generalship in Non-Mercenary Contexts**

Above I have tried to argue that Xenophon depicts his suasion-based leadership theory as best suited to the novel context of professionalised mercenary warfare, as one might expect given that this is where his fame as a leader was
rooted. The association is, of course, not exclusive, since the Xenophontic general also appears in plenty of non-mercenary environments and the author, as seen, saw a universal field of application for his management precepts, suggesting a fusion of his battlefield and Socratic backgrounds. But it is worth considering the degree to which even non-mercenary model generals are concerned with cultivating willing obedience to achieve the same kind of military professionalisation most easily obtained, in the opinion of Xenophon’s Jason, using a hired force.

An illuminating case study involves that quintessential device for encouraging enthusiastic and able followers: the use of contests and prizes to incentivise training. As seen, Cyrus the Great recommends these, and although hardly a mercenary general, he nevertheless becomes a monarch with a standing army composed of heterogeneous allies rather than a polis militia. They are also a centrepiece of Agesilaus’ ‘workshop of war’ at Ephesus, a training camp set up for his Asian campaign of 395 and celebrated in an encomiastic passage featured in both the *Hellenica* and the Spartan king’s eponymous biography (*HG* 3.4.16–19, *Ages. 1.25–8*). Ephesus is the rendezvous point for an extraordinary force of mainland and Asian Greeks assembled to take on a satrapal army, of which two key components were explicitly mercenary: the remnants of the Cyreans (3.4.20) and the new cavalry raised by Agesilaus (3.4.15, discussed above), the latter providing the lynchpin of the king’s strategy. The integration of ethnically diverse forces, the fostering of specialised units (prizes are offered for hoplites, cavalry, peltasts and archers), the challenge of finding provisions, and the lure of pillaging lucrative enemy territory all create an environment well suited to Xenophon’s mercenary-inflected leadership.62

Further suggesting the quasi-mercenary nature of Agesilaus’ force, his predecessor in Asia Minor, Dercylidas, uses plunder to raise pay for 8,000 men (3.1.28), which clearly includes a significant number of mercenaries beyond the 5,000 remaining Cyreans (D.S. 14.37.1), 300 Athenian horsemen to whom he promised μισθός (3.1.4), and the former bodyguards of Meidias that he had taken on (3.1.23). For the similar problems faced by coalition and mercenary forces, see n. 45 above.
Such contests are also a key element of the reforms that Xenophon advocates for the Athenian cavalry in *Hipparchicus*, a work concerned with recreating these auxiliaries as a quasi-professional force through a regularised training programme. In a revealing passage Xenophon discusses the salutary effect of pairing citizen and mercenary cavalry together so that the former can learn from the latter’s more advanced skills (*Eq. Mag.* 9.3–4):

But I say that the whole cavalry would be filled up to a thousand very much more quickly and much more easily for the citizens, if they should establish two hundred mercenary horsemen. For the addition of these men, it seems to me, would make the cavalry both more obedient and more competitive among its ranks in terms of bravery. And I know that even with the Spartans their cavalry began to be held in esteem after they added mercenary horsemen. And in the other poleis I everywhere observe that mercenary elements are held in esteem, for employment is conducive to great enthusiasm.

Xenophon, accordingly, seems concerned with exporting the strengths of mercenary warfare back into traditional civic forces. This is true both of technical innovations, such as the exploitation of peltasts and cavalry, and management strategies that reached maturity only in the context of professionalised service, even if these draw on traditional elements dating back to Homer.

Finally, if one accepts that Xenophon’s theory of leadership represents an innovative adaptation of conventional tropes to contemporary conditions of warfare, the central element of the author’s supposed conservatism,

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63 Cf. 6.4.10, where Xenophon praises the professionalism of the Theban cavalry, which, like the Cyreans, has achieved this due to continuous fighting rather than a programme of formal training.
his *philolaconism*, can be read in a new light.\(^{64}\) There is, of course, Xenophon’s personal connection to Agesilaus and his estimation of him as a model leader. But beyond this, Xenophon’s celebration of Lycurcan ideals in the *Constitution of the Spartans* in large part revolves around that society’s unique organisation towards the goal of military professionalisation.\(^{65}\) The Spartiates, as fulltime hoplites subject to a regular training regime, resembled in-house mercenaries with the added advantage of common citizenship much more than they did the amateur militiamen of neighbouring poleis. In the context of the fourth century, in which professional armies were becoming prevalent, Sparta’s ‘archaic’ constitution may therefore have seemed to the author to offer—paradoxically—the best solution for dealing with a rapidly evolving present. This was a present, however, that after the author’s return from Asia Minor with Agesilaus in *An*. 5.3.6) mattered for him only to the degree that it involved mainland affairs, as noted earlier. Despite his repeated interest in mercenary and mercenary-like practices within Greece, Xenophon largely ignores the true successor armies of the Cyreans: the huge Greek forces hired in the west by Dionysius (D.S. 14.44.2), and in the east by Artaxerxes (D.S. 15.41.1) and the Pharaoh Tachos (D.S. 15.92.2; but cf. *X. Ages.* 2.28–31), despite Iphicrates’ command of the former and Agesilaus’ of the latter.

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\(^{64}\) Tuplin (1993) 163–4 provides an excellent and nuanced assessment of Xenophon’s fond but far from uncritical attitude towards Agesilaus and contemporary Sparta.

\(^{65}\) Thus willing obedience and self-mastery are goals of Spartan *paidieia* (2.14), and Lycurgus fosters courage through formal competitions (4.2).
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SUBORDINATE OFFICERS IN XENOPHON’S ANABASIS* 

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Abstract: This chapter focuses on Xenophon’s treatment of divisions within the command structure presented in the Anabasis, and in particular on three military positions that are briefly mentioned—the taxiarch, ὑποστράτηγος, and ὑπολόχαγος. Arguing against the prescriptive military hierarchies proposed in earlier scholarship, it suggests that ‘taxiarch’ should be understood fluidly and that the appearance of both the ὑποστράτηγος and the ὑπολόχαγος may be due to interpolation. The chapter also includes discussion of two types of comparative material: procedures for replacing dead, absent, or deposed generals at Athens and Sparta in the Classical period, and the lexical development of subordinate positions with the prefix ὑπο-.

Keywords: Xenophon, Anabasis, subordinate commanders, taxiarch, ὑποστράτηγος, ὑπολόχαγος.

Xenophon’s Anabasis has more often been broadly eulogised for its supposed depiction of the democratic spirit of the Greek mercenaries whose adventures are recounted than analysed closely for the details it offers about the command structure of this ‘wandering republic’. ¹ When Xenophon’s presentation of

¹ References are to Xenophon’s Anabasis unless otherwise specified. Translations are adapted from the Loeb edition of Brownson and Dillery. We are grateful to Peter Rhodes for advice and to Simon Hornblower, Nick Stylianou, David Thomas, the editor, and the anonymous referee of Hists for comments on the whole article. Luuk Huitink’s work on this paper was made possible by ERC Grant Agreement n. 312321 (AncNar).

the command structure is discussed in its own right, it tends to be in relation either to the apologetic strains found in the *Anabasis* or to the broader theory of leadership that runs through his diverse corpus and that is sometimes historicised as a prototype of Hellenistic models. The aim of this article is to focus instead on Xenophon’s treatment of the divisions within the command structure presented in the *Anabasis*, and in particular the difficulties raised by three military positions that make fleeting appearances in the *Anabasis*—ταξίαρχος, ὑποστράτηγος, and ὑπολόχαγος. The first of these nouns appears in Xenophon’s account twice (3.1.37, 4.1.28), while the two ὑπο- forms are found just once (3.1.32 and 5.2.13 respectively—ὑποστράτηγος for the first, and ὑπολόχαγος for the only, time in extant Greek literature; there is also a single use of the verb ὑποστρατηγεῖν (5.6.36)).

Despite the lack of attention paid to these positions by Xenophon, the very fact that they are mentioned at all might seem a pointer to the growing professionalisation in Greek military practice that is often seen as a distinctive feature of the fourth century. But what are their functions? In the case of the ταξίαρχος, its second appearance, as we shall see, has frequently led scholars to assume that it was a formal term for light-armed officers in the Ten Thousand. As for the ὑποστράτηγος, the contexts in which the noun and the cognate verb are used have been taken to suggest that the word denotes an officer who replaces a dead or absent στρατηγός; and by extension, in the absence of other contextual clues, the same model has been applied to the ὑπολόχαγος. In this article, we will point to various problems in current scholarly views about the functions of these positions, propose a new interpretation of the ταξίαρχος, and raise the possibility that the appearances of the ὑποστράτηγος and ὑπολόχαγος are due to interpolation.

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2 Dürrbach (1893) remains the most detailed and hostile discussion of the *Anabasis* as apology; on the leadership theory see most recently Gray (2011); for the Hellenistic link see, e.g., Dillery (2004) 259–76.

Before offering a detailed analysis of the internal evidence provided by the Anabasis, however, we will look briefly at two types of comparative material relevant to ὑποστράτηγοι and ὑπολόχαγοι in particular: firstly, procedures for replacing dead, absent, or deposed generals at Athens and Sparta in the Classical period; secondly, the lexical development of subordinate positions with the prefix ὑπο-. Even if the specific textual suggestions that are here proposed are rejected, these subordinate positions deserve more extensive analysis than they have so far received.

1. Suffix Officers

At Athens there is little evidence for procedures when officers were absent or died, even though [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 61 offers an account of how different military offices were elected. This account does mention that στρατηγοὶ and ἵππαρχοι faced an ἐπιχειροτονία each prytany, but while [Aristotle] specifies that if put on trial they are reappointed if acquitted, he does not state who is appointed in their place if they are found guilty. Nor does he offer evidence for replacement procedures for the lesser officers he mentions, whether they be directly elected, like the tribal ταξίαρχοι or φύλαρχοι, or chosen by a superior, like the λοχάγοι.4

Striking evidence for the lack of a formal system in the case of a general’s temporary absence is provided by X.’s account of the prelude to the battle of Notium in 406.5 Alcibiades is described by X. as leaving his pilot (τὸν αὑτοῦ κυβερνήτην) Antiochus in charge of the Athenian navy (HG 1.5.11)—an appointment described by Krentz as ‘exceptional’ and explained by the fact that ‘no generals were available’.6 Even in the absence of other generals, it is

4 See Rhodes (1993) 676–88 on the details of the discussion of ‘elective military officials’.
5 For the rest of this article, ‘X.’ stands for the author Xenophon, ‘Xenophon’ for the character.
remarkable that Alcibiades gave the command to his pilot—a professional, unelected position.

As for the death or deposition of a general, the first clear evidence for Athenian procedures comes a few years before Notium.\(^7\) In 414/13 Nicias, the only remaining general of the Athenian force in Sicily after the deposition of Alcibiades and the death of Lamachus, sent to Athens to ask to be replaced himself. The Athenians instead chose two men on the spot, Menander and Euthymides, as additional στρατηγοί (Th. 7.16.1: προσελλοντο), until Nicias’ new colleagues Demosthenes and Eurymedon (who were already στρατηγοί) should arrive. It seems likely that Menander and Euthymides were made στρατηγοί in addition to the regular ten, having previously served as subordinate officers (perhaps ταξίαρχοι).\(^8\) Whatever the earlier status of the replacement generals, the example of the Athenian force in Sicily reveals clearly that there was no automatic system for replacing missing στρατηγοί.\(^9\) This procedure seems to be confirmed, moreover, by the aftermath of the battle of Arginusae in 406: after two στρατηγοί had died and seven had been deposed, the Athenians chose in addition to the single remaining στρατηγός (πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ εἴλοντο, X. HG 1.7.1) two new στρατηγοί, evidently leaving a board of only three for the rest of the year.\(^10\)

In Classical Greece, it is Sparta that provides the best evidence for procedures on the deaths of military leaders.

\(^7\) ML 33, a casualty list with two generals from one tribe in the same year, is possible evidence for replacement, but it is also possible that two generals from that tribe were elected initially; see Fornara (1971) 46.

\(^8\) Develin (1989) 152, 154: Alcibiades had been deposed the previous year (415/14), so the new στρατηγοί are not a straight replacement. For a different view of the Sicilian command, see Hamel (1998) 196–200.

\(^9\) The expedition was distinctive in that the three initial generals were sent αὐτοκράτορες (Th. 6.8.2, 26.1), but this point does not undermine the broader argument.

\(^10\) There is further evidence for the remaining years of the Peloponnesian War: for 406/5 Lysias was probably suffect for Archestratus (Rhodes (1993) 423); in 405/4 Eucrates was chosen after the battle of Aegospotami (Lys. 18.4). For fatalities among generals in the Classical period, see Pritchett (1994) 127–38, Hamel (1998) 204–9.
Some of this evidence concerns the navy. Diodorus presents the ναύαρχος Callicratidas learning from a seer before the battle of Arginusae that he will die in the battle (13.98.1). That he proceeds in a speech to proclaim Clearchus as his successor implies that there was no fixed replacement. But Diodorus’ narrative is evidently suspect (Callicratidas’ foreknowledge matches the dream attributed to one of the Athenian generals (13.97.6)).

From the evidence of X.’s Hellenica and the lexicographer Pollux, however, it has generally been assumed that there was in fact a ‘vice-admiral’, the ἐπιστολεύς, who would take over in the event of the admiral’s death (the only other occurrence of the Spartan position is at Plu. Lys. 7.2, evidently drawing from X.). The first evidence for this position is when Hippocrates, ἐπιστολεύς for Mindarus, sends a letter to the Spartans explaining that Mindarus is dead (HG 1.1.23). The next is when, owing to the rule that a ναύαρχος could not serve twice in succession, Lysander is sent as ἐπιστολεύς instead (HG 2.1.7). The Hellenica subsequently offers further evidence of an ἐπιστολεύς taking over on the death of the ναύαρχος (4.8.11); of an officer called by the hapax ἐπιστολιαφόρος acting in the same way (6.2.25); and also of an ἐπιστολεύς being left in charge of a separate contingent by the ναύαρχος (5.1.5–6). This idea of the position is also presented by Pollux (1.96), though with the support of a false etymology: οὕτω γὰρ ἐκαλεῖτο ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ στόλου διάδοχος τοῦ ναυάρχου (‘this was the name for the nauarch’s successor in charge of the expedition’).

The evidence of the Hellenica does nonetheless suggest that the translation ‘vice-admiral’ presents too simple a picture of the position of ἐπιστολεύς. The point of the

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11 Bleckmann (1998) 98 n. 219 suggests that Diodorus’ source deliberately blended into one long speech several short speeches delivered by Callicratidas in X.’s Hellenica. Roisman (1987) 32, by contrast, speaks of Clearchus as Callicratidas’ ἐπιστολεύς. X. HG 1.6.35–8 and 2.1.1–5 implies rather that Eteonicus took over the command.

12 LSJ, s.v. II. Compare and contrast Kagan (1987) 380: ‘Normally the epistoleus was the nauarch’s secretary, as the word implies, and vice-
Lysander story—that his appointment is a cunning ruse on the Spartans’ part—is spoiled if he was actually given the regular post of deputy. The primary sense ‘secretary’ corresponds better with the noun’s etymological link with the verb ἐπιστέλλειν and also with the role Hippocrates performs in communicating with Sparta.\(^{13}\) It is still possible that the responsibilities involved in the position changed over time from ‘secretary’ to ‘vice-admiral’; if so, it is still worth noting that this is a development that X. leaves to be inferred rather than commenting on it directly. But even this assumption is slightly complicated by the fact that the ἐπιστολεύς left in charge of a separate contingent at 5.1.5 was evidently not in a position to take over straightaway if needed.\(^{14}\)

While the evidence for the Spartan navy is complicated, there is one very clear reference to replacement officers in the Spartan army. This reference comes in Thucydides’ account of the fighting on Sphacteria in 425 (4.38.1):

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\text{Στύφων ὁ Φάρακος, τῶν πρότερον ἀρχόντων τοῦ μὲν πρώτου τεθνηκότος Ἐπιτάδου, τοῦ δὲ μετ’ αὐτὸν Ἰππαγρέτου ἐφηρηµένου ἐν τοῖς νεκροῖς ἔτι ζῶντος κειµένου ως τεθνεῶτος, αὐτὸς τρίτος ἐφηρηµένος ἄρχειν κατὰ νόµον, εἰ τι ἐκείνοι πάσχοιεν.}
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admiral’; Lazenby (2012) 27–8, who first uses the term ‘vice-admiral’, then glosses ἐπιστολεύς as ‘secretary’; and Rusch (2014), who refers to Hippocrates as ‘secretary and second-in-command’.

\(^{13}\) Michell (1952) 279–80, though he makes Hippocrates act as ‘vice-admiral’ (plausibly enough if he is to be identified with the Hippocrates of Th. 8.33-1, see Hornblower (1991–2008) 3.847; he further argues from Th. 8,99, D.S. 13.97-8 and X. HG 4.8.11 that there were junior and senior ἐπιστολεύς, but (though it fits with the triple command attested in the Spartan army, see below) this seems unwarranted. The development of the role may also be linked with changes in the nauarchy, which probably became an annual office only in the last decade of the Peloponnesian War; see Sealey (1976).

\(^{14}\) Green (2010) 279 n. 12 rightly complains that LSJ, s.v. II ‘wrongly rationalizes’. LSJ also gives the sense ‘secretary’, citing an inscription and a Persian position mentioned in Suda, s.v. ἐπιστέλλεις.
From the generals appointed earlier the first in command, Epitadas, was dead, while his chosen successor, Hippagretus, was lying among the corpses taken for dead (though he was actually alive). Styphon had therefore been selected as third in succession, to take command, according to Spartan law, should anything befall the others. (Trans. Mynott)

Here we find a word for ‘chosen successor’, ἐφηρηµένου, whose derivation is clear but which was also rare enough to attract a comment from a scholiast (ἐντὶ τοῦ μετ’ ἐκείνον ἀφηρηµένου καὶ χειροτονηθέντος). But ‘we do not know how extensive were the circumstances in which the law required or allowed the appointment of reserve commanders’; indeed, as Hornblower suggests, κατὰ νόµον may refer to custom rather than a formal law, so that Thucydides ‘may just be saying that the arrangement described in the present passage was typically Spartan and orderly’ (he aptly compares Thucydides’ detailed description of the chain of command in the Spartan army at 5.66, which seems to imply that this type of hierarchy is distinctively Spartan).

One point at least that is clear from this passage is that the choice of two possible replacement leaders was made before the battle (unlike in the Roman examples in Cassius Dio, where replacements are chosen only when needed). This procedure may be paralleled from a campaign earlier in the Peloponnesian War where the Spartan leader Eurylochus is described as accompanied by two Spartiates (ξυνηκολούθουν, Th. 3.100.2), one of whom takes over

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15 The verb is found also at D.C. 36.4.4, 49.43.7, who perhaps borrowed it from Thucydides; cf. ὁ ἐφαιρεθείς (of a successor in the event of death) in an inscription from Delphi (SGDI ii.10/32, second century BC).


command after the deaths of both Eurylochus and the other officer (3.109.1).\footnote{This link was made by Arnold (1840) 1.479. At HG 4.8.19–21, Diphridas takes over after the death of Thibron, but X. does not dwell on the technicalities.}

Given that Spartan influence is often seen in some other aspects of the army’s organisation, the Spartan parallel may be important for understanding the command structure adopted by the Ten Thousand. As we shall see, however, the clearest Spartan link lies in the titles used for lesser officers; in view of this, it should be stressed that there is no evidence for the use of ὑπο-terminology in the Spartan army.

### 2. Subordinate Officers

Since the Anabasis offers the first attested use of ὑποστράτηγος and the only instance of ὑπολόχαγος, it will be helpful at this stage, before turning to the Anabasis itself, to gather evidence for other military and civic offices with a ὑπο-prefix indicating subordination. In order to show the development of this terminology, we present in an Appendix a list, ordered chronologically, of all such positions that are attested by the third century AD.

Three features of the positions gathered in this list cast some light on X.’s use of ὑποστράτηγος and ὑπολόχαγος. Firstly, there is the distribution of evidence: many of the positions are attested not in literary texts but in inscriptions and documentary papyri. This distribution points to the comparative lack of detailed attention paid by ancient historians to administrative structures, whether within the polis or within armies, and so adds to the unusualness of the two ὑπο-prefixes in the Anabasis. Secondly, the list shows that a number of other ὑπο-positions are attested by X.’s time; indeed, there is even evidence from X. himself of scholarly exegesis of the Homeric ἱπαξ ὑφηνίοχος (see Appendix). The list also shows, as we might expect, a marked increase in the number of terms used over time;
while part of this increase is due to the accidents of survival, the evidence does seem to situate the ὑπο-prefixes attested in the *Anabasis* in a pattern of growing professionalisation in the Greek world. Finally, the ὑπο-positions gathered in the list display (again as we might expect) a marked lack of uniformity: at times a single ὑπο-officer, at times several with the same title, serve a higher officer. Whatever the proportion of subordinates to superiors, however, we have very little evidence in any of these cases for the distribution of responsibilities or for procedures in the event of death or deposition of superiors.

What of the ὑποστράτηγος itself? As we have noted, *Anabasis* 3.1.32 is the earliest occurrence of the word in extant Greek. After X., the word is next found in the Hellenistic period as the title of an officer in the Achaean League (Pol. 4.59.2, 5.94.1, 38.18.2), though ‘the scope and duties of this office are obscure; nor is it clear whether there were several or only one’. It is also found in inscriptions (for instance from Tenos, Magnesia, and Egypt) from the second century BC. In historiography it is used by Dionysius of Halicarnassus of a position offered by Pyrrhus to a Roman envoy (19.14.6). It is then used more frequently in Josephus, Plutarch, and Appian, before becoming particularly common in Cassius Dio and Byzantine writers. In Roman contexts, it is generally applied, during the Republic, to a high-ranking man such as an ex-consul or ex-praetor sent to offer counsel to a consul, and, after Augustus’ reforms, to the legatus legionis, the general in command of a legion. Two common features can at least be noted. Firstly, it is often plural rather than singular: Roman consuls would typically have more than one ὑποστράτηγος; the word is also used by Appian (*BC* 1.116) of

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19 Contrast, e.g., the ὑποστρατοφύλακες (Strabo 12.5.1: στρατοφύλακα ἐνα ὑπὸ τῷ τετράρχῃ τεταγµένους, ὑποστρατοφύλακας δὲ δῶ) and the ὑπογυµνασίαρχος, which regularly on inscriptions matches a single γυµνασίαρχος.

20 Walbank (1957–79) 1.514 (n. on Pol. 4.59.4); also 2.323–4.

two gladiators used by Spartacus as his seconds-in-command. Secondly, there is no expectation of succession: when Josephus has Moses speak of himself as ὑποστράτηγος of God (AJ 4.317; cf. 297), he is not presenting him as a Nietzschean avant la lettre.

A similar pattern is shown by the verb ὑποστρατηγεῖν, which is less common than the noun. As noted above, this verb is used once in the Anabasis. It is next found in Plutarch (Per. 13.15), who uses it of an individual, Menippus, who is said to have been exploited by Pericles. But Plutarch is evidently not using it in a technical sense, given that there was no position of ὑποστράτηγος in Classical Athens; it is quite possible that Menippus was not formally a στρατηγός.

This section suggests, then, that there is no reason to suppose that the rank of ὑποστράτηγος—let alone that of ὑπολόχαγος—would have been in any way familiar to X.’s original audience, but that the ὑποστράτηγος, at least, was much more familiar from the imperial period onwards, during the centuries in which the Anabasis, along with X.’s other writings, was being transmitted and used as a school text. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the relative lack of attention paid by Herodotus and Thucydides to replacement positions could result from the limits of their interests rather than from the lack of more formal systems. With this proviso in mind, it is time now to turn to the evidence for subordinate positions that can be inferred from the Anabasis itself. We will first survey the various types of leader mentioned by X.; then we will focus on the ταξίαρχοι in particular; finally, we will explore the problems that result from the inclusion of the ὑποστράτηγος and ὑπολόχαγος.

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22 Menippus is also named as Pericles’ accomplice by Plutarch at Mor. 812c (Περικλῆς Μενίππῳ μὲν ἐχρῆτο πρὸς τὰς στρατηγίας), without any hint of a formal office. Develin (1989) 103 doubts that Menippus was a στρατηγός at all; contrast Fornara (1971) 50. See also Stadter (1989) 178–9.
3. The Command Structure of the Ten Thousand

X.’s account of Cyrus’ gathering of his army at the start of Book 1 stresses his personal ties of xenia with the men who form and lead each separate contingent. After that, the narrative of the march upcountry in Book 1 focuses especially on Cyrus’ dealings with two of the στρατηγοί, Clearchus and Meno, as well as the rivalry between these two men. The only officers apart from the στρατηγοί mentioned in Book 1 are the λοχαγοί (‘captains’), leaders of subunits called λόχοι: they are mentioned once as part of the audience for a speech by Cyrus (1.7.2) and once in a flashback in Cyrus’ obituary (1.9.17), both times alongside the στρατηγοί.23

There is a shift in the narrative following Cyrus’ death at the battle of Cunaxa. When the leaders of the various contingents meet, Clearchus takes the role of leader and spokesman from the outset (2.1.4); X. subsequently makes it clear that his authority rests on his perceived personal experience and wisdom rather than on formal election (2.2.5). The λοχαγοί as a group also start to become more prominent, though they still always act in concert with the στρατηγοί (2.2.3, 5, 8; 3.29, 5.25, 29, 36)—except insofar as the twenty λοχαγοί who accompany five στρατηγοί on their visit to Tissaphernes are killed outside his tent while the στρατηγοί are seized within (2.5.30–2).

A new clarity in the Greeks’ command structure emerges at the start of Book 3, when replacements for the five στρατηγοί are elected (3.1.47, see below) and the army votes that the Spartan Chirisophus should lead the front of the new square formation while the distribution of στρατηγοί to the sides and rear should be determined by age (3.2.37). Further complications emerge later in the retreat, notably when the army briefly elects a single commander. The only salient detail worth noting here is that in the context of negotiations with the Thracian despot Seuthes, X. brings out a pay differential: στρατηγοί receive twice the pay of

23 Also, two λόχοι (dis)appear at 1.2.25, while Meno holds up the promise of future λοχαγίαι in a speech to his men at 1.4.15.
λοχαγοί, who receive twice the pay of ordinary soldiers (7.2.36, 6.1, 6.7); this ratio is said to be customary (7.3.10), and so presumably operated as well when the army was in Cyrus’ pay.

Further precision about the role of the λοχαγοί is added piecemeal in the course of the retreat. At one point X. mentions that the λοχαγοί in the rear have a system of leadership that rotates on a daily basis (4.7.8: τούτου γὰρ ἡ ἡγεμονία ἐν τῶν ὀπισθοφυλάκων λοχαγῶν ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, explaining why a Parrhasian λοχαγὸς acts together with Chрисphthalm and Xenophon). Besides this, for exceptional tasks, X. notes that officers sometimes command more than one company: at 5.1.17 Cleanet leads out his own and another λόχος, conceivably a private mission, while at 6.5.11 units of 200 soldiers in reserve on the left and right and in the centre each have their own leader (Σαµόλας Ἀχαιὸς ταύτης ἦρχε τῆς τάξεως … Πυρρίας Ἀρκὰς ταύτης ἦρχε … Φρασίας Ἀθηναῖος ταύτῃ ἐφειστήκει).

Two types of hoplite officer below the λοχαγοί are instituted when Xenophon modifies the army’s march formation: πεντηκοντῆρες and ἐνωµόταρχοι. These terms denote the leaders of two smaller units (probably of fifty and twenty-five men respectively) introduced in six special mobile λόχοι, three at the front, three to the rear (3.4.21). They are both terms found in the Spartan army (Th. 5.66.3, 68.3; X. Lac. 11.4), though it is not clear exactly how the positions introduced in the Ten Thousand correspond with the Spartan system.24

In addition to these hoplite officers, specific commands are mentioned for the non-hoplites. The cavalry leader, Lycius, is called ἵππαρχος when the post is instituted (3.3.20) and later ὁ τὴν τάξιν ἔχων τῶν ἱππέων (4.3.22). The leaders of the light-armed units, on the other hand, are referenced with the verb ἦρχε (1.10.7: Episthemes the peltast leader; 4.2.28: Stratocles the leader of the Cretan archers); with the same periphrasis used for Lycius the cavalry commander (4.3.22: Aeschines ὁ τὴν τάξιν [sc. ἔχων] τῶν πελταστῶν τῶν

Подчиненные офицеры в Анакисисе Хефонна; или с фразами λοχαγοὺς ...
пелластиас (4.1.26) и τῶν γυμνήτων ταξιάρχων (4.1.28).

Эта работа предлагает, что Х не предоставляет достаточно деталей о том, чтобы мы смогли реконструировать разнообразие должностей в армии, но что он вкладывает слишком мало информации о том, как эти должности фактически работали. Перед тем как перейти к ὑποστράτηγοι и ὑπολόχαγοι, нам нужно рассмотреть более подробно о легко-оружейных тαξιάρχοι упомянутые в 4.1.28 в связи с тαξιάρχοι к которым (вместе с στρατηγοί и λοχαγοί) Хефонна обращается в его речь к военнослужащим в 3.1.37: ὑμεῖς γάρ ἐστε στρατηγοί, ὑμεῖς ταξίαρχοι καὶ λοχαγοί.

3.1 тαξιάρχοι

Уже γυμνήτων тαξιάρχων в 4.1.28 является единственный другой использование слова в Анакисисе, поэтому оно обычно предполагается, что тαξιάρχοι в 3.1.37 являются также лёгкобронированными командирами. 25. Это предположение, однако, проблематично. Α тαξιάρχος является просто лидером тάξις — это термин, используемый в Анакисисе (и в других местах) для воинских частей (обратно и постоянно) конницы (см. выше) и пехотинцев (например, 1.5.14: τάξις ... τῶν ὀπλιτῶν, of a unit following Proxenus, one of the στρατηγοί) а также для лёгкобронированных войск. 26. Несмотря на это, набор возможных приложений для тαξιάρχος предлагается в лексикографах (например, Suda, s.v. ἡγεµών, στρατοπεδάρχης), надписях, и литературных текстах. Слово было первоначально упомянуто в фрагменте Аeschylus оно описывает ранги установленные Паламедес (TGrF fr. 182): καὶ ταξιάρχας καὶ ἑκατοντάρχας <στρατῶι> / ἔταξα ('О

25. E.g. Roy (1967) 295, Lee (2007) 65. The possible objection that γυμνήτων at 4.1.28 is on this view otiose has no force if ταξιάρχοι denoted leaders of non-hoplite units (a cavalry unit has been formed in the meantime).

26. Cf. Lee (2007) 93–6. X.’s fluidity militates against the otherwise reasonable assumption that ‘the presence of ταξις on the anabasis would suggest that ταξις commanders (ταξιαρχοι) might also be present with the army’ (Trundle (2004) 136).
appointed taxiaruchs and leaders of hundreds for the army"). This fragment is evidently set in the time of the Trojan War, but it may nonetheless be a first hint of the official Athenian rank of ταξιαρχος: commander of one of the ten tribal regiments. Herodotus, by contrast, uses the word three times for subordinate commanders in the Persian army (7.99.1, 8.67, 9.42.1) and once for Spartan officers (9.53.2); the looseness of his use is suggested by the fact that the latter include λοχαγοι. Outside Athens, Xenophon in the Hellenica combines it with λοχαγοι to describe the officers in Spartan armies that include mercenary contingents (including the remnants of the Ten Thousand: 3.1.28, 2.16; 4.1.26; also 6.2.18), while in the Cyropaedia it is the most common general term for ‘commander’, but also inserted in hierarchical lists between χιλιαρχοι and λοχαγοι (2.1.23, 3.3.11); in neither work is the word used to distinguish between commanders of hoplites and light-armed troops.

The identification of the ταξιαρχοι to whom Xenophon appeals at 3.1.37 with light-armed officers is made difficult not just by the vagueness of the term itself but also by the immediate context, where X. has mentioned the summoning only of στρατηγοι, ὑποστράτηγοι and λοχαγοι (3.1.32). The explicit summoning of λοχαγους … πελταστας to a later meeting (4.1.26: συγκαλεσαντας λοχαγους και πελταστας και των ὁπλιτων) tells, moreover, against the possibility that light-armed troops are subsumed in the narrative within the λοχαγοι whenever they hold meetings with the στρατηγοι. It also shows that X.’s terminology is

27 But note its absence from other lists, such as 8.1.14 or the sequence of numerical denominations at Hdt. 7.81. Attempts to map the Persian system attested in the Cyropaedia against Spartan practice equate ταξιαρχοι with Spartan πολέμαρχοι (for references see Tuplin (1994) 170 n. 34).

28 Michell (1952) 258 tentatively suggests on the basis of HG that ταξιαρχοι may have been a formal term in Spartan mercenary armies; even if this thesis were true, the later evidence of HG does not bear on terminology used in the Ten Thousand, despite the Spartan influence on the army.
Subordinate Officers in Xenophon’s Anabasis

inconsistent, since these men must be the same as the γυµνήτων ταξιάρχων mentioned soon afterwards (4.1.28).\(^{29}\) A further objection to the identification of the ταξιάρχοι with light-armed officers lies in the rhetorical weight that it gives to the light-armed troops, who are otherwise entirely ignored in the speeches X. records from the meetings of the officers and of the whole army. Any focus on the light-armed troops (many of whom were non-Greek in origin\(^{30}\)) would detract from the general image that these speeches present of the mercenaries as a collection of Greek hoplites.

Two further possibilities are worth mentioning briefly. One is that the ταξιάρχοι are leaders of two λόχοι.\(^{31}\) This identification can be supported by the wording at 6.5.11 (cited above; note ἦρχε τῆς τάξεως); it also provides a slightly closer fit with usage at Athens and elsewhere.\(^{32}\) The problem with this proposal, however, is that all attested combinations of λόχοι among the Ten Thousand are merely temporary expedients. Another suggestion is that the ταξιάρχοι are commanders of the front λόχος in each unit and the same as the ὑποστράτηγοι who were invited to the meeting at 3.1.37.\(^{33}\) The ὑποστράτηγοι themselves we analyse in detail below: for now it is enough to note that there is no evidence in the Anabasis for a distinct position of leader of the first λόχος (corresponding with the Roman primipilus).

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\(^{29}\) Cobet (1873) 116 audaciously normalised X.’s usage by printing ταξιάρχους τῶν πελταστῶν at 4.1.26. That there was some confusion about the position in the process of transmission may be suggested by the presence of the disjunctive ἢ before ταξιάρχων in the f MSS—one of the two main traditions: the c MSS have often been thought superior, but analysis of papyri and citations in antiquity does not show a preference for c over f readings (see Persson (1913)); there are numerous substantial differences between the two traditions).


\(^{31}\) Krüger (1826) 149.

\(^{32}\) As Anderson (1970) 97 notes, ‘where both words are used, the lochos is always a subdivision of the taxis’.

\(^{33}\) Zeune (1785) 168 (‘primi ordinis centurio’); similarly (but with no specification of the function of the position) Buzzetti (2014) 126 n. 44.
Given the difficulties with these various suggestions, we propose instead that Xenophon’s appeal ὑμεῖς ταξίαρχοι καὶ λοχαγοὶ is not in fact directed at two distinct ranks. Rather, it should be understood as an effective rhetorical amplification after ὑμεῖς ... στρατηγοί and also in the context of the exhortation that follows (3.1.37): ‘while peace lasted, you had the advantage of them alike in pay and in standing; now, therefore, when a state of war exists, it is right to expect that you should be superior to the common soldiers, and that you should plan for them and toil for them whenever there be need.’ Xenophon, that is, is not appealing to formal ranks in the Ten Thousand, but using general and flattering terms to evoke the sense of entitlement and responsibilities of an officer class. This interpretation has the advantage of making good sense of Xenophon’s rhetoric while also explaining why ταξίαρχοι are not mentioned at any of the other meetings in the Anabasis. The combination of positions especially prominent at Athens (ταξίαρχοι) and Sparta (λοχαγοὶ) can even be seen as a subtle piece of self-positioning on Xenophon’s part in his first speech to the assembled officers (the Spartan Chirisophus goes on to comment that all he knew of Xenophon previously was that he was an Athenian (3.1.45)).

34 Cf. Arist. Rh. 1365α10–15 on division into parts. Xenophon balances the social need to name the generals before the captains with the stylistic need to make the second colon more impressive; contrast how the tripartite structure found in the imitation of our passage at Arr. An. 7.9.8, ὑμεῖς σατράπαι, ὑμεῖς στρατηγοί, ὑμεῖς ταξιάρχαι, makes for an impressive effect even though there is only a single term in each limb.

35 Two provisos should be made. Firstly, λοχαγοὶ are attested in Athens (Crowley (2012) 36–9) both in fourth-century literary sources (X. Mem. 3.1.5, 4.1; Is. 9.14; Isoc. 15.116; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 61.3, which specifies that they were appointed by ταξίαρχοι (with Rhodes (1993) ad loc.)) and also as a cadet position in ephebic inscriptions; but in the fifth century at any rate the term (as the use of the Doric form –ἀγός rather than –ηγός itself suggests) certainly has strong Spartan connotations (despite the fifth-century context of the two Mem. passages; also, Ar. Ach. 575 and X. HG 1.2.3 are both very uncertain evidence for a formal fifth-century Athenian system of λόχοι). Secondly, it has been argued that ταξιάρχοι
Our analysis of ταξίαρχοι suggests, then, that X. is not only sparing in providing details on the functioning of leadership positions but also flexible in his use of terminology. In particular, the common scholarly usage ‘taxiarchs’ as a technical term for the light-armed officers of the ‘Ten Thousand’ is not warranted by the single passage 4.1.28 (especially as 4.1.26 could just as equally justify calling them ‘peltast captains’). With these results in mind we now turn to the two ὑπο- positions and to X.’s treatment of the methods used for replacing officers.

3.2 ὑποστράτηγοι

The mention of ὑποστράτηγοι occurs in X.’s description of the night of despair among the Ten Thousand after the loss of five στρατηγοί and twenty λοχαγοί. It will be helpful here to outline its broader context. Xenophon, who is said to have joined the expedition at the invitation of Proxenus, one of the στρατηγοί, but not as a στρατηγός, λοχαγός, or στρατιώτης (3.1.4), calls together the surviving λοχαγοί in Proxenus’ contingent. He concludes his speech with a proposal to call a meeting of the surviving officers, at the same time exhorting Proxenus’ λοχαγοί to show themselves ‘the best of captains and more worthy to be generals than the generals themselves’ (3.1.24: φάνητε τῶν λοχαγῶν ἄριστοι καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀξιοστρατηγότεροι). After a defeatist objection has been dismissed, this proposal is put into effect (3.1.32):

οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὰς τάξεις ἰόντες, ὅπου μὲν στρατηγὸς σῶος εἶη, τὸν στρατηγὸν παρεκάλουμ, ὡπόθεν δὲ ἄχρυοτο, τὸν ὑποστράτηγον, ὅπου δ’ αὐ λοχαγὸς σῶος εἶη, τὸν λοχαγόν.

were a position at Sparta at the time of the Persian Wars (van Wees (2004) 244), on the basis of Hdt. 9.53.2 and the mention of a ταξίαρχος in the Oath of Plataea (RO 88 l. 25); but it is better to see the presence of the term as a sign of Herodotus’ loose terminology (see above) and the oath’s inauthenticity.
The others proceeded to visit the various divisions of the army. Wherever a στρατηγός was left alive, they would invite the στρατηγός; where he was gone, [sc. they would invite] the υποστράτηγος; and, again, where a λοχαγός was left alive, [sc. they would invite] the λοχαγός.

The steps that are then taken to replace the dead men are as follows:

1) 3.1.33: gathering of about 100 στρατηγοί καὶ λοχαγοί.
2) 3.1.34: the eldest λοχαγός in Proxenus’ contingent speaks, addressing ὦ ἄνδρεσ στρατηγοὶ καὶ λοχαγοί.
3) 3.1.37–44: Xenophon speaks, at one point offering the exhortation ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἐστε στρατηγοὶ, ὑμεῖς ταξίαρχοι καὶ λοχαγοί (37, discussed above); and then suggesting that ‘generals and captains are appointed as speedily as possible to take the places of those who are lost’ (ἀντὶ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ὡς τάχιστα στρατηγοὶ καὶ λοχαγοὶ ἀντικατασταθῶσιν, 38) and that they summon all the soldiers after appointing ‘all the leaders that are necessary’ (τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὅσους δεῖ, 39).
4) 3.1.45–6: Chirisophus speaks, instructing ‘those of you who need them to go off and choose leaders’ (ἀπελθόντες ἦδη αἱρεῖσθε οἱ δεόµενοι ἄρχοντας, 46).
5) 3.1.47: Five replacement ἄρχοντες, ‘leaders’, are chosen. As the men they replace were all στρατηγοί, the new ἄρχοντες must all be στρατηγοί. No mention is made of replacement λοχαγοί, though Chirisophus’ instruction αἱρεῖσθε ... ἄρχοντας could be taken to cover λοχαγοί too. The use of ἄρχοντες at 46–7 picks up Xenophon’s speech.

From 3.1.32 alone—and leaving aside for the moment the injunctions of Xenophon and Chirisophus to elect replacements—it would seem that the υποστράτηγος takes the place of an absent στρατηγός.\footnote{E.g. Krüger (1826) 148. See above against the interpretation ‘primi ordinis centurio’; the further suggestion of Boucher (1913) 147 that only large units had a υποστράτηγος also lacks any supporting evidence.} But the sequence as a whole leaves it unclear why, if that is the case, the
 hwnds is not mentioned again (see further below). Confirmation of the function of the hwnds has, however, been sought in the position’s only other possible mention in Anabasis. This possible mention occurs when the army is at Cotyora on the Black Sea coast and the Spartan στρατηγός Chirisophus has left to try to get ships from the Spartans in the Hellespont (5.6.36):

They therefore took with them the other generals to whom they had communicated their earlier doings—namely, all the generals except Neon the Asinaean, who was hwnds (hwnds) for Chirisophus because Chirisophus had not yet returned.

Neon (who was presumably not a Spartiate but a περίοικος, i.e. from one of the outlying regions under Spartan control) is here initially classed among the στρατηγοί, but it is at once clarified that he is deputy (hwnds) of Chirisophus. X. could presumably have offered the same explanation of Neon’s role at his first appearance, when the tithe to be dedicated to Artemis and Apollo is distributed among the στρατηγοί, and Neon receives a portion in Chirisophus’ place (5.3.4: ἀντὶ δὲ Χειρισόφου Νέων ὁ Ἀσιναῖος ἔλαβε). At any rate, that Neon is classed as a στρατηγός in Chirisophus’ absence seems to confirm the implication of 3.1.32, namely that the hwnds discharges the duties of a στρατηγός in his absence. And this assumption is thought to be further confirmed by the fact that Neon takes over from Chirisophus after his death (6.4.11; cf. 6.4.23).

The problem with using Neon as evidence is that his position as subordinate to Chirisophus is exceptional in a number of ways. While the other στρατηγοί were selected by Cyrus to raise troops on his behalf, Chirisophus was acting to some extent in cooperation with the Spartan state (cf. D.S. 14.19.5, 21.2). Though Cyrus’ formal dealings with the Spartans are stressed in the Anabasis much less than in the summary of the background at Hellenica 3.1.1, X. does at least state that Chirisophus came with thirty-five ships from
the Peloponnese which were under the command of a Spartan ναύαρχος (1.4.2). That said, he does allow for some personal interaction between Cyrus and Chrisophus that goes beyond his dealings with the Spartan government (1.4.3): παρῆν δὲ καὶ Χειρίσοφος Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν, μετάπεμπτος ὑπὸ Κύρου (‘Chrisophus a Spartan was also present on the ships, summoned by Cyrus’). Moreover, if Neon was Chrisophus’ officially designated second-in-command, it is odd, as Roy has also acutely noted, that he does not more actively cooperate with the Spartan officials in the Hellespont after Chrisophus’ death: even though Neon always acts in the Spartan interest and then stays with the Spartans at 7.3.7 rather than joining Seuthes, he is not presented as having special relations with those officials at 6.6.5–37 or 6.7.1.37

Two further differences in Neon’s position are more clear-cut. Firstly, while Chrisophus at 5.6.36 was absent on a distant mission, the ὑποστράτηγοι mentioned at 3.1.32 appear in a context where their superior officers have left only for a short visit to Tissaphernes’ tent. Secondly, while it is true that Neon takes over from Chrisophus after his death (6.4.11), X. does not indicate whether a vote was held. The new generals who replace the men seized by Tissaphernes, by contrast, are explicitly said to be elected (3.1.47).

The use of the verb ὑπεστρατήγει in the case of Neon, then, leaves open three possibilities that prevent extrapolation from his case: like Plutarch’s use of the same verb, it might not correspond with a formal title ὑποστράτηγος; if it does, that might be an ad hoc appointment to cover Chrisophus’ unexpected absence; and if Neon has from the start been Chrisophus’ ὑποστράτηγος, that might reflect the sort of distinctively Spartan command structure seen in Thucydides’ account of the fighting on Sphacteria.

37 Roy (1967) 300, concluding that ‘Xenophon has probably again suppressed evidence’. The referee also notes that Neon does not act as subordinate for the absent Chrisophus at 2.5.37.
To leave aside the problem of Neon, the necessity of elections for vacant places, despite the survival of some ὑποστράτηγοι, seems to support the claim that there was no automatic right of succession for the ὑποστράτηγος on the death of his στρατηγός. Lee suggests that when Chrisophus instructs ‘those of you who need leaders’ (οἱ δεόμενοι) to choose them (3.1.46, quoted above), he refers to those units that did not have a ὑποστράτηγος. The problem with this suggestion is that X. implies that each contingent that had lost a στρατηγός would have a ὑποστράτηγος. Then, should be taken as referring not to those units which had lost both στρατηγός and ὑποστράτηγος, but to all units which had lost a στρατηγός.

While the function of the position is unclear, the main problem with the mention of the ὑποστράτηγος is its uneasy fit with the rest of the narrative. X. has just depicted the Greeks’ despair after the seizure of the five στρατηγοί, portraying the army in a state of disintegration (3.1.2–3). Now, however, it emerges that there have all along been subordinates able to stand in for the missing στρατηγοί. This contradiction exposes, and arguably detracts from, some of the literary artistry of X.’s depiction of the Greeks’ despondency. While the ὑποστράτηγος does not sit easily

38 Lee (2007) 53 n. 64. Lee’s treatment of the ὑποστράτηγος is confusing. He writes that ‘it is not clear from this passage [3.1.32] whether every contingent originally possessed a hypostategos’ (53 n. 64), and later that ‘not all contingents had surviving hypostategoi’ (83 n. 26). He further argues that ‘where a designated second-in-command (hypostategos) survived, the choice was probably straightforward’, while ‘in other cases, a contingent’s senior lochagos may have held the post of hypostategos’ and also been among the twenty λοχαγοί killed outside Tissaphernes’ tent; he then qualifies this rather unclear distinction by claiming that the ὑποστράτηγος might be the senior in service rather than age, given that Hieronymus, explicitly called the oldest of Proxenus’ λοχαγοί, ‘was apparently not hypostategos and was not chosen as Proxenus’ successor’ (53 n. 65). But this reasoning is circular: Lee infers his not being ὑποστράτηγος from the fact that he was not chosen.

39 Against the interpretation that 3.1.32 implies that a λοχαγός was invited only if both στρατηγός and ὑποστράτηγος were missing, see at n. 49 below.
with the immediate context, the problem is increased by its omission from the rest of the narrative of the retreat (with the possible exception noted above). Elsewhere, X. operates with a basic dichotomy of στρατηγοί and λοχαγοί in his descriptions of the army both in action and in council (notably in the ensuing council when the στρατηγοί and λοχαγοί gather (3.1.33) and new στρατηγοί are chosen (3.1.47)). It might be thought, then, that the υποστράτηγοι are simply subsumed in the narrative within the στρατηγοί or, more plausibly, the λοχαγοί (especially if υποστράτηγοι were always also λοχαγοί). But there are still passages where the absence of any mention of υποστράτηγοι is notable: X. stresses competition among some of the λοχαγοί but not with the υποστράτηγοι; and if the υποστράτηγοι are also λοχαγοί, their existence sits uneasily with the rotation system among the λοχαγοί in the rear (4.7.8), which seems predicated on the idea of equality.

Evidence that the omission of the υποστράτηγος in the rest of the narrative reflects X.’s indifference might be seen in a number of hints of the position that have been detected. We have already seen that some scholars have identified the υποστράτηγοι with the ταξίαρχοι mentioned at 3.1.37. More often, the position of υποστράτηγος has been used as a way to explain apparent anomalies in X.’s presentation of individual commanders. It has been suggested, for instance, that Pasion of Megara—who arrives with the smallest force of any leader (300 hoplites and 300 peltasts: 1.2.3)—was υποστράτηγος of Xenias, with whom he is grouped when men from their contingent(s) go over to Clearchus (1.3.7) and when they desert together (1.4.7). Another candidate for the post of υποστράτηγος is Cleanor. Cleanor speaks as eldest (2.1.10) at a meeting of ‘the Greeks’

40 Thus Krüger (1826) 149 suggested υποστράτηγοι were to be understood as included in the address to the στρατηγοί at 3.1.37 (where Xenophon also addresses ταξίαρχοι and λοχαγοί).

41 Either way, this would explain why they are not mentioned when differential pay levels are described (see above).

leaders’ (τοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄρχοντας, 2.1.8), is then directly called a στρατηγός at 2.5.37, but is subsequently elected στρατηγός to replace Agias at 3.1.47. To solve this difficulty, it has been suggested that Cleanor was Agias’ ὑποστράτηγος and that X. was speaking loosely in calling him στρατηγός before his formal election. In both of these cases, however, alternative explanations are possible: thus Roy treats Pasion as one of the original στρατηγοί, and suggests that Cleanor first took over from either Pasion or Xenias, and that later he also received command of Agias’ contingent, which was then combined with his own (i.e. either Pasion’s or Xenias’ old unit).

Two other proposals for the position involve characters who have not (or not yet) been presented as formal commanders at all. Parke claims on the basis of 5.6.25 (Θώραξ ὁ Βοιώτιος, ὃς περὶ στρατηγίας Ξενοφῶντι ἐµάχετο ('Thorax the Boeotian, who was always at odds with Xenophon over the generalship')) that Thorax was Xenophon’s ὑποστράτηγος. More startlingly Lee has speculated that the introduction of Xenophon at 3.1.4 (Ξενοφῶν Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτε λοχαγὸς οὔτε στρατιώτης ἦν ('Xenophon, an Athenian, who was neither general nor captain nor common soldier')) conceals the fact that Xenophon himself was ὑποστράτηγος of Proxenus. Lee’s suggestion, if true, would make even more audaciously false two aspects of X.’s presentation of Xenophon: rather than suggesting that Xenophon was serving for pay, X. incorporates him in a network of elite ties of philia and xenia, and rather than suggesting that

43 Lee (2007) 51 n. 52; Flower (2012) 95. If right, this view would be further evidence of X.’s comparative indifference to the technicalities of the command structure.

44 Roy (1967) 287, 289; Lee (2007) 45 n. 16 and 51 n. 52 misrepresents Roy as being compatible with his own view. On Roy’s view, too, we may note how much work X. leaves to the reader.

45 Parke (1933) 35. On the same page Timasion seems to be a slip for Neon.

46 Lee (2007) 54 n. 66.

Xenophon was doing no more than his duty as Proxenus’ subordinate, X. presents him as suddenly summoned to greatness by a dream from Zeus (3.1.11–12). These two speculations present a picture of the leadership of the Ten Thousand that is satisfyingly dense—but much denser than X.’s account warrants.

A different approach would be to see the rare appearance of the ὑποστράτηγος as an indication of special circumstances rather than as the result of X.’s indifference. It could have been a temporary position held by a λοχαγός covering the absence of a στρατηγός from the rest of his contingent, whether for a long trip, as with Chirisophus, or for the visit to Tissaphernes (when dinner and perhaps an overnight stay might have been envisaged). Even on this view, however, it is still hard to see why the position needed to be mentioned at all at 3.1.32—given that all the surviving λοχαγοί are summoned to the meeting at the same time as the ὑποστράτηγοι of the dead generals. At most one might speculate that the ὑποστράτηγος based himself in the tent of his στρατηγός when the στρατηγός was absent, while each λοχαγός would be with his own λόχος.

Rather than finding more examples of the ὑποστράτηγος between the lines of X.’s text or explaining the position away as merely temporary, we propose that the difficulties created by the ὑποστράτηγος at 3.1.32 point instead to its being an interpolation.

48 Editors agree that there are numerous interpolations in the MSS of the Anabasis, including whole sentences (1.7.15, 1.8.6, 2.2.6, 5.5.4, and 7.8.25–6, in addition to the book summaries at 2.1.1, 3.1.1, 4.1.1–4, 5.1.1, and 7.1.1, which are mentioned by D.L. 2.57, and so must predate the second century AD). Not surprisingly there is much disagreement at the level of clauses and individual words, but several clarifying glosses have been suspected; cf., e.g., 1.7.8, where Weiske (followed by Hude and Dillery) suggested that οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ originated as a clarification of the following words: καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τινὲς; 1.7.12, where Weiske (followed by Hude, Masqueray, and Dillery) rejected καὶ στρατηγοὶ καὶ ἡγεμόνες as a gloss on ἄρχοντες (καὶ στρατηγοὶ om. E). Such suspicions are reinforced by the fact that some differences between the MSS must be due to interpolations that aim at giving more complete and clearer information; cf., e.g., 5.3.3, where the Γ MSS add ἐκ τῶν ἁμήν τῶν,
not just by the lack of attention to the position elsewhere in the *Anabasis*, but also by a number of lexical, stylistic, and textual problems at 3.1.32. Let us here repeat the relevant sentence:

οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὰς τάξεις ἰόντες, ὅπου μὲν στρατηγὸς σώος εἶη, τὸν στρατηγὸν παρεκάλουν, ὅποθεν δὲ αἰχματο, τὸν ὑποστράτηγον, ὅπου δ’ αὖ λοχαγὸς σώος εἶη, τὸν λοχαγὸν.

The following points, taken together, may indicate that the words ὅποθεν δὲ … ὑποστράτηγον were inserted by an interpolator:

1) The fact that the middle limb of the tricolon ὅπου μὲν … ὅποθεν δὲ … ὅποθεν δ’ αὖ … does not express the subject of ὅποθεν, ὅστ’ ἑστήκε, unhinges the strict parallel structure found in other ὅπου μὲν … ὅπου δὲ … (…) ὅπου δὲ … (…) clauses in X. (*Mem.* 4.6.12; *Cyr.* 6.3.2–3, 8.4.4; *Ages.* 2.24; *Eq.* 8.10 bis); and such parallelism is a typical feature of X.’s style more generally. The second limb is therefore better analysed as a parenthetical ⟨wherever a στρατηγὸς was left alive, they would invite the στρατηγὸς (and where he was gone, the ὑποστράτηγος) and, again, where a λοχαγὸς was left alive, the λοχαγὸς’⟩, with the whole sentence effectively being a bicolon. The insertion could of course be X.’s own, but parentheticals do not disturb the carefully achieved verbal balance in the other passages cited above and its inelegance is untypical of X.

2) The introduction of the final limb with ὅπου δ’ αὖ, the reading of the c MSS (the f MSS read ὅπου δὲ) is unusual. Elsewhere X. uses μὲν … δ’ αὖ structures where there exists an opposition between the two clauses pronounced enough to warrant additional marking through αὖ, either because the contrasted entities are in themselves diametrically

μισθωσ, presumably to clarify οὗτοι ἐσώθησαν; and, invoking officers, 3.3.14: οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ c, οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ f. This kind of early, ‘technical’ interpolation is discussed for the text of Plato by Jachmann (1942).
opposed (e.g. opponents in war) (cf. An. 1.10.5; HG 4.3.16, 18 (=Ages. 2.9, 11); 5.1.29, 4.19–20; 6.4.6, 24; Cyr. 4.5-25; 5.4-5; 8.1.43; Hier. 2.18–3.1) or because they are marked as such through their involvement in very different actions (cf. An. 6.1.21; HG 5.4.29; 6.4.33–4; Mem. 1.2.24–6; Cyr. 2.4.24; 5.5.23; 7.1.18–19; 8.1.13, 47; 8.3.48); the figurative meaning ‘in turn’ may also mark temporal progression (a nuance which dominates at Cyr. 1.5.5 and 8.5.4). In the present case, however, the parallelisms between both the officers (who are not natural opposites) and the actions expressed in the ὃπου μὲν ... ὃπου δ' αὖ ... limbs are much greater than the contrasts. And while δ’ αὖ has been taken to imply that the λοχαγός was summoned only if there was no surviving στρατηγός or ὑποστράτηγος, this reading is belied by what follows, where it is clear (as we would expect) that all surviving λοχαγοί meet; and it makes no sense in itself, since it does not allow for the possibility (which must have been true in most if not all cases) that there was more than one surviving λοχαγός in contingents with no surviving στρατηγός or ὑποστράτηγος. The sentence effectively means, then, ‘they summoned all the surviving officers’, and δ’ αὖ seems incompatible with such a sense; it is perhaps possible, then, that when the interpolation was made, αὖ was inserted into one branch of the tradition to give relief to what was wrongly interpreted as a three-way opposition, or to make explicit the equally wrong idea that the three actions occur in succession.

3) It may be added that the second σῷος εἴη is omitted in E, one of the c MSS. If in E’s source ὁπόθεν δὲ … ὑποστράτηγον still had the status of a marginal gloss, the omission is easily explained and possibly correct, yielding ὃπου μὲν στρατηγός σῷος εἶη, τὸν στρατηγὸν παρεκάλουν, ὃπου δὲ (although E, being a c MS, reads δ’ αὖ) λοχαγός, τὸν

10 E.g. the Loeb (‘or, again, where only a captain was left, the captain’) and Ambler (less clearly: ‘where, in turn, the captain had survived, they summoned the captain’). Cf. Trundle (2004) 135, citing 3.1.32 to show that ‘the lochagos was next in line for the generalship after the hupostratēgos’.
λοχαγόν—a close parallel to Mem. 4.6.12, where the cola following the first are also significantly reduced: καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἐκ τῶν τὰ νόμιμα ἐπιτελοῦντων αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, ταύτην μὲν τὴν πολιτείαν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, ὅπου δ’ ἐκ τιμημάτων, πλουτοκρατίαν, ὅπου δ’ ἐκ πάντων, δημοκρατίαν.

4) οἵχοιτο is variously interpreted by modern translators ('dead' (Watson), 'missing' (Waterfield), 'gone' (Loeb), 'n’était plus là' (Masqueray)); Sturz’ lexicon lists it (along with three passages from the Cyropaedia) under ‘mori’, ‘die’—a sense that is more common in (but not restricted to) poetry. The antithesis with σῷος does suggest ‘dead’ as the most likely meaning (the same antithesis is found at Cyr. 5.4.11 as well as S. Aj. 1128, Tr. 83–5). But the Cyropaedia passages and other contemporary prose usages (e.g. And. 1.146) seem more emotionally charged than 3.1.32. If, on the other hand, the sense is ‘go’ or ‘be gone’ (as with all other uses of οἵχεσθαι in the Anabasis), the spatial treatment of the generals’ departure is unusual: the verb is normally used of characters who are the centre of the narrative focus as they leave the scene with a definite goal (if the goal is uncertain, it is often accompanied by a participle such as ἀπιών). Furthermore, on neither analysis does οἵχοιτο sit easily with ὅπόθεν. It presumably means ‘from those τάξεις from which’, and so ill fits the absolute sense ‘was dead’ (especially since there is no accompanying idea of departing for the land of the dead, as at, e.g., Hom. Il. 22.213, 23.101; Pl. Phd. 115d4). As a verb of movement, on the other hand, οἵχεσθαι is a strongly goal-oriented verb rather than a source-oriented one; that is, when it is used on its own

50 If the omission of the second σῷος εἶη is the result of haplography, this too would be easier to explain if E’s source did not have ὅποθεν δὲ … ὑποστράτηγον in the text.

51 Sturz (1801–4) 3.205, citing Cyr. 3.1.13 (ἀι δὲ γυναῖκες ἀναβήσασιν ἐδρύπτοντο, ὡς οἰχοµένου τοῦ πατρὸς), 3.4.11 (τὸ μὲν ἐπ’ ἐμοὶ οἰχοµαι, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ σοι σέσωσµαι), and 7.3.8 (ἐδάκρυσέ τε ἐπ’ τῷ πάθει καὶ εἰπεν· φεύ, ὦ ἀγαθῇ καὶ πιστῇ ψυχή, ὦ ὁχή δή ἀπολυτών ἡµᾶς). The word is not used in this sense in Herodotus or Thucydides, according to the lexica of Powell and Bétant.
(without a participle expressing the mode of movement), the destination may be specified (e.g. 1.4.8: ὅδε γὰρ ὁπή ὀἴχεται (‘I know where they have gone’)), but the place from which the subject departs usually is not. This syntactic selection restriction is absolute in Homer,\(^{52}\) and is only rarely violated in the Classical period;\(^{53}\) X. adds a participle in the relevant cases.\(^{54}\) Our sentence is closest in meaning and structure to the much later passages [Hp.] Ἐπ. 27.1.276 (ei μὲ πανταχόθεν ὀἴχεται τὸ χρηστὸς ἀνθρώπως ἐτεί εἶναι ‘unless their still being good people has altogether disappeared’) and Phl. Μορ. 413a (καὶ πρόνοια θεῶν … πανταχόθεν ὀἴχεται ‘even the providence of the gods has altogether disappeared’)—though both cases involve very figurative language hardly comparable to the dry report at Αν. 3.1.32.

None of these linguistic, stylistic, and textual arguments is decisive in itself, but collectively they lend considerable weight to the possibility that a later editor, familiar with the common use of the term in Roman contexts, inserted the ὑποστράτηγος clause through a mistaken inference from the position of Neon at 5.6.36. The clause with the verb at 5.6.36 is also open to suspicion as an explanatory gloss on Neon’s position, but defensible as long as it is interpreted loosely.\(^{55}\) If the clauses are retained, our discussion does at least point to the wider interpretative problems created by

\(^{52}\) Létoublon (1985) 98; Kölligan (2007) 151. Thus, in a case like ὀἴχεσθαι ἀντιστοιχεῖπα (Od. 1.242, said by Telemachus of Odysseus) ‘from here’ is implied, but not lexically expressed.

\(^{53}\) Cf. E. ΠΙ 1314–5 (ἐξε γὰρ οἴχεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ οἴχεται, Ph. 1744 ὅτι ἐκ ὅδων νέκεως ἀθάπτος ὀἴχεται); Hdt. 2.140.1 (ὁς δ’ ἀρα ὀἴχεσθαι τῶν ἄθλωσιν ἐξ Ἁθηναμ'); Ἐπ. 27.1.276 (ei μὲ πανταχόθεν ὀἴχεται τὸ χρηστὸς ἀνθρώπως ἐτεί εἶναι ‘unless their still being good people has altogether disappeared’); Hdt. 2.140.1 (ὁς δ’ ἀρα ὀἴχεσθαι τῶν ἄθλωσιν ἐξ Ἁθηναμ'); Ἐπ. 27.1.276 (ei μὲ πανταχόθεν ὀἴχεται τὸ χρηστὸς ἀνθρώπως ἐτεί εἶναι ‘unless their still being good people has altogether disappeared’)—though both cases involve very figurative language hardly comparable to the dry report at Αν. 3.1.32.

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\(^{54}\) An. 3.1.15: ἀποδράς ὄχεται ἐξω τοῦ Πόντου; 3.7.15: δεινευότο δὲ … ἀποπλέων ὀἴχεσθαι ἐξω τοῦ Πόντου.

\(^{55}\) The fact that this explanation is postponed from 5.3.4 tells neither for nor against the possibility of interpolation.
X.’s decision to focus on the ὑποστράτηγος only in these two contexts—unless, we have suggested, the position is very narrowly conceived as a temporary expedient. As we shall now see, similar problems are created by X.’s apparent indifference in the case of the other subordinate role with which we are here concerned.

3.3 ὑπολόχαγοι

ὑπολόχαγοι make their only appearance in X.’s account after the army’s arrival on the Black Sea coast. With half of the Greek army left to guard the camp near Trapezus, Xenophon leads the other half in an attack on a stronghold where a local tribe, the Drilae, has gathered. The site is difficult to approach, surrounded as it is by a deep gully on all sides and a manmade embankment with palisade and wooden towers. The Greek peltasts launch an attack on the site but are unable either to take the fort or to retreat in safety. Xenophon then inspects the gully, decides that the place can be taken, and plans the attack (5.2.11):

ἐπεὶ δ’ ἦκον οἱ ὁπλῖται, ἐκέλευσε τὸν λόχον ἕκαστον ποιῆσαι τῶν λοχαγῶν ὡς ἂν κράτιστα οἴηται ἀγωνιεῖσθαι· ἦσαν γὰρ οἱ λοχαγοὶ πλησίον οἵ πάντα τὸν χρόνον ἀλλήλων περὶ ἀνδραγαθίας ἀντεποιούντο.

When the hoplites arrived, Xenophon told every captain to form his company in the way he thought it would compete best; for near one another were the captains who had all the time been vying with one another in valour.

He then gives orders to the peltasts, archers, and slingers to have their missiles ready to fire. Then (5.2.13):

ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα παρεσκεύαστο καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ καὶ οἱ ὑπολόχαγοι καὶ οἱ ἀξιοῦντες τούτων µὴ χείρους εἶναι πάντες παρατεταγµένοι ἦσαν, καὶ ἀλλήλως µὲν δὴ ἐξνεώρον (µηνοειδῆς γὰρ διὰ τὸ χωρίον ἢ τάξεις ἢ) …
When all preparations had been made and the captains, the ὑπολόχαγοι, and those who considered themselves not inferior to these men in bravery were all grouped together in the line, and, moreover, watching one another (for the line was crescent-shaped to conform with the position they were attacking) …

The Greeks attack, with Agasias picked out for particular daring. They then find, however, that there is a strongly held acropolis within the stronghold, and get away with difficulty.

This is a difficult sequence to follow, and, as we shall see, some at least of the difficulties are probably due to the state of the manuscripts. Before considering the role of the ὑπολόχαγοι, we need to understand what the λοχαγοί are doing and who ‘those who considered themselves not inferior ... in bravery’ might be.

In relation to the λοχαγοί, Χ. distinguishes between the group as a whole and a subset of particularly competitive members. In picking out this subset, Χ. is looking back to two earlier scenes. Firstly, at 4.1.27, in a meeting of hoplite and peltast commanders, Aristonymus and Agasias are named as the first hoplite volunteers for a dangerous mission, and then Callimachus, ‘in rivalry with them’ (ἀντιστασιάζων), said that he was willing to take volunteers from the whole army, ‘for I know that many of the young men will follow if I am in the lead’. Secondly, in the attack on the citadel of the Taochians (4.7.11–12), Agasias, here identified explicitly as one of the rearguard λοχαγοί, sees Callimachus run forward from a clump of trees and then rush back for cover so that the defenders waste their stones:

When Agasias saw what Callimachus was doing, and with the whole army for spectators, he became fearful that he would not be the first to make the run across to the stronghold; so without asking Aristonymus or Eurylochus of Lusi (though the former was close by and both were his friends) or anyone else to join him, he
dashed forward himself and proceeded to go past everybody. Callimachus, however, when he saw him going past, seized the rim of his shield; and at the moment Aristonymus of Methydrium ran past both of them, and upon his heels Eurylochus of Lusi. For all these four were rivals in valour and continually striving with one another (πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ἀντεποιοῦντο ἡρετῆς καὶ διηγομῖζοντο πρὸς ἄλληλους); and in thus contending they captured the stronghold.

Here the three volunteers from the earlier scene are joined by a fourth, Eurylochus.

But why does the fact that these four λοχαγοὶ are close to each other explain why Xenophon tells all the captains to form their units as they see fit? In terms of numbers, X. reports soon after the attack on the Drilan stronghold that 8,600 men were counted at Cerasus (5.3.3). And in their final military engagement before reaching Trapezus the hoplites had been formed into eighty λόχοι, each of almost 100, together with three groups of about 600 light-armed troops (4.8.15). So, given that half the army went out on the campaign against the Drilae, there should have been over thirty λόχοι. It seems, then, that Xenophon expected the competitive spirit shown by the four λοχαγοὶ to impress itself on their peers.

This expectation seems in turn to be confirmed by the following narrative. Helped by the visual opportunities allowed by the terrain, the agonistic spirit spreads to include the men who are drawn up alongside the λοχαγοὶ and ὑπολόχαγοι—that is to say, ‘the men who considered themselves not inferior to these men in bravery’. The phrase itself tellingly echoes Xenophon’s earlier speech to the officers, where he claims that ‘you should consider yourselves superior to the common soldiers’ (ἀξιοῦν δεὶ ὑµᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀµείνους τε τοῦ πλήθους εἶναι, 3.1.37; cf. 5.2.13: ἄξιοιντες ... µὴ χείρους). But it still comes as something of a surprise, given that no clue has been given as to the identity

56 For the role of vision here, see Harman (2013) 84.
of these men—or as to how their own self-evaluation relates to the way in which the λοχαγοί arrange their companies.

While the sequence of events involving the ὑπολόχαγοι is difficult, the men themselves seem to be subordinate officers who enjoy enough prestige at least to rouse the competitive instincts of those beneath them; it also seems that it is precisely the concern with status that explains why they are mentioned at this point. But what is their formal function in the army? As we have noted, it is generally supposed, by analogy with the supposed role of the ὑποστράτηγοι, that they would take over on the death of a λοχαγός (though it is notable that they are not mentioned after the seizure of the στρατηγοὶ and the killing of twenty λοχαγοί at 2.5.32, unlike the ὑποστράτηγοι, who do appear in our texts in this context). Parke further suggests that X.’s silence does not preclude ὑπολόχαγοι having been present at the meeting of the στρατηγοὶ καὶ λοχαγοῖ (3.1.33), given that X. does not specify that ὑποστράτηγοι were present either, even though they were expressly summoned (3.1.32).

Another possibility is that there is some overlap with other named officers: Lendle argues that the ὑπολόχαγοι are probably to be identified with the πεντηκοντῆρες—leaders of a subunit introduced in the six special λόχοι at 3.4.21 (see above)—while Lee suggests that the ὑπολόχαγοι included both the πεντηκοντῆρες and the ἐνωμόταρχοι, leaders of the further subdivision. X.’s account seems to imply, however, that there were πεντηκοντῆρες and ἐνωμόταρχοι only in the six special λόχοι; this would allow for a total of either six or eighteen ὑπολόχαγοι, depending on whether we follow Lendle or Lee. These proposals also yield either two or six ὑπολόχαγοι for each λοχαγός, thereby leaving the chain of

57 This omission could be explained by the fact that X. focuses only on the replacement of the στρατηγοὶ, not on that of the λοχαγοί.

58 Parke (1933) 27 n. 2.

59 Lendle (1995) 304; Lee (2007) 94 n. 94. Lee earlier, in (2004) 297–8, proposed that when two λόχοι combined because of depleted numbers, if their two λοχαγοί were both still alive, one of them would become ὑπολόχαγος.
succession uncertain. Another possibility, then, is that the ὑπολόχαγοι are to be seen as holding a separate office in their own right, with one ὑπολόχαγος in each λόχος; in this case the πεντηκοντῆρες and ἐνωµόταρχοι might be οἱ ἀξιοῦντες τούτων μὴ χείρους εἶναι. If so, their total omission from the rest of the narrative is odd (it would be strange if both ὑπολόχαγοι and ὑποστράτηριοι were normally assimilated in the λοχαγοί). A further possibility that can also probably be ruled out is that the ὑπολόχαγοι were not formally officers: the clause οἱ ἀξιοῦντες τούτων μὴ χείρους εἶναι presupposes some level of public recognition.

The problem of the ὑπολόχαγοι—like that of the ὑποστράτηριοι—can be solved by assuming textual corruption. They appear in a section that is particularly beset by textual problems. At 5.2.11, the c MSS miss out the whole section ἐπεὶ … ἀγωνιεῖσθαι (seventeen words in all). There is another major difference between the main manuscript traditions at 5.2.15: in the string Ἀγασίας Στυµφάλιος καὶ Φιλόξενος Πελληνεὺς, καὶ Φιλόξενος Πελληνεὺς dropped out of the c tradition, and the following plural participle and verb were changed to singulars. There are further textual problems within the key clause of 5.2.13: οἱ λοχαγοὶ καὶ οἱ ὑπολόχαγοι καὶ οἱ ἀξιοῦντες τούτων

60 Thus Watson (1864) 149 n. 1.

61 As assumed e.g. by Rehdantz (1867) xii: ‘Die sonst noch vorkommenden Offiziere (ὑποστράτηριοι, ταξίαρχοι) scheinen von den Strategen, die Unteroffiziere (ὑπολόχαγοι, πεντηκοντῆρες, ἐνωµόταρχοι) von den Lochagen ernannt zu sein; sie standen nur zu diesen in einem persönlichen Verhältnis und hatten, so zu sagen, eine nur taktische Bedeutung.’

62 Thus f has Ἀγασίας Στυµφάλιος καὶ Φιλόξενος Πελληνεὺς καταθέµενων τὰ ὅπλα ἐν χιτῶνι μόνον ἀνέβησαν, καὶ ἄλλος ἄλλον εἶλκε, and c Ἀγασίας Στυµφάλιος καταθέµενος τὰ ὅπλα ἐν χιτῶνι μόνον ἀνέβη, καὶ ἄλλον εἶλκε. It is easier to suppose that Philoxenus was omitted from c than inserted in f, but the sequence in f is hard to follow: ἄλλος ἄλλον εἶλκε is perhaps intended to mean ‘the one pulled up the other’ (Loeb), but should really mean ‘some pulled up some, others pulled up others’; this, however, is difficult to square with the continuation καὶ ἄλλος ἀνεβεβήκει.
μὴ χείρους εἶναι πάντες παρατεταγμένοι ἦσαν. Two main textual variants concern us here: οἱ before ὑπολόχαγοι is omitted in f, while the c MSS read not ὑπολόχαγοι but ὑπόλοχοι.63 Given that ὑπόλοχοι is unattested and hard to construe in this context, the reading of c is probably not in itself an objection to ὑπολόχαγοι.64 More to the point is whether οἱ should be included or excluded before ὑπολόχαγοι. If it is included, it is unclear whether the comparative genitive τούτων goes with both the preceding nouns or just with ὑπολόχαγοι. This ambiguity can be avoided by omitting οἱ (and thereby binding the two nouns together), but this move is equally unsatisfactory: in a passage where there is so much stress on competition within and between ranks, it elides the difference between the status of a λοχαγός and that of a ὑπολόχαγος.65

The problems can be solved by suggesting that ὑπολόχαγοι entered the text as a gloss on οἱ ἀξιοῦντες τούτων μὴ χείρους εἶναι.66 Though there is no Roman use of ὑπολόχαγος to explain the interpolation, as with ὑποστράτηγος, it is still possible that the coinage of the word was due to the same sort of interest in ranks and formal

63 Note also that for πάντες CE have πάντας; that M has τούτων; that μηνοειδὴς is an emendation for μονοειδὴς (ε) or ἐνειδὴς (f); and that for τάξις, the reading of E, CBA have τάραξις and f παράταξις. There is also disagreement among editors over the structure and punctuation of the whole sentence (e.g. Marchant suspects καί or else a lacuna after either πάντες or ἦσαν), but this problem does not concern us here.

64 Buzzetti (2014) 86–7 n. 19 accepts ὑπολόχαγος as a ‘playful neologism’, interpreting it as ‘the under-troops’, ‘the troops that hide’. But the former meaning is impossible and the latter (while it could be supported by the verb ὑπολοχάω, ‘lie in ambush’, which is used twice by Josephus) makes no sense here.

65 For a single article with two nouns producing ‘the effect of a single notion’, while the repetition of the article ‘lays stress on each word’, see Smyth (1935) 291.

66 When this paper was almost complete, we found this suggestion was already made in the ‘Kritischer Anhang’ at the end of the school edition of Matthiä (1852) 433; it does not seem to have attracted any attention since. It might be thought that πάντες is more emphatic with three preceding terms, but this is not a strong objection.
Subordinate Officers in Xenophon’s Anabasis

procedures that may have prompted the earlier interpolation; if ὑπολόχαγος is genuinely Xenophontic, on the other hand, its disappearance from (what survives of) subsequent Greek literature and lexicography is perhaps unexpected. It is also worth speculating that the clause καὶ οἱ ὑπολόχαγοι has replaced a clause qualifying οἱ λοχαγοὶ and specifying the particularly competitive λοχαγοὶ mentioned in the earlier narrative; if this were right, οἱ ἀξιοῦντες τούτων μὴ χείρους εἶναι would be much clearer, as it would be a second clause qualifying οἱ λοχαγοὶ, parallel to the missing clause about the competitive men. With this solution, Χ. would be pointing to rivalry amongst the λοχαγοὶ rather than between ranks. This solution would also support the reading of πάντας for πάντες in CE (a corruption otherwise hard to explain), which can be understood as the object of παρατεταγµένοι ἦσαν, interpreted as an indirect-reflexive middle.67 The overall sense would then be: ‘when … the captains, <those who competed with each other> and those who considered themselves not inferior to these men in bravery, had drawn everyone up’. This reconstruction also gives much more point to παρατεταγµένοι, which with the MSS reading does not adequately express the required idea that the λοχαγοὶ and their rivals within their company were drawn up together at the front (hence Hug’s attractive emendation προτεταγµένοι).

4. Conclusion

Our exploration of subordinate commanders in the Anabasis has suggested that scholars have been overconfident in the granularity with which they have attempted to reconstruct the command structure of the Ten Thousand. The treatment of the ταξίαρχοι pointed to Χ.’s flexibility and the

67 For indirect-reflexive παρατάτησιν, cf. HG 7.5.23; Th. 1.32.2 (of ships). In our passage the verb would express the idea that the captains arrange their λόχοι as they see fit, and in the interest of their rivalry.
need to understand terminology in its wider rhetorical contexts. And with regard to the ὑποστράτηγοι and ὑπολόχαγοι in particular, our analysis has opened up four main possibilities. One possibility is that their presence in the text is a reflection of increasing professionalisation after the Peloponnesian War; on this view, we might see the Ten Thousand placed somewhere in between Athens and Sparta in terms of their adherence to a specialised military hierarchy. Another possibility is that the accidents of evidence explain why the ὑποστράτηγοι and ὑπολόχαγοι first appear in our sources in the Anabasis. If this is right, then the increased visibility of military professionalisation results from the narrative choices of X., who shows more interest in the phenomenon than his predecessors, but still leaves much obscure (as do many of his successors, who similarly show much more interest in the psychological effects of the loss of leaders than in the formalities of replacement). As far as X.’s ideas about leadership are concerned, the muted presence of these subordinate roles suggests that he is more concerned in the Anabasis with the relation of individual leaders and the soldiers they led, and again with interaction within the army’s leadership, than with presenting a granular picture of the workings of the army’s command structure in practice. A third option is to see the position of at least ὑποστράτηγος as temporary rather than permanent; on this view, the silence about the position apart from its two appearances could be explained by assuming that it existed only at exceptional times. Finally, we have proposed that the presence of both terms resulted from interpolator(s) displaying the sort of concern for military minutiae typical of the imperial or Byzantine eras. The arguments about the two positions are in many ways distinct, but it would still be fair to claim that the stronger the case against one of the positions, the more likely are the chances that the other position too is interpolated. Even if the specific arguments for
interpolation are dismissed, our analysis has at least highlighted some of the textual and interpretative difficulties that, for all its deceptive ease, are all too typical of the Anabasis.

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Appendix: Subordinate Posts with the ὑπο-Prefix

We exclude cases where the ὑπο-prefix does not indicate subordination to a distinct higher office, as in the two Homeric hapaxes ὑποδµώς (Od. 4.386) and ὑποδρηστῆρες (Od. 15.330), which mean ‘servant under’ and ‘labourers under’, rather than ‘under-servant’ and ‘under-labourers’.

By the same token, since there is no attested class of μείονες (a word which itself denotes inferiors), we exclude ὑποµείονες, which is first attested at X. *HG* 3.3.6, where it seems to refer to a class of people at Sparta rather than to an office; subsequently it is found only in Cassius Dio, who uses it of a military office (*LSf*, s.v.: ‘subaltern officers’).

Homer

ὑφηνίοχος is a Homeric *hapax* (Il. 6.18–19: αὐτὸν καὶ θερίπουσα Καλήσιον, ὅσ ὡς τὸ ὅππον / ἔσκεν υφηνίοχος). The word attracted attention from lexicographers and commentators, who were evidently perplexed by the coinage, given that the ἡνίοχος is itself presented in epic as subordinate to the warrior who rides on the chariot. The solutions proposed in antiquity were to see the position as either the same as the ἡνίοχος (Σ Il. 6.19 bT, citing ὑποδµώς as parallel; Hesychius u.898 υφηνίοχος- ἡνίοχος; Eustathius 2.235 van der Valk τὸν ἡνίοχον υφηνιοχον λέγει πλεοναζοῦσης καὶ ἐνταῦθα τῆς προθέσεως) or as a second ἡνίοχος (Eustathius continues: ἵσως δὲ καὶ ταύτων ἐστι τὸ υφηνίοχος τῷ δεύτερος ἡνίοχος); or else to cite the use of ἡνίοχος of Hector (Il. 8.89) as explaining why the charioteer should receive the υπο-prefix (Σ Il. 6.19 bT, cf. Σ Il. 8.89 Α:

68 Thus we exclude ὑπασπιστής (found in Herodotus and X. in the sense ‘squire’, ‘shield bearer’) since ὑπασπιστής is exclusively an epic word for ‘warrior’; and also ὑπογραφεύς (attested on a papyrus in the third century BC and then in literary authors) even though there is also a word γραφεύς, ‘secretary’, since ὑπογραφεύς seems to mean ‘one who writes under another’s orders’ rather than ‘vice-γραφεύς’.

69 The same parallel is used by Stoevesandt (2008) *ad loc.*; if right, then υφηνίοχος should be excluded from this list.
ὅτι τὸν παραιβάτην Ἐκτορα ἦνίοχον εἶπεν). After Homer, the only literary author to use the word is X., in Cyropaedia of a servant who hands over the reins of a chariot to Abradatas (6.4.4: λαβὼν δὲ παρὰ τοῦ ύφηνιόχου τὰς ἡνίας), shuts the carriage after him (6.4.10), and later receives the reins back (7.1.15: παραδοὺς τῷ ύφηνιόχῳ τὰς ἡνίας). X.’s use is presumably evidence for scholarly exegesis of the word by the fourth century BC: Abradatas and his servant hold the reins at different times, but one is superior to the other.

**Fifth Century BC**

ὑπαρχος is frequently used in historiography in Persian contexts, either for the satrap (who is subordinate to the king) or for a subordinate of the satrap (e.g. Th. 8.16); it is used by X. at An. 4.4.4 (where it is not certain whether Tizibazus is satrap or subordinate to Orontas). The same word is also found twice in extant tragedy, firstly of Menelaus, i.e. in a Spartan context (S. Aj. 1105–6: ὑπαρχος ἄλλων δεῦρ’ ἐπλευσας, οὐχ ὅλων / στρατηγός, though most editors reject these lines as an interpolation); secondly of the subordinates of Theoclymenus, ruler of Egypt (E. Hel. 1432), where the word is presumably modelled on the use of the term in Persian settings. ὑπαρχος is not strictly analogous to ὑποστράτηγος and ὑπολόχαγος in that there is no corresponding position ἄρχος (at least until the Byzantine period).

ὑπογραµµατεύς (found at Antiphon 6.35, and restored at Ar. Ra. 1084) is the term for a professional, paid under-secretary, an assistant to the elected γραµµατεύς of the council or assembly or of a board of officials. References to the position in comedy and oratory are generally derogatory, and sometimes there seems to be a deliberate blurring of γραµµατεύς and ὑπογραµµατεύς. There is no supposition that a ὑπογραµµατεύς would succeed to the position of γραµµατεύς.70

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ὑποξάκορος is used at Hdt. 6.134–5 of a temple attendant. Though in literary texts ζάκορος is attested first in Menander (and earlier as a personal name at Lys. 6.54), it is found in an early fifth-century inscription (IG 13.4).

Fourth Century BC

ὑπορχιτέκτων, attested on an Attic inscription (IG 2.1678) as well as inscriptions from Delos and Delphi.

ὑπογιμνασίαρχος, first attested at IG 4.753, from Troizen.

ὑποδιδάσκαλος is attested first in Plato (Ion 536a5): ὡσπερ ἐκ τῆς λίθου ἐκείνης ὁ χορευτὴς ὑποδιδάσκαλος ἀφθηγήται χορευτῶν τε καὶ διδασκάλων καὶ ὑποδιδασκάλων. Subsequently it is found only in lexicographers, who were probably guessing as to its function. The appearance of the word in Plato is explained by his use of the image of a magnetic chain for the spread of the power of poetry. The placement of ὑποδιδασκάλων after διδασκάλων serves a lexical enactment of this image, as the power of poetry extends from διδάσκαλος to ὑποδιδάσκαλος (the presumed function of the ὑποδιδάσκαλος would more naturally lead to its being placed between χορευτῆς and διδάσκαλος).

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For positions attested after the fourth century BC, we simply present a chronological list without further references (which can be gathered from LSJ, including the 1996 supplement, and the Hewlett-Packard database of Greek inscriptions), but using ‘I’ for those words attested in inscriptions, ‘P’ for those attested in documentary papyri:

71 Hesychius u.609: χοροδιδάσκαλος; Photius u.193 Theodoridis: ὁ τῷ χορῷ καταλέγων· διδάσκαλος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής, ὡς Άριστοφάνης (Ach. 628). For speculation as to the position’s function, see Wilson (2000) 83–4: 34 n. 144.
Third Century BC: ύπεπιστάτης (I, P); ύποδιάκονος (Posidippus, Philo, common in Christian authors); ύποδιοικητής (P); ύποτριήραρχος (P); ύφιέρεια (I).

Second Century BC: ύπαρχιφυλακίτης (P); ύποοπλομάχος (I); ύποπρύτανες (I).

First Century BC: ύπονακόρος (I); ύποπαιδοτρίβης (I); ύποστρατοφύλαξ (Strabo); ύποχρήστης (I).

First Century AD: ύπογεωργός (P); ύποκορυφαῖος (I); ύποχειριστής (P); ύφιερεια (I).

Second Century AD: ύποβιβλιοφύλαξ (P); ύποκήρυξ (I, restored); ύποκειμετρίς (P); ύποκοσμήτης (I; not in LSJ); ύποσυναστής (I); ύποτροφός (I).

Third Century AD: ύπαγωνοθετέω (I); ύποτμητής (= Latin subcensor; Cassius Dio).

‘Roman era’: ύπαγορανόμος (I); ύπεστιοχύς (I); ύποδημοφυλάς (I); ύποκαλαθηφόρος (I); ύποφυλάξ (I).
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RESPONSE AND FURTHER THOUGHTS*

John Dillery

1. Introduction

Xenophon and leadership. It seems a natural pairing, but why? A quick glance at the Internet shows that Xenophon is a popular author for students of leadership, both in the business world and in the military.¹ Dr. Johnson well observed that Xenophon showed an interest in the ‘delineation’ of the commanders at the end of Book 2 of the Anabasis that was literally without precedent.² Within the ranks of professional Classicists, leadership has long been recognised as an important Xenophontine topic,³ perhaps most articulately and influentially in the recent publication by the distinguished scholar of Xenophon, Vivienne Gray, Xenophon’s Mirror of Princes: Reading the Reflections (2011).

¹ I would like to thank Richard Fernando Buxton and John Marincola for their invitation to respond to this excellent collection of papers, both at the 2014 American Philological Association meeting in Chicago and here in their final form. Let me also apologise here for my frequent references to my own work; these are tiresome, but I hope that they will be taken mostly as suggestions for further discussion and not as proofs that I am invariably correct in my interpretations of Xenophon and other matters.

² Thus, e.g., Holiday (2012) and Sears (2007). Note the first sentence of Holiday’s piece from Forbes, alluding to Xenophon’s Cyropaedia: ‘Forget 1-800-CEO Read. The greatest book on business and leadership was written in the 4th Century BC by a Greek about a Persian king. Yeah, that’s right.’

I would like to start by asking why it is so easy to think of leadership in connection with Xenophon? If ‘the ideal leader’—to use the brief of the panel that this collection grew out of as it was originally posted—‘is one who wins the willing obedience of his followers through displaying a selfless devotion to cultivating their material and ethical prosperity’, what is it about Xenophon’s writing that makes this way of thinking about human interaction such a fertile issue? Can’t we do this kind of analysis also with Herodotus, or Thucydides, or even Homer? Well, obviously, we can and we do, but I would like to begin by supplying part of an answer to the question why Xenophon and leadership seem such a natural pairing, and then move on to the papers proper. I will conclude with a few thoughts of my own.

I believe that we are drawn to the issue of Xenophon and leadership because Xenophon is so explicit himself about his interest in the topic. Consider the following passage, well known, but a useful starting point nonetheless. At the beginning of his longest work, the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon writes as follows (1.1.3):

> When we thought about these things [namely how herd animals are much more cooperative than humans], we were forming the following thoughts about them: that it is easier for a human as he is constituted by nature to rule over all other living things than humans. But when we called to mind that Cyrus was a Persian who gained possession of an enormous number of men obedient to him, an enormous number of cities and an enormous number of nations, from this fact we were compelled to change our view: that ruling over men was not an impossible nor even a difficult task, so long as a person was doing this [that is, ruling] knowledgably.

Leadership is ruling over willing subjects and is an object of knowledge—an *epistēmē*. It can be learned. Evidently, to take Xenophon at his word, the realisation that *to archein* was actually a fairly graspable skill came to him when he was forced from an earlier position—that humans were in fact
ungovernable—by the example of Cyrus the Great (and think here too of that remarkable and similar passage from the *Oeconomicus*, where the Persian king is the model householder (4.4–15), to which I will return below). Indeed, in addition to the explicitness of his lessons in leadership, Xenophon can also offer a personal component to account for his acquisition of the lessons. His is real knowledge, tested and reformulated by a thoughtful man—or this is the impression: that he has thought long and hard about leadership and has in fact even changed his mind. Thus, similarly, the *Anabasis* can be read precisely as Xenophon’s education in leadership.

So Xenophon is explicit about learning to lead and he invites us to view his own discovery of its laws. He preaches, but seemingly from experience and reflection, not in the abstract. Both of these features of Xenophon’s treatment seem positively to invite our participation with him in considering the nature of leadership. And yet, not infrequently, we seem to want to make our analyses of Xenophon and leadership about something else. Why? Are we troubled by his explicitness—are his interests too obvious? Or is it shallow of us to be satisfied with Xenophon and leadership?  

2. The Papers

Luuk Huitink and Tim Rood focus on subordinate officers in the *Anabasis*. I think that by and large they succeed in establishing their main points: (1) Modern scholars tend to overestimate the ‘granularity’ of Xenophon’s description of the lower or ‘junior’ officers of the Ten Thousand; that it is

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*I am encouraged by the conclusions of Waterfield (2011) 150, who suggests that in the *Anabasis* Xenophon writes about leaders ‘in such a way that his readers are expected to learn the theory’, whereas when he imagines the ‘Ten Thousand as a polis, it is a way for him ‘to explain or understand the destructive power of greed on poleis’. That is, leadership is explicitly theorised, whereas the political aspects of the *Anabasis* are inherent in Xenophon’s view of the actions of the Ten Thousand and its leadership.*
not so much the ‘command structure’ that he is interested
in showing us, rather, it is ‘the relation of individual leaders
and the soldiers they led’. This overestimation takes the
form of seeing consistency in Xenophon’s use of terms for
lower-rank commanders, when in fact he seems to be fairly
loose in deploying terms such as taxiarch. (2) Two terms in
particular look troubling: ὑποστράτηγος and ὑπολόχαγος.
They are both used only once by Xenophon in the Anabasis
indeed the second is a hapax for all Greek literature), and
Huitink and Rood make a compelling case (slightly stronger
for ὑποστράτηγος) for viewing the terms as interpolations.

Two larger points came into my mind connected to their
main findings. I suspect they may well be right about the
focus of Xenophon’s attention in the Anabasis. While we do
see several instances where the activities or words of
subordinate officers (often Xenophon’s) are privileged in the
narrative, we do not see a consistent presentation of the
command structure between the lead commander and the
rank and file. This is an important finding and will no doubt
need to be taken account of by those who are eager to see in
Xenophon early evidence for the growing professionalisation
and sophistication of Greek theorising about the
command of armies, especially in combined arms, in the
fourth century.

But I think there is also another issue that needs to be
stressed. That the intermediary levels of command should
receive any attention at all in the Anabasis is worth thinking
about a little more. More typical in Xenophon, to say
nothing of Herodotus and Thucydides, is for military action
to be told very much either from a ‘top-down’, commander-
centred perspective, or from a collective one. Even for
actions that make most sense as ones that would have been
conveyed down a chain of command, perhaps an extensive
one, it is the commander who performs them. Thus, at the
second battle of Mantinea, it is Epaminondas who is the

I have dealt with this mode of narrative discourse in a couple of
places: Dillery (1995) 75 and 266 n. 70; Dillery (2001) 14, citing Connor
one who issues the command for his troops to whiten their helmets and paint their shields (HG 7.5.20); it is he who is credited with deploying the troops (21); he the one who leads them into battle; he who grounds the soldiers’ arms (22); and crucially, it is Epaminondas who brings the lochoi up one after another into a dense formation. No mention here at all of any subordinates receiving Epaminondas’ orders and then implementing them in action with their troops, which is surely what must have happened.

Or, alternatively, unit types identified by ethnics, and sometimes just the ethnics themselves, move about the battlefield or march with no commanders specified as ordering them to do so, and no sub-commanders either. Thus at the end of the same battle narrative, context tells us that cavalry and hoplites are moving about on both sides (HG 7.5.25), and in one area (the left wing), ‘most were killed by the Athenians’. But no one, either supreme commander or sub-commander, is telling the soldiers to do these things. Now some may object that inasmuch as Epaminondas was innovative precisely in his deployment of troops at Leuctra and Mantinea, Xenophon wishes to portray him as an especially ‘hands-on’ commander; there is no doubt that Xenophon singles him out for special treatment before his account of Mantinea. But in fact Agesilaus comes in for similar treatment at Coronea. For the most part ethnics are used both in the lead-up to that battle and the combat itself (HG 4.3.15–21). In a few, important moments, however, we see Agesilaus and one subordinate officer at Coronea performing specific actions: Herippidas, commander of the xenikos lochos, leads a charge from the phalanx of Agesilaus

6 Note esp. HG 7.5.19: Epaminondas is made a member of a whole class of ‘ambitious men’ (philotimoi andres), whose training of his army is carefully observed (a favourite Xenophontine topic of course, most clearly at HG 3.4.16–19 = Ages. 1.25–8); Epaminondas’ dispositions of his army before battle are ‘worth paying attention to’ (HG 7.5.21: ἄξιον αὖ κατανοῆσαι—axion being a key term for Xenophon, most memorably at HG 5.1.4; Breitenbach 1950: 20–3). The characterisation of Xenophon’s praise of Epaminondas for Mantinea as grudging at Cawkwell (1979) 33–6 I think mischaracterises the notice the general receives at HG 7.5, or at least grossly misrepresents it.
(17), and in the same section, the Argives fail to withstand the assault of ‘Agesilaus and his men’ (τοὺς περὶ Ἀγησίλαον) and flee towards Mt. Helicon. Then, perhaps most memorably, Xenophon takes note of a courageous but also rash assault that Agesilaus himself undertook, apparently, on the basis of what Xenophon says, all by himself (19 = Ages. 2.12: ‘he fought face-to-face with the ‘Thebans’ (ἀντιµέτωπος συνέρραξε τοῖς Θηβαίοις)), the vividness and rarity of the vocabulary occluding the participation of the troops under his direct command (cf. Ἀρ. Ἀκανθ. 4.3.15), who were presumably also there. The charges of Herippidas and of Agesilaus—the latter crucially as a unit commander and not overall general—remind me of the stubborn refusal of Amompharetus before Plataea to move from his position (Hdt. 9.53ff.): independent action by a subordinate officer that has a profound consequence on the outcome of the battle, sometimes good (as at Plataea), but not infrequently bad.

All this is to say that Xenophon’s focus on subordinate officers in the Anabasis is remarkable, whether understood as showing an interest in chain-of-command or simply because that link was the one that best showed the mutual bond of leader and led. Commander-centred narrative and identification of troops and their actions by collective terms such as ‘Athenians’ or ‘the cavalry’ work best when your focus is on explaining strategically and tactically what happens in combat and on campaign. However, something else is required when you wish to talk about cultivating loyalty: for that, at least in the Anabasis and occasionally elsewhere in Xenophon, a focus on the actions of the intermediate commander, or on the overall commander when functioning as a unit commander, is what is needed. Perhaps this should not come as a surprise given that the

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8 The adjective ἀντιµέτωπος is especially noteworthy and very rare; also found at Eq. Mag. 3.11 and (much later) Cassius Dio: see Gautier (1911) 169 sv.
Anabasis is in fact told by an intermediate, unit commander who specifically turned down the overall command.

The second point I would like to bring up in connection with the detailed study of Huitink and Rood is the problem of technical vocabulary in Xenophon. I have said that on balance I think they are right to worry about ὑποστράτηγος and ὑπολόχαγος. But the fact of those terms being hāpax legomena does not bother so much as the conclusion one is encouraged to form on the basis of their acute contextual analysis of both cases, in particular the rhetoric of the passages in question, which seems disturbed by leaving the words in. Indeed, I think we ought to remember the implication one can draw from the judgment of Herbert Richards, who was keen to rein in excessive doubt regarding rare, indeed once-occurring terms in the minor works of Xenophon: there are often times when this author wishes to use either rare technical or poetic words, even only once, and as such ‘[a]ll these words, therefore, though not used by X[enophon] elsewhere, tell really rather for than against X[enophon’s] authorship’.\(^9\)

Xenophon likes technical terms that he employs very rarely or even one time only. To think of one especially well known case from the Hellenica, recall that in the remarkable digression on the conspiracy of Cinadon (the whole passage being something of a one-off), we harvest from a single narrative two important descriptions of Spartan society and governance nowhere else attested in all ancient literature: ‘lower-grade Spartans’ (ὑποµείοσι, 3.3.6) and ‘the so-called “Little Assembly”’ (τὴν µικρὰν καλουµένην ἐκκλησίαν, 3.3.8).\(^10\) Relatedly, Xenophon is also in this same section the first author to use ὅµοιοι in the technical sense of Spartan ‘peers’ (3.3.5).\(^11\) As Cawkwell well observes, ‘[w]ithout this

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\(^9\) Richards (1907) 117.

\(^10\) See, e.g., Gilbert (1895) 40 and n. 1 and 50 n. 2, who points out in the second case that ἐκκλησία is not a Spartan term, and that the insertion of καλουµένη suggests that Xenophon is being approximate. Cf. Andrewes (1967) 18 n. 7. See, in general, Gautier (1911) 153–5, a section entitled ‘mots attestés chez Xénophon seulement’.

chapter the obscurity surrounding ancient Sparta would be ten times more opaque'.

The papers of Michael Flower and Frances Pownall form a logical pair and I will take them up together. I am in fundamental agreement with both, but that will surely not come as a surprise. From these essays one learns that for Xenophon good leadership and piety are very much thought of as interconnected, or, in the case of impiety, it is a sure marker of bad leadership or tyranny. For me, the critical questions are two and are interrelated: how representative is Xenophon in taking this view, and is such a view a remarkable one to hold?

Taking up the second question first, it is stressed at several points in Flower’s essay that for us the answer is essentially ‘yes’. Itemising the qualities of the effective leader identified by Gray and others towards the start of his essay, Flower notes one big absence: ‘[o]ne essential aspect, however, is missing from this list, and in our secular age, has naturally escaped the attention of many modern scholars.’ ‘In today’s world … no military handbook would begin with an appeal to prayer and sacrifice’, such as Xenophon’s *Hipparchicus* does. Modern leaders such as Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush, ‘who appeal to divine guidance’, excite our scepticism. Some, at least in the US, might well respond that in fact displays of religiosity by politicians seem positively required by a significant block of the electorate; that both Houses of Congress still employ chaplains; and that public devotion is to some extent expected of presidents (I am thinking, for instance, of the considerable national interest in the choice of denomination by Eisenhower in 1952). Flower, though, anticipates these potential objections at the end of his discussion. Yes, President Bush could assert that he was inspired ‘by God to invade Iraq in

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order to bring peace to the Middle East’, but Greek leaders according to Xenophon are never given such detailed and prescriptive instructions; ‘for most Greeks the answer [from the divine] is “advice” rather than a “directive”’. This strikes me as basically correct.

But was Xenophon unusual in seeing piety, and in particular a reliance on divination, as central to leadership? Here the answer is essentially ‘no’. Leaders who make decisions on the basis of divine communication go back to Homer, and are very much in evidence in Herodotus and Thucydides. What is perhaps unusual in Xenophon from a Greek perspective is the theorising he does in explaining the efficacy of relying on information from the gods. An omniscient and omnipotent divine that is also scrupulous about reciprocity is one worth consulting and being solicitous towards. Now Greeks had long felt that divination, especially by those in positions of authority, was a good thing; but it is Xenophon who explains clearly why that was the case, and in so doing precisely is innovative. Much of this theorising is found in connection with Cambyses in the Cyropaedia and Socrates in the Memorabilia. In the case of the latter, I might suggest a modification to Flower (and also Tamiolaki, who makes the identical point in her paper). Flower asserts that ‘Socrates is in many ways the perfect leader’. This observation comes as something of a shock I think. I don’t believe Xenophon thought of Socrates as a leader himself, though he reports on a Socrates who did have a lot to say about leadership. Remember that this is the man who, according to Plato, was proud to claim in his defence speech that he had been an obedient soldier, following the orders of those chosen to command him (ἀρχεῖον μου) and not leaving his post ‘at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium’ (Pl. Ap. 28c). To be sure, in Xenophon’s conception, Socrates is a model for his followers (e.g. Mem. 1.2.1ff.); but does that make him a leader? That I am not so sure about.

While impious leaders form an important subsection of Flower’s essay, they are the main focus of Pownall’s treatment. Her discussion fairly sparkles with wonderful observations *en passant*, especially in connection with the morality of the figures so acutely observed by Xenophon. Thus she is right to stress that Xenophon is careful to present villains who are, for all that, still ‘fully fleshed-out characters’, not cardboard cut-outs. Or, conversely, that men who are otherwise presented as ideal leaders can also be ‘not wholly virtuous’, such as Jason of Pherae. I am not sure if in the end we can style these men as morally ambiguous—and if I have read Pownall correctly, I do not in fact think she is urging this view. Hence, a portrait like that of Jason makes what Xenophon writes seem all the more remarkable. Are we to conclude that a fundamentally bad man, capable of plundering arguably the most important sacred site of the Greeks, could also be a good leader? It is a puzzle—and one to which I will return below.

If I have reservations about Pownall’s contribution it is in connection with her assertions that Xenophon appropriated the idea of the evil tyrant specifically from Athenian democratic ideology, and also that ‘[i]t is only with Xenophon that impiety becomes one of the standard *topoi* of tyranny’. As to the first matter, as Pownall herself notes, the word *tyrannis* first occurs in Archilochus, where it is used of a Lydian king, Gyges (F 19.3 West); and let’s not forget many other cases from around the Greek world, e.g., Alcaeus F 348.3 LP; or Theognis 823 and 39–40, where the word ‘tyrant’ does not occur, but the man who will correct Megara’s problems clearly is one and is finally classed with ‘monarchs’ at line 52; or Xenophanes F 3.2, in a context where Lydia is also important. And so forth. Pownall in particular believes that ‘the stereotypical fate of a tyrant is to be assassinated, all the more so to an Athenian audience’. But I, for one, am hard pressed to think of many Greek tyrants who were assassinated *sensu stricto*, though perhaps

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16 Cf. Forrest (1982) 256: ‘Archilochus may not want a tyranny for himself, but he knows what a tyranny is and he can envisage wanting it.’
we need to be careful about what we mean by ‘assassination’: targeted killing by a close associate or someone posing as one, by a fellow citizen, or perhaps by an agent of one’s enemy sent precisely for that purpose? Candaules was clearly assassinated, but was he a tyrant? Polycrates of Samos was clearly a tyrant, but was he assassinated? Myrsilus was clearly a tyrant too, but while we are famously invited by Alcaeus to celebrate his death (F 332), we don’t know how it was engineered, or even if it was violent.17 We must be on guard not to fall into the error so well observed by Thucydides of the Athenians (1.20.2, 6.54.2): making a man a tyrant when he was not one. Examples could be multiplied to suggest that assassination is not the typical end of the Greek tyrant, though some manifestly were assassinated; these cases are often found in areas on the fringe of the Greek world and involve leaders who were at least nominally kings, though they perhaps also ruled tyrannically (thus, e.g., Jason and the other dynastic murders in his family;18 Mania; Philip II). It is maybe more accurate to say that tyrants are routinely thought of as fearing assassination, thus providing us with innumerable stories both about their fateful request for a bodyguard while still ordinary citizens, as well as those moralising tales about how tyrants are in fact pitiable creatures who have to live every day in fear of their own shadow (see esp. X. Hier. 6.4, Pl. R. 579b). Indeed, sometimes the two topics are even connected, with the tyrant so fearful of his fellow citizens that he must keep a foreign bodyguard (e.g. Pl. R. 567e, X. Hier. 5.3).19

Speaking of topoi leads me to my second point. Pownall’s commendable advocacy of Xenophon’s literary originality may have led her astray in asserting that he was the pioneer of the theme that impiety is an identifying marker of the bad leader—to use her words, that ‘[i]t is only with Xenophon that impiety becomes one of the standard topoi of

17 Cf. Andrewes (1956) 93.
tyranny’. Surely the famous lines from the second stasimon of Sophocles’ *Oedipus Tyrannus* are predicated on the idea that impiety leads to tyranny: ‘*hybris* breeds the tyrant’ (S. *OT* 873ff.).\(^{20}\) In commenting on these lines, Jebb adduces A. *A. 757ff.*, the ‘impious act’ (*τὸ δυσσεβὲς ... ἕργον*) begets like ones afterwards, in anticipation of the arrival of the tyrannical Agamemnon.\(^{21}\) Even if we confine ourselves to prose antecedents, Herodotus produces multiple examples, but perhaps none more useful for me in this context than Otanes in the Constitutional Debate. He tells his fellow conspirators that they know the lengths to which the *hybris* of both Cambyses and the magus went (Hdt. 3.80.2); he asserts that the tyrannical man, glutted with *hybris*, performs ‘impious’ (*ἀτάσθαλα*) acts.\(^{22}\) Unless I have misread Herodotus here, it seems to me that Otanes is most definitely connecting impiety with the tyrant. Moreover, if Jacoby is correct in characterising the Debate as essentially a theoretical or generalised one, that would make Otanes’ remarks illustrative of views that were very likely widely held or at least acknowledged.\(^{23}\) However, I appreciate Pownall’s larger point that emerges from her discussion, and with which I have a great deal of sympathy: Xenophon seems like he is making a new point about the connection between tyranny and impiety because he is so consistently more explicit about it than other authors—with I think the exception of Plato.

Richard Fernando Buxton’s essay and that of Benjamin Keim also form a logical pair—at least in my mind. Both papers are very good at pointing out novel features of Xenophon’s understanding of leadership and how it works. Specifically, both are interested in how Xenophon redeploy elite ways of negotiating aristocratic interrelation

\(^{20}\) Cf. Kamerbeck (1967) 175: ‘*ὕβρις* means disregard for [divine laws]. Such a disregard leads to tyranny.’

\(^{21}\) Jebb (1893) 118.

\(^{22}\) ‘Impious’ is Powell’s translation of *ἀτάσθαλος*: Powell (1938) 50 s.v.

\(^{23}\) Jacoby (1913) 338.
to the larger world of the relations between the commander and his men. For Keim the key concept is honour; he claims that Xenophon asserts that all classes of people are motivated by honour, even slaves. I would argue that Xenophon does not make so sweeping a claim; rather, that the human desire for honour is in fact limited to only some people, and furthermore that the notion is still fundamentally an aristocratic one for Xenophon. Buxton’s view is broader and takes up more issues; he asserts that Xenophon very deliberately appropriated the idea of aristocratic philia and refashioned it into a major component of his theory of successful leadership.

I will begin with Buxton. The central argument of his essay, it seems to me, emerges in the section of his paper entitled ‘From Cyrus the Younger to Xenophon: Generalship as Xenia’. Buxton argues that the social reach of Xenophon’s (and Jason of Pherae’s) bonds of friendship and solidarity-building activity (i.e. taking the lead in strenuous public action and exercise) go much further than Cyrus’. To be sure, Cyrus also aims to build loyalty and willing obedience by undertaking actions that narrow the societal distance between him and his subordinates, so that they become in essence his ‘friends’, but a close look at who these people are reveals that they are themselves elites. By contrast, according to Buxton, Xenophon very visibly undertakes actions that put him on a par with the common rank-and-file; for Buxton, Cyrus is an ‘observer’ of these activities, whereas Xenophon is a ‘partner’. I think that Buxton is on to something here. It is I think true that good, which is to say, successful leaders in Xenophon often seem to be conspicuous performing the same sort of actions that even the lowest members of their armies perform. But is this xenia?

As seems frequently the case with Xenophon, matters are not as straightforward when it comes to illustrating what seem to be episodes of good leadership. Consider the all-important crossing of the Euphrates by Cyrus and his army (An. 1.4.11ff.). Cyrus informs his Greek generals of his real intention to march to Babylon against the Great King, and
they are instructed to report the plan to their soldiers; upon being told Cyrus’ real intentions, the troops refuse to go further without pay. At this point Menon sees an opportunity: he encourages his men to be the first Greek contingent to cross the river, for either they will be the first to follow the prince, or, if the Greek army decides not to follow Cyrus, they will be seen at least to have been obedient where others were not; thus Cyrus will feel gratitude towards them (χάριν εἴσεται) in the first scenario, and will be their philos in the second (An. 1.4.15). When the soldiers cross, Cyrus is pleased, and he sends gifts to Menon, and then crosses the Euphrates himself in spectacular, indeed miraculous fashion (as with Alexander and the Pamphylian Sea, the waters of the Euphrates seem to retire before Cyrus), with his entire army then following his example.

There is a lot to unpack here. In some details Buxton’s analysis is confirmed: Cyrus is indeed an observer, and most crucially he delegates, he does not lead directly himself—at least initially. He tells the Greek generals to relay his plans to their men; and he rewards Menon with gifts for engineering the crossing of the Euphrates, thereby acknowledging and reinforcing the bond of obligation he has with his unit commander who has managed to bring off this crucial stage of the inland march against Artaxerxes. Cyrus is generous, but typically he is generous only with his subordinate officers, not the ordinary mercenary soldier. But there are also complications to Buxton’s view. Menon describes for his men a reciprocal relationship that they will have directly with Cyrus of charis or philia. Real authority seems to rest with Menon’s men who clearly have to be persuaded to take the action Menon has in mind. If anyone is actually showing initiative in this passage, it seems to be

24 I am duty bound to report that the text in the second case is problematic: the MSS read φίλοι, emended by Bisschop to φίλου, which is followed by Gemoll and Hude and Peters.


Menon’s unit who perform the exemplary action, and then Cyrus himself. Indeed, it is Cyrus who shows the sort of personal initiative and participation that Buxton seems to want to deny him; while he is an observer in the passage, he is also a partner—he fords the Euphrates, and the army follows. And quite apart from these questions, there looms the even larger issue of Menon as leader. It is abundantly clear from elsewhere in the Anabasis that Xenophon thought Menon to be a bad man, a point he makes particularly obvious in his obituary of him (indeed, see Buxton’s n. 57). We learn there, in relation to matters concerning friendship and being a leader, that Menon ‘wished to be a philos to the very powerful in order that doing wrong he not be paying the penalty’ (An. 2.6.21); that he ‘contrived the making of his soldiers obedient by participating with them in acting unjustly’ (27). While it is clear that self-interest motivates Menon in the crossing of the Euphrates (and he alone is rewarded by Cyrus), and further that he persuades his men to be self-interested as well (1.4.15: as obedient men Cyrus will make them sentries (easy service) and will even make some unit commanders—lochagoi), there is nothing in the actual crossing to suggest that Menon and his contingent have acted wrongly—unless perhaps it is that they acted independently of the rest of the army. In Xenophon, as we have already seen, you can evidently be a bad man but a good leader. The obituary of Menon suggests that he manipulated leadership to advance his own interests: ‘eager to command in order to be taking more, eager to be honoured in order to be profiting more’ (ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ ἄρχειν, ὅπως πλείω λαμβάνω, ἐπιθυμῶν δὲ τιμᾶσθαι, ὕπα πλείω κερδαίνοι, 2.6.21). This strikes me as a perversion of successful leadership.

27 Cf. Lane Fox (2004a) 198–9, who discusses Menon’s sexual deviance as observed by Xenophon.


30 The rhetorical structuring of these clauses should be noted: not just the anaphora of ἐπιθυμῶν and πλείω, but also parison (seven
Another intriguing line of inquiry that Buxton follows has to do with the problems that attend command of mercenary armies made up of different Greek ethnicities. He argues quite forcefully that the innovative structures of command that Xenophon seems to promote across his corpus and especially in the *Anabasis* form a response to the challenges faced by a leader of armies that are made up of mercenaries drawn from different Greek states and regions, rather than comprised of citizen armies. The development of personal bonds of *philia* and *charis* between the unit commander and his men is an appealing suggestion for this world, where other ways of achieving unity of purpose and respect for chains of command may not have been available. While Buxton nowhere states this explicitly, he implies that commanders of ‘traditional’ Greek armies relied on regional and ethnic loyalty to keep their forces together, as well as social status. This must be true—one does not have to look very hard to find evidence that shared identity keeps units together in the Classical Greek world, and that commanders were often higher status persons. Yet, I am not so sure that the problems faced by multi-ethnic mercenary armies were particularly new in the period of Xenophon, hence necessitating the innovative response imagined by Buxton.

Consider the grumbling against Dionysius of Phocaea, which Buxton briefly mentions, that took place in the Ionian fleet before the battle of Lade as reported by Herodotus (6.12.3):

> Having offended which one of the gods do we endure these evils? We who in our madness took leave of our senses continue to entrust ourselves to a Phocaean braggart (ἀνδρὶ Φωκαιέι ἀλαζόνι) who provides three ships!

syllables in each, with the exception of eight in ἐπιθυµῶν δὲ τιµᾶσθαι, as well as homoioteleuton and homoioptoton. Cf. Bigalke (1933) 2.
Whatever else is going on in this passage (and there is a lot: proof of Ionian softness and insufficient appreciation of what freedom means), that an ethnic slur is being directed toward Dionysius by the sailors of the Ionian fleet who are not Phocaean seems to me to be unmistakable. Even if the story is a later fabrication, intended to explain the later Samian defection to the Persians, the imagined scenario relies on the basic assumption that there would have been grumbling at an upstart outsider who provided many fewer ships than others.\footnote{Murray (1988) 488; cf. Burn (1962) 212–13.} And other potential fissures in Greek armies may also have been felt, if not along ethnic lines, then, dare I say, more along those of social standing or class. Not only Thersites, whom Buxton does acknowledge, but also, e.g., Archilochus F 114 West and Tyrtaeus F 12.1–9 West: men who possess the outward trappings of physical and hence social excellence are nonetheless counted as worthless next to the man who possesses stalwart courage, though he is not so endowed with aristocratic virtues.\footnote{Cf. van Wees (2004) 80 on Archilochus F 114: '[a] poem by Archilochus also came down on the side of the ordinary soldier in preferring a commander with the plain looks of a commoner to one with the well-groomed appearance of an aristocrat.' Also e.g. Dover (1963) 196; Forrest (1982) 255–6.} And in general it is arresting, if also disturbing, that Kendrick Pritchett can look at the Anabasis and arrive at the following conclusion: ‘[l]imiting our research to the Anabasis of Xenophon, we gain the impression that discipline was very lax even in a mercenary army’ (my emphasis).\footnote{Pritchett (1974) 244.} Pritchett seems to assume that mercenary armies would have been more disciplined than the citizen-based army, and thus presumably whatever aspects of command that fostered discipline in mercenary armies were normally even more effective than those in citizen armies—not less so and thus in need of augmentation.

Keim’s essay argues a similar case. The core of his paper treats the transactional or reciprocal nature of leadership in the specific form of honour and honouring. In a sense, for
Keim, honour is the coin of successful leadership; it is the currency whereby the bonds of willing obedience and enlightened leadership are forged. In arguably the most important section of the paper, Keim analyses the ‘Psychology of Honour’ in Xenophon. He latches on to a most important passage in the *Hiero* (7.3), in which Simonides observes that out of all the classes of animals (zōa), humans are distinguished by their desire for honour (timē); he goes on to state that *philotimia* is neither found in irrational beasts nor in all humans; in whomever there is rooted a love of honour and praise, these are not only the most different from beasts, ‘they are considered men and no longer only humans’. In other words, not even all humans possess a craving for honour; only some do. Keim acknowledges that this is the claim in the *Hiero*, and yet he goes on to argue that ‘evidence from elsewhere throughout [Xenophon’s] corpus indicates that all humans may fall under honour’s sway’; notably women even, as well as some slaves. I think it is difficult to follow Keim in his analysis on this point. Rather than contradicting himself, which is what Keim must ultimately argue, I believe that what we must understand as Xenophon’s claim is (1) that humans do uniquely possess the desire for honour, but (2) that not all humans have this desire, and (3) that this desire can be felt by all classes of humans: men, women, slaves, etc. In her commentary on the *Hiero* passage, Gray compares *Oec.* 13.6–12: ‘... creatures have none [that is, *philotimia*], nor all human beings either, but ... it does occur among some slaves.’ This is I think correct. Just because *some* women and *some* slaves possess the desire for honour, that does not make it a universal human quality, especially when it is remembered that Xenophon has stated the opposite to be the case. Thus at *Oec.* 14.8–9 some of Ischomachus’ slaves show a propensity towards *pleonexia*, whereas others are honest and are treated like ‘free men’, even ‘gentlemen’ (*kaloi te kagathoi*) by Ischomachus (more on this passage below)! *Philotimia* is obviously an elastic term in Greek and

31 Gray (2007) 133 ad loc.
Xenophon is no exception.\textsuperscript{35} In many passages, it seems as though it is a thoroughly positive concept for him; but at other points, it is at least neutral, if not negative. Thus, as will be seen below, when I turn to a consideration of Tamiolaki’s paper, Critias and Alcibiades could be characterised as ‘most ambitious in nature’ (\textit{φύσει φιλοτιµοτάτω}, \textit{Mem.} 1.2.14); Tamiolaki’s discussion is very nuanced, but, at a minimum, this passage shows that \textit{philotimia} is not invariably a quality associated with positive human achievement in Xenophon’s eyes. \textit{Philotimia} can even be ‘foolish’, and citizens engage in activities clearly related to it that are ruinous to their private fortunes (\textit{Oec.} 1.22 and 2.5–8 respectively).\textsuperscript{36}

I do, however, believe that Keim makes a strong case for seeing honour as a, if not the, major incentive for generating willing obedience and hence successful leadership. Keim is at his most persuasive when he is able to break down in detail how best the leader should use honour in the management of his army. In ‘Honouring Successfully’, he itemises five ‘lessons’ that Xenophon offers that the good leader should follow. In ‘What to Do with Honours’, Keim isolates three ‘broad categories’ related to the distribution of honours: rewards for ‘completing specific tasks, acquiring necessary skills, and honing appropriate dispositions’. These are wonderful analyses, for they show \textit{in detail} how successful leadership worked in Xenophon’s eyes. If I have criticisms in connection with these two sections, they stem precisely from some of the details. Thus, it is sometimes difficult for me always to see the connection between the five ‘lessons’ and honour specifically; and in relation to the ‘broad categories’, there seems to me to be a problem with the term ‘skills’—‘abilities’ I think is closer to what Xenophon had in mind—‘skills’ seeming to me to be too narrow. Also, on my reading, there seems to be significant overlap between developing ‘appropriate

\textsuperscript{35} \text{Dillery (2015) 284 n. 249 for bibliography.}

\textsuperscript{36} I am indebted to Sarah Herbert for my awareness of these passages.
dispositions’ and acquiring the necessary skills. Keim’s precision in advancing his views, however, is noteworthy.

Melina Tamiolaki’s essay, ‘Athenian Leaders in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*’, is productively specific and treats material that is not always found in discussions of Xenophon and leadership. On both counts she is to be congratulated. While she takes up matters that are handled elsewhere in this volume, she manages to discuss the issue of Xenophon and leadership in ways that yield important results, in fact ones that will provide me with a way to wrap things up in my conclusion.

As I indicated above in my treatment of Flower’s paper, I do not think that Xenophon saw Socrates as a leader. Thus I have difficulty accepting Tamiolaki’s claim early on in her discussion, where she observes that ‘Socrates himself is portrayed as a sort of ideal leader: he does not actively engage in politics, but he constantly gives advice to his fellow-citizens, politicians or not, about several political issues’. As I argued above, I think there is a big difference between giving advice and having things to say about leadership, and being a leader oneself. I do not think that Xenophon elides the distinction. Indeed, if we were to press the issue in relation to, say, the *Hiero* for example, we would have to argue that Simonides and Hiero were both tyrants or quasi-tyrants, since they both hold forth on the question of tyranny, but this is obviously not true. With Keim, Tamiolaki, too, takes note of Xenophon’s characterisations of *philotimia*, and cites the same passages he does that demonstrate his belief that desiring honour is a uniquely human quality.

The core of Tamiolaki’s project, however, is devoted to two pairs of leaders treated by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia*: Critias and Alcibiades, and Pericles and Themistocles. Somewhat provocatively she asks us to see the first pair as not so negatively drawn by Xenophon as is commonly thought, and the second as more critical than one might have expected. As regards the first pair, Tamiolaki argues that Xenophon approached the leaders with two different
purposes in mind: a moral analysis that is subtly positive and attributes their respective falls to their prideful natures, and a political one that admits that Critias was a ‘lawful tyrant’ (!), while the even-more positively presented Alcibiades becomes a mouthpiece for Xenophon’s own views. There is much to admire in her discussion of Xenophon’s view of Critias and Alcibiades, but there are points when I sense her argumentation becomes a little tendentious. For example, in discussing the analogy of an Alcibiades who neglects himself being like an athlete who gains an easy victory and then neglects his training (Mem. 1.2.24), she argues ‘that Alcibiades ceased to be excellent (and therefore risked losing his superiority over others), not necessarily that he became bad’. Tamiolaki astutely notes that precisely the same point is made by Socrates in connection with the Athenians at Mem. 3.5.13.

While there is an internal logic to what she says, and furthermore Socrates, after being prompted by the Younger Pericles, does offer ways that the Athenians could reclaim their earlier excellence, even fairly quickly (3.5.14, 18), we need to bear two points in mind. First, there is the historical and dramatic contexts to consider of the two passages in question: the dramatic date of Mem. 3.5 is some time after the battle of Delion in 424 (cf. Mem. 3.5.4) and before Pericles the Younger’s death in 406 (post Arginusae); the date of the actual composition of the chapter is put late in Xenophon’s career, almost certainly after Leuctra in 371, probably in the decade 360–50. Socrates envisions real solutions to Athens’ decline in military standing. But when

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37 The circumstances that so trouble Pericles, namely the rise of Boeotian, and specifically Theban power, are truer of a Greek world that is post-Leuctra than the last quarter of the fifth century: Delatte (1933) 57–8, 73; Doriom (2011) 292 n. 3 and 294–5 n. 7.

38 Cf. Dillery (2002) 469–70 and n. 44. Indeed, at one point (Mem. 3.5.18) Socrates even observes ‘no no, Pericles, don’t think the wickedness of the Athenians so utterly past remedy. Don’t you see what good discipline they maintain in their fleets, how well they obey the umpires in athletic contests, how they take orders from the chorus trainers as readily as any?’ To this Pericles responds (19): ‘Ah yes, and it’s strange that such groups submit themselves to their masters, and yet
we turn to the passage regarding Alcibiades from Mem. 1.2, Xenophon offers us no possibility of a corresponding recuperation of Alcibiades' character and abilities. Indeed, since Xenophon's larger point there is that Socrates was not responsible for the awful things that both Critias and Alcibiades did in their careers, it is hard to see how any subsequent rehabilitation of Alcibiades would have been possible in Xenophon's line of thinking. What was done was done, and Alcibiades was probably long dead when Xenophon wrote up Mem. 1.2. Athens at the mid-point of the Fourth Century was a very different matter: Xenophon held out hope that the city, perhaps linked in some way with Sparta, might regain its political ascendance. Thus Mem. 1.2 and 3.5, while both featuring the image of the successful but complacent athlete, are in the end not really comparable. The second point to keep in mind is the larger issue of Xenophon's views on the potential for good not realised. While complete consistency on the matter is probably not to be found in Xenophon, he does tend to view entities (states, armies, choruses, households) that have the potential for good which has not been realised (due typically to disorder) not as situations that can be made right, but as ones that are to be regretted. Thus, as Socrates says in the Memorabilia to one of his interlocutors (2.6.17):

> It confuses you [literally: disorders your thinking—ταράττει] that you often see men who both do good and keep away from shameful things, instead of being

the infantry and cavalry, who are supposed to be the pick of the citizens for good character (καλοκἀγαθώσας), are the most insubordinate' (translation from the Marchant and Henderson Loeb). Cf. Wankel (1961) 107–8. I am reminded of the point I was making above in connection with Archilochus and Tyrtaeus: the lower status combatants turn out to be better than the higher status ones.

friends, fight with one another and treat each other more cruelly than men of no worth.\textsuperscript{41}

For Tamiolaki, Critias and the Thirty are lawful essentially because Xenophon presents them as a board lawfully empowered as nomothetai. With all due respect for her wonderfully close readings, this point seems a little like special pleading. All our main sources for the history of the Thirty (D.S. 14.3–7; Just. 5.8.8; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 35.1; X. \textit{HG} 2.3.11) make clear that they were lawfully appointed. What is interesting is that Xenophon alone does not make the ‘reestablishment’ of the patrios politeia one of the conditions of the Peace imposed by Sparta, which led naturally to the appointment of a board to review the laws.\textsuperscript{42} Instead of being imposed on the Athenians by the Spartans, in Xenophon the Thirty are chosen by the Athenian people to write down their ‘ancestral laws’ (\textit{HG} 2.3.2 and 11), arguably making their later violent regime an internally motivated action for which the Athenians are themselves to some extent ultimately responsible.\textsuperscript{43} But the larger point to register is that all our ancient sources are uniform in characterising the Thirty as an initially legal board of nomothetai that devolved into a band of bloodthirsty murderers. Xenophon was no exception. To minimise the tyrannical status of Critias and the Thirty risks obscuring the larger message Xenophon is trying to lodge with his portrait of them, especially in the \textit{Hellenica}.\textsuperscript{44}

In my view, Tamiolaki is more successful with her treatment of Pericles and Themistocles. As with Buxton, she sees the development of philia as the hallmark of successful leadership. Contrasting it with ‘Periclean eros’, she claims that both Themistocles and Pericles are most successful when they are shown encouraging political philia in their

\textsuperscript{41} Dillery (1995) 249.

\textsuperscript{42} This is all admirably laid out in Rhodes’ table at Rhodes (1981) 416–17.

\textsuperscript{43} Dillery (1995) 147.

\textsuperscript{44} Cf. Dillery (1995) 158.
fellow citizens towards themselves, when ‘the leader (and not the polis) becomes the object of love’. There is great merit to this observation, and I will return to it in my own conclusion. Here, though, I would like to examine Tamiolaki’s further assertion that this fostering of philia in one’s followers is a specifically Persian concept in Xenophon’s way of thinking. While it is certainly true that two Persians happen to display particularly clearly the quality of fostering devotion in their followers (Cyrus the Great and Cyrus the Younger), I believe that Tamiolaki errs in thinking that this makes the ability specifically Persian in Xenophon’s eyes. Tamiolaki writes:

Xenophon’s most compelling paradigms of leaders who acquired political philia are the two Persian Kings, Cyrus the Great and Cyrus the Younger, who are described as the most beloved leaders (Cyr. 1.1.3, 1.6.24, 5.1.24; An. 1.9.28).

I should first point out that, while he certainly craved the title, Cyrus the Younger was never king of Persia. However, even Xenophon himself could connect the Cyruses (famously at An. 1.9.1), and occasionally even appears capable of conflating them (notoriously at Oec. 4.18),45 thus making the younger Cyrus into a quasi-king—indeed at An. 1.9.1 he is even called ‘the most kingly after Cyrus the Great’ (μετὰ Κῦρον τὸν ἀρχαῖον ... βασιλικότατος). Secondly, and more importantly, it is not clear to me why these paradigms and not others are the ‘most compelling paradigms of leaders who acquired political philia’, though compelling they surely are. To cite a very conspicuous counterexample, consider the much-discussed scene at the start of Book 5 of the Hellenica, Teleutias’ departure from his men (5.1.3−4):

[Hierax] took over the navy, and Teleutias sailed homeward in a most blessed fashion (μακαριώτατα δή). For when he was going down to the sea setting out for

45 Cf. Pelletier (1944); Pomeroy (1994) 248–50 ad loc. with bibliography.
home, there was no one of his soldiers who did not take him by the right hand; one crowned him, another put a fillet on him, and those who came late nevertheless threw their crowns into the water as he was pulling out, heaping abundant prayers on him. Now I know that in these matters I treat no memorable (ἀξιόλογον) expense or danger or stratagem. But by god the following thing does seem to me worthwhile for a man to take to heart (ἐννοεῖν): by doing what on earth (τί ποτε ποιῶν) did Teleutias so dispose his men? For this achievement of a man is surely worth much more attention (τοῦτο γὰρ ἤδη … ἀξιολογώτατον ἄνδρος ἔργον) than a lot of things—money or dangers.

If we are to take Xenophon at his word and respect the rhetorical staging of this passage, one would have to say that Teleutias was one of the most compelling examples of a commander who inspired devotion in his men. Indeed, given that the passage is conceived of, and written in, a Herodotean and Thucydidean register while simultaneously challenging the primacy of their criteria for historiographic importance, it could be (and indeed has been) reasonably argued that Xenophon offered no more ‘higher profile’ example of leadership than Teleutias.47

46 At a detailed level, there are linguistic signals indicating both Thucydidean and Herodotean imitation, as well as locutions that are idiomatically Xenophontine. Thus, in the case of μακαριώτατα δή, Denniston observes that δή ‘[w]ith superlative adjectives and adverbs … is a favourite use of Thucydides’, while noting other authors as well, including our passage (Denniston (1954) 207). On ἤδη + ἀξιολογώτατον, compare Hdt. 2.148.1, τὸν [sc. λαβύρινθον] ἐγὼ ἤδη εἶδον λόγου μέζω, a similarly programmatic and polemical passage, and consult Kühner and Gerth (1966) 2.2.122, connecting HG 5.1.4 and Hdt. 2.148. Of course ἔργον as a historical object is both Herodotean and Thucydidean. On the other hand, Breitenbach (1950) 20 notes that τί ποτε ποιῶν is a ‘Xenophontine question-form’; indeed, see, e.g., Mem. 1.1.1. Also, ἐννοεῖν is a favourite term of his as well, especially in important, programmatic passages: see Dillery (forthcoming).

Tamiolaki asserts at one point that ‘Athenian democratic leaders are viewed positively only *to the extent* that they can be potentially assimilated with the Persian monarchs … or *to the extent* that they possess Socratic qualities’ (emphasis original). I am in much sympathy with this view, though I think it needs to be worded slightly differently. It is one thing to say that Persian rulers and Socrates seem invariably to embody Xenophontine virtues of leadership, but quite another to say that those virtues are necessarily identified with those individuals to the exclusion of others—that excellent leadership is at its root either uniquely Persian or Socratic. For one thing, there are morally suspect and unsuccessful Persian commanders in Xenophon. I think it is more accurate to say that Xenophon developed a set of virtues regarding leadership that are embodied to a significant, indeed remarkable degree by Socrates and men who happen to be Persian—though with the caveat that Socrates was not really a leader, and not all Persian commanders were also morally good and militarily successful (Tissaphernes in the *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* especially comes to mind as a counterexample). And having said that, I think that Tamiolaki has usefully forced a revisiting of Xenophon’s views: why is it the case that successful leaders in Xenophon seem so very ‘Persian’ and ‘Socratic’?

3. Conclusions

For Gray, at the centre of Xenophon’s ‘leadership theory’ is ‘the acquisition of “willing obedience” to secure success’ for both leaders and the led.\(^{48}\) Thus at the conclusion of *Xenophon’s Mirror of Princes* (2011) she observes (373):

> Ideally [Xenophon’s] leaders treat their followers as friends, and followers make the choice of free men to follow because of the leader’s knowledge of how to develop their talents and achieve their success as a

group, while retaining the right of choosing not to follow if their expectations are not met.

This is a very important insight and a good way into what I want to discuss here in my concluding remarks. Gray is quite right, but I think we need also to see Xenophon’s ideal as fundamentally paradoxical. For followers to be followers they really shouldn’t have a choice—no army could really function if its rank and file had the choice not to follow. Cyrus the Great’s endorsement of ‘geometric’ as opposed to ‘arithmetic’ equality (Cyr. 2.2.20; cf. Oec. 13.11) should be seen in precisely this context: while Cyrus can claim that ‘even to the worst it will seem that the good should have the larger share’ (Trans. Miller), I think F. D. Harvey was correct: ‘Democratic arithmetical proportion’, where no distinctions are made between citizens, ‘is … a concept introduced by anti-democrats’; no real Greek citizen of a democracy would have ever proposed such a thing; it was a straw man that permitted the veneer of societal equality to obscure societal difference and vertical hierarchies. In several different places Xenophon shows himself to have been a proponent of aristocratic, geometric equality, which is really no equality at all. Thus it is I think vitally important that we recognise that at a basic level Xenophon’s theorising about what makes good leaders is utopian (that’s ‘ou’-topian); if anything like what he describes in the Anabasis really happened, Xenophon must have known this was true. We ought not be too distressed though; many have noted the utopian streak in Xenophon’s thinking more generally.

To me, a productive way to proceed is to look for points of similarity throughout Xenophon’s corpus on ideal leadership and ask whether we can see a unified theory emerge and what constitutes it. Obviously, it is impossible for me to be comprehensive here. Rather, I will try to


gather some of the strings of thought in my foregoing analyses of the papers in this volume and venture a few of my own no doubt hasty and half-baked observations.

First, let me be clear: Gray I think is right in identifying the generation of willing obedience as an essential element of successful leadership in Xenophon’s mind. But I wish to return to Tamiolaki’s line of inquiry and the odd predicament that we find ourselves in when reading Xenophon’s thoughts on the matter—namely that his models for this quality seem often to be either Persian or Socratic, or in fact both. One passage that especially comes to mind is *Oec.* 4.4. In answer to Critobulus’ question about what sort of *technai* ought Athenian citizens practice, other than the banausic (which have been ruled out), we learn the following:

> We shall not be ashamed, shall we, said Socrates (ἄρα, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, µὴ αἰσχυνθῶµεν), to imitate the king of the Persians? For they say that that man, believing farming and the military *techne* to be among the best and most necessary occupations, pays especially close attention to both.

Regarding the phrase ἄρα … µή, Denniston explains that ‘[i]t does not necessarily imply the expectation of a negative reply, but merely that the suggestion made is difficult of acceptance … It expresses, in fact, an antinomy, a dilemma, an impasse of thought, or, at the least, a certain hesitancy’.51 I take it, then, that the phrasing of Socrates’ question suggests that there was in fact something odd, even counter-intuitive, about finding in the Persian king a model of the best occupations to follow, and that Socrates was pre-empting that reaction. Similarly, later in the same dialogue, Ischomachus explains to Socrates that in educating his slaves he employs the law codes of Draco and Solon, but

51 Denniston (1934) 47; see also p. 48 and n. 1. My translation is based on Goodwin (1890) 99 § 287, referred to by Denniston. The subjunctive αἰσχυνθῶµεν is explained as deliberative. But note the difficulties of Richards (1907) 3–4.
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also ‘royal laws’ (*basilikoi nomoi*)—that is, the laws of the Persian king (*Oec. 14.6–7*). Ischomachus makes use of all of these because, while Athenian law is good insofar as there are punishments for wrongdoers (*ἐκεῖνοι ... οἱ νόµοι ... εἰσὶ τοῖς ἁµαρτάνουσιν*), the king’s laws both punish wrong behaviour and also benefit the just (*ὡφελούσι τοὺς δικαίους*).

What is more, we learn that, with his slaves thus ‘incentivised’ by the positive inducement of Persian royal law, Ischomachus observes those among his slaves who are inclined to be honest and rewards them—*Oec. 14.9*: ‘now these just as freemen I treat (τούτοις ὥσπερ ἐλευθέροις ἤδη χρῶµαι), not only by making them wealthy, but even by honouring them as gentlemen (ὡς καλοὺς τὲ κἀγαθούς).*\(^{52}\)

The Socratic householder and his slaves, and the Persian king and his subjects are Xenophon’s ideal leaders.\(^{53}\) Why? In both locations—the private estate of the Athenian farmer and the Persian Empire—there is no public space. There are no institutional or true governmental structures in these imagined worlds.\(^{54}\)

Essentially, this idealised view permits Xenophon to deploy concepts that were more familiar from private relations between aristocratic Greeks into the public, non-elite sphere. The leader treats his inferiors as friends, even as fellow elites. To my eyes, Xenophon’s theorising about leadership involves a reworking of the private world of the aristocrat into the larger world of the political community. Thus honour and *philia* become central to his thinking about the ideal leader (think again of the papers of Buxton and Keim).

\(^{52}\) Wankel (1961) 57–8 and 64.

\(^{53}\) I realise here that I have therefore made Ischomachus into Xenophon’s mouthpiece, and have also somewhat flattened out the distinction between Ischomachus and Socrates. My student Sarah Herbert is currently engaged in a doctoral dissertation that shows, among other things, that this is problematic.

In some ways, Plato was attempting something similar in the *Laws*. At Lg. 693d–701e, Plato not only very deliberately seems to take on Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*, he even formulates an ideal view of leadership with the help of both Persian kings and Athenian laws: when the Persian king (either Cyrus or Darius I) treated his subjects not as chattel but as friends, and when the free Athenians bound themselves in servitude to their laws, then an equilibrium was found that enabled them to achieve great things. Thus the ideal freedom for Plato in the *Laws* can be arrived at if Persian authoritarian rule is tempered with the collegiality of friendship, or Athenian license controlled by subservience to law. But either case produces a kind of Xenophontine willing obedience, whether you start from the un-free or the free extreme.

But to return to Xenophon, this making public of the relations found in the private world of the Greek aristocrat had far-reaching consequences for him. Thus the relationship that Procles of Phlius imagines for Athens and Sparta towards the end of the *Hellenica* is, in essence, a relationship defined by the virtues of aristocratic *philoi*: Athenian support for Sparta would be ‘noble’ (*HG* 6.5.48: *gennaia*). Perhaps most radically, Xenophon’s vision in the *Poroi* involved the transformation of all of Athens’ citizenry into, essentially, aristocrats—people who did not have to work, but who would be supported by revenue generated by silver mines worked by public slaves. As van Wees has eloquently put it: ‘Xenophon’s pamphlet *Ways and Means* proposed a radical scheme to liberate the Athenians from...”

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55 When the ‘Athenian’ says at 694c6 that Cyrus the Great, though a good general, had no experience of ‘correct education’ (*μαθήσις* ... *ὀρθῆς*), many have detected a dig at Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia* (let’s not forget what the title means: the ‘education of Cyrus’), beginning with Athenaeus 11.505a. See English (1921) 1.393–4 ad loc. Also, e.g., Pomeroy (1993) 10, 26. Cf. Gray (2011) 260–1; I do not think that Plato ‘misunderstood Xenophon’s argument’, but was deliberately attacking it.


the need to work without resorting to imperialism (1.1).\footnote{van Wees (2004) 36. Cf. Finley (1983) [1959] 106.} So it should not come as a surprise that, for Xenophon, the ideal leader is one at the head of a community (or army) of willingly obedient followers. The resulting picture looks an awful lot like a Greek aristocrat leading a group of similarly minded kaloi kagathoi, but with ‘geometric equality’ quietly and tactfully observed. I am beginning to catch glimpses of the Hellenistic agora or gymnasium.

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