PAST FUTURES AND FUTURES PAST IN THE PRESENT


... ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὕθα κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὥθελμα* κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἄρκοντως ἔξει (Thuc. 1.22.4).¹

Historiography examines the Past from its surviving material evidence and as it has been recorded in word and image. Further, it inquires or obliquely implies how that Past has shaped subsequent Presents of past and present historians. This intriguing volume asks: what do ancient historians from Herodotus to Appian write about Futures? Such events remain future to the persons inside a historical narrative, but still within the epoch

¹ A difficult pair of clauses, notoriously debated. The historian mentions (paraphrased) as his desired and sufficient audience the few prudent men future to Thucydides who wish to examine what can be clear about events past to him (and of course them) and who seek in the future, to understand something useful* about past events future to Thucydides (or possibly even future to them, although A. W. Gomme forcefully denies the possibility, ‘not a sort of horoscope’, Comm. ad loc. (1956) I.149), events that will play out similarly and comparably—given the human condition (rather than ‘human nature’). Careful commentators—such as Gomme, Stahl, de Ste. Croix, and Hornblower—overlook the cautious but surprising, not quite synonymous and elastic doublet τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων. Thucydides’ closest repetitions of the remarkable ποτὲ αὕθα occur in his relevant description of a future recrudescence of the plague (2.48.3: εἴ ποτε καὶ αὕθας ἐπιπέσον), and in the dramatic exhortations shouted by boatswains to sailors in the Athenian crisis of the final sea-battle. Commanders urge them to give the effort their all, ‘now or never’ (7.70.7: νῦν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὕθας προθύμως ἀντιλαβέσθαι). The translator J. Mynott improved the lapidary R. Crawley’s ‘now if ever’. Steven Lattimore more precisely, if wordier, writes: ‘one more time, if they ever had before’.

* Trivial fact: ophelimos (Cicero’s utile, ‘useful’) is the last entry in E. A. Bétant’s Lexicon Thucydideum. Polybius (1.4.4; 3.31.12) echoes Thucydides’ language but differs in the nature of his apology for doing history. What kind of usefulness did Thucydides have in mind? Pliny Ἐπ. 5.8.11, before quoting this Thucydidean ‘climax’, urges that oratory and historiography be kept distinct. His own weird description of historical writing expects ‘geniality’—suavitate atque etiam dulcedine placet. What did his friend Tacitus think of that?
comprehended by it. In addition, one reads of events future to an entire narrative but past to the author, or events future to the author but past to his readers, and, since one must be thorough, future to the very readers of this review. For example, what can Thucydides’ or Tacitus’ forecasts (3.65.1) teach us about a Donald Trump US presidency in 2017? To what discernible degree can ‘hindsight be the thinking man’s foresight’ (Pelling’s epigram, 173)?

Nineteen essays, short (eleven pages) and long (fifty-four), divided into three sections, offer provocative answers. Certain ideas are difficult to grasp, not surprising—given the moving target of the various hypothetical Futures appearing dimly in the mist and the margins. The awkward title compounds difficulties. The cryptic, and often parenthetic, or at least condensed, ancient statements or implied beliefs available to us, such as Thucydides’ oft-quoted, pseudo-modest vaunt above, raise more questions than they answer (a problem especially evident in Darbo-Peschanski’s theories of possible ‘futures’). This situation justifies such a book. Although the Halimousian historian be worshipped still as fount of contemporary historiography, even his admirers must question, however many qualifiers are attached, the bold and bold claim ‘to ascertain what is reliably clear about future events’.

The editor’s extended introduction does more than pose a few questions and summarize the following contributions. Continuities and discontinuities between past, present, and future—or as this editor might phrase it, pasts, presents, and futures—depend on competing periodizations. I think of the recent coinage, ‘long nineteenth century’, or Classical Greece’s ‘short fourth century’. Consider the ever shifting parameters of the ever self-perpetuating present ‘modern’ age. Further, what degree or slope of change demands recognition of a rupture with a past? How long does ‘our’ modern period extend backwards (2000, 1945, 1918, 1880?) and forwards? Does modernity, ‘the longevity of the present’ (10), ever end? Did Greeks and Romans conceive of specific futures?

2 A. Powell (ed.), *Hindsight in Greek and Roman History* (Swansea, 2013) ix, observes that fulfilled expectations are privileged while unfulfilled forecasts ‘tend to be understated or lost’. ‘Inevitability’ provides an indemonstrable rhetorical weapon in advance and a comfortable, if not Panglossian, non-explanation in retrospect, for most events. A respect for contingency renders ‘what-if’ volumes like N. Ferguson’s (ed.) *Virtual History. Alternatives and Counterfactuals* (London and Oxford, 1997) provocative as well as exciting, but only suggestive, even if Thucydides’ own awareness of τὸ παράλογον permits occasional indulgence in contrary-to-fact constructions (e.g., R. Brock (Powell, supra, chapter 3) examines the Sicilian expedition in the manner of H.-P. Stahl’s thorough and persuasive exposition of this historian’s view of chance, *Thucydides. Man’s Place in History* (ET: Swansea, 2003, orig. German 1966)).

3 To translate ‘the plain truth’ as his meaning poorly serves Thucydides’ intelligence, one hopes.
To escape briefly the abstractions\(^4\) by which such questions boggle our feeble imaginations, when Herodotus spoke of big cities becoming small, and small big, and when Thucydides wrote of how future observers would misjudge Sparta’s and Athens’ actual power by their remains, relatively paltry and magnificent,\(^5\) did their projections into the future map onto Romans’ or our perceptions and parameters of the past? Thucydides in particular, followed by Polybius,\(^6\) emphasizes \(\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\,\pi\rho\alpha\sigma\delta\alpha\kappa\iota\alpha\iota\nu\), contrary to expectation, unwelcome outcomes during his war. He pessimistically predicts and expects similar miscalculations by later generations. Lianeri, thus reasonably, questions the possibility of ‘historical knowledge’ (8). Thucydides knew that ‘The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there’.\(^7\) We historians mold both the past and, \(a\,f\,o\,r\,t\,i\,o\,r\), the future by our limited and privileged (but soon to be obsolete or even dead wrong) conceptions of the present.

Jonas Grethlein has contributed several innovative ideas to ancient temporalism. The ‘plupast’ provided a useful neologism for events prior to a given historian’s period.\(^8\) Ancient authors and their characters voice views and narrate events about these earlier periods. The search for time past can support or (theoretically) destabilize the main narrative’s dynamic. Similarly, events future to the main narrative but past to the author can illuminate the reader’s understanding of how past agents’ ideas and strategies either developed as planned or went astray, viewing them in the light of later outcomes, future to them. The Triumviral period, for instance, sheds light on Sallust’s priamel study of the stumbling Catilina’s ill-fated uprising.

Grethlein’s thesis is (59) ‘the past … is essentially constituted by the future’, ‘a future past’ for the historian and ‘her readers’. Less paradoxically phrased, no historian ignores later events that gave the past events that s/he has selected their significance. In fact, that unrolling significance made them important for him or her, even if, like Thucydides, s/he strives to restore their presentness and their unknown outcomes for the participants. Grethlein calls this ‘experi-

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\(^4\) Like this: ‘It [truth] thus itself manifests an unfinalizability through which the polyphonic constitution of authorial discourse and the polyphonic potential of the event acquire a future-oriented temporality’ (14).

\(^5\) 1.10.2: \(\pi\rho\alpha\sigma\delta\alpha\kappa\iota\nu\,\pi\omicron\sigma\epsilon\lambda\theta\omicron\nu\,\pi\omicron\lambda\omicron\omicron\upsilon\nu\,\chi\rho\omicron\omicron\nu\,\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\zeta\,\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\zeta\) …

\(^6\) 1.13.11; 20.5.6; 1.1.2. Wiater (256) provides further examples.

\(^7\) The poet L. P. Hartley, alluded to, e.g., 35, but not acknowledged. See also David Lowenthal’s book of the same title (Cambridge, 1985), not mentioned.

\(^8\) See my review of Grethlein and Christopher Krebs (edd.), Time and Narrative in Ancient Historiography (Cambridge, 2012): BMCR 2012.11.43. Also see Jonathan Master’s sympathetic BMCR review (2015.02.17) of Grethlein’s Experience and Teleology in Ancient Historiography: ‘Futures Past’ from Herodotus to Augustine. Grethlein’s essay here is digested from that book (61 n. 7).
ential narrative’ as opposed to (the somewhat awkward term) ‘teleological narrative’. Polybius falls into a middle space in which wobble both his beginning (264 BCE or 220?: 1.5–6, 1.3.1) and his end (167 BCE, Pydna, or 146, Carthage?, 3.1.1–5.5)—despite his insistence that they be fixed clearly (3.1.4–5). The Achaean politician’s synoptic account of Rome’s fifty-three year march to domination refers to 220–167 (1.1.5). Regressus ad infinitum anticipates a progressus ad infinitum. Solon warns Croesus to look to the end, and thereby Herodotus warns readers to ‘look to the end’, not only Xerxes’ defeat but the ‘end of his Histories’. The ‘epilogue’ points to outcomes beyond Herodotus’ necessarily arbitrary halt, reprising an ‘Old Father Cyrus’ anecdote, while triangular conflicts still churn up an Aegean Sea in flux. Thus, historians apply retrospect to framing their chosen spatium but imply prospects for their narratives that make that past important for readers. An unexpectedly profound Sallust emerges at the end of this essay, one whose Catilinae Coniuratio presents that curious blip on Rome’s wide historical screen as charged with past significance for a roiled Roman present. Sallust suggests that this rebellion and its suppression were the culmination of elements of political decay from Tiberius Gracchus to Sulla. In his great speech, Sallust’s Caesar presents an ‘anticipated retrospect’. Caesar claims Cicero’s executing the conspirators will set a bad precedent (for the Triumviral proscriptions—unknown to him but familiar to Sallust’s readers). Grethlein’s reading makes Sallust as interesting as Syme’s, but some observations fall flat: e.g., Herodotus offers the insight that ‘history can only be written in retrospect’ (76).

Emily Greenwood examines narratologically ‘futures real and unreal’. The extra-diegetic narrator notes how Lydian kings did not ‘take any notice of this prediction until it was fulfilled’ (Hdt. 1.13.2). Another prolepsis notes with Herodotean realpolitik that the Athenians cooperate ‘only for as long as they badly needed the rest of the Greeks’ (8.3.2). Such futures are past to the narrators, while rare are ‘real’ futures—future to the narrator. Thuc. 2.54.3–4, certainly in a manner hostile to both prophecy and human memory of them, somewhat humorously fancies how the Athenians will interpret εἰκότως—in all likelihood—the old prophecy about another Dorian war, if it arrives with famine rather than plague, as λίμος/famines ‘hunger’ and not λοῖμος/pestilentia ‘sickness’—their recent catastrophic experience. For (not quoted by the author), ‘people were matching their recollection to their [present] experience/suffering’. The judgment echoes passages (1.20–2 and 6.53–4, 60) lamenting or criticizing human laziness and anxieties that shape and determine accepted and

9 οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρως τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζῆτησις τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐτοίμα μᾶλλον τρέπονται.
acceptable accounts of the past: τὰς ἀκοὰς τῶν προγεγενημένων ... ἀβασανίστως παρ’ ἀλλήλων δέχονται.¹⁰

Unreal futures are past for the historian (83), a matter not to be confused with unreal conditions or contrary-to-fact historical hypothesizing (my first thought). In our epigraph, one observes a ‘futuritive verb’ (mellô) and a future infinitive (esesthai). Greenwood contests whether Gomme was right to dismiss¹¹ the ‘horoscopic’ interpretation. That is, she believes that Thucydides wished to help readers to predict what their future holds. Even if she be right (following Roberto Nicolai),¹² when she contends that orators such as Demosthenes (Olynthiacs) made use ‘of the History as a practical resource for political decision-making’, that fact fails to prove Thucydides’ intention or belief about his research’s usefulness. What Greenwood does demonstrate to be true is the oratorical topos that political speakers wish to be thought capable of forecasting dependably (but cannot).

Themistocles’ innate intelligence distinguished him as one who could best envisage future developments (1.138.3). Greenwood points to parallels in medical texts arguing dependable methods of prognostics. Thucydides’ boldest prognosis is his vaunt that, when the war began, he expected/foresaw that ‘it would be great and indeed most noteworthy¹³ than/of previous ones’ (1.1.1:

¹⁰ This attitude also becomes important to Bassi’s discussion of ἀφανές (see below). In truth, Thucydides has a reasonably dire opinion of the accuracy of memories of past speech (and oral tradition) and events (see his criticisms of autoptic as well as hearsay bias, 1.22.1–3). Current perceptions misguided by eros and phobos et al. are much more often sunk than realized (cf. P. Huart’s valuable Le vocabulaire de l’analyse psychologique dans l’oeuvre de Thucydide (Paris, 1968)). This pessimism, a fortiori, conforms to his negative judgment of national and individual optimism concerning hopes and expectations for future outcomes. His scathing skepticism of human carelessness in recollection, observation, and prognostication finds significant confirmation of the middle term in Simons and Chabris’ famous psychological experiments on selective attention (aka ‘the invisible gorilla’). Half the subjects watching a movie in which a basketball is passed around fail to see a gorilla crossing the court and the screen (http://www.livescience.com/6727-invisible-gorilla-test-shows-notice.html, last accessed 23.11.16).

¹¹ ‘It should not be necessary, but it is, to explain ...’ (Comm. (1956) I.149).


¹³ The Greek idiom for the superlative is illogical, whether one translates the dependent genitive as partitive or comparative.
ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων). None of the essays worries this early recorded prediction, released, of course, long after the fact. Thucydides never claims divinatory expertise. His somewhat smudged record as strategos in not rescuing Amphipolis from Brasidas’s surprise (?) attack might forestall such a claim. His vaunt and prediction that no one ever again need puzzle over recognizing his plague has likewise been frustrated (2.48.3). He boasts that he has investigated and composed (‘written together’) what happened, once it was done, better than others, in a way that will provide ‘an acquisition for ever’. Greenwood wants to have things both ways (see 91 n. 44). She believes that Thucydides expects that his work will have ‘practical, political utility’ while recognizing Hans-Peter Stahl’s powerful arguments that prove otherwise. Stahl demonstrates convincingly that the Athenian general had become aware of the futility of dependably accurate anticipation. This perception applies to both the enemy’s rational chess moves ten steps ahead and the unpredictable vagaries (τὸ παράλογον) of weather (2.2: rain, etc. at the Platean break-in), miscommunications (7.44, Epipolae night battle—a dark comedy), enemy errors and cowardice (3.30–3), and the certified biggest surprise of all—the Plague.

14 Pericles, his paradigm of statesman’s foresight (2.65.6 and 13: πρόνοια, Odyssean προέγνω), became transfixed with hope of everlasting glory (2.64.5: ἐς τὸ ἐπείτα δόξα αἰείμνηστος; see G. Hawthorne, ‘Receiving Thucydides Politically’, in Harloe and Morley (2012) 212–28 at 224; see below n. 20). He failed to prevent the war and miscalculated (by his own admission) the unexpected plague and arguably the enemies’ advantages. The result was catastrophic for all parties sucked into the conflict (1.23). Themistocles’ evaluative epitaph in the excursus (1.138), τῶν τε παραχρῆμα … κράτιστος γνώμων, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλείστον τοῦ γεγενημένου ἀριστος εἰκαστής, κ.τ.λ., praises his skills with vocabulary reminiscent of our epigraph. Poor Demosthenes’ rational and superior Sicilian strategy fails in need of a second, while Nicias’ belief in lunar signals and human divination (7.50) carries the day. Nicias’ confident forecast of Syracusan democratic surrender despite current oligarchic control (7.47–9, reminiscing perhaps of Mytilene! 3.27–8) and his unjustified trust in divine mercy (real or feigned, 7.77), almost comically comes acropper—if one can forget the deaths for which he was responsible. Nicias repeatedly suffers defeat in the pre-expeditionary debates, when his analysis was right.

15 What be the klēma, a surprisingly concrete term, remains vague. John Moles argued at length that the Ξυγγραφή was a variant kind of monumental inscription: ‘ΑΝΑΘΗΜΑ ΚΑΙ ΚΤΗΜΑ: The Inscriptional Inheritance of Ancient Historiography’, Histos 3 (1999): 27–69. He surmises that this proemial claim and comparable vaunts are signs of historiographical competition, ancient literary agonistics, in which Hecataeus trumps the silly Greek stories, Herodotus trumps Hecataeus, and Thucydides trumps Herodotus. Infinite progress, Polybius perhaps would add.

16 In the book mentioned supra, n. 2.

17 Pericles admits here to consternation, somewhat bizarrely describing the epidemic as ‘the only event indeed beyond expectation’: μόνον δὴ τῶν πάντων ἑλπίδος κρέσταν γεγενημένον (2.64.1). I do not believe Thucydides would endorse this bold claim. Edith
Thucydides’ tragic account frequently features irrational suffering (some decisions more or less rationally chosen or accepted), while often condemning strategies falsified by facts. He underlines misled assemblies and political and personal unreason. Insightful leaders are rare on the ground and punished for their abilities. Themistocles, indeed, was chased into exile by his compatriots, Pericles was fined, if not deposed from office, while Spartan Archidamus was shouted down, Teutiaplus and Brasidas ignored or rejected repeatedly. General Thucydides himself was at least exiled (5.26.5), although after a serious setback. Consider Nicias, most impressive in accurately predicting a Sicilian catastrophe for the fantasizing Athenians (6.8–14, 20–3), most condemnable when bivouacked outside Syracuse for refusing to return her demoralized soldiers and sailors to Athens. He would have saved thousands of lives and Athens’ supply routes, but facing the ecclesia’s angry music was too fearful a price for him (7.48–9). The lesson thus might be that an insightful leader keeps his mouth shut, or gets shouted down, or dies on his (or his enemy’s) sword—like Demosthenes in Sicily.

Greenwood’s comparison of Thucydides to early Hippocratic texts is appropriate.18 Both authorities apply thick description, both were unable to help sufferers (of the Plague), both describe the course of diseases, both brag about the immense effort and time put into investigating their subject, and both imply audiences’ rich intellectual reward after closely reading their diagnoses. They assume their texts will benefit future readers (this is equally true, surely, for thousands of lost and destroyed texts), but explicit utilitarian claims are hard to demonstrate or sustain then or now. Greenwood closes with a promising distinction between historiographical micro- and macro-futures—those fulfilled (or not) within the text and those more open-ended, extra-textual futures, such as this review’s oft-quoted epigraph. While disputing many of her assertions and terminology, I found this essay provocative and stimulating.

Antonis Tsakmakis addresses Xenophon’s conception of history-writing, grappling with his inconvenient lack of (extant?) preface. Xenophon thereby deprived himself of the standard Hellenic opportunity to state his subject, chronological and geographical scope, significance, and principles of historical

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Foster (*Thucydides, Pericles, and Periclean Imperialism* (Cambridge, 2010), e.g., 188) ably presents the case for Thucydides’ realization of the imperialist Pericles’ miscalculations, but also his relative caution and prudence compared to his sometimes crazily optimistic successors, e.g., Alcibiades’ plan to conquer Carthage (6.15, 90)—if you can believe him.
investigation—even his name. Eschewing a prologue that flourishes methodological anticipatory announcements, Xenophon plunges into his predecessor’s *ultimas res* (almost precisely where Thucydides’ text breaks off) without defining an ‘external future’ (105). His subsequent narrative goes far beyond the 431–404 war, continuing on to the post-war *stasis*, peace, and later alliances, wars, and abortive tyrannies. He ends with Epaminondas’ last battle, Mantinea (362 BCE). Here, the internally unnamed author, in embarrassment, despair, or in the act of inventing a novel kind of explicitly continuous historiography, stops—as he began—in *mediis rebus* (107). His epilogue not only demarcates a stop amidst uncertain ἀκρισία (hapax in Xenophon) καὶ ταραχὴ but drags in The Divinity while ignoring the subsequent general peace treaty (cf. Diod. 15.89; Polyb. 4.33; Plut. *Ages*. 35.3). This summarizing intervention precedes a deliberate but astonishingly unfinalizing finale (7.5.27): ἀκρισία δὲ καὶ ταραχὴ ἔτι πλείων μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐγένετο ἢ πρόσθεν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ μέχρι τούτου γραφέσθω τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἰσως ἀλλῳ μελήσει.

Tsakmakis investigates three ‘until now’, ἔτι καὶ νῦν passages that ‘bridge the gap’ between narrated events and the present. The first (2.4.43) marks the observance of the Athenian oaths of reconciliation, one moment when Thucydides might have been expected to end his exposition, and points beyond the master to the author’s present—whichever year that might be. The second appears when describing the unique battle of Koronea (4.3.16), where Xenophon was present, but he omits that relevant fact of autopsy. The third concerns Thessalian Tissophonos, ruling in Pherecy ‘up to the time when this account was written’ (6.4.37: by 353 BCE). Tsakmakis finds this last remark crucial to Xenophon’s treatment of the earlier Thessalian tagos Jason. Described here as a gifted, ideal commander, a ‘paragon’ of the non-*polis* system (112 n. 22), Xenophon perhaps implies that he was a forerunner of the Macedonian spoiler, Philip. This five-page sub-section offers interesting comments on Xenophon’s political inclinations but seems hardly relevant to the volume’s focus on chronology.

Emily Baragwanath explores knowledge of the future in Xenophon, particularly his *Anabasis*. The ‘presentist’ narrative strategy of his historical-ish adventure story has the author Xenophon presenting his characters—such as ‘Xenophon’—worrying about the future—while the narrator keeps any anticipations hidden (119). Humans know very little about the future and find rational prognoses disappointed by flies in the ointment and irrational colleagues and opponents. The unknown unknowns outweigh the known unknowns and cause more difficulty.19 The mercenaries’ uncertain situation does not comprehend psy-ops, other deceptions by the enemy, or even moves by the Ten

19 To paraphrase the intermittently percipient American war-hawk Donald Rumsfeld, 12 February 2002. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GiPe1OiKQuk
Thousand’s presumptive but dubious friends. Cyrus the Younger painted a bold and rosy future (Anab. 1.7.7) for and to his invaders of Iraq. He wrongly predicts Persian battle behavior, as Xenophon notes (1.8.11; 131 n. 30). Events do not map reassuringly onto either likelihood or aspirations. The inspiring Persian strategist died at Cunaxa after he had abandoned forethought altogether in sibling rage (1.8.26). Miscalculation about the future next produces the catastrophic capture and summary execution of the incautious Hellenic Generals.

Xenophon the commander did not have the option of speculating on what might have been, when forced to cross the Centrites river with enemies before and behind him (Anab. 4.3.8). He had to protect his troops on the fly and postulate probable futures. Baragwanath observes (136) that the Anabasis, like the Hellenica, ends with matters unsettled—not the homecoming that had been the intended and expected telos for the troops and the narrative, but renewed, seemingly endless fighting in Asia Minor (7.8.24)—more of the same. In the course of the narrative, a minimum of prolepsis. Readers, like the troops, are kept clueless about the always obscure future. Look for no promises of utility such as the usually cautious Thucydides offered (in this review’s epigraph). Baragwanath notes, following others (see 120 n. 6), that the illustrious predecessor’s detailed narrative contradicts (she writes ‘stands in tension with’) the optimism of his methodological chapter, but I doubt that the Halimousian ever meant to suggest something as predictive as many readers extract from his opaque sentence. It is, however, characteristic of Thucydides’ vatic, laconic Attic prose that sentences, ideas, and sequences of events can support or suffer wildly different, even bewilderingly opposite, interpretations. In any case, Baragwanath notes that Xenophon’s historiographic method, so far as one extracts it from practice, eschews discussions of the ‘difficulty of grasping the truth of past events’ (138)—perhaps too kind a judgment of his suppressions, evasions, and false statements. She concludes that Xenophon turned to historiography (in contrast to essays in many other genres) perhaps to suggest skepticism about predicting the future and about ever learning from the past for the present. Subsequently known knowns might lead a chastened, now prudent, man to caution, when possible, in the face of future known and unknown unknowns.

Nikos Miltsios measures Polybius’ optimistic recognition of foresight. The Megalopolitan’s claims are much bolder than Thucydides—it’s easy to pre-

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20 Katherine Harloe and Neville Morley (edd.), Thucydides and the Modern World: Reception, Reinterpretation, and Influence from the Renaissance to the Present (Cambridge, 2012) 39. Review Welch or Moles (supra nn. 12, 15) mining the same vein.

21 12.25b3, 1.35.7–10, and 6.3.2 (9.30.8–9 in another’s mouth); quoted 142–3; see comments on Darbo-Peschanski’s contribution below.
dict, if you study history! and the *anacyclosis* pattern makes it easier, since sequences repeat themselves. Thus, the future for Polybius is ‘not a totally inaccessible or inscrutable domain’ (144). But the *Histories* teem ‘with people who fail dismally to foresee the future’ (145). Such losers may prove the displaced Achaean hostage’s didactic point: one should study the past and learn from its negative examples. In addition, his fondness for Tyche (129 examples in the preserved text), especially in war, shows the limits of strategic planning. Even prudence only ensures the possibility of success, not any certainty. This was true even for a Hannibal (150). This pioneer historian will eliminate excessive narration and focus on causation; others will produce a crowd-pleasing essay but not a lesson: ἀγώνισμα μὲν, μάθημα δ’ οὐ γίνεται (3.31.11–13). Study of the incalculable is an essential component in history’s lessons, preparing one to cope better with future uncertainties (1.35; 9.2—a paradox). Professor Polybius expresses irritation with slow- and non-learners (e.g., 9.16.5).

Christopher Pelling notes correctly that Dionysius’ twenty-book history ends where his predecessor Polybius had begun—homage to the prosaic art of the Arcadian, another ex-pat who had planted his pen in Roman turf for decades. His work looks backwards at past Roman *politeiai*, but ‘the future [is] looming in the background’ (256), far beyond his terminal opening date of 265 BCE. Not only the deleterious Gracchi (2.11.2–3), but intimations of the Ides of March (4.37–40). Since ‘Hindsight is the thinking person’s foresight’ remains true, Dionysius looks to Greek precedents, as Romulus did. He also describes Roman events future to his designated period but past to this narrator—such as Crassus’ ignoring dire omens before his Parthian campaign (2.6.3–4). Why does Dionysius—and Livy too, another Augustan—produce all this foreshadowing? Can it surprise that a historian might construct a distant past based on his knowledge of the recent past? Indeed, it could not be otherwise, because human thought processes cling to analogy in order to understand nature as well as past human events. Thucydides invites us to think future events will resemble past ones, and they do to some limited degree, but historians must perceive far past events in terms of recently experienced ones. A palmary example is precisely Thucydides’ ‘archaeology’ (1.2–19) in which he proudly speculates about a plausible ancient Trojan War Age (and more) in terms of the political and military struggles that he himself has witnessed. Prolix Dionysius ‘meshes with contemporary themes without crudely sounding a pro-Augustan or anti-Augustan gong’ (169). Dionysius, like Thucydides, writes much about imperialism (for the former, in the Italian peninsular phase), both of them appreciating positive aspects of military force and power concentrated in one city.

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22 This perception should be applied to every ancient (and contemporary) historian.
Catherine Darbo-Peschanski’s essay divides into two halves: external parameters and internal organization of temporality and, second, how the future may resemble the past or the present. First, she shows how epic and drama have beginnings and ends imposed by plot and tradition (Achilles’ anger, Philoctetes’ abandonment and decade-long isolation), whereas historical accounts select or construct a time-limited subject or begin at the point when one eminent predecessor stopped. Thucydides’ *pentacontaetia* is not a *hexacontaetia* because of Herodotus’ arbitrary but artfully chosen end-point. Xenophon, Theopompus, and others commenced more or less where Thucydides’ text unintentionally broke off. Meanwhile, Xenophon actually (if half-heartedly) invites someone else to pick up where he has chosen to halt his words. Polybius begins where Aratus and Timaeus ended. The historian must discover or invent his plot limits—a war does nicely, although its causes trigger an infinite regress. S/he must write up and pace any sequence of events with mini- and major climaxes and closures, of an organic (think Thucydides’ Sicilian narrative) or inorganic (Thucydides’ or Livy’s annalism) and eventually stop. Otherwise, one reads of ‘just one damn thing after another’ (Elbert Hubbard).

Darbo-Peschanski oddly describes the fundamental drivers of history as ‘the temporality of plot lines’ (181). She briefly identifies three structuring concepts (which do not seem temporal to me) as justice (Herodotus’ pendulum of *dikê*, or *tisis*), human nature (Thucydides’ governing passions of hopes, fears, hatreds, and desires observed in the paradigmatic Peloponnesian War), and, thirdly, ‘a force at work organizing events and human actions’ (Polybian *anakyklôsis*) complicated by open-ended chance and mischances, *tychê* and *atychêmata*. The remainder of her essay (181–93) left me puzzled, starting from the phrase (181) ‘all the *historiai* … include the future at the expense of imposing closure …’. She observes repetitive elements both in Herodotus’ back and forth transgressions, and in Thucydides’ explicit claims about the (depressingly destructive) constancy of the human ‘thing’ (*τὸ ἀνθρώπιον*, *ἀνθρώπινον*) and therefore of human-designed or -suffered events.23 Polybius’ cycle of political constitutions that brings sequences back to where they started is the culminating explicit example (186). But Polybius appears to claim that Roman conquest stops the clock or the sequencing (1.2.7–8, quoted but ms. A is defective just here). All three conceptions imply the perceptive historian’s predictive power (6.3.1–2: *προειπεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος στοχαζόμενον ἐκ τῶν ἔξω γεγονότων εὐμάρεσ*),24 although note that none of them claim prophetic status. The author identifies a ‘fourth principle of closure’, a ‘physics of events’, that may be

23 E.g., 1.22.4, quoted above; 3.82.2; 1.76.2–3; 3.45.3, 7, etc.

24 *eįμαρές*, ‘easy, trouble-free’, really? Historiographers acknowledge the cruder element in Professor Polybius’ ideas of cause and claims for teachable foresight, e.g., M. Grant, The Ancient Historians (New York, 1970) 159.
glimpsed in Plutarch (Sert. 1.1) and in pseudo-Plutarch On Fate, inspired by Plato’s Timaeus (191–3).25

Katherina Wesselmann argues that Herodotus, despite claims of cyclicity and predetermination, creates a space for unexpected outcomes, unexpected not only by his personae, who never seem to learn from their exemplary predecessors (213), but also by first-time readers. Proleptic authorial δεῖ and χρῆ γενέσθαι (196–7) and less dependable oracles forecast ‘fated’ outcomes, but Herodotus also explicitly considers hypothetical alternatives, such as everyone’s favorite counterfactual exploring ‘what if the Athenians had joined forces with Xerxes?’26 or implicit alternatives, such as the triagonal Persian debate concerning theoretical democratic, oligarchic, and monarchic regimes (198–200). ‘If-not’ turning points pepper the Histories, such as crises before the battles of Marathon and Salamis (202), or indeed the Persian invasion (Artabanos at 7.10a). ‘Herodotus, master of prolepsis’ (203), frequently anticipates the logos he is about to tell and arguably the course of the next empire, the Athenian (disregarding Fornara’s decisive 1971 essay).

Wesselman shows well that Herodotus’ futures include a past future for his protagonists, hypothetical futures for them, and present futures for his readers. She then discusses ‘no future’ approaches (204–12), based on her dissertation, examining pre-existing, repetitive patterns of myth present in the Histories. Drawing back from the conceptual abyss of writing that ‘nothing new ever happens in the Histories’, she does insist ‘that repetitiveness is included in the plurality of Herodotean future concepts’ (207). Now, while history does not repeat itself, a historian extracting certain patterns of human behavior is not ipso facto a mythicist,27 or a social psychologist. Not only autocrats and demagogues, but fathers and children fall into certain patterns of (mis)behavior,

25 Proofreading in this essay and Liakos’ falls below the publisher’s usual high standard. There is no footnote for lemma 25, the typeface of a sentence on p. 187 has been shrunk, and the wrong sigma is set in final position in n. 14.

26 See E. Baragwanath, ‘Herodotos and the Avoidance of Hindsight’, in Powell (2013, supra n. 2) 25–48. She discusses roads not taken, in primis Athenian defection, a course of action that would have produced the enslavement of splintered Hellenes (29). She underlines the fragility of Hellenic independent survival (35), in other words, the contingencies of the master-plot.

27 Wesselmann avers that ‘the cycle of human matters’ (1.5.3, 207.2) is ‘omnipresent in [Herodotus’] Histories’, a view that my Historical Method of Herodotus opposes ([Toronto, 1988] 166, 197) discussing five systems of explanation (cf. Wesselmann, 198). Some academics also have applied such cycles to the Thucydides’ quotation that begins this review, but this minority, often found in nomothetic departments of political ‘science’, are generally enthusiastically dependent on Richard Crawley’s admirable English version, here positing ‘an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future’. Many of the same academics, some of them innocent of Greek, also pounce happily on Crawley’s translation of the sentence (1.23.6) that suggests to them that Thucydides thought his war was ‘inevitable’. Thucydides used no such term or concept. Daniel Tompkins recently pointed out (by
given human parameters of precedents, options, and pressures. Wesselmann’s elegant seven parallels between Herodotus’ and the swineherd Eumaios’ rape stories do not adequately support a thesis of ‘No Future’ (sub-head, 204), timelessness as the way that Herodotus conceives the past. Alternatively, the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (quoted 213) anhistorically views our interest in the past as but a prop to keep our present from becoming ‘the past’. The stronger form of her thesis would be that history is nothing but repetition, or, at least, closer to Lévi-Strauss, that historians find the only significant features of the past to be the repetition of past events in the present.

Lianeri notes Thucydides’ allergy to proleptic remarks. She counts three (2.65; 5.26; 6.15), here ignoring other examples such as 1.10, 2.48, 2.54, etc. On the other hand, when she notes that this elusive historian ‘proclaim[s] the eternal legibility of [his] text’ (35) by κτῆμα ἐς αἰεὶ, she and Rood point to a problem. No real contradiction emerges between Thucydides’ universal, transhistorical ‘human nature’ (ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις) and his awareness of humans’ unreliable cognition—fallible comprehension—in interpreting their presents. That is part of the human condition. A fortiori, however, interpretive issues emerge when confronting a past epoch’s mute and uncooperative stones, alien bones, and other material remnants (49–50, 342)—or the still immaterial future.

Karen Bassi’s essay touches on many topics also found in Greenwood’s and Rood’s contributions. Visible, fading, and invisible elements in Thucydides—literal and metaphorical—interest her. She perceives the past and future to be in dialogue in historiography rather than as two different mirrors of the present. The past vanishes but leaves traces; the reality is gone. The past can be known better than the future, but writers often show more confidence about

e-mail, and thanks to Tim Rood and Neville Morley) that Crawley had never printed this dangerous, thought-impeding English word here in his published editions (1866, 1874). It was introduced by his nephew Richard Feetham in a later modification (1903) under Crawley’s name. Simon Hornblower, following Hans-Peter Stahl’s revolutionary study, adequately refutes both this optimism for scientific prediction (Comm. ad loc. (1991) I.61–6) and, following Colin MacLeod, rejects the ‘inevitable’ school’s interpretation of Thucydides’ crucial sentence on the cause of his war. Thomas Hobbes (1629) carefully translated ἀναγκάσαι as ‘necessitated the war’—in his ‘most servilely faithful’ rendition (W. Smith, 1753). Steven Lattimore prefers ‘inevitable’, P. J. Rhodes and J. Mynott (following Hornblower) employ the better English translation ‘forced’. In my modified edition of Crawley’s translation (Barnes and Noble; New York, 2006), I used the verb ‘pressured’ to avoid ideas of political predetermination, fate, or forces beyond human control compelling political decisions. Martin Ostwald’s ΑΝΑΓΚΗ in Thucydides (Atlanta, 1988) notes that this historian’s more frequent use of words in this family of concepts than his predecessor did. The Athenian had a psychological—rather than metaphysical—understanding of ‘necessity’. The earlier Ionian historian offers a more moralistic employ, as Rosaria Munson shows, ‘Ananke in Herodotus’, JHS 121 (2001): 30–50.
it than is justified, as the oft-quoted theorist Reinhart Koselleck avers. Bassi turns to Thucydides’ ‘archaeology’, in part a reconstruction of the past on the basis of visible remnants. Thucydides stated that the further back an event, the less reliable our present knowledge. He presents a thought experiment for the future prompted by current ‘misunderestimations’ that devalue Mycenaee’s once vast but ‘now’ bygone influence because of the unimpressive nature of its contemporary (that is, unexcavated) ruins. Future evaluators, he continues, may well underweigh Spartan significance by its paltry shrines and foundations or overweigh Athenian significance because of its impressive Pentelic remnants hymned by Pericles (2.40–3).

Bassi, too, quotes 1.22.4, discussing the ‘criterion of physical presence at historical events’. The visual aspects of past poleis are both fragile and undependable, while autopsy for events is necessary but also subject to point-of-view bias—personal partiality as well as limited perspectives. This is not so much a paradox as a continuation by other means of Thucydides’ polemic against believing that one can accurately reconstruct the past (1.20.1: τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαιὰ τοιαῦτα ἠὗρον, χαλεπὰ ὄντα παντὶ ἐξῆς τεκμηρίῳ πιστεῦσαι), or against thinking that the public even cares to invest energy in investigating recent, even current events. This historian’s first task is to uncover the ‘truest’ but most

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28 His frequently quoted work, especially Futures Past (2004, orig. German Vergangene Zukunft, 1979) exhibits profound skepticism about the knowability of the past. On a third hand, Koselleck argues that one recalls the past only with the intent to anticipate the future, and that one then can only act on the assumption that he is forecasting recurrent events, ‘same or similar’. This cyclicity was more believable in a world more stable than the modern one in its technology and institutions. See ‘The Unknown Future and the Art of Prognosis’, in The Practice of Conceptual History (ET: Stanford, 2002) 133, 135, 144–6.

29 1.10.1–2; cf. Lucian’s perverse, inverse view analyzed by Tamiolaki, infra.

30 The iconic ‘Bushism’ of 6 November 2000, delivered shortly after the disputed Florida popular presidential vote count.

31 Logically, the argument uncovers ‘unsettling methodological implications’ (Rood, 340), indeed, an anti-archaeology, since Thucydides claims the material record does not reflect political and military power. What you see is not what you would have found, but Rood points out that Thucydides’ important example is exceptional, the visible here misleads the student of historical power. One may, however, argue that the Athenian evidence is not misleading, but Thucydides has been carried away by the irresistible and convenient Spartan small-town antithesis. Bassi cleverly suggests that the passage furnishes ‘clearly an ironic comment on the outcome of the war’ (126), unknowingly resuscitating the restless but buried corpse embodying the impossibly centrifugal question of compositional layers. Following Rengakos, she believes that all ‘flash-forwards’ in Thucydides concern the Athenian 404 surrender and defeat.

32 οὐ χρώμαι ἁμισθητοῦμενα with οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας. He here and later has in mind the rushed court proceedings against those accused of profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries and the Herms.
unseen-unn noticed-obscure-invisible cause(s) (πρόφασιν ἀφανεστάτην) of the recent, now narrated war (1.23.6). Bassi describes Thucydides’ Athenians as repeatedly blind in a world where clear recollection requires hard work and anyway has inescapably narrow limits (237). His work intends ‘to clarify what can be examined’ (skopein to saphes) of the past and the future, but these two epochs present quite different epistemic hurdles to the investigator. My translation of the epigraph hopes to suggest that this vaunt is more cautious than certain critics think. Bassi ends with a discussion of the Peisistratid altar (237). The Athenians ‘disappeared’ the dedicational inscription by extending the altar’s length (μεῖζον μῆκος), but Thucydides notes that the mnêma’s text is still legible although in indistinct/faint letters (6.54.7: ἀμυδροῖς γράμμασι). The sentence may be easy to translate, but it remains hard to explain. The past has left us this mute stone hoarsely whispering. If Thucydides’ description of a surviving object puzzles us, perhaps that experience should caution us that his description of a speech or a battle may be less transparent than we think. Bassi’s ambitious article, too, repeatedly left me unsure of her focus and meaning; she ends her essay writing vatically, ‘the future is the limiting factor of what can be known about the past’ (241).

Nicolas Wiater discusses ‘deferred closure in Polybius Histories’. Having continued the history from Timaeus’ halt, he expects his own narrative to be carried further by others. Like Pausch’s essay, Wiater sees a beginning before his beginning, and the story goes beyond his end. ‘History does not begin, historical narratives do’ (245), but Polybius sees a synoptic unity to his subject (3.1.4–5). He necessarily selects the relevant incidents in a complex and confusing ‘landscape’. History can provide concrete examples that help readers—that is, envisioned, wanna-be commanders and statesmen—to assess courses of action, to take precautions as well as forming policies that can succeed (12.25b.2–3). The unpredictable paralogon is as prominent in his narrative as in Thucydides—one needs discipline and training in order to handle unexpected

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33 More fully quoting 1.20.3: πολλά δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὄντα καὶ οὐ χρόνῳ ἀμνηστούμενα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἑλλήνες οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται ...

34 One can still read the clearly inscribed letters of the ruined altar, although the paint was already gone when Thucydides saw it in his still undespoiled city. R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, Greek Historical Inscriptions (Oxford, 1969) #11, review interpretations.

35 Have historical texts often influenced leaders’ political and military decisions? ‘One of the few military books [Ulysses S.] Grant had ever read was de bello civili, in translation, at West Point’ (Richard Goldhurst, Many Are the Hearts. The Agony and the Triumph of Ulysses S. Grant (New York, 1975) 164). Goldhurst reports Mark Twain’s well-known comparison of his friend Grant’s prose achievement to Caesar’s (another Civil War). He later adds a detailed comparison of their prose styles and manner, among them, dependence on active verbs, absence of direct speech, synecdoche, and understatement (262–5). Goldhurst, once a college teacher of Greek and Latin, published on this very subject of Caesar’s style: CJ 49.7 (1954): 299–303.
contingencies and sudden reversals. Polybius ponders how Fortune foils expectations and defeats rational reckoning, among other places at 29.21.1–7 or 38.21—perhaps suggesting that Rome’s empire is transient just like the others that he has mentioned, although Wiater doubts it (262). For Roman readers, Polybius’ end marked Day One for future decisions that will determine their now vast empire’s stability.

Plutarch and Appian (no Arrian in this volume) receive shorter shrift. They share skepticism with prior historians about historical actors’ ability to predict—much less prophesy. These Greek-speaking Roman Imperial authors take pains to point out their politicians and generals’ wrong predictions and perhaps ignore several of their more clever calculations.

Paolo Desideri emphasizes Plutarch’s acknowledgment of the feeble state of Hellas (269; cf. Mor. 824e) ever since the early death of Alexander, part of God’s plan (Mor. 316f–317a). The past has its heroes, preserved in the Bioi: what would a true Greek like Lycurgus have done (Mor. 84d–85b; cf. Philop. 1.4)? The Romans have been ἑλληνικῶτεροι than the Greeks themselves in the post-Classical Greek past (274), so Plutarch proposes to escape his dubious and precarious present—imagining a better Hellenic future (cf. Aem. 1.5). Dissatisfied with his own world, he nevertheless eschews ‘epigonism’. Desideri’s Plutarch hopes for a new creative Hellenism (comparing Nietzsche’s concepts of heroism and new futures, 276–9).

Luke Pitcher observes the Alexandrian Appian’s disinterest as narrator in suggesting specifics of the future (281), although his characters, when facing life or death choices, have no such luxury. Appian, in the middle third of the second century CE, as a good conservative perceives a ‘present good order to which the earlier[, often chaotic] history he describes was heading’ (283). His characters anticipate the future, but the narrator does not frequently do so. The anticipators, like Tiberius Gracchus, often turn out to be mistaken (BC 1.11.43). From Thucydides to Caesar, characters who predict easy success find themselves falsified and upended—whether ‘delusional braggarts’ like Lentulus, mistaken calculators of the enemy’s next moves, or erroneous interpreters of prophecies (as in the Syriakê, 286). Appian argues that in extremis, hope is a better and more rational strategy than despair (291). Pitcher cites Polybius (2.4.1–5: Aetolian siege of Medion) as Appian’s predecessor urging one to grasp at even desperate plans for deliverance, when survival looks unlikely. The ‘potency of the unexpected’ can have good as well as bad consequences (292).

36 P. 256 n. 51 reports the preponderance of unfavorable, paralogical peripeteiai from Mauersberger’s Polybios-Lexikon: forty-eight to six.

37 No articles on Theopompus, Timaeus, or Eusebius, either, nor, given the reasonable Hellenic parameters, on Latin-writing Caesar, Suetonius, or Ammianus, but the coverage is impressively wide.
Melina Tamiolaki’s contribution recognizes the uncertainty of the future as a historiographical topos already in Herodotus (3.65: Cambyses; 5.24.2: Darius). Hope for the survival of one’s historiographical text in an environment where many were lost provides another topos. As to the former topic, again—as always—one encounters more failures than successes in predicting (296), despite the fact that many historians (especially Polybius) advertise their works as useful for teaching close readers how to anticipate future outcomes. The satirist Lucian in his de historia conscribenda propounds some historiographical theory about future events at the beginning and end of his essay. One should write for the future, because writing for the present requires flattery of the powers that be (hist. conscr. 40, 61, 63). What had traditionally been a vaunt (usually of utility) becomes a methodological statement: one’s audience determines one’s purpose and degree of dedication to accuracy. Avoiding accounts of the present enables one to be more truthful, so historical distance from one’s recorded epoch becomes an advantage, an idea radically opposed to Thucydides and Polybius’ insistence on recording events that one has lived through and observed (autopsy). The temporal gap better enables impartiality, a position more plausible when the imperial fist was ubiquitous, unlike in the age of fractured Aegean polities. This view renders Homer a better historian, more truthful, since he did not write when Achilles lived (hist. conscr. 40–1; quoted on 300). While Lucian’s Cynic-inspired apolis, autonomos, abasileutos ideal for a historian (hist. conscr. 41) does not ‘run counter to the whole experience of Greek historiography’ (301), it reflects his vaunted promotion of detachment from established and influential institutions. His obsession with accusations of flattery reflects the awkwardness of fame and fortune in the Second Sophistic—Athenaeus and Plutarch also treat it extensively (305). Orators and historians must navigate prudently through the shoals of acceptable discourse under autocrats. Lucian has singled out excessive praise among many forms of authorial bias to focus his rhetorical display. Tamiolaki concludes by asserting that Lucian’s claim to be writing for the future helps to legitimate ‘the genre of theory of history’ (307), although she probably means ‘legitimate historiography’.

Dennis Pausch inserts Livy into this Hellenic congeries by questioning the extent of his debt to Greek antecedents. Livy feared that the closer he got to his intended end-point, the greater seemed his remaining task (31.1.1–5). He refers to his own scriptorial future, that is, the magnitude of the task still before him—although long ago was it willingly undertaken. Despite his reluctance

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38 These terms apply to Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius.

39 The Patavian patriot’s difficulties included fear of stepping on Augustus’ toes, as the intended termination of his 142 books (9 BCE) reached the age of recent civil wars and the Augustan settlements. Livy’s monarchical and republican past extended, then, to the minefield of his present and his associations with Pompeians and the primus inter pares victor over them. His oscillating optimism and pessimism, especially in the Preface, did not exclude
to make ‘explicit theoretical statements’ (312), and despite his resolutely annal-
istic framework, his flexible method becomes more readable by violations of
these Roman traditions—he offers previews of the future, e.g., the battle of
Cannae (22.42.10; cf. 26.6.13–16, Capua) in the voice of both an historical fig-
ure and the narrator. His speakers evoke the future as well, such as Hannibal
thrice addressing his troops (317–20). Speeches contribute to multi-perspective
‘polyphony’ (320). For the books in which Livy follows in Polybius’ footsteps,
the Roman offers more portents as previews—ominous signs encouraging fear
of the future. Despite his assiduous reports of portents, Livy can show a skep-
tical attitude to rituals and prodigies. When Cumaean mice gnaw gold in Ju-
piter’s temple, Livy comments: \textit{adeo minimis etiam rebus prava religio inserit deos},
‘such are the trivialities in which misguided superstition sees divine interven-
tion’ (27.23.1–4, p. 322). Historiography, Pausch argues, changed significantly
from Polybius’ epoch to Livy’s, a century and more later. Livy modified Po-
lybius’ literary strategies, Pausch avers, while the political future that Polybius
dimly propounded had become Livy’s lived reality (327).

Antonis Liakos explores a forgotten paradox originating from Peter Paul
Rubens’ title-page engraving for Goltzius’ 1645 publication of \textit{Antiquitatis Mon-
umenta} (329–30, here reproduced). The Classical Age of Greece had been lost
in iterations of the Biblical Daniel’s interpretation of Nebuchadnezzar’s
dream: Four Empires (331, Median, Persian, Macedonian, Roman). The last
epoch extended into Eusebius’ ‘eternal present’ of Christendom and thus into
what one now terms ‘early Modern’. In this view, the present was ‘an extended
sequel of the [Roman-Christian] past’ (338). The image represents the rejection
of the old, obsolescent, and quadripartite canonization of periods preva-

tent until Cellarius’ three textbooks—Antiquity, Middle Ages, and Modernity
(1669, 1685, 1696)—named and materialized a new one. Thus, Rubens shows
the figures of the old paradigm being thrust down into the cave of Oblivion
while archaeology and numismatics percolate up towards the surface and
Athena, Goddess of Wisdom. ‘The invention of the middle ages was more im-
portant for the study of antiquity than for the middle ages themselves’ (336),
permitting, \textit{inter alia}, attention to the Greek classical period. Dionysius (\textit{Ant.
Rom. 1.2–3}) anticipates this revaluation—their sequence of empires—weighing
Greek and Roman epochs by length and extent. The new temporality had ‘the
present [as] part of the future of the past’—not a mere appendage, (say) late
Christendom. The new mind-set perceived a greater gap between past and
present than between present and future. Liakos has a fascinating point and
makes it clearly.
Tim Rood examines Thucydides’ brief allusions to Homer’s Trojan War past, recently excavated or superstitiously demolished ‘Carian’ graves on Delos (1.8.1), his contemporaries’ (νῦν, 1.10.1) (mis-)calculation of Mycenae’s former greatness, and the thought experiment of future tourists’ estimation of Greece’s current leading powers from the abandoned and bare, shattered (if once presumably lavish) ruins in futuro (1.10.2–3). Future ruins, Rood states, reflect on imperial power and glory, even in Pericles’ apparently prescient words (2.64.3). Rood turns to French, British, and American observers of those very ruins—that had later still become underwhelming by post-Enlightenment standards. Appearances seemed disquietingly deceptive to this deposed Athenian General, now a pessimistic and sidelined observer. Past and present remains mislead, and the appearance of future ruins cannot be anticipated or their significance easily calculated. Historical continuity, however, not the Athenian historian’s noted disjunction, better served the ‘British imperial appropriation of the past’ (353), and, afterwards, the American. The future remains unstable, actually biddable and constructable, while it remains future.

Cultural critics can under- or over-estimate ‘unbridgeable temporal gap[s]’ (Rood, 353). The future is good to think with—about the present. ‘Thucydides’ historicist reasoning that the impression of Athenian power, based on material remains, would exceed reality was replaced by a tendency to make Athens an imperishable source of cultural and spiritual values’ (354). The ephemeralist’s pessimistic prediction becomes the traditionalist’s proud boast of continuity (citing F. S. N. Douglas (1813), C. Wordsworth (1839), and T. B. Macaulay (1866)). And this misapplication can be succeeded by wildly differing contemporary perceptions of Thucydides’ thought as over-universalizing (with a fanfare for the ubiquitously excerpted Melian Dialogue) or fussily obsessing over atomistic battle statistics.

Aviezer Tucker takes ancient historians and philologists further from terra bene cognita, but one gains exciting insights into the shared nature of contemporary analyses and the Rankean paradigm (as well as those of Biblical scholarship, Indo-European linguistics, and modern European historiography). The use and abuse of Thucydides and Leopold von Ranke’s most quoted quote—wie es eigentlich gewesen—leads to a justified polemic against Grethein’s ‘binary classification of teleology vs. experience’ in historiography (363 n. 8). Whereas ancient historians practiced source criticism considering issues of bias, access to information, and distance in time from events reported, the Leipzig-trained von Ranke did something new: ‘he inferred new knowledge’ based on conflicting ‘information signals’ from multiple testimonies.40 Tucker proceeds to map the ‘historiographic revolution’ starting from Bible criticism in German schol-

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40 Charts of information sources and transmission (369–70) puzzled more than helped me to understand ‘information theory’.
arship. From the second half of the eighteenth century, these academics developed a method of dating texts and applied that method to classical texts and a related method to comparative linguistics. Some pages later (379), we reach Niebuhr’s misguided ‘ballad’ theory of the Plebeian poetic sources for early Roman history, based on, Arnaldo Momigliano averred, ‘two sentences by Cicero referring back to Cato, and one incomplete sentence by Varro quoted by Nonius’. These ancient fabrications of the distant past were designed to establish precedents for a desired present or from other motives (competitive vanity, patriotic suppression) to misrepresent what once happened. Ranke understood, after discovering ignored archival sources for his later European periods, how later historians had abused and misused inconvenient evidence or paid disconcerting evidence no heed whatsoever. He showed rather than explained how differing points of view could be deployed to produce a more accurate account of the past. He thus generated new knowledge from a comparative method.

Oswyn Murray ruminates on ancient imperialism and liberty as the leading vectors in post-seventeenth century European historiography. His essay originated at Nankai University in Tianjin, China. The Romans model imperialism, the Athenians the triumph of the individual (388), although Athenian direct democracy is no one’s present paradigm, as he notes (389). Josephus, that prolific but unreliable interpreter of one tribe’s sacred history inside another ethnicity’s language and secular literary tradition, regrettably surfaces nowhere else in this collection. This *engagé* Jewish historian’s desperately inventive but persuasive ‘recollection’ of his captor Vespasian’s future, experienced or conveniently imagined while prisoner-of-war in Galilee, provides a unique but neglected opportunity. The historical actor is the event’s historian in a self-certified, veracious account. Josephus delivered allegedly Messianic prophecies both to, and allegedly about, General Vespasian—that he would rule the Mediterranean World!

Although this clever survivor of Jotapata’s siege and desolation attracted his fellow Jews’ hatred and calumny, he garners less attention today from Greek and Roman historians. Murray legitimately observes that he ‘may be regarded as perhaps the most important of all ancient historians for the future of [European] historical writing’ (391). He was certainly the only one whose

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43 *BJ* 3.9.399–405; Suet. *Vesp*. 5 confirms the incident; so, too, the grouchy Tacitus, but more vaguely, *Hist*. 1.10; 2.1; 5.13.
works long graced many households of ordinary (European Christian) believers (392). William Whiston’s translation (1737 and many reprints) was the ‘most widely read and most widely owned book after the Bible in the English speaking world for the next two centuries’. Murray owns a copy inherited from his grandfather, and (to pursue his divagation) I’ve picked up three cheap American editions for a song. In his slippery histories—recognized from early times by Jews and Christians as affording dubious veracity—he, nevertheless, bridged the gap between sacred and secular (Western) histories. Murray reviews other translations of the many surviving works of Yoseph ben Matatyahu, ‘the learned and Authentic Jewish Historian’ (Whiston’s title page). He essays to explain how even the few Christians of later eras who discarded miracles and divine intervention struggled to fit the events of Jewish history into Greek and Roman methods of recording the past (395). Those who professed belief in one Almighty and All-Wise Ruler of the Universe struggled to reconcile sacred, Biblical history with modern, scientific versions of Jesus’ short life and career or with the fate of the ‘chosen’ Jews for the twenty centuries following. Murray’s detailed paper
44 encompasses central myths of Western history in short compass—myths that feature the enlightened conquest of savages on all continents, the spread of (rather limited) democracy, and triumphs of the (somewhat, sometimes) free market.

Harloe and Morley discuss wittily later generations’ use and abuse of Thucydides.45 Lianeri likewise points out that reticent Thucydides’ historiographical claim for the utility of his unique methods, τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι (1.22), is opaque, not transparent. The programmatic wish suggests a timeless human condition or nature, but his text demonstrates infinite contingency, mutability, and uncertainty characteristic of the human situation. When rational people did politics in antiquity (and not only then, of course), the emotion of hope often exceeded rational expectation, and ancient historians regularly in their analyses jump on the disjunction from reality expressed by ἐλπίς nouns, adjectives, and verbs.46 One principal task for

44 Readers may wonder what Murray’s original Chinese hosts and audience made of references to the very Reverend Henry Hart Milman, Heinrich Graetz, and the ultra-nationalist German Heinrich Treitschke. Few Western Classicists and historians today, much less their students, read the fumbling but earnest Greek of Josephus (more comfortable in Aramaic and Hebrew). These nineteenth-century monuments of historiography attract yet less attention.

45 Essays in Harloe and Morley’s and Powell’s earlier volumes understandably complement the metaphysics in the volume under review. The first collection addresses specific, actual future uses or reception of (Thucydidean) Greek historiography; the second explores how histories and Histories might have turned out differently, if only …

historians is to underline the pitfalls and limitations of even the best human data and planning—Thucydides and Polybius’ many examples of ‘contrary to reasonable expectation’.  

Historians look back to explain how particular aspects of their once-future present looked to past persons for whom that period was still their dim future. In any era, politicians and assemblies direct future-oriented thoughts on their present, with all the misperceptions, limiting if distorting desires, ignorance of others’ plans and of brute facts that obscure any moment or blind men to imminent crisis. Further, historians past and present select the acts and attitudes that (we think) explain the outcomes that provide a writer’s chosen closure, depending on bias—glorious Hellenic Victory over the Persians, grim Peloponnesian Defeat of the Athenians. In Xenophon’s alluring case, the opt-out moment is an Inglorious Stalemate that paralyzed post-Mantinean, hollowed-out Hellas (Helle. 7.5.27). ‘This is the way the world ends/ Not with a bang but a whimper’.

Xenophon’s unprecedented latched-on (if inexplicit) start after Thucydides and his depressed in-meditas-res halt to the Hellenica surprise readers. Lianeri (26–7), who is impressively au courrant on historiographical theory, does not ask whether Xenophon, therefore, is a bold innovator, or a clumsy continuator who did not know how to stop his infernal historical machine. Does he offer ‘the meaningful plot’ or not? Are his notorious suppressions of significant facts atypical for Hellenic historians or just business as usual? How far out does he—can he—envision his immediate readership’s posterity?

Lianeri believes that modern historians unconsciously depend on and promote an assumption of monologic history—a grand thread leading from the liberty and autonomy of ancient Hellas to modern democracies (45). In a ‘Whiggish’ take on the inevitability of democracy, scientific progress, and truth, one suppresses (consciously or not) contingent facts and alternative ancient outcomes in searching for exemplarity and a thread of continuity to connect desperately alien, ancient Europe to modern nations gestated in the European tradition. In this view, Greek and Roman historical times are properly seen as anticipating modernity in a temporally unfolding picture of continuity, one trans-historical reality—nearly teleological itself even when

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47 The concept and exercise appear already in Herodotus: 1.79.2; 8.4.1, 11.3.
48 But Polybius also invited qualified readers in his audience to continue writing the history of Rome beginning where he leaves off (37; cf. Wiater, 251, 265)—there is no eschatological ‘end of times’.
49 Plutarch offers an alternative use of the past—great men, great leaders, who anticipated the inevitable unity and monarchism of the Roman Emperors. Autocratic coughs and tics sway the world that he knows. Irascibly unhinged and exceptionally uncontrolled individuals brought about—and can do so again—chaos and civil wars for quiet, ordinary folk.
necessarily suffering interruptions, such as the so-called ‘Middle Ages’. The ancient historiographical tradition is subsumed into a continuous temporal framework, a grand picture to which we are invited to assimilate ourselves. Such uses of history, popular though they be, are banal, when not pernicious. They sacrifice nuanced ambivalence both in past political choices and present decision-making, as well as in Thucydides’ unpromising narrative of pathos, error, and catastrophe. Such narratives suppress the unpredictable clashes and outcomes of irrational actors manipulating toxic unreason. They seek distinctly stark dilemmas, where, in truth, the fog of contingencies smothered darkling plains. ‘Remembering past climates [of thought and opinion with accuracy] is a minority activity’, however.\(^\text{51}\) In sum, Lianeri’s collection raises worthwhile questions, provides stimulating responses, and invites further reflection.

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\(^{50}\) A thirty-page bibliography and a basic subject index (but no index locorum antiquorum) close the volume.

\(^{51}\) Powell’s observation introducing Hindsight (2013, supra n. 2) x.