Before I begin to talk specifically about *Annals* Book 4, I should like to address the larger question of what we are talking about in the disciplines of Classical history and historiography when we talk about truth, as it is one that has been for some time well-examined in other genres of historical inquiry. The theories and debates that have marked these other discussions will be useful in opening up what has become repetitious in the *querelle* between historians and historiography scholars of antiquity; namely whether the literary interest of an ancient historian’s work has much or anything to do with uncovering the past events it relays. In particular Holocaust studies finds it urgent to discover a satisfactory way of thinking about this problem that does justice to the testimony of survivors. This testimony is not always congruent with what historians have discovered to be the ‘facts’ of the testimony, and the debate over the ‘truth’ of the testimony has much in common with the divide between Classical historians and we who take a more ‘literary’ approach. Our divisions don’t capture critical attention as much as those within Holocaust studies; in fact it perhaps seems out of place to assimilate the speech of our subjects, the privileged old white guys, to those who lived through the horrors of the Holocaust. Nevertheless I find it compelling to forge ahead with the idea that Tacitus and his contemporaries had survived a period that left deep marks on their language; a period that we could perhaps call traumatic, while being careful about exactly what we mean by this term, and that care taking the form of working closely with their language to give more defined parameters to the notion of trauma and its effects on knowledge, communication, and speech.

I don’t wish to get trapped in a circular argument, in which Tacitus’ language is adduced as evidence that he survived a trauma, because he did survive a trauma and his language is like this. Rather, I hope to uncover some things about his language that point to the interdependence of speech and power—in particular, the difficulties that certain forms of power raise for the project of

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1 The translator gives different versions in volumes 1 and 2 of Delbo (1995).
2 For a good summary of the positions, see Roth (2012) and Trezise (2013).
self-expression and the understanding of oneself in time and space as a historical being. What does the language of a particular individual tell us about how power and its subjects interact at a given moment in time, and what bearing does this interaction have on our own construction of this historical moment? These are issues that I think have been under-thought in the quarrel that historians have with those of us whose commitment is to language (as if that itself were not a historical artifact of the utmost significance).

Certainly Tacitus’ work provides fertile ground for all kinds of investigation, but the issue of truth divides investigators. Historians think that literary critics cannot account for historiography’s claims to truth; we who deal in literary criticism believe these accusations are grounded in a simplistic notion of representation. But let me go further and say, first, that these accusations are grounded in simplistic notions of truth, and second that a more complicated understanding of truth, one grounded in the complexities of language--but not limited to them--is a fundamental teaching of Tacitus. Or, to put it differently, and not to use quite such evaluative terms as ‘simplistic’, I would say that there are at work in Tacitean studies two fundamentally different approaches to the question of history: 1) that it consists of some irreducible THING, called variously truth, reality, and so on, that both ancient and modern historians try in their different ways to get at (what Michael Roth calls ‘kick the stone’ historians); 2) that it exists only as it is created and re-created by historians and their interpreters. The apparent dangers of this second approach (relativism, particularly in the face of such historical atrocities as the Holocaust) seem especially acute to guardians of a history that is so old and whose documentation is sparse and fragile. The contours of this debate, and the problems with both approaches, have been well outlined in historical disciplines, and the postmodern approach has gained widespread (though heavily debated) acceptance there. In Classics we lag behind, where the sources of our study should in fact prompt us to join in vigorously; after all, what would surprise Thucydides or Tacitus about theories of the ‘linguistic turn’?3 In this paper, as in my work as a whole, I want to look at Tacitus as a historian who simultaneously documented the past, theorised about how the past could be represented, and experimented with the representation of the past as a vital means of recovery after the experience of violence and trauma. In his work, the stone and the soul are not separable. This paired interest gives Tacitus’ voice fresh authority in the face

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3 This is not to say that historiographical studies in Classics have not recognised and creatively integrated contemporary theories of history writing into the study of ancient history. A large debt is owed to A. J. Woodman (1988) for identifying the relevance of Hayden White’s (1975) work on the rhetoric of historiography and opening up this field of inquiry in Classics. However the terms of separation that still exist between historical and historiographical scholarship speak to limitations within our field that keep us from contributing to wider discussions of this topic in the humanities, when our material could considerably expand the parameters of these debates.
of changing views about the interrelationship of epistemological (un)certainty and political/ethical commitment.

The question of truth in history, as it is put by scholars who worry about the linguistic turn in Classical historiographical studies, is not historical (making transcendental, as it does, what historical truth would be), nor is it strictly philosophical (because it has to do with history and is asking for an understanding of a concrete object rather than a timeless one). Tacitus’ way of writing history investigates this in-between status of truth as a timeless concept and history as a time-bound one. On the one hand, we can approximate an understanding of ‘what really happened’—but it will only ever be an approximation. On the other, a primary interest in language risks shelving the lived experience of the historian who wrote and the time of which he wrote. Some historians invite (maybe with Tacitus I would say summon?) us to look in both directions and examine the past as something that exists in relationship with the present and with oneself as the writer of it. The ‘reality’ or ‘truth’ of the past is not simply open to any interpretation because the responsible historian examines what is still lived and felt: the past that is still there. This is also an invitation to understand what we are looking for when we use terms like truth, reality, etc. This what consists of more than the details of an event or character; or rather I should say less, since it exists as a kind of absence. I mean that when we make positive claims about Tacitus’ work—he is reliable, he is unreliable, he tries to be reliable, he is reliable according to certain standards, his motivations for being unreliable are x, y, z, etc.—we are looking to close a circle of meaning that Tacitean language circles around. So perhaps one could spend a useful and productive career on the gesture of circling, and understanding what past, and what relationship to that past, it gestures toward.

One of the most compelling features of Tacitean discourse is its sensitivity to the position from which it speaks. That is, the res that form his subject matter are not separable from his investigation of the shaping of a human subject by circumstances of extreme pressure: the pressure of an extreme form of power, and the relationship of a human subject to it. Even if many of us who study Tacitus have never experienced an external form of power like the one he describes, nevertheless this question of how we shape ourselves as subjects, through our language, in response to perceived pressures both external and internal, is something that Tacitus speaks to beyond the specific historical situation that forms the matter of his text. Historical truth, for Tacitus, has everything to do with relationship. What I will examine specifically in this paper is the element of desire in the relationships that make up his historical field: between the present and the past (Tacitus’ own as well as those of his era); between historical agents in his narrative; between the reader and Tacitus’ text; between the reader and the past that Tacitean narrative relays. In every instance, Tacitus makes us acutely aware of his own speaking position (most obviously, in the complexities and discomforts of the language he uses) and of
our own, from which we respond to him. Not an insignificant aspect of the discomfort generated by Tacitean language is its ability to illuminate the desiring aspect of relationships of power.  

As Ellen O’Gorman notes in her introduction to this collection of papers, the literary approach to historiography is well equipped to illuminate ideology, which she aptly calls ‘a historical force and a poetics of lived experience’. I will call attention in this paper also to the erotic force of ideology, in its figuration of relationships of power through the movements of desire they generate. Contemporary ideology critique draws on psychoanalysis for understanding these movements and relationships, though a truly political nature is easier to intuit than firmly discover in psychoanalytic theories of the subject and his/her relationship with power. However what is lacking in most contemporary discourses about the connection between external realities and internal representations of them—ideology critique, historical and historiographical studies, and so on—is a consideration of ancient authors who address these very problems. Tacitus’ detailed psychological portrait of the relationship between the senate and the princeps in the *Annals*, or acrimonious senatorial debate against the background of the delations in the *Histories*, could contribute great nuance to the consideration of more contemporary problems. When Elizabeth Bellamy, critiquing several attempts to find a truly political dimension in psychoanalytic theory, allows that it could possibly illuminate the ways in which subjects resist ideology as well as generate it through relations of desire, can we not see Tacitus’ difficult narrative as just such a position of resistance? Or can we not understand Nero’s excesses, and the desire with which they cross the narrative (Tacitus’ own in detailing them as well as our own in reading about them), as a figure of the kind of ‘scandalous pleasure’ that marks what Žižek calls the ‘obscene’ side of ideology—that is, what must be repressed in order for society to go on as it does? In the case of imperial subjects, might this not be a kind of obscene enjoyment of passivity and/in the face of the spectacle of excessive power? These are some of the questions that this paper begins to address in its interest in specific moments of desire in *Annals* Book 4.

What Tacitus wants, insofar as we can know it from his language, and what he thinks history is, are inseparable from each other. What does he want? To understand the truth of his circumstances and what produced them. What does he think history is? The serial effort to produce truth from a system whose nature seems to occlude it. But what we grasp from Tacitus’ language is that

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4 For a theoretical discussion of this topic, see Butler (1997).
5 See Bellamy (1993).
7 Žižek (1987) 125.
‘truth’ is a fantasy incited by the secretive nature of particularly Tiberius’ principate. Everybody in fact knows the most basic fact about the principate: one person has all the power. In Tacitus’ representation, however, what the system produces is the desire for some other truth, something anterior to the obvious if unstatable fact that one man can order politics however he chooses.

In the content of the Annals we see this in the representation of Tiberius’ desires as secret throughout most of his regime (‘desires’ understood broadly here as what he wants), but concentrated, finally, as extreme sexual activity. The senate is driven by what they imagine Tiberius is concealing, and their desire to know it. In turn we are drawn into this fantasy—_was will der Tiberius_— and in the end seem to be rewarded with the baring of his desire in the form of his physical proclivity for kinky sex. But this is another veil, not invented but inherited by Tacitus from the tradition, that obscures what _isn’t there_: namely a core, or final truth, or reality about Tiberius, or what will finally make sense of him, and by extension this political system, once and for all. This elusive _THING_, or core, is a matter of their own—our own—desire. Tacitus repeats the tradition in describing the titillating details of Tiberius’ personal, i.e. sexual, inclinations, but his narrative context emphasises political intrigue, double-dealing, and ambiguity. He does not bridge Tiberius’ sexual and political behaviour; he does not argumentatively integrate Tiberius’ lust with his wielding of power. One is merely left—once again—to imagine the connection between the two, in such a way that the revelation of outsize sexual desire provides a satisfying imaginary answer to the question of Tiberius.

In form, Tacitus constructs this play of imagination and desire with language that makes us work hard to uncover its meaning, and sometimes frankly just makes us guess (I’ll refer at the end of the paper to the problem of Sejanus’ knees and face in the episode where he saves Tiberius from a collapsing roof.) He formulates as a question of desire what historians who don’t like meddling literary critics see as a problem to solve. What the senate wants from Tiberius, historians want from Tacitus. And this is ideology: the thing we make up as the truth of our daily operation, in order to place ourselves in the world and give our circumstances a meaning. The discipline of history speaks directly to

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8 Though I have been chided by Joy Connolly for overstating the case: the lived experience of imperial power was that of a complicated structure in which one would have felt subject to several degrees or instantiations of power. As she put it in a verbal response, ‘Of course one person didn’t have all the power’. Her point is important and the nuances of this experience of power need further development in my argument. However as she herself argues in an innovative interpretation of Pliny’s _Panegyricus_ (2008), it is precisely the fear of the princeps that governs a whole set of new relations with power that Pliny attempts to generate through his rhetoric.
this desire for self-contextualisation, providing access to it through the constructions of the past that seem to explain things about the present. And I’m arguing—at least as I see it through the modes of his speech—that this is what Tacitus desires too: an answer to the question of the self that is not only historical but also existential. At the same time, he shows us the impossibility of this wish.

The history of ideology critique consists of the shifts that have occurred in theorising the relationship of external reality, or what is often called ‘truth’, to the internal representation of it. Recent work in this field argues that this relationship is mediated by desire; desire is what metabolises the external into representation. What we note in our panel abstract about a certain cadre of historians is a refusal to recognise or reckon with the ‘internal’ part of this equation, with the question of desire. On the other hand, the scholarship that takes language into account explains Tacitus’ truth-claims largely in terms of the history of rhetoric, differences between expectations of historiography then and now, etc. This is very useful for understanding the context that shapes his writing, and has helped us to see him as a product of a particular tradition whose history is itself an interesting and important field of study. But in focusing exclusively on representation it skirts the question of the relationship of the external to the internal. It solves the problem by referring it to cultural specifics: here is one culturally specific definition of truth (ancient historiography) that differs from ours in the following ways, x, y, z. And there still exists some notion of a ‘beyond rhetoric’, some kind of ground zero of truth that we shortchange or skirt to our own scholarly and ethical detriment. But if I have learned anything from Tacitus, it is that wherever the claim to truth arises one should be suspicious—even or especially of him. That the insistence on truth is an expression of desire, this is something that scholars of ideology have been claiming for decades, and is of the utmost importance in Tacitus as well.

How and where does this show up in his work? Right away, in his language that forces such recognition of itself. This project of making history, he seems to say, is going to require as much of you as it is of me. I want you, I make a claim on you. The claim to truth inherent in Tacitean historiography is founded in the desire for another to fill out his meaning, or else why would he leave so much out? The level of participation he overtly demands corresponds to a difficulty in finding a wholeness of expression, a way of telling the whole truth that would also be the full expression of himself. Something is missing that cannot be supplied by the act of writing history alone: Tacitus’ writing calls attention to the incompleteness of the truth claim, which is also an expression of the sense of something missing in its writer. Who is it that speaks this incomplete language? A subject who makes at least one thing clear: he will

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9 A point toward which Sinclair’s (1995) suggestions about Tacitus’ use of the verb introspicere in the Annals gestures.
not give you what you want or expect in terms of fullness in meaning. You will
don't get what you want because he makes no pretence of having it. He does not
even make a solid or full claim to the truth status of his own text: he will speak,
in those well-visited words, without anger or bias, causes of which he is far
from having. Tacitus positions himself in between two modes of having, having
bias or not having it, either of which would round out the position from which
he speaks. To assert either position would also be an assertion of outside-ness,
a claim to be able to see from the outside the relationship between himself and
the power that governs him. To say ‘I do or do not have a reason for hatred or
partiality’ separates ‘I’ from the power toward which it has either of these qual-
ities. It is an assertion of knowledge about the self. But Tacitus only says he
remains ‘far from’ these reasons; that is, there is a distance between the ‘I’ who
writes and a knowledge, which would also be a mastery, of itself that it could
make full or plain in language.10

This distance from complete self-expression, or complete mastery of one-
self, illuminates the struggle of the self to make sense of itself within the confines
of power relations, independence from which exists only in fantasy. Tacitus
does permit himself to flirt with such fantasy figures: Cremutius Cordus, for
example, in Annals Book 4, or his father-in-law Julius Agricola, or, also in Annals
4, Marcus Lepidus, who comes up at 4.20. Tacitus mentions him favourably
several times in the Annals and here gives his own assessment of Lepidus’ char-
acter after describing how he has maneuvered the outcome of a treason trial
toward some kind of justice:

hunc ego Lepidum temporibus illis gravem et sapientem virum fuisse
comperior: nam pleraque ab saevis adulationibus aliorum in melius
flexit. neque tamen temperamenti egebat, cum aequabili auctoritate et
gratia apud Tiberium viguerit. unde dubitare cogor fato et sorte nas-
cendi, ut cetera, ita principum inclinatio in hos, offensio in illos, an sit
aliquid in nostris consiliis liceatque inter abruptam contumaciam et de-
forme obsequium pergere iter ambitione ac periculis vacuum.

This Lepidus I discover for myself to have been a serious and wise man
during that period. For he turned many issues away from the savage
flatters of others toward a better outcome; nevertheless he did not lack
balance, since he thrived equally because of influence over and favour
with Tiberius. Hence I am compelled to question whether, as is the case
in other areas, so too the leaning of principes toward some, and their
aversion to others, is the result of luck and fate, or whether there is some-
thing in our own deliberate choices, and we may beat a path free of

10 Cf. Levick’s point about procul signalling Tacitus’ effort (and difficulty) to express his-
ambition and danger between sheer defiance and shapeless subservience.

The more obvious contrast would be between luck and fate on the one hand, and ‘our own deliberate choices’ on the other, but this is not what Tacitus says. The element of personal responsibility or control does not lie in our own choices, deliberate though they may be, but *something—aliquid—in them*. What is the something? In his notable returns to the theme of the good man under bad rulership Tacitus, I argue, betrays a desire for that which is denied him and for which, in Dylan Sailor’s terms, the autonomy and *auctoritas* of his writing compensate.\(^\text{11}\) As Sailor points out, Tacitus displays a good deal of skill and ingenuity to make a case for himself in a world where *auctoritas* is most obviously bought at the cost of one’s own life. The suicide delimits the self as an absolute contrast to the regime; in so doing it acknowledges the regime. Tacitus does not see things in such absolute terms, but his own in-between philosophy, expressed in the global irony of his text, betrays in the characterisations of such men as Lepidus and Agricola the *desire* that one could have it all, or the omnipotent fantasy that one could be master of oneself and yet remain on the safe side of the regime. This Lepidus passage suggests however that the means for achieving this are a mystery. They don’t lie in us but in *something* in us. And this Something in Lepidus *compels* Tacitus to examine his way of being more closely; it attracts him enough to stop the narrative and ask the 64 million sesterces question: how do we govern ourselves when what we know of government is tyrannical and corrupt? That is, what is the balance between autonomy and submission that allows one to achieve these moral qualities, *sapientia* and *gravitas*, and what are we if we cannot find it?

To this question there is no satisfactory answer. Suicide seems to many to provide one, but Tacitus sees it not only as a useless gesture but also in its own way a submission or form of cowardice. It is not a self-authorisation but an ultimate recognition of the authority of the regime. In his suggestion that the suicides against the regime actually make an empty gesture aimed at shoring up their own *gloria*, they make no radical stand against the symbolic system but rather stitch themselves more tightly into it. How does one unstitch oneself? The question of the mysterious something, whose existence Tacitus hypothesises not only in Lepidus but in the first-person plural ‘us’, I would argue, is Tacitus’ expression of the question, the question of ideology or fantasy in the sense that it is what gives an imperial subject something to hold on to in an extreme politics of dissimulation. In this statement of personal interest in Lepidus Tacitus flashes on his own investment in the system at the same time as revealing the emptiness of this investment, a mysterious something he wants

\(^{11}\) Sailor (2008).
to know, possess, and communicate. What is the unspecified thing at the heart of our specific, deliberate plan that makes us lovable or detestable to power?

Tacitus’ assessment of Lepidus makes the princeps the sole reference point for judging character. From his remark that Lepidus struck a balance between influence and favour to the metaphor through which Tacitus envisions the possibilities of life here—the path and the cliff, or the path along the cliff—the idea is that goodness shows itself through its relation to power or the danger that power represents. The sense of an inner property or something that we possess for ourselves is therefore an oxymoron, since the condition for its manifestation, and any results that might accrue from it, is the presence of power.

The paratactic connection between clauses, liceatque, showcases aliquid in nostris consiliis as if aliquid had its own existence; grammatically, it is not subordinate to the following idea (of walking a middle path between the dangers with which power faces us.) Grammatically, then it leaves the fantasy of the mysterious inner property aliquid intact, although clearly the two clauses are closely linked in thought.

A final thought on this passage: the pair of adjectives that describe the dangers of the path. On the one side, contumacia is a cliff from which one could suddenly plunge; on the other, obsequium is, as Martin and Woodman point out in their commentary, a ‘wasteland’. Both are metaphors for conditions in which one loses one’s sense of oneself. A fall down a cliff erases everything but the barest impulse to survive; the solitude of a wasteland removes all interaction through which one can know oneself. The middle way, placing one in space and time, gives the self not just security but a sense even just of simple existence. Desire in Tacitus is the desire to feel found, and this would theoretically make truth possible. But the melancholic tone of his writing instead reflects a sense of loss to the self that is the condition of his political situation.

My claim has been that Tacitus’ language teaches us that whatever is prior is not also originary: history does not exist on its own but only as an interaction, between the historian and his object, between us and him, between us and his object with him as an intermediary. And these are all relations of desire. So, to conclude, I’d like to look briefly at Sejanus as a central figure of desire, whose study suggests directions we might take as we continue to tackle these questions.

Sejanus and Tiberius together represent the crux of Tacitus’ view of the principate as a system of desiring relationships. The princeps is understood on the one hand as having everything, but he is also understood as wanting or wishing things that are hidden from everyone else. He therefore becomes the locus of meaning around which the imperial signifying system orients itself. It is the imagining of his hidden desire that prompts discussion and action, as Tacitus elucidates most clearly in Book 4 in his representation of the interactions between Tiberius and the senate. (These remind me of one of Jacques
Lacan’s definition of love as ‘giving what you don’t have to someone who doesn’t want it’.) Tiberius is one of the great characters in all of literature that moves others’ desire while his own is completely occluded (like the lady in courtly love poetry). Sejanus, on the other hand, is a desiring machine. In contrast to Tiberius’, his desires are completely open. The argument of Book 4, announced at its beginning as the deterioration of Tiberius’ principate, hinges on Sejanus’ desire for power but also on the hold he has over Tiberius, which Tacitus describes in terms that are very lover-like: he binds Tiberius, renders him helpless (incætum intectumque). His last appearance in Book 4 is as Tiberius’ saviour from a roof or cave mouth that collapses during the dinner at the Spelunca villa, in which we find him kneeling over Tiberius, forming a sort of tabletop over the princeps. Let me first call attention to the sexual dimension of this posture, and then to the problematic mention of Sejanus’ face. The manuscript says Sejanus is genu vultuque et manibus super Caesarem suspensus, which Woodman and Martin don’t like because the ablative vultu would have to be ablative of respect, and therefore a metaphorical use, as compared with the two instrumental ablatives referring to the body parts, knees and hands, by means of which Sejanus is literally propped up over Tiberius. They emend to utroque, ‘both knees’. But I’m inspired by Ellen’s wonderful reading of the passage that makes Sejanus’ face, for which Tacitus supplies no description here, an empty sign misread by Tiberius as a sign of his loyalty. I’d move further and see the two faces, Sejanus’ and Tiberius, as providing an image of reciprocal desire whose agents both grasp at something that isn’t there. Sejanus wants power, but achieving it is a matter of harnessing his own and Tiberius’ desire. He will do whatever it takes, and is shown throughout the book to be extremely active in the pursuit of his desire, trusting in his own abilities. The sexually charged superior posture here represents this. But in this sexually dominant posture he runs up against the inscrutable face of Tiberius, whose expression, not explicitly referred to here, is nevertheless implied by his interpretive stance toward the incident and the fact that if there is indeed a vultus in this text, it must have been Tiberius, underneath it, who saw it. So we have two blank faces, the vehicles for the movement of desire, each seeing its own desire in the face of the other. And this relationship founds the truth of this era of the principate as Tacitus describes it.

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12 The quip does not appear in the published versions of Lacan’s seminars. For two (of many) verbal attestations of it, see the online exchange between Jacques-Alain Miller and Hanna Waar (http://www.lacan.com/symptom/?page_id=263 (accessed 21 May 2015) and Jonah Dempcy (2013).
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