THE FAILURE OF THE AETOLIAN DEDITIO AS A DIDACTIC CULTURAL CLASH IN THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS (20.9–10)∗

Abstract: This paper examines the Aetolian deditio in fidem of 191 as described by Polybius 20.9–10. Erich Gruen influentially interpreted Polybius’ description as inconsistent and exaggerated, on the grounds that Greeks and Romans from the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC had a common understanding of πίστις and fides and that Polybius’ own evidence on deditio was inconsistent. This paper reasserts the older view: that Greeks generally then had a hazy knowledge of Roman culture, including the practice of deditio, and that—even if weight be granted to factors such as the Roman commander’s personal character and ambitions or the historian’s supposed dislike of the Aetolians or his deployment of a degree of dramatic licence or a possible ‘hardening’ in the Romans’ general practice—this passage properly emphasises a genuine cultural clash, thereby promoting Polybius’ fundamental paideia-objective of teaching Greek readers, above all Greek politicians, how to respond competently to the realities of Roman power.

1. Introduction

The year 191 BC was critical for the interstate position of the Aetolian Confederacy. It was facing a particularly dangerous military threat. Its ally, Antiochus III, had been defeated by the Romans at the battle of Thermopylae and forced to leave his military base of Chalcis in Euboea and then to flee to Asia Minor. After that, an agreement was made between the Roman consul M.’ Acilius Glabrio and the Macedonian king Philip V to launch a joint attack against two important cities of the Confederacy, Heraclea and Lamia, with the strategic objective of separating the Aetolians from the Aegean and cutting their communications with the Seleucid king. News of the fall of Heraclea to the Romans soon reached the Aetolian council in Hypata, forcing the Aetolians to try to reach an agreement with

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Glabrio, to whom they immediately sent a first embassy. Glabrio, busy, as he said, with the distribution of spoils, told them to consult his subordinate L. Valerius Flaccus. The Aetolian council then decided to send a second embassy, this time led by the federal strategos Phaeneas, who, following Flaccus’ advice, offered Glabrio a formal deditio in fidem. After a complicated series of events, this deditio failed and the Aetolians remained at war with Rome but rapidly lost their independence. Polybius states the basic reason for the failure (20.9.10–12): ‘the Aetolians … decided to authorise Acilius to deal with the whole matter, giving themselves to the faith of the Romans, not knowing what force this has, but led astray by the word “faith”, as if more complete mercy would accrue to them because of this. But among the Romans to hand oneself over into “the faith” has the same force as to give the authority about oneself to the victor’, that is, to surrender unconditionally.

The account of deditio given us by Polybius in the fragmentary Book 20 is one of the main testimonies concerning this Roman practice, together with Livy’s account of the same incident (36.27–9), which derives from Polybius; Livy’s own account of the actual procedure of deditio (1.38.1–2); Polybius’ further reflections on the practice in Books 36; and the bronze tablet from Alcántara, recording the capitulation of a Spanish community in 104 BC.

The modern debate on the implications of deditio for the understanding of interstate relations in the ancient world has recently been revived in the context of a controversy about the existence (or not) of an ‘international law’ regulating the practice of warfare, and this episode of the abortive Aetolian deditio has been at the centre of the debate. On the one side, Burton has defended the existence of an ‘international law’; on the other, Eckstein has argued a ‘neo-realist’ case. This debate reflects the continuing influence of one of the most ambitious and comprehensive essays ever written by a modern scholar on the question of fides and πίστις. In 1982 Erich Gruen reacted against the then traditional view that the Polybian passage was proof of a

4 Pol. 20.9.1; Liv. 36.27.1; Grainger (1999) 464–6.
3 For the Greek and full textual exegesis see pp. 160–70 below.
5 Quoted below, p. 163.
6 See pp. 173–4 below.
7 Nörr (1980).
8 Burton (2009); Eckstein (2009); a ‘neo-realist’ reading of Polybius can already be seen in Eckstein (1995a) 195.
strong cultural clash between Roman and Greek practices. He argued that
on the contrary other evidence indicated a virtual identity of the two notions.\(^9\) Burton has in effect now resumed this argument so as to define the
Roman practice of *deditio* as a common ‘habitus’ in the Graeco-Roman
world, according to the sociological concept developed by Bourdieu.\(^10\) On
Gruen’s thesis, *deditio* could be defined as a common regulative principle, or,
as Burton redefines it, as a sort of ‘international law’ recognised and practised
by virtually everybody in the ancient Mediterranean. On these readings of *deditio*, Polybius’ description of a cultural clash between Aetolians and
Romans in 191 BC is historically distorted.

This paper will argue the following positions. Greek politicians from the
later 3rd and earlier 2nd centuries were generally not able to recognise the
full meaning of the Roman political practices—including *deditio*—which they
had to deal with. In some cases—including, again, *deditio*—the consequences
of such ignorance could be very high. Consequently, Polybius uses the Aeto-
lian experience of *deditio* as a didactic example to his Greek public of the
risks entailed in ignorance of Roman practices. The Aetolians are an igno-
rant people who need to experience pain to learn, and in doing so become a
deterrent example for Greek readers of Polybius, some of whom will natu-
rally share the Aetolians’ ignorance. The sequence can be linked to other
passages of the *Histories* where Roman cultural otherness is stressed. While
some of this paper’s emphases have recently been anticipated by other
scholars, such as Eckstein and Champion, as will be duly noted below, the
question is so important, alike from the point of view of its historical signifi-
cance, of its historiographical implications (both in Polybius and Livy), and
of the modern scholarly tradition, that a full-scale treatment seems justified.
I also hope that my treatment will shed new light on the density and subtlety
of Polybius’ historical writing.

2. Gruen’s Case

In his well-known and influential article of 1982, Gruen’s purpose was to
challenge two then common assumptions. The first assumption was that Po-
lybius was right to equate entrusting oneself to Roman πίστις with uncondi-
tional surrender. The second assumption (a corollary of the first) was that
there was a major gap between Greek and Roman understandings of πίστις
and fides respectively.

\(^9\) Gruen (1982); accepted as the best explanation, by, for instance: Kontorini (1983) 29;
Ando (1999) 15 n. 50.

\(^10\) Bourdieu (1997) 7–13, 16 and passim.
Gruen produced a series of counter-claims. The first counter-claim was that Phaeneas, the politician given the central role by Polybius in the performance of the Aetolian *deditio*, should already have been aware of what Roman *fides* meant in this context after having been lectured on the subject by T. Quinctius Flamininus some years earlier in the negotiations between Rome, Philip and the Aetolians, as attested by Polybius himself. The second counter-claim was that the Romans assigned a main role in their ideology to the act by which peoples entrusted themselves to Roman *fides*, and this practice was clearly known for centuries and indeed experienced by the Greeks, as shown not only in Roman literary evidence, but also in some Greek testimonies from the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC. The third counter-claim was that Polybius’ representation of people entrusting themselves to Roman *πίστις* as unconditional surrender was inconsistent with some of Polybius’ own representations elsewhere, for instance, that of showing *deditio* as something rather positive in the case of Corcyra during the First Illyrian War (229/8). The fourth counter-claim was that Greeks could not have found it hard to understand *fides*, because it effectively functioned as an integral part of the Hellenistic Greek value system of *πίστις*. For the understanding of Polybius’ narrative of the Aetolian *deditio*, Gruen suggested that it would instead be more useful to take account of the personality of Glabrio, ‘a man hot-tempered and easily roused to ire’, and also to point to the issue of his personal ambition as a Roman commander who had just expelled Antiochus from Thermopylae, achieved success in Euboea, and taken Heraclea by storm. Given these important successes, Gruen suggests that it is likely that the consul was seeking the perfect finale to his successful campaign in Greek territory, obtaining the Aetolians’ unconditional surrender and the right to return to Rome as Glabrio *Aetolicus*. To this last issue, ‘the Glabrio factor’, we shall return in its proper context.

In engaging with Gruen’s core arguments, I discuss first the general topic of Greek *πίστις* and Roman *fides* in interstate relations, taking account of a wide range of sources, including Polybius, and secondly the Polybian evi-

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13 Gruen (1982) 60–2; Pol. 2.11.5–12.
17 See below, pp. 169–70.
dence directly germane to our episode, that is, the evidence that belongs within the same, very extended, narrative sequence.

3. Greek πίστις and Roman fides in Interstate Relations

Gruen’s main claim is that there was no substantive difference between what Romans meant by *fides* and what Greeks meant by πίστις in the field of interstate relations. To start with, Gruen attributes a very significant value to the evidence of a frequently alleged Locrian coin of the third century, which shows an image of Rome being crowned by a personified Πίστις. But, as Dmitriev has recently argued, the cultural meaning of this coin is anything but self-evident. To quote Dmitriev: ‘[it] … could have reflected attempts by some Greeks in the third century to rationalise Roman politics within the traditional Greek system of values’. But Gruen also appeals to the first decree of Teos in honour of the Seleucid king Antiochus III and Laodice III (ca. 203 BC). In lines 24–5 this document includes the following sentence: ‘… and gave ample evidence of the good faith he already shows toward all men (απόδιξιν ποιούµενος µεγίστην τῆς προϋπαρχούσης αὐτῶι πίστεως πρὸς ἀπαντας ἀνθρώπους).’ Gruen was certainly right in thinking that these words show some resemblance to the moral language of *fides* as explicit in the act of *deditio*. On a general level, however, this epigraphic document obviously tells us about the translation into the political field of a social reciprocity relationship between superiors and inferiors, as Ma has argued. It was a Tean inversion of royal discourse, reflecting power relationships between king and city from the city’s perspective and translating those unequal relationships into the convenient language of euergetism. Other examples are also quoted by Dmitriev and they point in the same direction.

Thus, while there may have been some degree of coincidence between the notions of πίστις and *fides*, as connoting faithfulness to agreements, this factor does nothing to undermine Polybius’ claim that *deditio in fident* does not imply any agreement going beyond the act of surrender itself. The Teos

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18 Gruen (1982) 60; *BMC, Italy*, 365, 15.
19 Dmitriev (2011) 249; see also Boyancé (1972); similarly, a Chalcidian hymn celebrated the πίστις (*fides*) of the Romans and Flamininus (Plut. *Flam*. 16).
20 SEG 41.1003, I; Gruen (1982) 66; for the decree and a short commentary, see Ma (1999) 308–11.
22 Ma (1999) 216.
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inscription simply illustrates the positive or mild side of Greek πίστις, but it does not provide us with anything to allow the equation of πίστις in itself with deditio in fide. For the reference to πίστις appears only to praise the respectful behaviour of the Seleucid king during his stay in the city with his friends and troops. The text of the decree does not imply any act of surrendering. It is also highly probable that Teos was not even establishing formal relations with King Antiochus III, because its foreign policy was reduced by its dependence on the kingdom of Pergamon; πίστις here is just an act of royal euergetism very different in its political nature from the Roman notion of fides.

We might consider another case. At some point between 154 and 149 BC, the Boeotian city of Oropos voted a decree in honour of an Achaean citizen named Hieron of Aegira for his display of support and good will to the city during a border dispute with Athens. This decree includes the following: ‘since we also [i.e. like the Achaeans] continue to remain in the friendship and pistor of the Romans’ (ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τεῖ Ῥωµαίων φιλίαι καὶ πίστει διατελοῦμεν ὑπάρχοντες). Both Oropos and the Achaean Confederacy were at this point independent states. For the Confederacy it is probable that a formal treaty of alliance had been signed with Rome forty years before, but neither of these states had yet experienced a deditio. In this decree Roman πίστις has the broad meaning of loyalty, as generally understood within this Hellenistic world of reciprocal relations between political communities and individuals, but the relations are moral rather than formal, and the notion does not bear on deditio in fide.

A Seleucid document more directly relevant to our debate than the Tean decree is an official letter of the Viceroy Zeuxis to the city of Amyzon

24 Polybius recalled other similar events, especially during his narrative of the campaign of Attalus against the cities that had gone over to Achaean. It is there specified that ambassadors of Teos and Colophon ‘arrived, handing over themselves and their cities (ἐγχειρίζοντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς πόλεις). Interestingly, the Greek historian makes clear that: ‘he treated the ambassadors from Smyrna with special kindness, because they had been the most constant in their loyalty of all towards him (τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν πίστιν): Pol. 5.77.5–6. He dealt in the same way with the citizens of Lampsacus, Alexandria Troas and Ilion, ‘because of the fact that these had preserved their loyalty to him (διὰ τοῦ τετηρηκέναι τούτων τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν πίστιν): Pol. 5.78.6.

28 Signed maybe between 192 and 191 BC: Badian (1952).
29 Calderone (1964) 45–52.
The second line of this letter recognises, for all who had entrusted themselves to the Seleucids (αὐτοὺς πιστεύσαντες ἡμῖν ἐνεχείρισαν), the enjoyment of all their properties as long as they maintained their good will towards the king. It is true that this letter has a highly idealistic message, but we can recognise both the similarity in wording between this document and the formulas of Roman deditio and the similarity of outcome to cases where deditio resulted in mild Roman treatment of the dediticii, some form of which mild treatment Phaeneas and the Aetolians were evidently expecting in our passage of Polybius. But this is an aspect of deditio which we will deal with later.

The need for precise analysis of context is particularly clear in one of the testimonies alleged by Gruen: the speech of Nabis of Sparta in Livy. It has long been established that this speech, though it probably has a Polybian origin, also contains elements of invention by Livy, and so the speech is already problematised as evidence that deditio in fidem was not a cultural challenge to the Greeks of the 2nd century BC. Even so, Nabis does not have a perfect knowledge of what Roman fides was, being confused about fides (socialis), but maybe this is precisely what Livy was intending to show to his Roman readers by the words he put into the mouth of the Spartan tyrant. But in any event the most important feature of this speech is that fides involves loyalty between allies, not surrender.

Debate about Greek understanding—or lack of understanding—of deditio in fidem naturally raises the whole question of Greek knowledge of Roman practices in this era. As Gruen himself has pointed out, before the


34 Similarly, the Cyrrhestae entrusted themselves to the πίστις of Antiochos III, after being defeated in a battle (οἱ δὲ περιλειφθέντες παρέδοσαν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως πίστιν): Pol. 5.50.8.


36 Cf. pp. 164–5 below.

37 Cf. p. 161 below.

38 See below, pp. 154–5.

39 Gruen did not give the reference to the passage, but it is clear that it is to the speech of Nabis in Liv. 34.31.1–19, especially 1–5.


39 This is finally recognised by Gruen himself in his most recent monograph: Gruen (2011) 133.

40 See the commentary in Dmitriev (2011) 240.

Romans landed in Greece, Greek knowledge of Rome consisted of a small number of anecdotal data typical of an antiquarian curiosity. Thus Eratosthenes asserted that some barbarian peoples, such as the Romans, Carthaginians, Indians and Arians, were governed admirably, though in practice the Greek geographer knew little about the origin and foundation of Rome. Most of the material about Rome was written by western Greek authors such as Timaeus of Tauromenion, though also by some eastern Greeks like Hieronymus of Cardia, who described the Pyrrhic War. In Gruen’s own words: ‘antiquarianism, mild curiosity, and an occasional display of recondite erudition; nothing more can safely be inferred from the fragmentary allusions in writers of the fourth and early third centuries’.

Did things then change toward the end of the third century? Diplomatic contacts and agreements were established from 228 BC with a Roman embassy sent to Aetolia, Achaea and later to Corinth and Athens. Nevertheless, these embassies were mere formalities and they did not lead to the establishment of any kind of lasting diplomatic relations. The only historical example of a formal alliance with a Greek state during the 3rd century BC was signed with the very Aetolians with whom this paper is concerned (212/211 BC), but this does not seem to have been intended as a permanent obligation either by the Romans, or by the Aetolians. Some inscriptions show the deep ignorance that the Greeks still had regarding Roman institutions. For instance, in a letter of Philip V to Larissa from ca. 214 BC, the Macedonian king has a basic understanding but he is also very inaccurate in some details regarding the extension of Roman citizenship. Another compelling piece of evidence is an inscription found in Rhodes in 1976. This inscription mentions diplomatic relations between Rome and Rhodes in ca. 200 BC, possibly as a result of pre-war arrangements against Philip V. In this Rhodian inscription the way in which the Rhodians named the Roman ambassadors as πρεσβευταὶ αὐτοκράτορες or ‘ambassadors with full powers’ is noteworthy. This mistake clearly shows a full Rhodian ignorance of Roman diplomacy, but the mistake is understandable because the designation of ‘ambassadors with full powers’ was very common practice among Greek

41 Strabo 1.4.9. On his poor knowledge about the foundation of Rome: Hecataeus of Abdera, FGrHist. 241 F 45.
43 Pol. 2.12.4–8; cf. Just. 28.1.5.
44 Holleaux (1921) 113.
45 IG IX.1, 244; Liv. 28.24.8–13; cf. Pol. 9.37.6–39.7; 11.5.2–8; Gruen (1984) 17–21.
46 Syll. 3 543, ll. 33–6.
and Hellenistic states, though it was entirely foreign to the principles of the Roman Republic.⁴⁸

Recently, however, Čašule has argued that the Roman intervention in the First Illyrian War (229–228 BC) ought to be perceived as neither surprising nor unexpected, on the alleged ground that ‘a review of newly discovered archaeological, epigraphic and numismatic evidence for the networks of trade and communication which spanned the Adriatic Sea from the late fourth century BC demonstrates the extent to which the Adriatic was an interconnected entity’.⁴⁹ Rejecting this picture, Eckstein has rightly emphasised the lack of third-century Italian and Roman archaeological remains on the Adriatic coast.⁵⁰ The balance of the evidence shows, as we have seen, that Greeks in general from the third century did not properly understand Roman practices.

Gruen advanced other arguments in support of his thesis about the universality of the fides/πίστις practice, such as certain actions performed by Celts, Carthaginians, and other peoples. We can only note here that this is a dangerous historical approach because all the quoted passages belong exclusively to the works of Greek historians from the Roman age or they are written by later Latin authors.⁵¹ It is impossible to have access to what these peoples understood or thought about fides in the second century BC, because they do not leave us their own written testimonies and we do not have their own voices; and also because the Latin cultural framework of these accounts does not allow us to take them at face value as a historical testimony.

4. The Polybian Evidence

What can be said about the generally mild and protective face of Roman πίστις shown by Polybius in some earlier passages of his work that seem to be in contrast with the case of the Aetolian abortive deditio in Book 20? Some passages of Book 2, relating to Roman campaigns in the area of the Illyrian coast,⁵² do indeed seem to show readers a benign face of deditio. Was Polybius

⁴⁸ Ibid., 29.
⁵¹ Thus: Diod. 13.43.3 (Segesta and Carthage in 410 BC); Pol. 3.52.4; 60.10 (Gallic tribes before Hannibal in 218 BC); Pol. 3.100.3 (Hannibal and Luceria in 217 BC); Liv. 26.16.13 (Hannibal and Capua in 211 BC); Liv. 29.30.11 (Masinissa and Mazaetullus in 204 BC); passages quoted in Gruen (1982) 68 n. 90.
simply inconsistent in this matter and was he simply incorrect in his uncom-
promising assertion of 20.9.10–12? 

In response to this question, several factors have to be taken into ac-
count.

Firstly, the final formula of the deditio ceremony, in which the Roman
magistrate pronounced the words ‘at ego recipio’ (‘and I accept them’), as giv-
en in the tablet of Alcántara (104 BC) and in Livy (1.38.2), as well as the gen-
eral associations of Roman fides, raised the prospect, for peoples who en-
trusted themselves to Roman fides, of a mild treatment by the victors after
surrendering.

Secondly, such peoples often expected such mildness.

Thirdly, such peoples often did receive it.

Fourthly, the Romans themselves often invited deditio in fidel with the
understanding of mild subsequent treatment or congratulated the defeated
upon embarking on this course or even conferred freedom upon such dedi-
tici.

Fifthly, it is no doubt historically possible that Roman behaviour in this
matter ‘hardened’ as time went on. Initially, Rome did establish a rather
lax order, though without signing formal treaties with Adriatic states. None
of these historical factors, however, undermine the substance of Polybius’
claim in 20.9.10–12.

And there is an important sixth factor here, to do both with historical
and with historiographical aspects. The general need for rethinking historio-
graphical aspects of the Histories has recently been emphasised by Champi-
on, especially in connection with some collective representations. In this
case, the first five Books of the Histories show the most positive face of the
Romans as a collective representation, assimilating their collective behav-

55 Walbank (1957–79) III.80; Liv. 34.49.3–4; 39.54.7.
56 Walbank (1957–79) III.79.
57 Cf. the letter of the Scipios (next note) and Pol. 36.4.4 (re Carthage in 149).
58 Cf. the letter of the two brothers L. and P. Cornelius Scipio to the city of Heraclea
(190 BC), congratulating the Heraclean for having entrusted themselves to Roman fides
and conferring freedom, ‘as to the other cities which have given the authority to us’: Syll.
avour with that of the Achaeans who are the quintessential Greeks in these
first Books. One of the narrative contexts in which Roman behaviour is
compared with a properly Hellenic attitude is the first war against the Illyri-
ans. Here, as Champion emphasises, the contrast between Roman fides and
Illyrian lawlessness could hardly be made more explicitly (2.11.5–6: ‘Ῥωµαιῶν
πίστιν ... Ἡλλυρίων παρανοµιάν’). In Book 2 the Romans thus appear as the
liberators of the Greeks, after rescuing them from the terrible threat of bar-
barians who, as the historian says from a Greek cultural perspective, were at
that time like common foes (πᾶσι τότε κοινοῖς ἐξῆθεν ἐστίν, Pol. 2.12.6).

From both a historical and a narratological perspective, Roman customs
do not appear as something particularly problematic when Romans are
fighting against barbarians, such as Celts, Illyrians or Ligures. But Polybius’
account of the first Roman contacts with Greeks in the Histories emphasises
their otherness, for example in the speeches of the Greeks Agelaus of Naup-
pactus (5.104), Lyciscus of Acarnania (9.32–9) and Thrasyrates of Rhodes
(11.4–6) and in the action of the Roman proconsul P. Sulpicius Galba, who,
having taken Aegina by storm, at first refused, but then allowed, captive citi-
zens to ask for monetary help from other Greek cities to be ransomed, as a
favour for the rest of the Greeks, because it was a custom among them (ἐπεὶ
toῦτο παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἔστιν (Pol. 9.42.8). Polybius’ emphasis on the Romans’ different cultural features and oth-
erness has indeed been a concern of scholarship since Schmitt’s classic arti-
cle of 1957, and over the last two decades, some scholars have stressed Poly-
bius’ ‘outsider’ view of many aspects of Roman culture, interrogating, or

63 Champion (2004) 113; for πίστις as connoting the act of in fidem se dedere in relation to
Corcyra see Edlund (1977) 133. Polybius here seems to have been directly translating
Roman words, giving Greek near synonyms: fides for πίστις, amicitia for φιλία, as estab-
lished through the act of deditio: Walbank (1957–79) I.161. The classical explanation of this
strategy of creating a supposed Roman sphere of influence through ties of clientela (with
Illyrian cities but also with Demetrius of Pharos) is Badian (1958) 45–7. In recent years the
attempt to project this hierarchical system of Roman society on to the sphere of interna-
tional relations has been criticised. The main argument against it is that the only literary
testimony where there is a reference to patrocinium and clientela in this international sphere
is Liv. 37.54.17. The problem is that this is a near literal translation of Pol. 21.23.4, and
there the term used by the Achaean historian is ἐξουσία (authority). So Badian’s argu-
ment that amicitia and φιλία are euphemisms for clientela appears inconsistent with Roman
64 This situation is interpreted, but in an undeveloped form, as a ‘culture clash’ by
65 Schmitt (1957/8). cf. Erskine (2000); Pelegrín Campo (2004); Champion (2004);
Thornton (2010).
criticising, the counter-idea of a progressive ‘Romanisation’ of the historian’s thought.\textsuperscript{66} Thus our emphasis on cultural difference in the case of the abortive Aetolian \textit{deditio} is firmly in line with recent scholarship on ‘other-ness’ in Polybius.

We may now turn to the Aetolian \textit{deditio}, beginning with the complicated Book 18 narrative, one of whose elements—the encounter between Flamininus and the Aetolians—Gruen claims to be inconsistent with the Book 20 \textit{deditio} narrative.

Let us first set the scene. In 198–197 the Aetolians were allied with Rome against Philip of Macedon and Phaeneas was one of the Greek representatives with the Roman general Flamininus in the latter’s intricate peace negotiations with Philip after his defeat at the Aous Pass. Among the demands of the various Greek contingents, the Aetolians demanded that Philip restore undamaged the cities which he had taken from the Aetolian League (18.2.6). During the acrimonious exchanges between the two sides, an interesting incident occurs (18.4.3–4):

\dots while the king was still saying these things, Phaeneas, who was impaired in his eyes to a considerable extent, interrupted Philip, saying that he was talking nonsense: for he must either fight and win or do the bidding of the more powerful. But Philip, although he was in a bad situation, nevertheless could not refrain from his characteristic style but turning to him said: ‘This is clear, Phaeneas, even to a blind man.’ For he was quick of grasp and in this regard naturally well-endowed for scoffing at people’.

There are several noteworthy points. Phaeneas here accepts the general principle that the defeated have to obey their victors. Philip himself is not only mocking Phaeneas’ near blindness but also playing mockingly on Phaeneas’ name, which means ‘bringer of light’. In historiography, as elsewhere, jokes may have real significance. Philip’s prescience will become clear as the narrative progresses.

Within the narrative of the decisive battle of Cynoscephalae, Roman cultural otherness is twice stressed. Before the battle, Macedonian scouts call the Romans barbarians (Pol. 18.22.8). And during the battle (18.26.10), some Roman soldiers misunderstand the gesture of surrender of some of the Mac-

\textsuperscript{66} See, for example, Martínez Lacy (1991); Erskine (2000); Pelegrín Campo (2004); Champion (2004); Clarke (2005); Guelfucci (2010); Thornton (2010); Langslow (2012) 92; Moreno Leoni (2012); this is not to deny, however, that Polybius also sought Roman readers who had Greek: see e.g. 29.20.1–4 (p. 171 and n. 107 below).
edonian troops and make a butchery of them explicitly as a result of their ignorance of Macedonian custom (ὅπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ ποιεῖν τοῖς Μακεδόσιν).

After Philip’s defeat at Cynoscephalae, relations between the Romans and Aetolians begin to deteriorate and this is where the encounter between Flamininus and the Aetolians begins (18.34.1–3):

... whether he [Flamininus] was generally annoyed at the greed of the Aetolians concerning the spoils or did not wish after casting Philip out of his rule [sc. over Greece] to leave the Aetolians as masters of the Greeks. He was irritated also by their boastfulness, when he saw that they were putting their own names to the victory and filling Greece with their valour. Therefore, in their meetings he behaved rather highhandedly towards them and was silent about public business, but carried out all his measures both independently and by the agency of his own friends.

This was the situation when Philip began skilfully to treat for peace. After the Aetolians became aware of the mild peace proposals made by Flamininus to the king, their existing suspicions of Flamininus doubled as they started to suspect bribery as the reason for this mildness. Then, the historian decides to explain to his readers the real reason: ‘not knowing the Romans’ character and customs (οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ Ῥωµαίων ἔθη καὶ νόµιµα) in this matter, but inferring from themselves and calculating that it was probable that Philip would offer a very large sum owing to the situation and Flamininus would not be able to withstand them’ (Pol. 18.34.8, cf. Liv. 31.32.1). Here ἔθη καὶ νόµιµα represent the Polybian concept of culture, and the passage delineates a clear cultural frontier. Thus in Book 18 Polybius already flags up the Aetolians’ radical ignorance of Roman cultural practices. These Aetolian suspicions, however, would be plausible to a Greek audience, judging from Polybius’s own words: ‘For since by this time bribery and the notion that no one did anything gratis were very prevalent in Greece, and so to speak current coin among the Aetolians, they could not believe that Flamininus’ complete change of attitude towards Philip could have been brought about without bribes …’ (Pol. 18.34.7). This is not the first time that Polybius refers to bribery as common practice among the Greeks (παρὰ µὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν), and the relative absence of this practice among the Romans (παρὰ δὲ Ῥωµαίοις). Indeed, readers should make a clear connection between this passage and earlier emphatic passages to the same effect (6.56.1–5, 13–15; cf.

67 Cf. further Champion (2000a) and (2000b).

In 18.34.7 Polybius’ use of ‘current coin’ as a metaphor nicely intensifies the theme of the exchange of literal coinage in bribery. Already we can see how Polybius both progressively intensifies key themes and weaves together different key themes into a complex organic whole.

Now from Polybius onwards ἄγνοια can refer both to lack of knowledge and to the mistakes resulting from it. Thus Polybius’ explanation here fulfills a clear didactic purpose and warns his readers against similar ignorance on their own part about the role of bribery in diplomacy. We shall return to this didactic aspect of the Histories, which will form a key element of our interpretation of the actual deditio narrative.

In the complicated negotiations after Cynoscephalae, Phaeæas again demands of Philip restitution of the cities he had taken from the Aetolians, Philip for his part agrees, but Flamininus says that they had the right to take none of the others but only Phthiotic Thebes (18.38.5):

For when he had got near the Thebans with his forces and was urging them to come into the faith of the Romans, they had refused. Therefore now, when they were in his hands by war, he said that he had the power to take counsel concerning them as he chose. When Phææas and his friends held this excessive and said that they had the right, firstly, because they had now fought on his side, to take the cities which were previously leagued with them, and secondly, in accordance with their original alliance, according to which the movable property of those captured in war belonged to the Romans, but the cities to the Aetolians, Titus said that they were showing ignorance (ἀγνοεῖν) in both respects. For the alliance had been undone at the time when they had made terms with Philip, abandoning the Romans, and even if that alliance yet remained, they had no right to take and take over any cities which had handed themselves over voluntarily to the faith of the Romans, which all the cities in Thessaly had now done, but only if some had been captured by force.

We note that the Aetolians are again being accused (this time by the main Roman figure in this sequence) of ‘ignorance’—and ‘ignorance’ on two counts.

Readers of Polybius of course know the relevant history up to this point: how the Aetolians first appealed to the Romans to counter Philip’s growing power in Greece and made an alliance with them to that end in 212/11; how they independently made terms with Philip in 206; and how they again joined the Romans against Philip in 198. Flamininus’ argument as regards

the annulment of the original alliance is clearly being represented by Polybius as right, a factor which obviously tells against the overall Aetolian case.\textsuperscript{70} But since Flamininus maintains that the Aetolians have no case even if the original alliance still applied, it is critical to examine his argument as regards \textit{πίστις} and ‘fides’. Within the economy of the \textit{Histories} as a whole, Flamininus is the first Roman to ‘lecture’ the Aetolians on the implications of \textit{deditio}.

The distinction made by Flamininus between the two categories of cities that had come into Roman power would have given Phaeneas the impression that circumstances affected the practical meaning of \textit{deditio}. Since Phthiotic Thebes had on an earlier occasion refused to surrender, Flamininus (it seems) was free to hand it over to the Aetolian Confederacy; but since the other three Thessalian cities had surrendered without hesitation, after the battle of Cynoscephalae, Flamininus, it seems, was not free to do so. Thus Phaeneas might have concluded that the latter cities were entitled to better treatment or maybe even to enjoy independence, and this despite his own earlier recognition that the defeated had to obey their victors.\textsuperscript{71} In fact, of course, Flamininus, in showing Phaeneas the protective face of Roman \textit{fides} in relation to the three cities which had surrendered without hesitation, was curtailing Aetolian expansionist ambitions. But in any event, the victorious Roman is explicitly imposing his own terms on the \textit{dediticii} and equally explicitly dictating his terms to other interested parties, here the Aetolians.

Subsequently, the disillusioned Aetolians change sides and ally, disastrously, with the Seleucid king Antiochus III. As we have seen, it was Antiochus’ defeat in 189 that triggered the episode of the abortive Aetolian \textit{deditio} which is our central concern.

According to Polybius, at the first embassy, the Aetolian ambassadors (20.9.2):

\begin{quote}
on meeting the Roman general, were setting out to make rather long speeches, but were cut off in the middle during the meeting and prevented from doing so. For Manius said that for the present he did not have the time, since he was occupied by the distribution of the spoils of Heracleia, but he said that having made a ten days’ truce he would
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{70} Gruen (1984) 441; cf. Dmitriev (2011) 250–2. It is interesting to observe that Phaeneas appears in the epigraphic record (\textit{IG IX.1.1}; Grainger (2000) 266) as \textit{γραµµατεύς} of the Aetolian Confederacy during the period 207/6 BC, that is, precisely the year in which the Aetolian Confederacy decided to make a separate peace with king Philip V, directly contravening the terms of the treaty signed with Rome; we do not know what, if anything, Polybius made of this.

\textsuperscript{71} Cf. already Walbank (1957–79) III.80–1.
send Lucius with them, to whom he bade them speak about what they were requesting. The truce being made, and Valerius having come to Hypata, discussions—rather long ones—took place concerning the state of affairs. Now the Aetolians sought self-justification by advancing the deeds of friendship they had done to the Romans from the very beginning, but Lucius cut their flow short and said that this type of self-justification was not suitable to the present times, for the friendly acts from the beginning having been annulled by them, and the existing hostility having occurred because of the Aetolians, the friendly acts of the past no longer contributed anything to the present circumstances. Therefore he counselled them to give up self-justification and turn to supplicatory speech and seek to obtain the general’s pardon for their shortcomings. The Aetolians, having made even more speech about the situation befalling them, decided to turn over everything to the authority of Manius (ἐπιτρέπειν τὰ ὅλα Μανίῳ), giving themselves to the faith of the Romans, not knowing what force this has, but led astray by the word ‘faith’, as if more complete mercy would accrue to them because of this. But among the Romans to hand oneself over into ‘the faith’ has the same force as to give authority concerning oneself to the victor (τὸ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν δοῦναι περὶ αὑτοῦ τῷ κρατοῦντι).

We note first that the Aetolian motivation for the deditio—‘as if more complete mercy would accrue to them because of this’—corresponds to some extent to Flaccus’ hope that they might attain ‘the general’s pardon for their shortcomings. Both items broadly cohere with earlier findings: that Romans could hold out the hope of mild treatment after deditio and that dediticii might expect it. Nevertheless, the Aetolians are explicitly ‘led astray’ by the Roman terminology. The translation of the end of this section tries to reflect the precise verbal relationships of the Greek. The last sentence is usually rendered in terms of ‘surrendering’, but this is a paraphrase rather than a translation. Ἐπιτροπή here means ‘power’ or ‘authority’, and Polybius’ point is that ἐπιτρέπειν τὰ ὅλα Μανίῳ, ‘turning over everything to the authority of Manius’, which involves ‘giving themselves to the faith of the Romans’, ‘gives’ the latter ‘power’ or ‘authority’ over the Aetolians because they have ‘given up’ their own ‘power’ or ‘authority’ (ἐπιτροπὴ), or ‘selves’.

The cultural frontier is here explicitly constructed when the historian introduces the episode with the words παρὰ δὲ Ῥωµαίοις (20.9.12), because that immediately confronts the Greek reader with the reality of the other-

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72 Thus e.g. Paton (2012) 261, following the gloss of LSJ, s.v. 2 (see further pp. 174–5, below).
73 LSJ, s.v. 2.
ness of Roman practices. This emphasis is significantly absent from Livy, concerned though he is with the difference between Roman and Greek practice. The cultural difference between the Aetolians and the Romans is illustrated not only by the climax of the passage—the explicit emphasis on the Aetolians’ ignorance (οὐκ εἰδότες) of the implications of the Roman deditio in fides—but also by the repeated contrasts between their long speeches and inappropriate appeals to ‘ancient history’ on the one hand and the Romans’ focus on action and on the immediate present on the other. Thus the emphasis is completely integral to the context. We may note also that Flaccus here makes much the same arguments as Flamininus had done (18.38, the annulment of the original treaty).

We have already noted that Aetolian ‘ignorance’ is a recurrent motif of this narrative. There are two other particularly relevant passages in Polybius. In the speech in Book 11 before the Aetolian assembly delivered by Thrasyocrates of Rhodes in 207, the ambassador asked the Aetolians ‘to put their own ignorance before their eyes’ (Pol. 11.5.1, 8). As Pédech already suggested, this reference to ἄγνοια is plausibly a Polybian addition to the historical speech, and it is used by Thrasyocrates to make a didactic point to the Aetolians, using visualisation as a mnemonic device to inculcate a moral lesson.

And shortly after the deditio episode, in a totally different context (20.11.7), Philip in conversation with the Aetolian Nicander will blame the ‘collective ignorance of the Aetolians’ (τὴν κοινὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἄγνοιαν) as the source of all evils of Greece, and use it to make a didactic point to his listener. It is striking that the Macedonian king here seems to take upon himself the role of the didactic historian. Thus our passage’s emphasis on Aetolian ‘ignorance’ is not only heavily emphatic in itself but it is also completely organic to Polybius’ historical analysis of the whole theme of Graeco-Roman relations and of the crucial role of the Aetolians in particular.

The second Aetolian embassy, led by Phaeneas, then attempts the deditio (20.10.2):

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74 It is a common practice in the Histories to initiate this kind of passage with sentences of this sort, or with κατὰ τὸ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἔθος or κατὰ τὸν ἐθισµόν, whichh reveal the general cultural otherness of the Romans: Dubuisson (1985) 276–7.

75 Burton (2009) 243 n. 3, does not understand this point, i.e., why Livy did not decide to paraphrase the Polybian passage directly (20.9.12), although he followed the rest of Polybius’ account closely. In fact, in this passage Polybius ‘translates’ the Roman practice into terms understandable for a Greek, something that was not necessary for Livy’s Roman readers.

76 Pédech (1964) 268.

77 For Polybius’ use of visualisation see Marincola (2013) 82–3.
Although the Aetolians do now follow Flaccus’ advice and do the right thing by offering deditio, they first inappropriately justify themselves, contrary to Flaccus’ explicit advice to them. At the offer of deditio, Glabrio confirms their status as Aetolians and their desire to submit, to which they agree. This exchange is much briefer and less precise than the apparently ancient formula preserved by Livy 1.38:

The king [Tarquin] asked [the Collatines]: ‘Are you legates and spokesmen sent by the Collatine people to surrender yourselves and the Collatine people?’

‘We are.’

‘Is the Collatine people an independent power?’

‘It is.’

‘Do you surrender yourselves, and the Collatine people, city, lands, water, boundaries, temples, sacred vessels, all things divine and human?’

‘We surrender them.’

‘And I accept them.’

Polybius himself knew this formula.\(^{79}\)

Might Flaccus’ appeal on behalf of the Aetolians then imply that the deditio had not been properly conducted, ambassadors being by definition representatives of an independent state? But such a subtlety would blunt Polybius’ main point: the sheer ignorance of the Aetolians, now and (as we have seen) in other contexts. The discrepancy between Glabrio’s wording and the elaborate formula of the ritual seems better explained in terms of

\(^{78}\) Ogilvie (1965) 154, citing Plaut. Amphitruo 258–9 for a similar listing of things surrendered.

\(^{79}\) Pol. 36.4.1–4 (pp. 173–4, below).
Polybian brevity as he gets to his main point. Or one could give it positive value: the Aetolians’ initial self-justifications already break the ‘rules’ of dedi-tio, so Glabrio’s brevity, when they eventually get to the point, expedites the thing that matters. In any event, we may note Polybius’ superior brevity as contrasted with the over-emphatic Livy (36.28.1–2): ‘he [Phaeneas] concluded with saying, that “the Aetolians surrendered themselves, and all belonging to them, to the faith of the Roman people.” The consul, on hearing this, said, “Aetolians, consider well whether you will yield on these terms.”’

To Flaccus’ intervention we shall return.

Glabrio then gives a series of detailed orders, where it is interesting to note that Livy makes two wrong additions.

But Phaeneas interrupts him (20.10.6–9):

‘But what you order us, general, is neither just nor Greek.’ But Glabrio, not so much becoming angry, as wishing to bring them into consciousness of the situation and to strike terror into them completely, said: ‘So you still give yourselves Grecian airs and make a speech about what is appropriate and proper after giving yourselves into the faith of the Romans? You whom I will have bound in chains and led away, if this seems best to me.’ Saying this he ordered a chain to be brought and an iron collar to be put round the neck of each. Phaeneas, then, and his people were completely amazed and all stood there speechless as if paralysed both in body and soul because of the

\footnote{Cf. Briscoe (1981) 263: ‘a considerable elaboration on the simple question in Polybius’}. 

\footnote{Briscoe (1981) 263}. 
unexpected nature of what was happening to them. But Lucius and some other of the military tribunes who were present entreated Manius to make no harsh decision concerning the men present, since they were ambassadors. When he consented, Phaeneas began to speak …

At the start of this passage Phaeneas is again clearly disregarding Flaccus’ advice—‘to turn to supplicatory speech and seek to obtain the general’s pardon for their shortcomings’. His reaction immediately illustrates the Aetolian ignorance about the implications of *deditio in fidem* as explicitly emphasised by Polybius himself. He is behaving as if the Aetolians and Romans are making a peace treaty. A critical question for us, then, is how would a Greek of the time understand *πίστις* in a treaty of peace? Hellenistic political experience showed that *πίστις* only appeared in instances of superiority, as a gift given by powerful states, or as a loyal attitude of weaker ones towards them. Indeed, the term *πίστις*, which is widely attested in Greek texts, both literary and epigraphic, does not occur in treaties of peace. This constitutes a clear difference both from *fides* in Roman treaties and from the implications of *fides* in *deditio in fidem*. And of course from the Roman point of view, which is also Polybius’ point of view, the Aetolians and Romans are not actually making a peace treaty, ‘since … *deditio* involved none’. Over and above Phaeneas’ general misunderstanding of the nature of Roman *deditio in fidem*, readers must infer that he supposes that, because the Aetolians are now prepared to surrender to Rome, they should be treated as generously as Flamininus had treated Phthiotic Thebes.

Phaeneas’ counter appeal to Greek norms also requires consideration. Clearly, he believes that meaningful standards of behaviour do exist among Greeks and can therefore claim that the Romans are not here behaving in a properly Greek way. Nor are they—that is the very point at issue. Nevertheless, it is the case that the allegedly ‘common laws of the Greeks’ or ‘laws of Greeks’ did not have a binding legal nature among the political communities in the Greek world. In fact, there is no mention of them in any text of a Greek treaty. Phaeneas is making a claim to an ideal consensual behaviour, which is only existent as a theory even among Greeks. Even more

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82 Nörr (1980) 140–2. Calderone (1965) also remarks the existence of a difference between the *πίστις* in Greek agreements, which implied a bilateral act that had as a corollary the recognition of both polities, and Roman *fides*.

83 Walbank (1957–79) III.80.


important, in context, is the fact that any appeal to Greek practice, real or alleged, is immediately inappropriate, as Glabrio sarcastically notes, his use of ἑλληνοκοπεῖτε ironically mimicking Phaeneas’ Ἑλληνικόν. Glabrio’s contrast between Greek and Roman norms echoes Polybius’ own. The same contrast is explicit in Livy’s account of the event (36.28.5–6). It is true that Livy is here following Polybius, but as a Roman with his own knowledge of deditio he should be presumed to understand it, and Gruen’s denial that deditio posed a cultural challenge to the Greeks of this age therefore means rejecting both the authority of our two main literary sources, one Greek and one Roman, for this episode, and their general understanding of the implications of deditio. Glabrio’s main motivation (to his anger we shall return) is to make the Aetolians aware of the reality—‘wishing to bring them into consciousness of the situation’—or, in short, to teach them a lesson. This lesson is conveyed through the medium of terror: a recognised Roman technique (although, on a ‘meta’-level, as we shall see, it also corresponds to the technique of Greek tragedy). This is the second ‘lesson’ given by a Roman general to the Aetolians about the nature of deditio—though it takes a strikingly different form from Flamininus’.

We have seen that Polybius’ own emphatic criticism of Aetolian ‘ignorance’ combines with similar criticisms made, to didactic effect, by characters within the text and that Glabrio’s contrast between Greek and Roman norms echoes Polybius’ own. His criticism of the inappropriateness of the Aetolian speechifying echoes earlier criticisms made both by Flaccus and (implicitly) within the narrative. Thus within the dramatic context, Glabrio’s goal of ‘bringing them into consciousness of the situation’ has an important historiographical function. For in the Histories generally, this goal, expressed in similar language, appears in contexts where the historian himself attempts

86 The verb ἑλληνοκοπέω is a near hapax legomenon, difficult to translate, whose only other attestation occurs at 25.3.1 to characterise the policy of Perseus in Greece. Other composite verbal forms of κοπέω appear in the Histories, most particularly, ὀχλοκόπον used in 3.80.3 to show the mob-courting by C. Flamininus. This is the sense in which Perseus’ behaviour in Greece is generally translated, ‘flattering the Greeks’, and it is quite possible that in the passage in Book 20 the verb has the same meaning; if so, Glabrio is warning the Aetolian strategos against trying to seek support from other Greeks, flirting with them, or maybe trying to accuse the Romans of barbarism in order to win the favour of other Greeks. Modern translators understand it differently. Mauersberger (2002–6) s.v. gives the following translation for the first attestation in the context of the Aetolian deditio: ‘den edlen Griechen markieren’ (similarly Walbank (1957–79) III.81), while in the passage on Perseus and the Greeks he gives: ‘d. Gr. umschmeicheln, poussieren’. Livy’s glosses—moris Graecorum and ex more Graecorum—are too general to indicate how he understood the Greek verb.

87 See below, pp. 169–70.
to outline the importance of the acquisition of certain knowledge by the reader who is defined precisely by his ἄγνοια of the relevant material. That happens, for instance, when Polybius introduces geographical digressions, explaining that when an author talks about unknown places it is necessary ‘to lead listeners [readers] into true and familiar notions’ (εἰς ἀληθινὰς καὶ γνωρίμους ἐννοιας ἄγειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, 3.36.5). Similarly, ‘to lead readers briefly to true notions of the aforementioned war’ (εἰς ἀληθινὰς ἐννοιας ἄγειν διὰ βραχέων τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας ὑπὲρ τοῦ προειρηµένου πολέµου, 1.15.13); or on the Roman military camp: ‘I think, therefore, it befits the occasion to attempt, as far as is possible in speech, to lead readers into a notion of the disposition of the forces on marches, in encampments and in battle formations’ (διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ µοι πρέπειν τῷ καιρῷ τὸ πειραθῆναι, καθ’ ὅσον οἰόν τε τῷ λόγῳ, τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰς ἔννοιαν ἅγαγείν τοῦ κατὰ τὰς πορείας καὶ στρατοπεδείας καὶ παρατάξεις χειρισµοῦ τῶν δυνάµεων, 6.26.11). Thus the parallelism between Glabrio’s goal in the dramatic situation and the historian’s in analogous situations of audience ignorance makes Glabrio in this essential respect a figure for Polybius himself.

Now Polybius of course was committed to a didactic project, a project both practical and moral. The explicit aim of his work was the διορθωσις or correction of the reader, which is considered most effective when it is achieved through one’s own experience, but less dangerous when it is obtained through the experience of others. Therefore Polybius strongly recommended experience resulting from history-reading as a way of training politicians and giving them experience (1.35.7–10). Diorthosis was the most concrete result that the reader could get through reading history (1.1.1). Polybius, then, is here ‘putting his readers right’ about the realities of deditio in fidem. In fact, this didactic dimension of the passage was already noticed by Eckstein some years ago. He wrote: ‘Polybius’s purposes in telling the story of Glabrio and the Aetolians were to explain to his readers the meaning of deditio … and perhaps to demonstrate how not to act in a crisis, not simply to attack the Aetolians’. But I hope to have made the case more strongly by showing how organic Polybius’ emphasis is to his whole

88 The same purpose is spelled out within the main geographical descriptions in Polybius’ work (i.e. 1.41.7; 4.38.12; 5.21.9).
89 On the didactic purpose of the Histories, see e.g. Mioni (1949) 24–9; Sacks (1981) 122–44; 180–6; Eckstein (1995a) 140–50; on teaching through example and mimesis in ancient historiography, see e.g. Fornara (1983) 114; Chaplin (2000); Nicolai (2007) 14–19.
90 διόρθωσις: 1.35.6; 35.8; ἐπανόρθωσις: 1.35.1; cf. also 1.1.1; 7.12.2; also the verb ‘to correct’ (διορθοῦσθαι): 38.4.8.
narrative of Aetolian–Roman relations. Somewhat similarly, Champion considers that Polybius uses the Aetolians as a representative example of collective irrational behaviour, but not only does Champion not provide an in-depth analysis of this key passage in Book 20, but also his model is excessively general and misses many important aspects of Polybius’ analysis.

Glabrio’s ‘lesson through terror’ is immediately effective. The Aetolians suffer and experience physical and mental terror, as a consequence of their ignorance. There is surely some Polybian exaggeration of the paradoxon that the Aetolians experienced at the action of the consul (διὰ τὸ παράδοξον τῶν ἀπαντωµένων). Here it is instructive to compare Livy’s account. Livy makes the Aetolians’ initial recourse to deditio more Machiavellian (36.27.8): ‘for they thought that in this way they would impose shame upon the Romans against doing violence to suppliants and also they themselves would be no less within their own power if fortune showed them something better’ (i.e. help from Antiochus), though this opportunism itself misconceives the real logic of deditio, until they learn Glabrio’s ‘lesson’ (36.28.6–7): ‘then the arrogance of Phaeneas and the other Aetolians was broken and they finally perceived under what condition they were’. But this is precisely because the Greek historian wants to show us that the Aetolians truly did not know the political drawbacks of a deditio. This was a serious lack of knowledge about one of the basic tools of Roman international relations; but this powerfully underlined the general image of the Aetolians as a people ignorant of Roman ἔθη καὶ νόµιµα as a whole. Thus, contrary to Gruen’s assumptions, Phaeneas and the other Aetolian ambassadors could be surprised by what seemed to them to be the strangely rough behaviour of Glabrio, which seemed inconsistent with the image of deditio that they had previously formed in their minds from Flamininus’ behaviour in Tempe. Pace Gruen, the choice of Phaeneas is not inconsistent merely because his previous political career did not enable him to understand the full meaning of the Roman practice. On the contrary, by using in his work the same Aetolian character making the same mistake twice, Polybius was in fact winking to the reader, linking the two passages where there was a cultural misunderstanding through placing in both of them the same Aetolian character. The two passages of the Histories in which Phaeneas appears together provide the full meaning of deditio. Whereas Flamininus had shown Phaeneas the protective face of the fides against Aetolian expansionist ambitions, Glabrio showed a rather different side when the historical context was modified and the Aeto-

lians had become overt enemies of the Romans, and, moreover, ones who now sought to invoke Roman fides after becoming declared enemies of the Republic and after being defeated. Thanks to their negative example, however, readers of the Histories can learn a very important lesson without risk.

The next question, then, is: how do we understand Flaccus’ intervention? We have already excluded the possibility that it points up irregularity in Glabrio’s behaviour. Even on its own terms, Flaccus’ argument does not actually ‘work’, because ambassadors, unlike heralds, were not sacrosanct. But, as we have seen, Flaccus had earlier acted as the Aetolians’ advisor over the deditio and it is also likely that he felt a family obligation to the Aetolians, since the original Roman treaty with the Aetolians had been concluded with a M. Valerius Laevinus, though the precise relationship is uncertain. Moreover, Flaccus is not motivated only by the imposition of chains and iron collars: Glabrio’s use of the word ἀπάξω, untranslated in the Loeb edition, clearly raises the possibility of Phaeneas and his men being led away to execution. Flaccus, then, is using any arguments he can find to prevent the worst befalling his Aetolian clients.

Phaeneas accepts Glabrio’s orders and thereby shows his belated and hard-won understanding of what deditio in fidem implies. At this stage, he has, we may say, ‘seen the light’, as his name should imply, in contrast to his political ‘blindness’ up to this point. It is worth noting, however, that Polybius does not explicitly state that Phaeneas and the other Aetolians now understand the situation: the effect is to throw the Aetolians’ initial astonishment into sharper relief. We may contrast Polybius’ technique here with Livy’s explicit and more prosaic ‘et tandem cuius conditionis essent senserunt’, (‘and at last they realised the condition they were under’). But Phaeneas

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95 This is noted by Eckstein (1995a) 218 n. 29.
97 We note in passing that Livy has transferred Flaccus’ appeal to Glabrio not to be rough with ambassadors to the Aetolians’ Machiavellian motivation (‘they thought in this way they would impose shame upon the Romans against doing violence to suppliants’, 36.27.8); cf. Briscoe (1981) 259.
100 Paton (2012) 263.
101 For this meaning (not in LSJ) see e.g. Plut. Brut. 45.6.
102 I use the word loosely: cf. n. 63 above.
103 Livy has ‘transferred’ this thought from Polybius’ later remark about the Apokletoi (20.10.13: see below); cf. also Briscoe (1981) 264.
says that the implementation of those orders requires the agreement of the people. Glabrio grants a resumption of the armistice and Phaeneas and the envoys tell the Apokletoi (the members of the select Council) what has taken place and what has been said.

It is at this point that we should consider Gruen’s alternative explanation of this sequence: the personal ambitions and character of Glabrio. How much space does the narrative leave for these factors? We have already excluded the possibilities that Glabrio’s handling of the deditio ritual or Flaccus’ reaction to the ‘lesson in terror’ point to any irregularity in Glabrio’s behaviour. On the other hand, Walbank comments on the Aetolians’ first approach: ‘Acilius’ remark [on being busy with the spoils of Heraclea] was no doubt intended to irritate the Aetolian envoys’. Yet Glabrio does then send the Aetolians to Flaccus and he grants a ten days’ truce. What, then, of Polybius’ remark at 20.10.7, ‘Glabrio, not so much becoming angry as wishing to bring them into consciousness of the situation and to strike terror into them completely, said …’? But anger can be an appropriate response to grossly inappropriate behaviour: the consul thinks that he has completed the Roman ritual of deditio, and he is giving orders to foreign ambassadors who have just become dediticii (20.10.4–5). And anger is explicitly his lesser motivation. It is also telling that, irrespective of Glabrio’s personal ambitions and character, after he left office, Roman foreign policy maintained the same peace proposals. Whatever role Glabrio’s personal character and ambitions played, it was not so great as to break normal Roman expectations of the ‘rules’ of deditio, which (as we have seen) is not to say that those ‘rules’ did not allow widely different practical outcomes for different dediticii. In any event, the narrative leaves little or no space for Glabrio’s personal ambitions or character as an explanatory factor of any significance.

We return then to Phaeneas and the envoys’ report to the Apokletoi (20.10.13):

TINGS TOTE PRRONT LNNOIVN ELABAN AITWLOI TIS AVTWN ANGOIAS KAI TIS EPIFHEROMENHS AVTOIS ANAGKHS.

Hearing which things then for the first time the Aetolians obtained consciousness of their ignorance and of the necessity being brought to bear on them.

\textsuperscript{104} Walbank (1957–79) III.78 ad 20.9.2.

\textsuperscript{105} Thus, the Senate: Pol. 21.2.4; 5–6; Liv. 37.1.5; Scipio: Pol. 21.4.10–13; and again the Senate: Liv. 37.49.4.
Now the Apokletoi achieve the same insight as the ambassadors. The wording picks up the wording of 20.9.10 (Polybius’ comment on Aetolian ‘ignorance’ of what deditio involved) and 20.10.7 (Glabrio’s wish to bring the Aetolian ambassadors into ‘consciousness’ of their situation). The ambassadors, who have themselves learned the hard way, now in turn ‘teach’ the Apokletoi, who in turn ‘learn’. The sequence controverts common and superficial assumptions that figures within ancient historiography rarely learn anything. But the situation also has a certain ‘meta’-quality, further promoting the ‘learning’ of the readers outside the text, as ‘learning’ is passed on as it were in a relay. News of Phaeneas’ treatment, however, causes the people to become so savage (ἀπεθηριώθη) that discussion of the Roman commands becomes impossible and for that reason and others when the armistice lapses the Aetolians remain at war—futilely. The description of the people as ‘savage’ underlines Polybius’ final condemnation of any attempt to resist the implications of the Roman deditio in fidem, and the specific imagery—of animalism—undermines any notion that such resistance is a mark of Greek civilisation or indeed of any human civilisation.

5. Conclusions

Let us now summarise the main features of this brilliant and complicated narrative.

The visual tableau at the centre of the climactic deditio episode has an essential function: that of providing readers with a visual mnemonic of the crucial lesson of deditio in fidem. Here the parallel with the speech delivered to the Aetolians by Thrasylcrates of Rhodes again becomes relevant. The figure within the text asks the Aetolians ‘to put their own ignorance before their eyes’ (Pol. 11.5.1, 8); the historian correspondingly provides his readers with a visual mnemonic of the Aetolians’ ignorance about deditio as a deterrent to those readers’ own ignorance about the implications of that practice.106 Another interesting example of this interaction between the figure within the text who uses a visual mnemonic for didactic purposes and the didactic historian occurs in the speech of L. Aemilius Paullus in Book 29 (20.1–4), where the Roman general uses the ‘sight’ of the defeated Macedonian king Perseus to warn his fellows against excess in victory—and Polybius himself is implicitly so warning his Roman readers.107

106 For such visual mnemonics within historiography see Liv. praef. 10, with Feldherr (1998) 32, 43.
While we cannot here go into the old and still disputed questions of the possible influence of Aristotle’s *Poetics* on Polybius and of the reality (or not) of ‘tragic history’ and Polybius’ relation to it, 

it is a fact that the climactic scene is strikingly visual and that some elements of the vocabulary and of the narrative movement of the episode parallel Aristotle’s tragic prescriptions. The Aetolians experience the emotions of ἔκπληξις and θάμβος (20.10.7, 9 ~ *Poet.* 54a 4; 55a 17; 52a 4; 60a 12, 17). Both the Aetolian ambassadors and later the Aetolian Apokletoi make the transition from ignorance to knowledge (20.10.11, 13 ~ *Poet.* 53b 29, 33). In the course of this transition the ambassadors experience a dramatic change of fortune ‘contrary to expectation’ (20.10.9 ~ *Poet.* 52a 3). Within this narrative, the emphasis on the ‘necessity’ brought to bear on the Aetolians might also sustain a tragic tone (~ e.g. Aesch. *Ag.* 218). In Polybius, as in other great classical historians, tragic narrative patterning can serve both as a useful analytical tool and as a mechanism for bringing readers inside the narrative, an especially useful combination when readers are being taught a lesson through the sufferings and consequent learning of the historiographical figures.

Although the ‘lesson’ of the conclusion of the narrative is arrestingly simple, the narrative as a whole is complicated. It combines the historically analytical and explanatory—tracing the decline of the Aetolians step by step—with the politically didactic. In the latter aspect, it makes an obvious demand of the Greek reader, but it makes a much greater intellectual demand in the piecing together of contrasting elements of narrative, a demand which—if our analysis is correct—some highly distinguished modern scholars have failed to do.

In the light of the problems regarding the differences between Roman and Greek understandings of *fides* and πίστις in the field of interstate relations, the alleged implausibility of Phaeneas as the main character of the episode of the Aetolian failed *deditto* makes no sense. On the contrary, this choice was calculated by Polybius in order to fulfil the didactic purpose of showing sustained Aetolian ignorance about Roman practices and deterring readers from such ignorance.

Polybius’ didactic purpose is also underpinned by delicate but pronounced inversion of Greek historiographical (and especially Herodotean) and Greek tragic stereotypes. Until the end of the sequence, when he educates the Apokletoi, the hard of sight Phaeneas, ‘bringer of light’, is the very opposite of the blind seer, and the wise advisor is not the Greek but the non-Greek, even ‘barbarian’, Romans; and throughout the sequence the wise warner is not an ‘external’ figure but a Macedonian king.

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108 See recently Marincola (2013).
As throughout Polybius, perspective is crucial. Characters in the *Histories* are the witnesses of events. They show their single, subjective and random points of view that result from their own lived experiences, and the historian in turn gives readers an overview. In the chequered history of Aetolian-Roman relations, different ‘gazes’ are in play: Phaeneas, at one time a Roman ally, at another a Roman enemy who had surrendered; the Aetolian Apokletoi; the Aetolian people; the all-seeing historian; and Greek readers who must be brought to the right perspectives on the chaotic experience of a cultural encounter with a profoundly ‘other’ Roman world.

The overall portrait of the people responsible for bringing the Romans into Greece is of course truly remarkable and extremely critical. Naturally enough, therefore, some scholars, such as Musti and Antonetti, have explained this Polybian episode as an expression of the malicious satisfaction of the Greek Achaean historian at the bad experience undergone by the hated Aetolians or of his *Schadenfreude*. But in attempting to reconstruct Polybius’ aims, it is problematic and trivialising to remain in the field of possible authorial prejudices, because this utterly fails to do justice to his didactic purpose and the very considerable literary skill that underpins it within this long and elaborate sequence.

Although it has not been part of my purpose to attempt a systematic analysis of the differences between Polybius’ and Livy’s versions of the central *deditio* episode, some account should be taken of the fact that Livy’s re-writing of Polybius partly represents a critique of the historical plausibility of the latter’s version. Nevertheless, I have said enough about the relationship between the two historians to suggest Polybius’ superior historiographical seriousness here to Livy.

While our interpretation of the Aetolian *deditio* episode has established its impressive internal consistency and its equally impressive consistency with the larger narrative of Aetolian–Roman relations, it has to take account of two other Polybian passages where *deditio* is discussed at length, in Book 36 (36.4.1–3, 9.1–17), to see if Polybius attains a total consistency throughout his long work (something which in other areas he has of course regularly been accused of failing to do). These two discussions spring naturally from the

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110 On the narratological application of the concept of the ‘gaze’ in Polybius see Davidson (1991); also McGing (2010) 95–128.
111 Cf. also Musti (1978) 72.
112 Musti (1978) 72; Antonetti (1990) 134.
114 Cf. the discussions—and defences—of Hau (2011)
momentous events of the narrative (the initial surrender of Carthage, the failure of that deditio, the Third Punic War, and the sack of Carthage), and acquire additional weight from coming near the end of Polybius’ 40-book narrative. Of course, the sheer emphasis on deditio and the sheer number of times that Polybius feels the necessity of explaining its meaning to his readers in themselves strongly argue against deditio being well understood by his contemporary Greek readers.\footnote{Eckstein also asked the same question: Eckstein (2009) 254, 261.}

The first passage runs (36.4.1–4):

Concerning surrender (τῆς ἐπιτροπῆς) I have spoken before but it is necessary now also to recall it summarily. Those who give themselves into the authority of the Romans (τὴν Ῥωµαίων ἐπιτροπὴν) give first of all the land which belongs to them and the cities in it, but along with these things all the men and women that belong in the land and the cities, likewise rivers, harbours, temples, and tombs all together, so that the Romans should be lords of everything, but those who give themselves are simply no longer lords of anything.

Here ‘I have spoken before’ cross-references to 20.9–10 and the Aetolian deditio; Polybius emphatically re-emphasises his claim that deditio in fidem gives the Romans absolute power; and the enumeration of things ‘given up’ is very close to the formulations of Livy (1.38.2) and the tablet of Alcântara, which again shows Polybius’ precise knowledge of the terms of deditio. It is also interesting to note that Polybius plays on two senses of the noun ἐπιτροπή: first ‘surrender’, second ‘authority’.\footnote{For this ‘double’, reciprocal meaning, one might compare nouns like χάρις. The former meaning is in fact not properly recognised by LSJ, s.v. which glosses phrases such as τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν διδόναι περὶ αὑτῶν αὐτῶν as ‘surrender unconditionally’; but this obscures the fact that in such phrases the word actually refers to the ‘power’ or ‘authority’ of the person to whom the surrender is made; on the point see p. 161 above. The linguistics, however, are clearly understood by Mauersberger (2002–6) s.v.} In this way he emphasises that one party’s ‘surrender’ is the other party’s ‘authority’, and he thus clarifies his own clever punning in the earlier discussion at 20.9.12.

The second passage comes in the long summary of the different Greek opinions about the justice or injustice of what the Romans had done after the Carthaginian deditio of 149 BC (though mention is also made of the Romans’ treatment of Perseus and Macedon). There has of course been much scholarly debate over which opinion(s) Polybius himself favours.\footnote{Discussion and earlier scholarship: Baronowski (2011) 103.} Of course, the mere fact that four different opinions are set out without formal arbitra-
tion between them serves as a device to make readers think and decide for themselves. At the same time, the very variety of Greek opinions on the subject proves the need for Polybius to make the situation clear, both implicitly and explicitly.

Nevertheless, the interpretative decision does not seem very difficult. The fourth and last opinion is given the greatest weight, both because of its length (28 lines in the Teubner edition against 8, 15 and 15 for the other three) and its position. Now this opinion says that the Romans ‘had received a voluntary surrender from a people who had given them the right to do what they chose, and when this people had refused to obey their commands, they had applied force to them’. This maps precisely on to Polybius’ own narrative of the Aetolian deditio. Phaeneas’ claim in that narrative that what the Romans were demanding in their case was neither just nor Greek also finds an echo among the Greeks critical of Roman behaviour towards Carthage. We have seen that Phaeneas’ claim in the earlier context was shown to be inappropriate. Here the fourth opinion precisely defines what should or should not be considered an ἀδίκηµα, or injustice, by Polybius’ contemporary Greek readers. One of the criteria (36.9.15) is ‘what is done contrary to laws and customs’. But the fourth opinion is quite explicit that the Romans ‘did not break any laws or customs or their personal faith. For having received from a people who consented willingly full authority to act as they wished, when this people refused to obey their orders they finally resorted to force’. The picture is completely consistent: Glabrio’s requirement was not an ἀδίκηµα, nor was the action of the Romans against Carthage an ἀδίκηµα, because deditio was an integral part of Roman culture, which does not imply that we have to consider it part of Greek culture, but just the opposite. Polybius’ overall treatment of deditio is completely consistent, and the historical facts about deditio are securely established: deditio gave the Romans absolute authority and it was up to them how they then treated the dediticii.

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Cf. also Pédech (1964) 199.
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