There is an unwritten law that the volume of scholarship on a subject is in inverse proportion to the evidence available. That is particularly true of the early Hellenistic historian, Cleitarchus, son of Deinon. In Jacoby’s definitive compendium thirty six fragments are accepted as authentic, comprising eight pages of text. On the whole these ‘fragments’ are singularly uninformative. Few give any extended digest of Cleitarchus’ narrative, and there are only five lines of verbatim quotation. All that has survived of his work, then, is a handful of weak attestations, supplemented by a few vague and bilious criticisms of his style and veracity made by later authors, usually with a taste for Atticism and antipathetic to Cleitarchus. Yet Cleitarchus bulks very large in the historiography of Alexander’s reign, not for what is directly attested but for his supposed contribution to the extant source tradition. It is generally agreed that there is a strand of evidence common to the accounts of Diodorus, Curtius Rufus, Justin’s Epitome of Trogus and the Metz Epitome. The extent and pervasiveness of this tradition has been the subject of long and occasionally heated debate, but there is a general agreement (or has been since at least the time of Eduard Schwartz) that a nucleus does exist, common to a string of extant, derivative historians, distorted in various ways according to the vagaries of the transcriber but deriving ultimately from an early historian independent of (and frequently in conflict with) the more ‘respectable’ accounts of Ptolemy and Aristobulus, which form the basis of Arrian’s narrative. This shared tradition is often termed ‘the Vulgate’, and the most popular candidate for its authorship has been Cleitarchus.

The problem of the Vulgate and its identification fits into a wider problem. Diodorus is the branch of the common tradition most susceptible to source criticism, and his use of sources elsewhere can be examined. Yet controversy is rife. Few scholars (other than Tarn) have credited him with much originality and imagination in the use of his primary authorities; but it has been a burning issue whether he was predominantly a unitarian and used in the main a single source for his primary narrative or juxtaposed two or more sources without reconciling the differences. As a result Book 17, the history of Alexander’s reign, is drawn into the maelstrom; is Diodorus’ work simply an extract from a single source, to be regarded as an incompetent contraction of Cleitarchus (whom he names and uses elsewhere), or is he selecting material at will from two sources or more? In the first case Diodorus can be...
seen as providing an outline of the ‘Vulgate’ tradition, and he is the primary tool for its identification; in the second we are at sea, and the identification of the common tradition becomes a highly complex and subjective business. Both cases have been argued in recent years. Twenty years ago J. R. Hamilton wrote what I still regard as the classic exposition of the unitarian case, but it is far from accepted, and Nicholas Hammond has repeatedly advocated a dual tradition in Diodorus, derived alternately from Cleitarchus and Diyllus of Athens, and has attacked the concept of the ‘Vulgate’ as fundamentally misguided.

A revision of the entire question is certainly timely, and Luisa Prandi’s new book, it must be said, is thorough, systematic and balanced. She first examines all the extant fragments in their chronological order, extracting all chronological and biographical detail and attempting to determine the range of authors who used Cleitarchus and his general popularity. On this basis she addresses the extant tradition, rigorously contrasting the extant narratives with the attested fragments and cross-comparing one source against another. From this intricate comparison emerge firm but inevitably controversial conclusions. Prandi accepts the existence of a common tradition or ‘Vulgate’ as indubitable, and given the wide popularity of Cleitarchus in the late Republic and early Empire (which no other Alexander historian, not even Callisthenes, can match), he is the overwhelmingly probable choice as the ultimate source. However, he is only the ultimate source; much of the material in Curtius comes from a later intermediary, identified as Timagenes. Nor is Cleitarchus uniquely used, even in Diodorus. Prandi tries to establish two traditions, one focused upon Alexander and the other with a more ecumenical, ‘Hellenic’, perspective. The former is conventionally ascribed to Cleitarchus, the latter, more startlingly, to Duris of Samos. On this foundation Prandi conservatively outlines some of the presumed traits of Cleitarchus, basing her criticism on the somewhat adverse testimonia of the ancient authorities. He was close to the events, drew on a lively oral tradition, and had a penchant to rhetorical sensationalism, yet lacked any unifying interpretation.

Much of this interpretation seems to me unexceptionable. Prandi, I think, has removed any doubt that Cleitarchus’ work is early, in the first generation after Alexander’s death, ‘verso la fine del IV secolo a.C.’ (p. 71). She also argues strongly that he wrote in Egypt, in the reign of Ptolemy I but not necessarily at court or directly influenced by Ptolemy; hence it is impossible to tell whether his work precedes or postdates that of the king (pp. 79-81). I feel that this issue is too quickly discarded, as it is surely of cardinal importance for the interpretation of Cleitarchus’ work. The historian’s attachment to Alexandria is tenuously attested; only Philodemus expressly terms him ‘Alexandrian’, and since he is listed alongside the rhetorician and
historian, Hegesias, whose company he shares in the *De sublimitate* (3.2 = *FGrHist* 137 T 9), there is little doubt that he is referring to Cleitarchus the Alexander historian, not some obscure rhetorician. Prandi has attempted to widen the argument by hypothesising an ‘Alexandrian transmission’ (pp. 55-7): Sotion, Eratosthenes, Dionysius Scytobrachion and Timagenes all drew upon Cleitarchus. This is admittedly somewhat weak. It is a matter of faith that Diogenes Laertius took his reference to Cleitarchus and the gymnosophists (D.L. 1.6 = F 6) from Sotion, and the range of authors cited by Eratosthenes and Dionysius is so vast that one cannot presuppose any especial predilection for Alexandrian writers—and Eratosthenes’ views of Cleitarchus were in any case roundly negative.

Some progress is perhaps possible through attentive analysis of the tradition of Cleitarchus’ relations with the Cynic philosopher, Stilpon of Megara. On this Prandi (pp. 67-8) is prudent and conservative, observing that the evidence does not admit or exclude a sojourn by Stilpon in Egypt; she is inclined to believe that he taught Cleitarchus there, but there is no proof that they did not meet in Athens or Greece proper. Stilpon’s dealings with Ptolemy are important, and deserve further study. Diogenes (2.111) records a celebrated humiliation which Stilpon inflicted upon his rival, Diodorus Cronus, ‘in the presence of Ptolemy Soter’ (the ‘Suda’ also attests that he was entertained ‘by the first Ptolemy’). However, a page later Diogenes describes how Ptolemy acquired control of Megara and tried to persuade Stilpon to join him in Egypt. He failed to do so, and Stilpon remained to experience the tender mercies of Demetrius Poliorcetes, who captured Megara in midsummer 307 (D.L. 2.115; cf. Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 66; Plut. *Demetr.* 9.8-9). These passages are generally, but wrongly, held to be contradictory. The year before Demetrius’ campaign Ptolemy had intervened in the Greek world with great éclat. He wintered on Cos and crossed the Aegean to base himself at Corinth, and presided over the Isthmian Games in summer 308. He was in the vicinity of Megara for several months, and will have entertained the luminaries of the philosophical schools of the city. Stilpon presumably performed before him (and defeated Diodorus Cronus in dialectic), but refused his invitation to Alexandria. It was presumably then that he won over Cleitarchus, detaching him from the following of Aristotle of Cyrene (D.L. 2.113 = T 3), a philosopher not elsewhere attested but who could well have enjoyed local renown in Egypt and travelled with Ptolemy’s court to Greece. In that case Cleitarchus and his fellow-student, Simmias, were courtiers of Ptolemy Soter in 308. He was already a figure of some notoriety, enough for him to be a celebrated catch, and it is quite possible that he had begun his literary works by 308. At all events the tradition of his cultivation of Stilpon is consistent with his being a courtier of Ptolemy, and tells in favour of it.
That sheds an interesting light on the relationship between Cleitarchus and his patron and the relative chronology of their histories of Alexander. Two of the extant fragments deal directly with matters on which Ptolemy is known or presumed to have expressed an opinion. In the first place Cleitarchus notoriously expressed the view that Ptolemy was present at the siege of the Malli town (Curt. 9.5.21 = F 24), whereas Ptolemy himself (so Arrian and Curtius state) declared that he was elsewhere, and the detailed campaign narrative of Arrian locates him explicitly with the forces on the east bank of the Acesines, commanding the rearguard in that area while Alexander moved east to the Hydraotes and attacked the Malli (Arr. 6.5.6-7; cf. 13.1). If Cleitarchus wrote after Ptolemy and with full knowledge of Ptolemy’s history, he was virtually calling his patron a liar. The same is true of the celebrated fragment which makes the courtesan Thais responsible for the burning of the palace at Persepolis (Athen. 13.576E = F 11). As Prandi concedes (p. 80), Arrian’s account of the matter not only ignores the role of Thais but excludes her; the palace is burned as a matter of policy by Alexander. Now, if, as is almost certain, Arrian’s account is based on Ptolemy, Cleitarchus was contradicting him on a matter that concerned his nearest kin. Thais was his mistress and prominent in the Egyptian court; Ptolemy’s children by her were players in the dynastic game, Eirene marrying Eunostus, king of Cypriot Soli, and Leontiscus participating in the Battle of Salamis in 306. If Ptolemy had written an account which gave Thais no part in the burning of Persepolis, it would have been a grave provocation to claim that she was actually the main cause of the event. Ptolemy may not have been the most intolerant of the Successors, but he had a dark side, as he showed when he poisoned his benefactor, Polemaeus (Diod. 20.27.3). Prandi insists that he had no need to control historical writing. Possibly so, but he was an acute propagandist, and nobody close to him would have written material inconsistent with the royal propaganda. It is practically axiomatic that if Cleitarchus wrote accounts of sensitive episodes which conflicted with Ptolemy, he wrote before him; he was no doubt attempting to be flattering and complimentary, but his treatment did not suit Ptolemy’s purposes when he came to write his own history.

What emerges clearly and valuably from Prandi’s study is the popularity of Cleitarchus’ work, particularly in the late Republic. Philodemus reveals that his style could be called ‘Cleitarchean’ (T 11), while Cicero implies that his young friend, Caelius Rufus, was virtually devoted to the historian. More significantly, Cicero claims that one of the leading Roman historians of his age, L. Cornelius Sisenna, based his approach upon Cleitarchus; he fell short, and even if he had achieved his aim, he would have been second rate (Cic. De leg. 1.7 = T 13). Prandi is right to insist that the tone is depreciatory; Cicero is leading to the conclusion that he is the natural person to write
Roman history, and denigrates Sisenna through Cleitarchus. On the other hand Sisenna’s choice of Cleitarchus as model is significant, indicating that he was the historian of first recourse for the Alexander period. We cannot go much further on this line of argument. Sisenna’s *reliquiae* are as fragmentary as those of Cleitarchus, and we cannot use the one to explain the other. Elizabeth Rawson (*CQ* 29 [1979] 336-45) made some highly tentative suggestions, to which one might add the analogy between Sisenna’s description of the portents before the Marsic War (Cic. *De div.* 1.99 = Sisenna F 5 Peter) and Diodorus’ almost identical report of the portents before the fall of Thebes (Diod. 17.10.2-6). If Cleitarchus was at the base of the latter, he may have inspired Sisenna’s choice and exposition. The main point, however, is that Cleitarchus could be seen as the historian to imitate, and he was a natural choice as source of Diodorus’ narrative of the Alexander period.

Prandi (pp. 117-24) does full justice to Diodorus’ one explicit citation of Cleitarchus (2.7.3-4 = F 10; cf. 10.1-6), the anticipatory reference to his description of Babylon, which he inserts into his digest of Ctesias (exactly as he anticipates the description of the Ganges in Book 18 when he is resuming Megasthenes’ exposition of Indian geography a few chapters later, at 2. 37. 2-3). There can be no reasonable doubt that Diodorus knew and used Cleitarchus as a secondary source for his description of Babylonian prehistory. That creates the presupposition that Cleitarchus was a primary source for the period which he actually covered, namely the reign of Alexander. So far so good. But was Cleitarchus the only source? Can one postulate a second source which Diodorus used, either sporadically, as he cited Cleitarchus (and Hieronymus) in his early books, or as a systematic control source? Prandi here deploys an original line of argument, a *via negativa*. She isolates ‘at least four instances’ in which Diodorus’ text contradicts the attested fragments of Cleitarchus (pp. 87-8) and cannot therefore derive from Cleitarchus himself. In these contradictory reports (and other sections of Book 17) she identifies a more ‘Hellenic’ orientation, which she argues comes from Duris of Samos, the principal authority for Diodorus’ Sicilian narrative of the period, who could well have been used as a supplementary source for the history of Alexander.

Objections to the hypothesis are easily formulated. Duris admittedly is a figure of far greater substance than his rival Diyllos, whom Hammond claims as Diodorus’ second source for book 17. Against the three uninformative fragments of Diyllos we have nearly a hundred attested for Duris. However, for the reign of Alexander there is a mere handful of attestations. One (Plut. *Dem.* 23.3 = FGrHist 76 F 39) asserts that the number of Athenian orators demanded by Alexander was ten, the figure reported by Diodorus (17.15. 1). This is, of course, hardly conclusive. Plutarch also ascribes the figure to Idomeneus the Atthidographer, and there is no reason to believe that
he was exhaustive in listing his authorities. On the other hand, the absence of Sicilian material in Diodorus’ account of Alexander surely tells heavily against Duris as a major source. It is unlikely in the extreme that Duris recorded no significant events in Sicily between 336 and 317, when Diodorus introduces his account of Agathocles, with considerable emphasis, at the start of Book 19. Given Diodorus’ understandable interest in things Sicilian, it would seem probable that the sources he used for Books 17 and 18 recorded little or nothing about the island; and that would surely exclude Duris. However, the question of the identity of the secondary source, whether Diyllus or Duris, is immaterial. What matters is the validity of Prandi’s method. Must we necessarily postulate a double source tradition in Diodorus 17?

I must state at this point that I have serious doubts about Prandi’s procedure. Obviously if one can pinpoint direct contradictions in Diodorus, then there is a prima facie case for postulating two sources. But the contradictions must be direct contradictions of fact, not simply omissions of supposedly relevant detail. Cleitarchus’ work was very substantial, at least twelve books and perhaps as many as fifteen. Diodorus can only have used a fraction of the material, and what he selects may be drastically contracted. He may also have distorted his original. The latter is a very thorny issue, for Diodorus’ original is very rarely available, and we usually have to make do with comparison with other derivative writers who have used the same primary material (Photius with Agatharchides or Arrian and Strabo with Megasthenes). Yet there are passages preserved from Book 25 that derive from Polybius’ fully extant description of the Mercenaries’ Revolt at Carthage. Here Diodorus’ procedure varies sharply, from verbatim quotation to almost total misunderstanding and deformation. For a fairly accurate, though abbreviated account one may compare Diod. 25.2 with Polyb. 1.81.2-4, 82.1; for a more intricate borrowing consider the following:

Taking him at once to Spendius’ cross and visiting bitter punishment on him, they took down the one [Spendius] and crucified the other alive, slaughtering around the body of Spendius thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank. So Fortune, as though it were her design to compare them, gave both the extreme punishment upon each other in turn.

(Polyb. 1.86.6-7) Hamilcar crucified Spondius. But when Matho took Hannibal prisoner, he nailed him to the cross. Thus it seemed that Fortune of set purpose was assigning success and defeat in turn to these profaners of human nature.

(Diod. 25.5)
There is no doubt that Diodorus is summarising Polybius’ original, and he is prepared to deduce a moral from the story. But it is not Polybius’ moral. Diodorus generalises and trivialises, and adds a moral charge of his own. That is what we should expect. The гномаи give most latitude for divergence. Diodorus follows Polybius as far as the ‘facts’ are concerned, but apparently feels himself free to draw his own moral conclusions. That has an obvious relevance if we are in the business of ascribing bias or partiality to his lost primary sources.

When we come to Prandi’s specific instances of contradiction we are quickly in this world of secondary elaboration. According to Athenaeus (13.586D = F 30) Cleitarchus largely agreed with Theopompus’ portrait of Harpalus and his relations with his Athenian courtesans. For Prandi (pp. 42, 88) there is a contradiction with Diodorus; Theopompus concentrates on Harpalus’ relations with Glycera and his tendency to demand honours, whereas Diodorus (17.108.4) deals with the treasurer’s general insubordination and his relationship with his first Athenian mistress, Pythionice. This argument only works if we assume that all Diodorus writes is all that Cleitarchus recorded. But the assumption is patently incorrect. It is clear that Theopompus dealt at length with Harpalus; Athenaeus (13.595A-C = FGrHist 115 F 253) dealt with Pythionice at some length, and expatiated on the posthumous honours paid to her. That is exactly what Diodorus records. If he was resuming Cleitarchus, he confined himself to the earlier part of his account, that which dealt with Pythionice. He omitted the subsequent expose of his relations with Glycera. One may readily assume that Cleitarchus did give the same general account as Theopompus, dealing with Harpalus’ behaviour in general and his relations with the Athenian courtesans in particular; but Diodorus only cared to extract a portion of the story.

Central to Prandi’s thesis is her treatment of the sack of Thebes. Diodorus’ account, she argues (pp. 42-5, 89-90), is formally inconsistent with what Athenaeus digests of Cleitarchus’ work; the Alexandrian historian shows a note of disdain while Diodorus repeatedly stresses the heroism of the Thebans. But, as Prandi notes, the context of Athenaeus’ remarks is on the whole favourable. It is the first item of a series of examples contrasting the poverty of the Greeks with the self-indulgent luxury of Cleopatra and Antony. For contrast Athenaeus refers us to Cleitarchus’ account of Theban banquets, which were proverbial for their frugality, and notes that the entire wealth of the city when it was sacked by Alexander amounted to less than 440 talents. Athenaeus goes on to claim that the Thebans were ‘mean-spirited and greedy’ (a proverbial combination: cf. ‘Suda’ A 518.1), with an excessive appetite for their repulsive fare, and adds whimsically that the Per-
sians were ruined by their banquet at Thebes before they set foot on the battlefield of Plataea. Cleitarchus certainly characterised the Theban banquets as a gastronomic disaster, but the negative emphasis may be due to Athenaeus, paving the way for his joke about the Persians at Plataea. Even if Cleitarchus did take a dim view of the Thebans’ cuisine, it did not mean that he had a negative view of their resistance to Alexander.

Perhaps more important is the conflict on fact. According to Athenaeus the entire wealth of the Thebans amounted to 440 talents; for Diodorus (17.14.10) it was the sale of the prisoners of war which released the sum. The figure is the same, but what it represents is totally different. One of the traditions is clearly wrong, and we must decide whether we have two secondary authorities giving abbreviated and garbled versions of a longer original or two primary sources which are in disagreement, one of them applying an authentic figure to the wrong transaction. The former seems to me the more likely, especially given the fact that in Diodorus the figure occurs in a contracted closing sentence. He ends his narrative of the siege of Thebes with a note about the fate of the surviving populace; Alexander sold his prisoners and amassed 440 talents. The two clauses read as interconnected, but Diodorus could well have abbreviated a relatively long description of Alexander selling his prisoners, rounding up everything of value in the city (which he surely did), and realising a grand total of 440 talents. It is perfectly possible that both Athenaeus and Diodorus resume a common source but do so from different perspectives; Athenaeus uses the figure to illustrate the poverty of the Thebans, whereas Diodorus emphasises the ‘Schrecklichkeit’, the razing of the city and the selling of the captives, and notes as an afterthought that the total was 440 talents.

The entire hypothesis of the ‘Hellenic’ source rests upon the purported contradictions which Prandi detects in Diodorus. Much of this I find ultra-sceptical, in particular the analysis of the opening chapters of Diodorus 17 (pp. 93-6). Here she sees two incompatible strands, the first a source which stresses Alexander’s moderation and his diplomacy in re-establishing the League of Corinth, and the second an account which stresses the naked terrorism with which he crushed opposition in Macedonia and rebellion in Greece. But surely the two strands are quite compatible. Alexander could afford to be conciliatory in 336/5 when dealing with the compliant communities which sent delegates to Corinth. That was perfectly consistent with draconian treatment of states which resisted him and, like Thebes, did so contumaciously. So Diodorus explicitly states at 17.3.6. There Diodorus summarises Alexander’s response to the difficulties at the start of his reign: some communities he dealt with by persuasive diplomacy; others he scared into compliance, while some were forced into subjugation. The triad (πειθώ, φόβος, βία) is a perfect summary of the next few chapters, his diplomatic
overtures to the Thessalians, Amphictyons and Ambraciots (4.3), his intimida-
tion of the Thebans and Athenians (4.4-6) and his subjugation of the
northern peoples (8.1) and of course the destruction of Thebes. The termi-
nology of 3.6 is repeated and serves as a unifying theme. This could of
course be Diodorus moulding subject matter from different sources into a
coherent, unified narrative; but it is more likely that he took the patterning
from his source. There is certainly nothing in the exposition that presup-
poses the use of contradictory sources.

The \textit{via negativa} is taken further when Prandi compares Diodorus with
the rest of the ‘Vulgate’. She devotes some twenty pages (pp. 125-44) to a
critical juxtaposition of Diodorus and Curtius, concentrating on the differ-
ences between the two expositions. Such differences, she argues, are best
explained by the hypothesis that they are based on distinct primary sources.
Even when the two accounts are roughly parallel, there are divergences in
Curtius which suggest that he was working from a later, intermediate
source, most probably Timagenes, whom Curtius does once cite. It is cer-
tainly possible that Curtius uses Timagenes on a more extensive basis; he is
the only historian of the late Hellenistic period named by Quintilian (10.1.75;
cf. Prandi pp. 70-1), and is listed with some approval immediately after
Ephorus and Cleitarchus himself. However, Timagenes’ work is totally
opaque. We know that as a person he was acidic and outspoken, and in-
curred the anger of Augustus. But his work is very scantily attested, and the
only evidence we have for the Alexander period is Curtius’ statement that
he (like Cleitarchus) gave Ptolemy a role at the Malli town. It is sheer con-
jecture that he was the target of Livy’s celebrated broadside against the \textit{levis-
simi ex Graecis} who claimed that Rome would have fallen to Alexander (Liv.
9.18.6 = \textit{FGnHist} 88 T 9); the man who burned his history of Augustus (Sen.
\textit{Contr.} 10.5.22) might have taken a jaundiced view of Roman pretensions
thereafter, but before the break, while he was in the household of Augustus
and enjoying his patronage, he was unlikely to have been excessively pro-
vocative. We simply do not know what was the character, let alone any bias,
of Timagenes’ treatment of Alexander, and it is little help to identify him as
a source.

What is more important is Prandi’s view of Curtius. As with Diodorus,
her method of working from divergences is only valid if Curtius accepted his
source material without significant adaptation. That is demonstrably false.
Of all the extant Alexander historians Curtius is probably the most complex
and baffling. His style is highly rhetorical and dramatic, and his shaping is
patent. He can arrange his material into vivid dialogue, subject his factual
narrative to a running counterpoint of moral commentary, and it is arguable
that there are wider literary themes which determine his choice and mould-
ing of material. These aspects will be fully treated in a forthcoming mono-
graph by Elizabeth Baynham (Alexander, King, General and Tyrant: A Study of Roman Curtius’ History of Alexander the Great, University of Michigan Press 1997). It is clear that Curtius operated very cavalierly with his material, and it is often impossible to tell whether a divergence comes about because he has superimposed his own interpretation or literary shaping. That Prandi occasionally concedes (p. 104), without drawing the wider consequences.

In practically every instance that she adduces I would argue that the divergence occurs because the secondary writers have elaborated different aspects of the primary tradition. Consider, for instance, their treatment of Abdalonymus’ appointment as king of Sidon. Here Diodorus and Curtius give very much the same exposition of fact (except that Diodorus erroneously locates the episode in Tyre and mentions only a single host of Hephaestion); however Diodorus (17.47.6) stresses the miraculous turn of fortune which elevated Abdalonymus to the kingship, whereas Curtius (4.1.25-7) has a dialogue on the self-sufficiency of virtuous poverty. For Prandi the divergence represents two modes of narrative which cannot derive from the same source. Hardly so. The change of fortune is one of Diodorus’ favourite themes, and what he says of Abdalonymus is repeated almost verbatim with respect to Eumenes’ rehabilitation (18.59.4-6). He was probably inspired by a reference in his source to the general amazement at the appointment, which Curtius also mentions (4.1.23-4), and moralised upon it, just as he presumably worked up Hieronymus’ reference to Eumenes’ change of fortune. On the other hand, Diodorus also refers to the meeting with Alexander and the friendship which eventuated. That theme was worked up by Curtius as a moral dialogue, and it is perfectly possible that his source stressed the hard-won virtue of Abdalonymus which he then applied to his kingship—it was a topic which appealed to the Cynic leanings of Cleitarchus. The same source could also have stressed the surprising change of fortune, and evoked Diodorus’ banal comments. This seems to me a clear case where identical source material is differently shaped according to the differing interests of its derivatives.

But when is a divergence a divergence? Not all the supposed contradictions need be posited. A clear case is the report of Curtius on the Oreitan campaign, which allegedly makes Hephaestion commander of the third army group, while Diodorus (17.104.5) gives that role to Alexander (Prandi p. 139). That is an oversight. Prandi refers to the wrong section of Curtius (9.10.6), the campaign against the Arabitae in which Hephaestion did participate (Arr. 6.21.3-5); in the next paragraph, however, Curtius describes the division of forces for the Oreitan operations and does so in exactly the same terms as Diodorus: maritimos Ptolemaeaus, ceteros ipse rex et ab alia parte Leonnatus urebant. Here the two versions are absolutely congruent.
The Charidemus episode (Prandi pp. 126-8) is a more complex and interesting issue. Charidemus’ outspokenness and his subsequent execution are reported by Curtius and Diodorus in rather different ways. Diodorus (17.30) places the story at a Persian council-of-war in which Charidemus urges Darius not to concentrate his forces in a single engagement. He was opposed, lost his temper and was subsequently executed. For Curtius (3.2.10) the episode comes after the review of forces at Babylon, and instead of a council-of-war there is a simple dialogue between Darius and Charidemus in which the latter denigrates the Persian numbers and prefigures the Macedonian victory. Prandi accepts the received opinion that the passage is reminiscent of Herodotus’ story of Demaratus’ warning to Xerxes (Hdt. 7.101-5), and argues that the reference goes back to the ultimate source, whom she identifies as the ‘Herodotean’ Callisthenes and claims to be independent of and inconsistent with the source used by Diodorus.

But once again matters are not quite so simple. In Diodorus Charidemus’ denigration of the Persians does occur, but it is contracted to a few words at the end of the episode (Diod. 17.30.4). What is more, there is an indication that Diodorus’ source recorded a protracted transaction; first the debate over the division of forces and then Charidemus’ angry belittling of the Persians. He even signalises a lapse of time: ‘the king was at first inclined to agree with what Charidemus said, but later (µετὰ δὲ ταῦτα) his friends offered strong opposition….’. This could all take place on the one occasion, but equally Diodorus could be contracting a longer account which recorded at least two stages in Charidemus’ downfall. The same appears to be the case with Curtius. He does mention—very briefly—Darius’ final decision to commit all his forces under his own command (Curt. 3.2.1) and places the decision, as Diodorus does, immediately after the news of Memnon’s death. The army review follows, and forms the backdrop to Charidemus’ outburst and death. It is possible to take both Diodorus and Curtius as resumes of an extended account which first explained the debate over strategy which earned Charidemus the enmity of the Persian generals and then moved on to the calumnies which occasioned Charidemus’ belittling of Persian courage and his summary execution. Diodorus records both sections but cuts down Charidemus’ final outburst to a few generalities. On the other hand, Curtius has omitted the preliminaries and attached the episode to the review of forces which gives him the opportunity for a rhetorical speech implicitly recalling Xerxes and Demaratus. Here I entirely agree with Atkinson that ‘the differences between the accounts of Diodorus and Curtius are basically compositional’.

One might also stress the similarities. Both Diodorus and Curtius underline the provocative nature of Charidemus’ comments, Darius’ loss of control and his later regret for his actions. That surely suggests another parallel:
the quarrel between Alexander and Cleitus, in which the themes of contumacy, anger and remorse bulk so large. Darius reacted to provocation with the same irrational fury as Alexander and suffered the same regret after the event. Curtius indeed adds the curious note that Darius allowed Charidemus proper burial once remorse set in (3.2.19), which is what he later states that Alexander did for Cleitus (8.2.12). Similarly, Diodorus (17.30.4) refers to Charidemus’ ‘untimely outspokenness’ (ἀκαιρος παρρησία), which is precisely the characteristic attributed to Cleitus (cf. Arr. 4.9.1; cf. 12.7; Diodorus’ own account of the Cleitus affair is not preserved). The exact agreement suggests that the implicit analogy with Cleitus was present in the source shared by Diodorus and Curtius, and such an analogy can hardly have been present in the work of Callisthenes, who died a matter of months after Cleitus. On the other hand Cleitarchus might well have been concerned to show that Darius had foreshadowed the atrocity and anticipated Alexander. In both cases the wages of candour were death.

If Prandi’s via negativa fails to do justice to the complexities of the extant sources, the reader may justifiably ask how one may trace Cleitarchus’ contribution. I can only repeat my methodological principle, which Prandi finds unacceptable. One must look for passages where the narrative of Diodorus and Curtius (and Justin and the Metz Epitome) seems identical or nearly so and where the variants can be explained in principle by the stylistic and compositional practices of the primary authors. The inevitable starting point is Curtius’ famous direct citation of Cleitarchus (Curt. 9.8.15 = F 25; cf. Prandi, pp. 23-4, 143), which is embedded within his narrative, the notice that the casualties in the mountain kingdom of Sambus amounted to ‘800,000’. Now, Curtius’ entire narrative runs parallel to Diodorus 17.102.5-7. The same episodes come in the same order (except that Curtius adds an element of confusion at 9.8.16, when he inserts a note from another source, related to Arr. 6.17.1); and Diodorus gives a figure of 80,000 for the deaths in Sambus’ kingdom; allowing for simple manuscript confusion it is clearly the same figure as we find in Curtius. Further, both authors continue with the famous story of Ptolemy’s poisoned wound and the antidote miraculously found by Alexander. It looks like an indisputable common tradition, and most writers have taken it as such.

For Prandi (pp. 136-8), however, there is a significant divergence: Curtius (9.8.22) records that Ptolemy was believed to have been the illegitimate son of Philip and so half-brother of Alexander. There is nothing of that in Diodorus, whose narrative Prandi believes is more closely related to Cicero (De div. 2.135) than to Curtius, and Curtius in her view used Timagenes, who superimposed late Ptolemaic propaganda. This is no trivial point. It is fundamental to Prandi’s argument that Ptolemy’s paternity ‘non gioco alcun ruolo nel momento delle lotte per la successione ad Alessandro’ (a direct
quotation from Malcolm Errington, whom she cites here). No attested role perhaps, but the literary tradition is extremely thin, and we cannot exclude the possibility that the fiction was alive and abroad by 309/8, when Ptolemy was competing for supremacy in Greece and vying for the hand of Cleopatra, who—on this basis—would be his half-sister. The fatherhood of Philip is integral to one of the episodes in the earliest version of the Alexander Romance (Ps.-Call. 3.32.9-10; Leo 32.3; cf. A. M. Wolohojian, The Romance of Alexander the Great by Pseudo-Callisthenes 269, p. 152), and Merkelbach characterised it as propaganda of the earliest period of the Successors. He may have been wrong, but there is certainly no force in the implicit argument from silence. Ptolemy could well have made the claim, or encouraged it, in which case it is not surprising to find it in Cleitarchus. In other respects Diodorus and Curtius run parallel, emphasising different aspects of the story and including a eulogy of Ptolemy expressed in very similar terms. There is, then, a common tradition, which may be confidently ascribed to Cleitarchus; and there is a presumption that Cleitarchus represented Philip as Ptolemy’s natural father.

The principle of comparison and the identification of the common tradition seems to me the only practical way of adumbrating the outline of Cleitarchus’ narrative—which is the most we can hope to do. There are, and will remain problems, not least the silence of Diodorus on the two famous and controversial episodes known to have been mentioned by Cleitarchus: Ptolemy’s alleged presence at the Malli town and the Roman embassy sent to Alexander. The silence can be taken as evidence that Diodorus drew on sources other than Cleitarchus (cf. Prandi 110 n. 137), but one can equally well argue for inadvertence, or possibly deliberate choice, on the part of Diodorus. The Roman embassy is, I think, such an instance. It is clear that the relative strengths of Rome and Alexander’s Macedon were a contentious issue when Diodorus was writing. Livy’s outburst against the facetious Greeks who maintained that Rome would have fallen is symptomatic of the climate. In the war with Cleopatra propaganda notoriously played a large part, and Cleopatra will have made the most of her Macedonian lineage. In that context the Roman embassy was a godsend; the Romans had submitted themselves to the great Alexander and were the natural vassals of his heirs. And Cleopatra may well have exploited the traditions which connected her ancestor by blood to the Argead house: Ptolemy was the proper heir to the power and empire of Philip and Alexander. It is perhaps significant that in Vergil’s brilliant description of Actium Cleopatra is simply Antony’s Aegyptia comitum (Aen. 8.688). There is no reference implicit or explicit to her Macedonian origins, and it could have been contemporary propaganda to depict her as an alien usurper. If so, Diodorus must have taken note. The triumviral period was precisely the time in which he was
bringing his *Bibliotheke* to completion, and he (like Timagenes) lived in the west under the dispensation of Octavian. He was hardly likely to bring out details in Cleitarchus which were exploited in the propaganda of the other side. Cleitarchus’ probably brief allusion to the Roman embassy could be quietly omitted, as might the tradition that Ptolemy was a half-brother of Alexander. The silence may well echo contemporary politics, and afford no clue to Diodorus’ ultimate source.

The search for Cleitarchus is beset by doubt and ambiguity. Some may doubt that there is anything to find. Such at least was Tarn’s view, and he devoted much of his formidable energy to the demolition of the Cleitarchean Vulgate. It is nearly fifty years since his confident prophecy of the demise of Cleitarchus: ‘I trust that less may be heard of him in future; but I fear that for many years yet he will haunt the courts of history, an unhappy gibbering shade, decked in the false tinsel of the role once thrust upon him.’ But, despite the superb rhetoric, the ghost has refused to be exorcised, and rightly so. It remains true that Cleitarchus was the most widely read, vituperated and used of the Alexander sources. We should be grateful for the minute care with which Prandi has analysed the corpus of fragments and the scrupulous fairness with which she addresses modern scholarship. She has vindicated the centrality of Cleitarchus and strengthened the case for the ‘Vulgate’. What is necessary now, and radically so, is more detailed attention to the attitudes and compositional practices of the extant writers, less concentration on omission and trivial divergences, more on the shared material and the different literary aims in treating them. It is only through such close analysis of the mediocre and often infuriating writers who happen to be extant that the ghost will acquire substance and the pathetic debris of the surviving fragments will be supplemented by significant and informative detail.