Dear readers after months of preparation, consultation and refinement, FORUM is out again. The journal has undergone some crucial changes since the last issue.

Firstly, to signpost these modifications a new appearance was aimed for, so the journal now has a new cover. Secondly, it has become international with submissions from Australia, USA and other universities in the United Kingdom beside our usual postgraduate contributors from Newcastle University. Further contributions from the rest of the world are expected in subsequent issues. The variety of papers in this issue, as in previous ones, goes beyond a theme, reflecting the multi-disciplinary nature of our research.

The third major change which the journal has undergone is the review system. Formerly the editorial team carried out the tasks of reviewing and as well as editing the articles with support from academic staff. This time independent reviewers were selected to appraise the papers and comment on them. The benefits are two-fold: for the participating postgraduates a higher standard, and for the reviewers the opportunity of getting familiar with budding researchers in their respective fields. The reviewers are principally experienced academics from Newcastle University’s School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape. Nevertheless several international professionals and academics have been contacted to participate in the coming issues.

The editorial team would like to thank Dr. Hisham Elkadi, the immediate past Director of Postgraduate Research in the school for his dynamic contributions and enthusiasm for Forum. We welcome his successor Dr. Geoff Vigar and appreciate his efforts towards continuity. Further, we would like to thank Rosi Fieldson, ex-member of the editorial team, for her efforts in the editing of the previous issue.

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The Aspiration for Housing in Jeddah – Saudi Arabia

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Keywords: household’s choice, housing demand, housing mobility, socio-economic trends

Abstract
Challenges confront individual household’s choice and ability to afford the chosen housing type in Saudi Arabia Jeddah, to overcome the issue of housing markets, housing demand, housing mobility and housing choice. To better comprehend these challenges and the fundamental forces underlying the socio-economic trends and housing market characteristics in Jeddah; the article propose a conceptual framework wherein housing market outcomes of interest are affected by neighbourhood preferences and aspirations of housing are interacting with urban population growth.

Introduction
The urban population in Jeddah has grown rapidly from 1970 to 2002 to an estimated population of 2,560,000 at average annual growth rates of 12.43% in 1970 and 11.05% in 2000 (Frisbie, 1995). Jeddah plays an important role in the Saudi Arabian economy as the second largest city in the Kingdom. 80% of the imports enter the country through the city, (Abdulgani, 1993). These have provided more jobs and thus improved the opportunities for a better quality of life. Jeddah also plays a very important function as the gateway to the two holy cities, Makkah and Medina, where visitors arrive by both sea and air.

To cater for this population and economic growth, the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF) was established in the 1970s has contributed to private housing and office building and thus to the construction sector in the city. The presence of national as well as international companies has also contributed to economic development, and housing market demand has increased land values.

The development in housing in Saudi Arabia, and in Jeddah in particular has changed over the last 50 years. Flats or apartments and villas began to be constructed in the mid 1950s. Changes in housing design and the employment of foreign architects have both lead to the introduction of new types of housing units. The villa type housing was first introduced into the market by oil companies in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia.

This paper deals with different types of houses that are available in Jeddah, especially in the north of the city which is characterised by new modern housing. This housing market is characterised by different types of housing: detached villas, semi-detached villas and flats. These three types represent the majority of housing in the north of Jeddah. The property market in Jeddah needs to be aware and respond to the types of housing preferred by the population. It also needs to take into consideration the main issue - the individual household’s choice and ability to afford the chosen housing type

Theoretical background
Housing is among the most powerful determinants of community character, significant factors are the styles, age, quality and appearance of a neighbourhood. Cities show physical evidence of growth, change, and reveal a great deal about the people who built a town from its earliest days to the present. Land use and architecture provide a snapshot of local history, the condition and value of housing sheds light on the socio-economic status of a community's current population.

According to Rossi (1955), at a macro level, the distribution of households across housing units results from a match between individuals’ housing needs and their ability to satisfy these needs. Housing preferences are driven in part by demographic factors, such as movement through the life cycle (Speare, Goldstein, and Frey 1975). For example, when individuals marry they typically look for housing with sufficient space to accommodate the growth of their families. Likewise, because housing is tied to specific locations, neighbourhood characteristics such as school quality may also be important factors in housing selection. Earning capacity is also one of the main determining factors for achieving standards, because the ability to satisfy housing needs depends on resources. People with high incomes are likely to enjoy the most freedom in choosing where to live, and those with high levels of education may be better able to obtain information about housing opportunities. In contrast individuals on public assistance are likely to be more constrained in their options.
A good understanding of the nature of human needs is of crucial importance in the formulation of housing and space standards. These needs may vary between different ways of life for example: patterns of household formation and composition, housing choices, housing demographic, lifestyle, housing unit availability, housing demand, housing mobility and neighbourhood change. In addition choice is important because it leads to alternative designs and different specifications. Another fact that should be taken into account is that metropolitan development increases the use of land per capita as households moved to the suburbs.

Household formation and composition is the dimension that overlaps substantially with a subfield of demography known as household demography and embraces other aspects of social demography, where as most housing research begins with the behaviour of households. Myers (1990) states that housing demography can be usefully classified with respect to four foci: household formation and composition, housing choices, housing construction and inventory change, and spatial patterns and consequences.

Housing Programme Developments

The main goal of the Saudi Arabian Government’s housing policy is to provide its citizens with decent and safe accommodation. This goal has been stated in all Five-Year National Development Plans, in which the housing programmes have been grouped into two: The Public Housing Sector and the Private Housing Sector.

The housing market is an important influence on house prices and in local housing markets, since the early 1970’s; the provision of decent housing to Saudi citizens has been a national objective. To achieve objective, a specialised financial institution The Real Estate Development Fund was set up to extend interest free credit to individuals. The private sector has also participated in developing private housing (Al- Rahman, 1994).

The loan criteria followed by the REDF do not target any particular social group or region. The only criteria are that the loan beneficiary should be a Saudi citizen and be at least 21 years old. The loan beneficiary must show that he/she have not had a previous REDF loan. In short, the REDF at present practices a “first come first served policy”.

The only spatial differentiation implied in the policy is that the amount of loan per application is adjusted according to the size of the settlement in which the home is to be built. In larger cities the maximum loan value granted is about 300,000 SR (US$ 80,000), 250,000 SR (US$ 67,000) in towns; and about SR 200,000 (US$ 53,000) for persons in smaller settlements.

Public housing

The Public Housing Sector in Saudi Arabia consists of two types of housing programme; these are commonly referred to as the Low Income Housing Programme and the other as the Government Employees Housing Programme. In the case of the Low Income Housing Programme, it should be noted that the government builds the housing units and distributes them among the cities (Muairfi and Benna, 1995). In addition it should be pointed out that in 1991 each public housing flat in Jeddah attracted a subside of 250,000 Saudi riyals (about 66,667 U.S. Dollars).

Private housing

The Real Estate Development Fund (REDF) makes available two kinds of loan for privately financed housing. One is a long term (25 years duration) interest free loan of between 100,000 and 300,000 Saudi Riyals (SR 1.00 =US 0.27) granted to Saudi citizens to construct their own houses. Successful applicants had to re-pay that sum in twenty-five annual instalments to the REDF. A rebate of 20% of the whole instalment was given if it was repaid on time, and a 39% rebate was granted when all remaining instalments were repaid in one lump sum. No interest on the payments was charged. To avoid disagreements, the applicants had to accept the flats allocated to them as long as they were of the same size and same interior design as other flats (Al-Ghamdi 1996).

The other type of loan is a medium term loan of 10 years duration also interest-free, which is a commercial loan programme available to develop investment residential housing for rental (Muairfi and Benna 1995).

Five year plans and housing supply

It is useful to consider the implementation performance of the housing programme through the Saudi Five Year Plan. During the earlier plans there were remarkable achievements in housing allocation. The market rigidities experienced during the First Plan (1970-1975) were removed with the setting up of appropriate institutions such as the REDF and the Ministry of Public Works and Housing. A total of 889,000 housing units were constructed during the last four plan periods, against the target of 880,000.

This success generated a housing surplus, particularly in the urban areas, by the latter part of the 1980s (REDF, 1989). The units, newly built during the last two decades, constituted a basic housing stock that could accommodate as much as 47% of the national population and 64% of the total urban population (Al-Hathloul and Eddan, 1992).

The phenomenon of surplus in the housing market has been the result of an evolutionary process of the housing development strategy followed by the government. Housing has primarily been considered the domain of the private sector. The role of government in housing was
The Aspiration for Housing in Jeddah

The Aspiration for Housing in Jeddah

flexibly formulated to meet various housing challenges during the last two decades. Housing development strategy, therefore, has gone through phases of laissez-faire policy in the 1960s, the active and direct strategy in public sector housing for low income groups and public sector employees in the 1970s and the indirect and coordinating housing development strategy in the 1980s (Fedaak, 1989).

On the other hand, the growth of real estate sector, like the construction sector, was mainly determined by the growth in oil revenue. The contribution of the real estate sector grew from 2.9% of the GDP during 1975-80 to 3.7% during 1980-85. (Al-Hatloul and Edadan, 1992). In Saudi Arabia the private sector depends largely on government financial assistance, which has funded a considerable proportion of private housing at a zero interest rate. (Al-Rahman, 1994). [E.g. if the government provides a loan of 100 SR for 20 years, the individual repays 100 SR at the end of 20 years].

The fifth development plan (1990-95) recognised the phenomenon of housing vacancy when it stated that: “The excessive overall housing supply, with a large number of vacant housing units, both public and private, particularly in urban areas has significantly decreased the real estate and rental values in the Kingdom”(Ministry of Planning, 1990).

Population trends and housing forecast

A household’s aspiration for property is highly related to housing choices taking into account changes in social, economic and demographic factors. Households are also constrained in their housing choices by the supply of housing available in the market.

Customers demand for houses and housing styles varies in relation to income. Alonso (1964) focused on the fact that households probably value residential land for other reasons, not simply as an input to the production of housing. In his view, consumers’ demand for residential land was like that for any other durable good. In addition the distribution of households across housing units results from a match between individuals’ housing needs and their ability to satisfy these needs. Housing preferences are also driven in part by demographic factors.

The trends in population growth, household characteristics and income that affect Saudi Arabian and Jeddah’s housing must be taken into account in any analysis of the housing market in Jeddah. The housing sector needs to identify these key trends and assess their implications for the housing market.

The difference between the expected growth in population and the required supply of the housing stock over the next 20 years, as shown in Figure 1, indicate a gap in demand for households. It is estimated that 78 thousand housing units need to be provided in the next 20 years. In addition the study also considers the quality and distribution of household units, in relation to the demand features stated above.

The REDF, supported by the government, provided funding without interest rate charges but, as shown in Figure 2, in the mid 80s this funding dropped from more than 600 million to 200 million SR, due to a drop in oil prices. The second drop was in the beginning of 1990s due to the Gulf war resulting in further shortage of funding.

The performance of REDF in financing the private sector housing market has been exemplary. However, a review of REDF loan criteria suggests that the REDF’s impact on the regional housing needs in the Kingdom could have been more equitable if the loan allocation had been done based on the real housing needs of the regions. This view takes account of the fact that one of the main objectives of REDF is to increase the private housing stock in the country, so that housing needs of all sections of the society across all regions should be met efficiently.

Another important future concern will be the regional inequality in the provision of housing finance. Since a significant amount of the new housing units constructed are REDF financed, any regional inequality in the provision of REDF loans could lead to significant regional
imbalance in the housing adequacy in the country. The strategy to meet the housing needs of the future should, therefore, be governed by a balanced trade-off between the economic efficiency approach and the social justice (equity) approach in the allocation of housing finance in the Kingdom. Banks and firms have great potential in exclusively funding private housing: this is likely to result in redirection of financial resources to other forms of investment such as historic area preservation and urban renewal (Al-Rahman 1994).

The following implications could be deduced from the present REDF loan policy:

- A large share of loan applications originate from the highly urbanised and developed regions, i.e. the level of regional housing needs and the housing loan allocations are not related.
- Since a larger share of the approved loans has gone to the high cost developed regions this will have reduced the share available for the total housing needs of the country, as compared to an economic efficiency or a regional equity based housing fund allocation strategy.

Population and housing demands in Jeddah

The population of Saudi Arabia has grown very rapidly since 1970. Prior to 1970, the largest segment of the population was rural. After 1970, however, population distribution experienced a new trend that is the shift of population from rural to urban areas. In fact, it can be argued that the rapid growth of the size of the Saudi Arabian population witnessed during the 1950-90 period occurred mostly in urban areas. Urban population increased from 5.9% to 48.7% between 1970 and 1980. The growth of urban population continued at a high rate throughout the seventies, and eighties. In 1992 77.2% of the total population and 68% of the Saudi population lived in urban areas (Al-Hathloul 1992).

The remarkable growth in population of Jeddah as can be seen from Figure 3 started at the beginning of the seventies. Jeddah has been attracting firms, and also foreign labour. Employment opportunities have caused large scale internal migration from rural areas, villages, and small towns.

Jeddah like other cities has experienced a shortage of affordable housing. The government has provided financial help but, despite these efforts, housing prices have continued to increase. The expected growth of population and household units in the next 20 years added to the present shortage will generate a major gap between demand and supply. There are 495,000 household units of different types with a majority (67%) being flats. The average size of Saudi households is 4.8 persons.

The ability to satisfy housing needs depends on resources. People with high incomes are likely to enjoy the most freedom in choosing where to live, as are those with high levels of education. Family size, age, income, dependence on public transportation, and quality of neighbourhood all has a bearing on location decisions. In addition, individual choice might affect location decisions for homeownership.

![Figure 3. Population increase in Jeddah from 1807-2001](image)

![Figure 4. Population trends and forecast from 2002-2022](image)

Housing characteristics in Jeddah

Types

The demands for housing based on income, family size, remodelled housing, extended housing, changes in area

(Source: Jenaideb 1993 and the author)

This transitional stage resulted in a rapid expansion of the city, during which the national and regional role of Jeddah was established. Decisions and ideas were implemented during this stage that governed and shaped the urban growth of modern Jeddah.

Changes in income, taste and population size have, over the years, resulted in different needs and demands that are highly dependent on individual circumstances. Together housing needs are related to population, either directly, on a per capita basis, or indirectly, on a per household basis. Consequently housing needs are based on population projections, along with assumptions about the relationship between population size and the number of housing units that it will occupy.
and lifestyle are also crucial. Even though household residential locations within Jeddah are very important, we should take into consideration that it is unlikely that housing market in metropolitan Jeddah could satisfy the needs of all individual households. More important however, is to mention that economic, social and physical factors in housing demand such as living space and a better living environment also contribute to changes in lifestyle. For instance, choices of residential location are affected by income and proximity to the workplace.

Housing types should meet the need for housing within a growing urban market at particular price ranges and rent levels, and provide the necessary housing types for households at all income levels. The changes in the types of houses in Jeddah, according to different surveys that took place at different points in time since 1970 (Robert Matthew) and 1977 (Sert Jackson), reveal differences in household type and family size.

The number of villas has grown 17 fold, a growth from 3,250 to 57,647 units that shows an increase from 4% to 12% in the market share of villas. The number of flats has grown 16 fold, from 21,300 to 335,670 units with an increase from 28% to 68% of all housing stock. Traditional housing has grown 2.5 times; however, this traditional housing has decreased as a percentage from 52% to 20%, as shown in Table 1. Traditional housing means those characterised with a courtyard and built on a single floor with existing materials or new materials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Villa</th>
<th>Flats</th>
<th>Traditional Houses</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Matthew 1970</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>21,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sert Jackson 1977</td>
<td>14,229</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>99,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breath Consultancy 2002</td>
<td>57,647</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>335,670</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Housing type changes from 1970 - 2001
(Source: Albeeah Consultancy, Municipality of Jeddah 2002)

Ownership

The rate of ownership has dramatically changed. For instance from 1977 to 2002 the share of home ownership increased from 19% to 35%. According to Albeeah consultant the highest percentage increase was in 1970 when with an average of 31%. On the other hand, the proportion of tenants decreased from, 77% to 58%, between 1977 and 2002. Whilst there has been a decline in the percentage of tenants the number of the tenants has increased 6 times over in the same period from 133,413 to 289,473, see Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owners</th>
<th>Tenants</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Matthew 1970</td>
<td>23192</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sert Jackson 1977</td>
<td>32269</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breath 2002</td>
<td>173981</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Housing prices are determined by a variety of complex factors, such as the price of land, the types of existing housing, the demand for housing, the variety of residential choices in a region and housing mobility. In fact many of these factors are crucial in the Jeddah housing market.

Trends in the housing market should be reviewed as new dynamics may be affecting housing cost. In addition to better understand these dynamics a number of surveys have been carried out at different times in Jeddah.

Income

Based on data from the Central Department of Statistics, (1987) the average household expenditure on housing increased from 23% in 1979 to 28% in 1983, due to rent increases. For instance a previous survey of household expenditure on rent pointed out that an urban household spends approximately 14% of total expenditure on rent (Saudi Industrial Development Fund, 1987). On the other hand, we should also consider what effects the income level of the residents within the urban areas, has on neighbourhood and housing characteristics and to location choices.

The relationship of annual income and rent per house among the different types of housing in Jeddah are as, follow: for a villa the average annual income per household is 150,000 SR and the annual rent is 28,000 SR giving a rent to income ratio of 0.19. In contrast for a flat where the income per household is 96,000SR and the average annual rent is 16,000, the rent to income ratio is 0.167 as shown in table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing type</th>
<th>Average annual income per household (SR)</th>
<th>Average annual rent (SR)</th>
<th>Rent to income ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Villa</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat</td>
<td>98,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional house</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>0.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>103,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Annual incomes, and rent for housing types in Jeddah in Saudi (1$=3.75 SR)
(Source: Albeeah Consultancy, Municipality of Jeddah 2002)
Size
An analysis of historical development trends provides insights into how the local housing market in Jeddah. A series of different surveys have estimated the average number of rooms per house. For instance in 1970 there were 2.6 rooms per house with 2.5 persons per room. In 1977 Sert Jakson found the average number of rooms per house had risen to 5.7 and the number of persons per room had fallen to 1.4. In 2001 (Beeah, 2001) found 4.6 rooms per house and 1.16 persons per room.

Figure 4. Changes in number of rooms in household units
(Source: Albeeah Consultancy, Municipality of Jeddah 2002)

Cities are the physical demonstration of the socio-economic aspirations of citizens. Housing demand as a result of these aspirations may be considered as one of the major determinants of the structure of urban residential neighbourhoods. In addition housing has been changing in both quality and quantity. Additionally it should be noted that the stagnation experienced in the housing construction industry in the 1980s reduced the housing supply, reduced housing vacancies in the 1990’s and thus lead to an increase in housing prices. As a result the country in the 1990’s created a strategy of housing stock management through rationalising public and private sector participation in the housing market. (Al-Hatloul and Edadan, 1992).

Conclusions
The research the author is undertaking seeks to investigate and analyse that fundamental forces underlying the socio-economic trends and housing market characteristics in Jeddah. The housing market needs to ensure that, with the growth in population and the increasing requirements for housing units, the characteristics of housing accord with people’s preferences and aspirations. Housing characteristics, neighbourhood quality, and location in relation to services are important in housing markets. Future research will explore (1) how housing characteristics (space and quality of housing), neighbourhood characteristics, environmental quality, and location, affect choice and house prices; and (2) how income, family size, and changes in life-style affect the demand for this housing.

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Myers, D. (1990). Housing demography linked demographic structure and housing markets The board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System
Abstract
With the end of socialism in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet state industrial output fell, unemployment increased, living standards decreased, poverty rates rose, life expectancy decreased and some residents of urban areas returned to subsistence agriculture as a means of survival. These changes had profound effect on the structure of the urban economies of the region. Twelve years after the collapse, many of the former Soviet republics still have not regained the level of industrial and other economic activity they had during Soviet times. The purpose of this research is to investigate whether and how cities of the former Soviet Union can become engines of growth. This article focuses on a study of linkages among industrial firms in Yerevan, Armenia. The theory underlying the study is that both localisation economies of scale and urbanisation economies of scale can foster economic growth in cities. If these economies of scale can be nurtured in former Soviet cities, then those cities should contribute to, if not drive, economic growth. The study examined 108 industrial firms in various industries in the Yerevan economy. To identify linkages, the questionnaire asked whether firms produced intermediate goods for the local economy and whether or not the firms used intermediate goods produced in the local economy. The results of the surveys were then correlated with changes in the level of output in those industries to attempt to gauge if growth were associated with linkages. While the results are mixed on the association of linkages with growth, the surveys do indicate some types of interventions which may be needed in the local economy to spur growth.

Introduction
At the end of socialism in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet state industrial output fell, unemployment increased, living standards decreased, poverty rates rose, life expectancy decreased and some residents of urban areas returned to subsistence agriculture as a means of survival (EBRD, 1999; O’Brien et al., 1998). Conditions were not uniform in all countries. Some recovered more quickly than others, particularly in Central Europe. Yet in all transition countries difficult conditions persisted for several years, and the economies of many of these countries have yet to make a complete and effective recovery.

To reverse the downward economic trends causing so much hardship across Eastern Europe and Eurasia, governments and individuals in affected countries, international financial institutions and donors expended much effort and many resources. Early efforts were primarily concentrated in three areas: macro-economic stability, price liberalization and privatisation (EBRD, 1999; Stiglitz, 1998; Layard, 1998). Macro-economic intervention was essential to combat the effects of the transition recession. Price liberalization was the logical consequence of the end of the command economy. Privatisation gave as many persons as possible a stake in the new economic regime.

Over time, institutional and policy issues were identified as fundamental determinants of successful reform (World Bank, 2002). Institutional changes included land tenure and judicial reform, changes in corporate governance and development of banks and capital markets. Donors also attempted to establish equitable and transparent systems of tax and customs administration.

In addition to macroeconomic and institutional reforms, donors support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in order to spur growth in transition economies. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have a common strategy to strengthen SMEs. Actions include development of an appropriate competition policy, a business environment rewarding productive effort, business support services and access to capital. USAID programmes provide business services, expand credit opportunities and support non-governmental organizations in efforts to improve the business environment. Specific actions taken in the Central Asian Republics include business and economics education at the university level, formation of business advocacy organizations, reform of banking institutions and micro-finance programmes. (EBRD, 1999; USAID, 2003a and 2003b).
Donors also work to improve the economic life of communities. USAID’s Office of Urban Programmes works in four areas: urban infrastructure, governance, local economic development and health (USAID, 2003c). In Armenia, USAID-funded projects have focused on improving infrastructure and providing short-term employment opportunities (USAID, 2003d). Urban economic development strategies have been designed for the cities of Ijevan and Alaverdi (Urban Institute, 2003). The European Union’s Tacis programme has executed an economic development study of Lori Marz (region) (Tacis, 2001).

These reforms are important for economic growth in the transition countries. However, none of these reform efforts deal specifically with urban economies per se. A review of the transition literature reveals a significant omission of urban economic policy in transition countries (Pickles et al., 1998; Lavigne, 1999). From the perspective of an urbanist, a failure to deal with city economies is a significant policy omission. This is so because cities are recognized as engines of economic growth (World Bank, 2000; USAID, 2003c). By removing barriers to efficient city economies, cities may generate the kind of growth that will lead to measurable improvement in the lives of city residents in transition countries.

Many authors have demonstrated cities are engines of economic growth. Bairoch (1988), in his historical, worldwide survey of urbanization and economic development, notes urbanization influenced development in a number of ways: encouraging innovations; facilitating monetarization; enabling social mobility; fostering a labour market, especially for skilled labour and expanding markets. Jacobs (1969, p. 6) argued cities are “primary economic organs” and demonstrated cities are places where new work grows from existing work, thus leading to development and transformations of city economies. Henderson, Kuncoro and Turner (1995) empirically supported Jacobs’ thesis. They found a correlation between new high-technology firms and diverse urban areas. More recently, Sassen (2000) has described the crucial contribution cities make in the new world economy. Fujita and Thisse (2002), in their groundbreaking study of agglomeration economies, echo the words of economist Hirschman when they note cities “are the main social institutions in which technological and social innovations are developed.” Following Jacobs, they further recognize cities’ economic bases change over time, leading to a “geographically diverse pattern of economic development” (Fujita and Thisse, 2002, p. 389).

Cities are engines of economic growth because of two kinds of externalities – localization economies of scale and urbanization economies of scale. Localization economies of scale occur when related firms or industries locate in close proximity for mutual benefit. Urbanization economies of scale arise from diverse economic activities. Some urban areas exhibit localization economies of scale, while others demonstrate urbanization economies of scale. Different kinds of firms locate in different cities; depending on the kind of economies of scale they require (Henderson et al., 1995; Bogart, 1998).

Development economists employ concepts similar to externalities. Kasliwal (1995) discusses these externalities, or “linkages,” in the context of economic growth in Southeast Asia. He notes the diffusion of knowledge and technology, the movement of personnel and the development of other networks among firms in terms similar to those used by Jacobs, Henderson, Bairoch and others in describing externalities in urban areas. The genesis of externalities in development economics comes from Albert O. Hirschman. Hirschman discussed backward and forward linkages in the context of industrial development. He described them in this fashion:

- The input-provision, derived demand, or backward linkage effects, i.e., every non-primary economic activity, will induce attempts to supply through domestic production the inputs needed in that activity.
- The output-utilization or forward linkage effects, i.e., every activity that does not by its nature cater exclusively to final demands will induce attempts to utilize its outputs as inputs in some new activities.

Hirschman (1959) notes domestic availability is a “more effective spur” to economic development than importing component parts.

Thus, both the urban economics literature and the development economics literature include the concept of generating economic growth through beneficial externalities among firms. This concept is crucial in the context of transition because if those externalities or linkages can be created, they can stimulate economic activity. The local labour market will be strengthened if local firms can produce for their neighbouring firms. Use of local goods will lower transportation costs, making local goods cheaper. As firms produce more intermediate goods, they create opportunities for other firms to use those inputs in the creation of new final products.

This research is undertaken to determine the extent to which these linkages among industrial firms exist within...
Yerevan, Armenia. If those linkages exist, the research will analyse whether they are associated with growth.

Linkages in the Soviet Economy

Soviet economic geography began with Lenin (Lavrishchev, 1969). Lenin’s principles to guide industrial location in the Soviet Union included the following:

- Primary production should be located near sources of raw materials, reducing transportation costs;
- Intermediate and final production facilities should be located near the consumer;
- Economic regions should develop both internal and external economies of scale, including backward and forward linkages;
- Economic activity should be diffused on an equal basis throughout the Soviet Union;
- Industrial facilities should be sited such that the standard of living is equivalent across the Soviet Union (Schiffer, 1989).

These principles, among others, were the basis of Soviet regional geography. However, Soviet industrial organization impeded pure application of the theory. Industries and enterprises in the Soviet Union were subject to one or more levels of government (party) supervision. All-union ministries managed some directly. Others were managed by all-union ministries through corresponding republic ministries. In some cases, industries were supervised by republic ministries if there were no corresponding all-union ministries. At the local level, attempts were made, through planning, to locate industries such that they could reinforce and support each other, as the theory of linkages would dictate (Bergson, 1964; Ohanian, 2002).

Political considerations often overruled the economic theory of industrial location. This occurred in two ways. First, the ministries controlling industries, especially the “power” industries related to defence and heavy industry, could annul local plans and site factories almost at will (French, 1995). Second, in order to keep the individual republics from seceding from the Union, factories were sited such that they were dependent on inputs from factories in other republics. Markets were also located in distant republics or in the COMECON nations. This pattern of remote location of inputs and markets prevented creation of local linkages that could have made individual republics economically independent (Ohanian, 2002). Political considerations of keeping the republics in check outweighed the additional transport costs incurred in this pattern of industrial location. Because transport costs were generally understated in the Soviet economic model (Schiffer, 1989), the additional transport costs imposed by these political considerations were not considered economically significant.

The Armenian Economy

The Soviet Armenian economy was structured according to the factors described above, but was also influenced by two unique factors. The first factor was the location of “dirty cities” in Armenia. According to Ohanian (2002), there were seven “dirty cities” in the Soviet Union that produced ecologically dangerous materials. Four of the seven Soviet “dirty cities” were located in Armenia. The “dirty city” policy was instituted to keep these dangerous industries away from European Russia. Armenia’s urban economies were especially dependent on imports of raw materials to support the dirty factories in those cities.

The second unique factor in Armenia’s economy was a large defence component. As much as 40% of the Armenian economy was based on defence work (Soghomonyan, 2002). For example, the factory Basalt produced technical equipment for Soviet submarines (Ohanian, 2002). For strategic reasons, the Armenian defence industry was heavily dependent on inputs from other republics. Its only market, naturally, was the Soviet military.

Notwithstanding its heavy concentration on the defence industry, the Soviet Armenian economy had a significant variety of industries throughout the country, in keeping with at least some of the theoretical principles of Soviet industrial location. The final Soviet GOSPLAN for Armenia shows that energy, food, machine tool, building material, miscellaneous production and printing were found in most regions of the Republic (GOSPLAN, 1987). Armenia thus had a diverse economic base in Soviet times. The industrial structure of Armenia generated a standard of living for its citizens higher than that of other republics (Soghomonyan, 2002).

The state of Soviet Armenian industry can thus be described as both typical of Soviet industry in general, with a wide variety of industries represented throughout the Republic, yet rather more heavily dependent on the centre due to the high concentration of both defence and “dirty” industries. This heavy dependence on inputs and markets from outside Armenia made the Armenian economy extremely vulnerable when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.
During transition the Armenian economy has changed dramatically. This can be seen by examining gross domestic product (GDP) and output figures for the eleven-year period from 1990 through 2000. Figure 1 illustrates the GDP and Figure 2 shows output figures for the same period.

Taken together, these two tables show the radical restructuring that took place in the Armenian economy following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Industry’s contribution to GDP fell by half, while agriculture’s contribution doubled. Agriculture became the employer of last resort as the unemployed took up subsistence agriculture in order to survive (Tacis, 2001). This is not the first time in Armenia’s history that its people reverted to an agrarian economy. This happened after the 1914 – 1921 period of war, genocide and revolution (Suny, 1997).

The effect of this deep structural change on Yerevan was profound. During the period 1990 through 2000 the number of firms in the city increased due to privatisation, but employment in the industrial sector fell dramatically. This is shown in the figures presented in Figure 3.

As can be seen from Figure 3, rates of decline in excess of ninety percent occurred in six of ten industrial sectors, measured by the value of the output. Overall, industrial production in Yerevan fell by almost ninety percent for industry as a whole in the period 1990 – 2000.

**Research Questions**

This research examines two questions:

- Have linkages been created within the urban economy of Yerevan?
- Assuming linkage exist, to what extent have those linkages contributed to growth Yerevan’s economy?
- This research is important for transition cities for two reasons. First, if linkages do exist and if they contribute to economic growth, development policy and programmes should foster those linkages. Second, if these linkages do not exist, the structural flaws preventing their creation should be identified and removed in order to create efficient urban economies.

**Methodology**

This article focuses on linkages among industrial firms in Yerevan, Armenia. Yerevan was selected because of its importance as an urban manufacturing centre during Soviet times and because it is the primate city in Armenia.

Linkages were identified by questioning firms about the source of their inputs and the disposition of their outputs. Firms interviewed were generally selected from the Spyur Business Directory. The Spyur Directory only includes firms registering with Spyur.

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1 Industrial output was also significantly affected by the 1988 earthquake in the northern part of the country. According to one estimate, more than 30% of Armenia’s industrial capacity was destroyed in that earthquake (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2000).

2 This is not the first time in Armenia’s history that its people reverted to an agrarian economy. This happened after the 1914 – 1921 period of war, genocide and revolution (Suny, 1997).
Linkages among Industrial Firms in Yerevan, Armenia

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>Production Decline Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Enterprises</td>
<td>Million AMD (in comparable prices)</td>
<td>Number of Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>280,864.0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ferrous metallurgy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7,477.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Non-ferrous metallurgy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28,859.7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chemical industry</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>422,319.7</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Machine-building &amp; metal-working industry</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>215,822.1</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Forest, wood-processed and paper production</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>59,988.2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Construction materials production</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>155,940.0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Light industry</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>210,189.3</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Food industry</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>553,313.6</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Other industries</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37,041.1</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>1,971,815.0</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Indicators of Output of the Principal Industries of Yerevan Years 1990-2000 (Gross Output in Comparable Prices)*
(Soghomonyan, 2002a, adapted by the author)

- Searching Spyur’s on-line directory on the word “manufacturing” produced a list of 431 firms. The 431 firms were reduced to 242 by eliminating (1) all firms located outside of Yerevan and (2) firms in Yerevan producing food, beverage or tobacco products or electrical power.

Using a judgmental sampling technique, 97 firms were selected across most manufacturing sectors. Eleven other firms were selected based on the author’s knowledge of their existence or on the basis of information revealed as the surveys were conducted.

The survey instrument was designed for this study. Questions included firm growth, number of employees, and types and disposition of output. The instrument also requested data on the type and source of inputs. Open-ended questions on barriers to growth were also included. Armenian sociologists experienced in survey research conducted the surveys.

Industrial production statistics from the Armenian National Statistics Service (NSS) for the years 1999 – 2002 were used to identify growth in industrial sectors. The NSS uses the NACE classification scheme. Statistics by Marz (region) were first published in 1999. Because Yerevan has the status of a Marz, statistics for Yerevan Marz are city statistics. Adjustments for inflation were made using coefficients provided by the Armenian Ministry of Finance and Economy.

Results

With respect to the first question, the survey results showed that to some extent, linkages do appear in Yerevan’s economy. As shown in Figure 4, 39% of the firms surveyed produce intermediate goods for further use in the Armenian economy. Thirteen firms (12%) produce only for export. Fifty-three firms produce final products for use in Armenia’s domestic market. Of the 42 firms producing intermediate goods, 9 firms (8%), produce only intermediate goods.

The survey instrument also asked whether firms obtained intermediate products from Armenian firms. The responses to that question are shown in Figure 5.

* Figures for years before the adoption of the Armenian dram (AMD) were originally in Soviet roubles. The National Statistics Service (NSS) of Armenia converted rouble-based figures to AMD according to conversion formulae developed by its statisticians.
Figure 4. Percentage of Firms Surveyed Producing Output for Use by Other Firms in Armenia (Surveys conducted by the author)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manufacturing Category</th>
<th>Number of Firms Surveyed</th>
<th>Number of Firms with No Local Input</th>
<th>Number of Firms with only Local Raw Material Input</th>
<th>Number of Firms with both Local Raw Material and Local Intermediate Goods Input</th>
<th>Number of Firms with only Local Intermediate Goods Input</th>
<th>Number and Percent of Firms with Inputs of Local Intermediate Goods (Total Columns 5 &amp; 6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food/Beverage/Tobacco Processing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather Goods/Shoes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Production</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Production/Printing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refined Petroleum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber/Plastics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Metallic Mineral Production</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals/Fabricating</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Production</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical/Electronics/Optical</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9 33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Production</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25 23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. Percentage of Firms Surveyed Using Output Produced by Other Firms in Armenia (Surveys conducted by the author)
The responses that are shown in the two tables show somewhat incongruous results. Whereas 39% of firms produce intermediate goods for the local market, only 23% of firms procure those goods. In seven industries, 33% or more of firms interviewed produced intermediate goods for the local market. Yet in only three industries did 33% of more of the firms surveyed procure intermediate goods in the local market. The survey results suggest somewhat weak linkages may exist in the Yerevan economy.

Industrial production statistics for Yerevan for the years 1999 – 2002 were examined to determine the relationship between linkages and growth. The growth figures were compared with the survey results to determine if growth occurred in the sectors with the strongest linkages.

The results do not necessarily support the hypothesis. As shown in Figure 6, basic metals/fabricating, non-metallic mineral production, transport, machine production and electrical/electronics/optical production showed impressive growth, 58%, 27%, 495%, 30% and 102% respectively. However, there is no correlation between those growth rates and high rates of linkages. Seventy-three percent of basic metals/fabricating firms do produce intermediate goods, and 50% of firms in non-metallic mineral production and transport produce intermediate goods. Thirty-three percent of machine production firms made intermediate goods, with electrical/electronic/optical at 26%. On the other hand, even though 100% of the firms surveyed in the rubber/plastics sector produced goods for other firms in the Armenian economy, growth in that sector over four years was 1%. Chemical production decreased by 26%, even though 37% of the firms in that industry produced goods for use by other Armenian firms. Thus high growth rates and linkages were not uniformly correlated.

Discussion
A review of the linkage literature in urban economics and in development economics shows no study of linkages in post-Soviet urban economies. The importance of this research lies in determining how the theory of linkages may be applicable to those economies. Because Soviet urban growth did not generally foster traditional linkages, in most cases linkages must be newly created during the transition period.

The survey results do not show significant creation of linkages in Yerevan’s economy. Furthermore, some of the linkages may not be sustainable. For example, many of the intermediate goods produced in the basic metals/fabricating sector are for construction. There is significant construction in Yerevan at present, but financing for that construction comes primarily from outside Armenia, either from donors or from the Armenian Diaspora. Large-scale donor financing of construction is set to end in 2003 (Mkrtchyan, 2003; Soghomonyan, 2002).

On the input side, results were also mixed. Six firms, or forty percent, producing goods in the other category used local input, but production in that sector declined over the period in question. Furthermore, two-thirds of those six firms were furniture manufacturers whose primary input from the local market was processed wood products. Only in the machine production and electrical/electronics/optical sectors are increase in output and balanced links on both the output and input side in evidence.

The responses also revealed that even in those cases in which firms use inputs from other local firms, many of those inputs are simply scrap from factories not currently operating. In other instances, inputs drawn from other firms are simply unused raw materials from Soviet times. Thus, the level of actual economic activity between firms which is new production is less than the survey results would indicate.

A further complication is the quality of materials produced in Armenia. Several survey respondents indicated that locally produced goods were either too expensive or of poor quality, or both. For those reasons, they shunned local production and used imported products. Survey results indicate that one reason for the poor quality of local goods is that production equipment is in many cases outdated. Firms cannot acquire new equipment because of lack of financing. Firms become trapped in a vicious cycle – because they cannot acquire new technology, they cannot produce quality goods, and because they do not produce quality goods they cannot generate the revenues they require to modernize their facilities.

To this author’s knowledge, donors have not yet begun to address the problem of linkages among industrial firms in Yerevan. As noted above, programs exist to support SMEs, but typically they support to retail, craft or tourism firms individually and do not seek to create supply chains within the local economy. The author has no knowledge of any programme by any donor to specifically develop either localization or urbanization economies of scale within or among Armenian urban economies. This seems surprising, given the importance of these externalities for the functioning of an urban economy.

The USAID draft Country Strategy for Armenia for the years 2004 – 2008 does include a component on clustering in the context of expanding the labour market (USAID, 2003e). However, the Strategy has not yet been adopted and it is not known how programmes to support clustering will be designed and implemented. It is assumed that some attempts will be made to link local universities with economic activities. Whether those programmes will address issues of linkages among industrial firms is not yet known.
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**Manufacturing Category** | **Absolute Change** | **Percentage Change** | **Percent of Firms Surveyed Producing Intermediate Products for Use in Armenia** | **Percent of Firms Surveyed Procuring Intermediate Goods**
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Food/Beverage/Tobacco Processing | 18,356,584 | 33% | No firms surveyed | No firms surveyed
Textiles | -994,379 | -33% | 14% | 14%
Leather Goods/Shoes | 295,814 | 867% | 0% | 0.00%
Wood Production | 498,845 | 268% | No firms surveyed | No firms surveyed
Paper Production/Printing | 200,253 | 6% | 20% | 20%
Refined Petroleum | 1,298 | 129,800% | 100% | 0%
Chemicals | -2,134,862 | -26% | 37% | 12%
Rubber/Plastics | 6,742 | 1% | 100% | 0.00%
Non-Metallic Mineral Production | 315,485 | 27% | 50% | 17%
Basic Metals/Fabricating | 5,020,547 | 58% | 73% | 9%
Machine Production | 511,474 | 30% | 33% | 44%
Electrical/Electronics/Optical | 2,113,058 | 102% | 26% | 33%
Transport | 114,771 | 49% | 50% | 0%
Other Production | -4,885,871 | -30% | 7% | 40%

*Figure 6. Changes in Yerevan’s Manufacturing Output, 1999 – 2002 (In 000 Armenian Dram) (Showing Percent of Firms Surveyed Producing Output for Use by Other Firms in Armenia) (NSS Industrial Production Statistics, surveys conducted by the author)*

**Conclusion**

This study investigates the hypothesis that linkages among firms in transition urban economies will lead to increases in growth. The subject of the study was Yerevan, Armenia. The study sought to determine if linkages exist in Yerevan and, if so, whether they contribute to urban economic growth.

The results of the study indicate that linkages are present, in that firms in the Armenian economy do produce intermediate goods used by other domestic manufacturing and construction firms. However, those linkages are not strong, and structural barriers to the creation of linkages exist. Furthermore, the results are inconclusive as to the effect of the present weak linkages on growth in the Yerevan economy. The survey results indicate (1) barriers to the creation of linkages should be removed, and (2) one way to remove those barriers may be to provide investment in new equipment and technology so that Yerevan’s industrial firms may produce quality products at competitive prices.*

*References*


GOSPLAN of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (1987), Yerevan (photocopy of the original in the author’s possession)


* There was no refined petroleum in 1999. In order to calculate the percentage, the number 1 was substituted for 0. Hence, the large percentage increase.
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Soghomonyan, P. (2002b) Interviews with the author, May
Tacis (2001) Regional Development Programme for the Lori Marz, Lori Marz, EDAR 9804

Architecture & Environmentalism: 
Movements & Theory in Practice
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Keywords: Environmentalism, Architecture Theory, Environmental Architecture, Sustainability

Abstract
Towards the end of the last century, the environment came to the forefront of architectural debate. Whilst opportunities for improving the environmental performance of housing and offices have been investigated, the retail sector has seen limited application of environmental theory. This paper is part of a larger work considering the place of environmental evaluation in retail architecture, particularly the whole life costing approach. The research aims to develop understanding of such methods in case study application and develop these methods to aid environmental decision support modelling in the retail sector.

Introduction
The aim of this paper is to establish the relationships between environmentalism and architecture and where environmental analysis relates to the theoretical background of this subject area. This will be approached through two objectives;

1. Mapping of the development of Environmentalism,

Environmentalism
Environmentalism covers a broad spectrum of ethical, political and scientific ideologies, Figure 1. Concepts such as sustainability, introduced by Goldsmith in Blueprint for Survival (1972), became more widespread following the 1987 Brundtland report. However, the meaning of sustainable; able to be exploited indefinitely without depletion, has been surpassed by a prefix of sustainable equaling “good for the environment”. A similar shift in usage is true of “Green”, initially associated with the Green Party, is a term still commonly used as an umbrella term pertaining to a mindset that is the opposite of the exploitative or capitalist. This use of manipulative terminology is in evidence in many disciplines.

The word Ecology, derived from the Greek oikos – house and logos – understanding, has been in use since German Biologist Ernst Haeckel first used the term in 1878 (Pope, Appleton, Wheal, 1991 p.85). Ecologists study the world as a balanced system of natural forces in which no living thing exists in isolation. Ecology is the scientific study of ecosystems, not a political or philosophical viewpoint. Ecosystems can be viewed with human life as an externality, or alternatively that all species including mankind are integral to the ecological balance.

Environment
- the conditions that affect the behaviour and development of;
- the physical conditions that exist;
- the natural world in which people, animals and plants live.

Environmentalism
- concerned about the natural
- environment and a desire to improve and protect it.

Ecology
- the relation of plants and living creatures to each other and to their environment;
- the study of this.

Sustainable
- involving the use of natural products and energy in a way that does not harm the environment;
- an action that can continue or be continued for a long time.

Sustainability
- development that meets the of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

(Brundtland Report 1987.)

Figure 1. Definitions
Environmental instability is caused by imbalance between population, resources and pollution. As population increases, resources are used faster and more pollution is produced, each having an exponential effect on the next. Although these problems are distinct, they are part of an interrelated network of positive and negative feedback loops effecting a multitude of other systems involving economic social and technological change.

Mapping Environmentalism

Environmentalism has developed, evolved and diverged into a complex network of ideas and behaviours, attempts to portray the historical development of environmentalism to the present day allowing the interpretation of shifting patterns in policy and action. In the earliest times a view of the universe existed that stems from Pagan and religious ideas that were closely allied to nature, this Natural Magic was widespread until the Renaissance, Figure 2. Alongside this belief was Aristotelian science and the Anthropic centric view of Medieval Cosmology, where the celestial regions encircled the Earth and Man had dominance over nature. Critically this sets out the notions of how Man relates himself to the environment, either, less than, equal to, or greater than the environment. The Scientific Revolution of the 16th Century saw a gradual shift with Natural Magic evolving into Romanticism and Aristotelian science into Newtonian Science. Two analogies developed reflecting this divergence, likening the environment to a huge biological model, and conversely, to the mechanism of a clock, or machine.

Pepper (1984) suggests that Romanticism was one of the early forms of ecologist thinking, stemming from a reaction against the rational progression of science and technology in the late Victorian period. Leading up to this period, landscapes that had escaped cultivation became increasingly appreciated for the sublime qualities of their wilderness. Ideas of utopian self-sustaining communities were developed in the 19th century. Essentially romantic idealism, the idea of using ones own hands to produce food and home comforts was attractive in an increasingly mechanized society. However, the missionary zeal of this kind of environmental and social engineering was based on an idealism that had infeasibility as its basis (Borsi, 1997, p.10). A less idealist liberal movement, which concerned itself with a peaceful existence and getting back to nature persisted well into the 20th century with a major Neo-Romanticist insurgency in the 1960’s and 1970’s.

Between these two extremes, a separate theory developed. Pepper (1981) suggests that this middle ground is the domain of social sciences stemming from the ideas of Francis Bacon. This ideology allows science to become the servant of Man, providing better quality of life through improving all manner of circumstances. As the use of science is very often to benefit those who can afford to fund it despite suggestions by the authority and the scientists that such work is supposedly for the good of all.

The application of this new social science was manifest during the industrial revolution which in turn gave rise to capitalism and widespread exploitation of natural resources.

Through Malthus and Darwin, a form of environmental determinism has endured where humans and animals behave in a certain way, particularly in a competing manner in order to secure survival, an idea promoting capitalism. At the same time, Darwin’s ideas of balance and the interrelated nature of life on earth has supported the GAIA hypothesis of James Lovelock (1979). This systems approach to the environment suggests that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, and that the environment is an indivisible system. Despite this contradiction, Darwin and Malthus’ environmental determinism have supported an intersecting ideology.

These three models of Systems, Social science and Mechanisms approaches allowed the environment to be understood in very different ways, and very different conclusions were drawn about how it worked, these analogies have endured to the present day.

More recently, interest in our relationship with the environment was re-established by a number of publications responding to damage to wildlife caused by farming techniques (Carson, 1969) and the oil crisis of the 1970’s (Goldsmith, 1972 and Meadows, 1972), Figure 3. Whilst both Goldsmith and The Club of Rome took population growth as the prime driver of imbalance in their world systems, they had very different approaches for tackling the problems of the environment. The Club of Rome introduced the idea of a technologically optimistic society, (Meadows, 1972 p.129) one that believes that environmental problems will be solved by technological solutions. When modelled, applied technological solutions are portrayed as prolonging the period before system collapse, but not eradicating it (Meadows, 1972 p.140) leading to the conclusion that technological solutions alone will not result in stability.

Goldsmith (1972 p83-86) advocates a change to the value system of the developed world, where growth of economic supply and demand has been central to so-called stability. Real value or social accounting not economic value was the key to non-growth economy to achieve sustainability. This idea is essentially Ecocentric and challenges the Technocentric model of the world as a machine, definitions established by O’Riordan (1981, p.1).

Strong political significance is attached to these two opposing ideologies. Commoner (1992) particularly sees
Figure 2. Environmentalism Map: part I
Figure 3. Environmentalism Map: part II
the Technocentrists as traditional right wing and capitalist and Ecocentrists as left wing. He goes on to suggest that many of the worlds ecological problems have been caused by allowing market mechanisms to override all other concerns. He does point out that market driven economies can create markets for seemingly environmentally benign products, but only at vast profit to the supplier. He asserts that failures in the technosphere are visited as effects upon the ecosphere, which adds further force to his condemnation of the Technocentrists. In order to counteract this point he suggests that the largest socialist regimes (USSR, Eastern European Nations and China) have had disastrous effects on their environments (1992, p. 219-220). Whilst Commoner admits that neither end of the spectrum is faultless, he adds further divisions of Fundamentalists and Realists between the ecocentric and technocentric extremes.

Pepper (1984) asserts that Technocentrism is the dominant and authoritative attitude to the environment in Western society and the one which is held by those which exercise the most power. This view according to Pepper is a result of the overriding approach of classical science that has been dominant since the 16th century. He argues that rationalism in the scientific world has created a dualism, inspired primarily by Descartes, that matter is composed of primary qualities that are measurable, and secondary ones that are subjective and may only exist in observation. This empirical science is not influenced by social, cultural or aesthetic ideas. Ecocentrism opposes this view with emotional and subjective ideas being paramount. This dichotomy was been undisputed until the resurgence of subjectivity in sub-atomic physics and Quantum Theory, Pepper (1981). O’Riordan has suggested a relationship between these environmental extremes and religion, with Western Judeo-Christian ideas more easily relating to technocentrism and Eastern religions relating to ecocentrism. Pepper disputes this, suggesting that both ideas exist in Christianity, however, dominance over nature appears to have succeeded over an affinity with it alongside the developments in scientific thought that threatened to dispute Biblical ideas.

Whilst the dichotomy between the technocentric and ecocentric ideologies has persisted to the present day, the deterministic central ideology has not been so well defined, some further clarification was established by O’Riordan (1981), Figure 4. Protestors at the most ecocentric end of the scale and Activists straddle Commoner’s Fundamentalists. Reformists take the central route between the extremes. Conformists represent the pure technocentrists and Inactivists are beyond the previous scale representing the point of view of extreme capitalists. Diversification of environmentalist spectrum may go some way towards de-politicising the arguments, particularly in the UK where the distinction between the main political parties has become blurred. By the late 1980’s, it was becoming clear that individual countries were not able to make significant impact in environmental issues without the support of their neighbours. More importantly, it was recognized that the developing countries of the world needed aid to avoid making the mistakes of the developed world in managing their own environments. The first Earth Summit took several years of planning. In 1992, The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development was held in Rio de Janeiro. It led to the creation of Agenda 21, a document promoting sustainable development throughout the world and conventions on climate change; biological diversity and sustainable development were also agreed. The key achievements of Rio were not the documents themselves, but the increased public awareness of the issues involved and a desire locally to follow the ideas set out in Agenda 21. Local Agenda 21 was adopted by many councils and planning departments. It is important to note that China, Russia and the US continually refuse to sign up to the agreements to reduce emissions and consumption of resources that the rest of the world’s nations have accepted. Whilst sustainability as a concept has been adopted by both left and right wing policy in the UK, the concept is still diverse enough to be implemented from an ecocentric or technocentric point of view. Today, Socio-Economic Environmentalism, attempts to benefit everyone and everything by balancing social economic and environmental sustainability. In practice this is difficult to control and prove, and like pre-industrial social science, is prone to exploitation by the sponsoring authority.

**Environmental Architecture**

Defining architectural styles and theoretical standpoints has long been a pre-occupation of the architectural profession. The practice of establishing a paradigm has been in existence from the start of the neo-classical period. Architectural history and theory has traditionally been taught as a chronology of styles and movements, with special interest in the conflicts between styles, such as the Gothic and Classical in the 19th century, and Modernism and Postmodernism in the 20th. This mindset leads the profession to attempt to apply names to classify a particular design approach. Although Van Der Ryn and Cowan (1996, p. 12) argue that architects had no environmental vocabulary pre 1970’s, there is a body of architectural work that has reflected on man’s position within the ecology of the earth prior to the advent of 20th century environmentalism. This section of the paper will attempt to clarify the emerging terminology and aesthetic relationships between environmentalism and it’s expression in the built form. This section will demonstrate that Architecture has closely reflected the period of development of Environmentalism since the 1960’s.
Figure 4. Environmentalism Map: part III
Figure 5. Environmental Architecture Map: part I
Mapping Environmental Architecture

The following mapping diagram is set out in a similar way to the previous mapping of Environmentalism, a format made familiar in architecture by Jencks, Figure 5.

There is a consensus (Olgyay 1963; Hawkes 1996; Hagan 2001) that the earliest writings that considered the nature of the environment and how it is made apparent in building were evident in Vitruvius, Figure 6. and these three requirements considered the most fundamental requirements of buildings. This method of resolving the needs of the building user in the form and materials of a building has been fundamental in establishing civilization in climates where the unprotected human could not survive.

Figure 6. Vitruvius' Formulation

Vernacular building techniques from all climatic regions have allowed communities to thrive in harsh environments. Commonly they respond to diurnal and seasonal variation well and use locally sourced materials. This makes vernacular buildings inherently environmentally responsive. Cultures tend to rely less on vernacular wisdom as they experience economic development and increasingly consider fashion and taste as the prime motivators of their architecture. The result is increased consumption of materials from further a field, and introduction of architectures that are less appropriate for the local climate, necessitating increased servicing loads. In many developed societies, the rediscovery of the methods of vernacular architecture has fuelled both theoretical work and built examples. Hagan (2001, p103) suggests that those who use the vernacular as a generator of environmental solutions fall into two groups; (ecocentric) anti-industrial pro-craft revivalists and those seeking theoretical models for passive environmental design. In some developing nations however, use of vernacular can be perceived as patronizing sentimentality (Hagan 2001, p118) or crude climatic and cultural determinism.

Colonial development establishing Western European architects and building practices in diverse climates may have resulted in forced development of building technology and design initiative to cope especially with heat and humidity in tropical zones such as Lutyens work in India. The same is true of New World architecture of this period (Banham, 1984 p. 305). Banham (1984, p44) suggests that the introduction of internal electric lighting was a considerable factor in the advancement of the new styles of architecture from Art Nouveau in the 1890’s. Both the work of Morris and Ruskin have many references to the environment and the potential dangers of industrialization. This Romantic Movement in architecture was strongly associated with early environmentalism (Pepper, 1984) and has informed the development of Arts and Crafts and Organicist architectures.

Though not consciously related to the threat of environmental collapse, the relationship between man and the environment in terms of comfort and well-being was well explored, not least by Le Corbusier, who’s writings have been used by designers to inform their work (Vale 1991 and 1996; Olgyay 1963). Modernism and functionalism have been suggested by many (Hagen 2001, p151; Slessor 1997) to have strong links with environmentalism if the “function” of a building is partly the modification of the external climate to provide comfort. Banham however contests that the German functionalist schools such as Bauhaus ignored most thoroughly the “human concepts of environmental quality” (p124) evolved before 1914. In addition, Banham (1984, p304) suggests that the intention of the International style modernists had been to rid the world of the inadequacies of vernacular architecture. Thus, the relationship of environmental architecture and Modernism is somewhat paradoxical in nature. Perhaps the strongest factor of modernism that positions it firmly as the progenitor of technological solutions is the precept that technological progress leads to material growth and the technocentric machine aesthetic.

Olgyay (1963) wrote about the interlocking fields of climate balance as early as 1963. Shown in Figure 7, very much like Vitruvius, his work has no pretensions to aesthetic style whilst maintaining the need to tie the technology into good design. Givoni (1969) followed Olgyay with a more scientific approach to the same problems of climate and comfort without any suggestion of how good aesthetic architecture is achieved developed from the technology.

The environmental architecture of the 1970’s concentrated on energy prompted by the developments in environmentalism surrounding the oil crises as discussed.
in the previous section. The amount of energy used in the running of buildings has increased due to the introduction of building services during the course of the last century (Banham 1984 gives an historical account). Solar power and the ideas of passive solar design and passive ventilation grew into the main concepts used to define the architecture of the period. These principles made a dramatic impact on domestic and housing design and were generally more applicable to the way of life of most people. The concept of Low Energy Buildings was introduced, although still mainly realised as homes designed for one-off clients and architects themselves, a few local authorities began to take some interest in reducing running costs of housing through passive solar design. By that time, environmentalism had taken on its political meaning and environmental design was becoming more self-conscious. In the preface to the second edition of Givoni (1969) written in 1976, he acknowledges the new relationship of man in the environment that had become current since the first publication.

Banham (1984) categorizes building types in to four modes of environmental control; Conservative, Selective, Regenerative and Exclusive (Figure 8). The Conservative Mode aims to temper changes in external climate by thermal storage, primarily by massive walls. Banham saw this as the “the ingrained norm of European culture.” (p.23). The Selective Mode expels unwanted conditions and admits the desirable and has always been mixed with the conservative in elements such as windows, shades and ventilation devices. The Regenerative Mode applies energy in the form of heating or cooling and introduces artificial light. In traditional construction, all three modes are employed but most built forms tend towards one or other mode. Banham claims that the Conservative/Selective mode “…sees power consumption as an embarrassing aberration. Their embarrassment was fortified in the Sixties and Seventies by the growing tide of concern about pollution, energy costs and the depletion of finite natural fuel resources.” p.277 the response in Banham’s opinion was the “passive” Solar Movement in architecture. This movement was primarily concerned with low technology and rarely explored actual “active” solar power. Banham saw the majority of this movement as fanatical and to a certain extent exploitative of the domestic (female) effort required to alter blinds, open vents etc. Banham’s fourth Exclusive mode has no relation with the environment and is typified by highly serviced buildings. These are designed in a manner that makes an internal environment sealed completely from the external.

Hawkes (1996, p. 14) demonstrates a climate balance diagram of biology, climatology, architecture and technology very much in the manner of Olgyay, Figure 9. However, his definitions of building types (1996 p109) follow in the pattern of Banham; Pragmatic, Exclusive and Selective. Where Pragmatic ignores environmentalist themes, Exclusive reflects a more considered level of
Figure 10. Environmental Architecture Map: part II
design than Banham’s mode but still works exclusively form the external environments. The selective magnet filters the external environment in a combination of Banham’s Conservative, Selective and Regenerative modes.

A number of commentators have chosen to dissect environmental architecture into two camps. These two categories are a direct parallel with O’Riordan’s Ecocentric and Technocentric ideologies. Guy and Shove (2000, p.13) define these ideologies respectively as those that feel social responsibility and those that wish save on energy and material costs for their own benefit. Similarly, Lloyd Jones (1998, p.11) claims that there are two profoundly opposed schools of architectural thought, Cultural-fix and Techno-fix. This dichotomy represents those (ecologists) who believe that a change in the culture and attitudes of society (even if they have to be enforced by regulations or levies) is prerequisite, and those (technologists) who see technology providing the answers to the problems we have forced upon the environment thus allowing society to continue to function as it has evolved over the centuries of industrialisation. These two schools have profoundly different design methodologies.

Ecologists, Van der Ryn and Cowan (1996) suggest that the esoteric aspects of design are critical. These are listed as nature, place, biodiversity, vernacularism and

Figure 11. Environmental Architecture Map: part III
manifestation of didactic teaching through design. The ecological approach has further developed into a more defined ecology theory by the use of observations of ecosystem as models or metaphors to help in the design of construction and industrial projects (Kibert et al. 2002). This group argues that we have become ecologically illiterate through our separation from the natural environment by the built environment and that we need to rediscover our relationship with nature through this representation. This principle is *Ecomorphism*, where a building is representative of a system as opposed to *Biomorphism* where a building represents the form of an organism. They would also argue that this is not an ideology but a scientific methodology although not one that follows the rules of empiricism (Van der Ryn and Pena in Kibert et al. 2002, p.2132).

Technologists, Thomas and Fordham (1996) offer five elemental considerations required to form buildings with an energy balance through the measurables of skin materials and U values, site planning, energy use, comfort and daylight, solar, ventilation, material solidity, air quality and moisture. Slessor (1997) suggests an association with High-Tech, recommending works by Foster, Rogers, Grimshaw, and Hopkins as examples representing application of the technological approach.

Hagan (2001) concludes that there are three categories of environmental architecture; *Symbiosis*, *Differentiation* and *Visibility*. Symbiotic design uses statistical factors to constrain it’s brief. Hence it falls very much at the technological end of the spectrum. Hagan suggests that one reason why Symbiotic architecture is closely related to the modernist and high tech stream is the ease of calculation of environmental effects in and around orthogonal and regularized forms reflecting the International Style (p149) thus representing the technocentric school. Hagan divides differentiation into two distinct methodologies; *Cultural Differentiation* responds to the vernacular and social aspects of the genius loci, through an understand of the lifestyle of an indigenous people, it is believed that a design solution will by nature respond to the environment. *Climatic Differentiation* however uses geographical and meteorological data to formulate a scheme. Both of these respond to Vitruvian ideology through Olgyay and Hawkes, and as such reflect Darwinian determinism. Hagan’s architecture of *Visibility* is defined by the intent to make environmental ideas clearly legible in the aesthetic treatment of a building. It allows the conception of architecture as art to remain in place. Hagan is willing to accept that all three categories are distinguishable in the work of many architects, however one will be dominant. It is also suggested that they are a layered profundity of thought in the environmental design process. As an example of one way of designing, Symbiosis is the initial requirement to achieve fixed requirements or targets, the designer may then go on to respond to the local environment of the building and finally attempt to make their design efforts visible to the user.

Guy and Farmer (2001) split sustainable architecture into six categories using built examples and architects for definition. This *metalogic* spans the ecologist to technologist spectrum; *Eco-technic*, *Eco-centric*, *Eco-aesthetic*, *Eco-cultural*, *Eco-medical* and *Eco-social*. Eco-technic represents a broad grouping of methodologies from Hawkes’ Pragmatic to Selective modes. Eco-centric is the antonym of Eco-technic. The other four are between these extremes, with Eco-aesthetic corresponding with Hagan’s Visibility; Eco-social and Eco-cultural straddle Cultural differentiation and flow from Vernacularism and bioregionalist traditions. Eco-medical is a direct descendant of Givoni (1969) and Hawkes (1981) on positive human environments but has now encompassed sick building syndrome, employee efficiency and other more recently researched phenomena that regard human health and well-being in internal environments.

Today, as a parallel of socio-economic environmentalism there exists a principle of balancing three aspects of sustainability, Figure 12. Whilst design methodology respects a middle ground between eco-centric and technocentric concerns, it does not result from the determinism but rather an acceptance of aspects of all three standpoints; Ecocentric environmentalism, Deterministic socialism and Technocentric economics.

Although the mapping diagram attempts to place a number of architects within the various streams of environmental architecture, may have shown differing methods in differing situations such as Le Corbusier’s machine ethic contrasting with his work in India. Others, such as Erskine have evolved over long careers and have shifted slightly from one stream to another. The use of the work of certain architects to define methodologies can be misleading. One such is example Ken Yeang. Yeang has his own philosophy, which he calls Bio-climatic architecture. It is derived from the deterministic geographical and climatological principles of Olgyay whilst allowing
expression through new materials and building forms such as the skyscraper. The main constraints of Yeang’s architecture are to reduce energy consumption whilst improving comfort; both very beneficial to the client. He confesses that he pays little service to the constraints of life cycle analysis or sustainable development (Richards 2001, p11-12). Jencks sees Yeang as Organitech (Rattenbury 2002). Guy and Farmer (2001) give Yeang’s work as an example to typify their Eco-technic Logic. Hagan (2001) describes Yeang’s work as Climatic Differentiation, whilst Lloyd Jones defines Techno-fix. Yeang’s earliest writings introduce Bio-climatics very much in the style of Givoni, Olgyay and Banham, forcing Yeang’s work into a less Technologist position. Close scrutiny of his architecture would suggest much less attention to technical measurement of building performance and in contrast a keen interest in more the softer aspects of low-tech and passive environmental tempering such as planting, water features and appropriate materials for internal environments. This suggests that the outward symbolism of environmentalism (Hagan’s Visibility) may in some circumstances override both Differentiation and Symbiosis thus inverting Hagan’s theory of progression of environmental design sophistication.

This form analysis of architecture can never be fully fixed as Jencks has demonstrated by publishing an appendix to his original charting of twentieth century architecture (Rattenbury 2002). It is apparent that the definitions used by writers and designers have been interpreted by each to explain their own ideas relating to their work or their reaction to the work of others in the context of the environment as we are presented with the environmental problems of the time in which the definition is used. The wealth of environmental architectural history cannot be denied, however, we must remember that this represents a very small fraction of the construction industry as a whole. If all construction were to have sustainability in it’s brief regardless of the other constraints and requirements of the client, all work should find its place within the spectrum of environmental ideas presented here. Whilst it can be argued that environmental architecture is not an aesthetic style, it is without doubt a movement albeit separated into three overlapping strands of Ecocentrism, Differentiation (Determinism) and Technocentrism.

Conclusion

The parallels that can be drawn between environmentalism and environmental architecture, as shown in the mapping diagrams, aids the understanding of how the architectural world has responded to the changing pressures of the three themes of environmental instability. Unlike environmentalism however, architecture bridges the divide between art and science supported by many paradigms, this sets up a tension between satisfying both objective criteria and subjective desires. The design community faces the problem of communication of their response to environmental issues and solutions to the client and the client’s market, the public. It would seem vital that in order to achieve their aims, architects need to have real and compelling proof that their designs do provide the solutions they promise. In an attempt to reconcile the conflict between economy and environment, it became increasingly popular in the 1970’s to consider environmental problems in terms of economic comparisons, such as cost benefit analysis and environmental impact assessment, in order to attempt to put a higher value on the environment. Whole life costing and other economic valuation methods of measurement have been categorized by many of the commentators advocated here as part of the technocentric methodology. To many designers who are positioned on the ecocentric and differential methodologies and do not believe that value can be placed on the environment, this may make WLC unappealing or too closely related to the right wing and capitalist notions it has been suggested to represent. Others are dismissive due to current crudeness of modelling techniques (Hagan 2001, p10).

There is no conclusive correct method for the design of environmental architecture, but it would seem that the best solutions for the environment results from the implementation of the broad spectrum of ideas of socio-economic environmentalism. However, the methodology is intensively subjective and dependant on the accurate capture of both client and externality specific values and constraints. Balance between the three forces in this methodology can only be achieved with complementary objective data offered by WLC evaluation. Whilst ethical arguments may work in academic and to a lesser extent political spheres, persuasion of the majority of construction customers is primarily economically driven, social and environmental considerations follow. In order to increase the proportion of environmentally considered built work in the construction industry, reliable complementary methods of subjective and objective analysis must be both formulated and legislated.

References


The City as Public Space:
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Keywords: Abuja, Access, City, Cultural Diversity, Nigeria, Public Space

Abstract
This article explores the social construction of public space in the Central Area of Abuja, Nigeria’s capital city. Using qualitative data collected from a survey of public spaces in the Capital City, the paper argues that the grand philosophy of ‘City As Public Space’ which permeated the master planning of the city and which itself was distilled from the nationalistic and egalitarian aspirations that conceived the new capital, have not been effected in its implementation. The paper posits that the cumulative effect of government effort to establish its presence in the Capital City ahead of the initial occupancy date resulted in the sidelining of public space development in the city centre particularly. The paper then concludes that this situation is detrimental to the proper functioning of the capital as the nation’s ‘public space’, basing its argument on the premise that public space is the arena for social intercourse in any society, more so in the culturally rich and ethnically diverse one like Nigeria’s.

Introduction
Urban design is primarily concerned with the physical and socio-cultural quality of the public realm, with a built environment that fulfils society’s aspirations and represents its values (Worpole 1992; TheUrbanTaskForce 1999). To achieve this object urban design aspires towards “making better places for people than would otherwise be produced” (Carmona, Heath et al. 2003, p3). In its earlier stage of development urban design concentrated more on the visual qualities and aesthetic experience of urban spaces (Cullen 1971; Unwin 1971; Sitte 1979) rather than on the cultural, social, economic, political and spatial factors and processes (Lynch 1960; Alexander 1965; Whyte 1980; Jacobs 2000).

Contemporary urban design has synthesised these earlier traditions asserting the essence of place not only in terms of its spatial qualities but the diversity and activity it gives to life. Carmona et al discuss in some detail seven frameworks identifiable in this latest thinking (Carmona, Heath et al. 2003, pp9-12).

Within these traditions there have also been different critiques of the urban environment tacitly accepting that urban design involves a plethora of players and interests. There are critiques directed at the actors (Lang 1994; Bentley 1999; Llewelyn 2000), others at the product (Loukaitou-Sideris and Banerjee 1998), some others at the processes (Jacobs and Appleyard 1987) and yet others at the regulations (Rouse 1998).

The discourse about urban design and the public realm is located within a wider discourse about the ‘City’. The literature on the nature and quality of the ‘City’ is vast. Essentially there are different approaches to imagining the city. These portrayals usually emphasise particular dimensions of the urban experience, basically: social, economic, environmental or political. Each offers some insight, although because of the wide spectrum, many of these approaches fail to connect in some respects. However there is in general a consensus that the ‘City’ ought to be understood in its “multiplicity of relational nets which weave across city space [sic] the connectivity of these relations and their variable interconnectivity” (Healey 2002, p1778). In her discussion of this, Healey posits that such a multiple imaging of the city has the potential to create and sustain the city as a “shared collective resource which is richer and more inclusive” (Healey 2002, p1778) in all respects, especially in the contemporary fragmented urban experience. She breaks down the basic categories and dimensions of the urban experience – i.e. economic, environmental, political and social – into seven finer points, namely:

1. As physical artefact
2. As cultural milieux
3. As every day life
4. As cultural identity
5. As collection of economic assets
6. As systems of interconnected parts
7. As symbol, an iconic identifier used to present to outsider and citizen

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Within this context of multiple meanings and continuous flow of recomposition, this paper looks at public space development in Abuja's city centre. The paper argues that the development of the Central Area and indeed the entire Capital City should be seen in the light of the social construction of space and conceived as a continuous two-way process in which the people, government and professionals create and modify public space within the city while at the same time are themselves influenced by the public spaces in various ways.

The context of this discourse is a qualitative survey of public spaces in the Capital City, carried out in August 2002. The survey was part of a wider research of public spaces in three case study towns in Nigeria. The methods used in the investigation were observation, interviews and documentary analysis.

The Conception of Abuja as Public Space

Abuja is the Capital City of Nigeria. It came into being on 4th February 1976 by federal government decree (see among others FCDA 1979; Barbour, Oguntoyinbo et al. 1982; Umeh 1993). Before then, and for about sixty years, Lagos had served as Capital City (see among others Aderibigbe 1975; Akinsemoyin and Vaughan-Richards 1977; Folami 1982; Adeluge, Osuntokun et al. 1986). At the expiration of its Master Plan period (1980-2000), which coincided with the beginning of the new millennium perceived as quintessentially urban, the Capital City is gradually catching on to its role as the nation’s hub. It is becoming more and more familiar with its function as the modern administrative city of national and continental significance it was envisaged to be.

Abuja’s paramount role however is to serve as “a symbol of Nigeria’s aspiration for unity and greatness” (FGN 1975; AFRICA 1983). This idea of the City as:

- Seat of Government
- A place of and a symbol of unity
- A melting pot of Nigeria’s diverse cultures, and a magnet for diverse peoples and nations
- A place of physical beauty and an exemplary physical environment

pervaded, not only the choice of but also the design and planning of the Capital City.

No doubt the problems experienced in Lagos, the former capital, contributed to the shaping and sharpening of this aspiration (McNulty and Adalemo 1988; Peil 1991). The need for such a capital city cannot be divorced from the history of Nigeria as a vast conglomeration of diverse nationalities, brought together to form a British colony at the dawn of the 20th century. In the nearly 100 years that Nigeria has been a political entity, she has had both centripetal and centrifugal forces tugging at her continued existence as one nation. The need for restructuring has been a recurring issue, but so also has the call for unity amidst her rich diversity (Achebe 1983; Isichei 1983; Beckett and Young 1997). Indeed she has weathered a bloody civil war ‘to keep Nigeria one’.

Relocation of the Capital City

Figuratively, Lagos and Abuja are umblically linked. The latter borne out of the former; the relocation to the present capital resultant from the role and character of the erstwhile capital. There had been informal but recurring consideration of the suitability of Lagos as Federal Capital long before General Murtala Mohammed’s government set up a seven-man panel to advise it on the contentious issue. Often referred to as the Aguda Panel, its terms of reference were in summary to examine the dual role of Lagos and advise government on the desirability or otherwise of retaining those roles (FGN 1975; FCDA 1979). The Panel after extensive investigation found Lagos unsuitable to continue to serve as Federal Capital and having been mandated to recommend alternative locations in the event, scored about thirty potential towns and locations on thirteen criteria and finally selected Abuja, a completely new site (FGN 1975; FCDA 1979; Umeh 1993; Olomola in Kalgo and Ayileka 2001). Several reasons informed the Panel’s choice of Abuja including its ethnic neutrality and central location in the heartland of Nigeria, potentially accessible (physically and socially) to all parts of the country. The federal government accepted the Panel’s recommendation affirming that “a centrally located Federal Capital in a spacious area with easy access to all parts of the Federation would be an asset to the nation and would help in generating a new sense of national unity” (as quoted severally in FCDA 1979, p27; AFRICA 1983).

This sense of or aspiration for unity was so important that the Aguda Panel noted in its report thus:

It is needless for us to state the obvious – that we are just in the process of building a nation of the many ‘nations’ which occupy the geographic area known as Nigeria. It is our belief that one way of forging the idea of unity of this nation is by building a capital city which will belong to every Nigerian, where every Nigerian will rest assured that he has opportunity to live in parity with every other Nigerian, and where no Nigerian will be regarded either in law or on the facts as a ‘native foreigner’. (FGN 1975; AFRICA 1983, p67) (emphasis added)

1 This is the Nigeria-Biafra War fought from June 1967 to January 1970.

2 In 1967 when 12 states were created out of the previous 4 regions, Lagos was made the capital of one of the states in addition to being national capital.

3 The Aguda Panel was comprised of Justice Akinola Aguda (chairman), Dr Tai Solarin, Col. Monsignor Pedro Martins, Alhaji Musa Isma, Chief Owen Fiebai, Dr Ajato Gondonu and Prof O. Ogan.
Figure 1. Major cities including the new and old Capital Cities -
Lagos & Abuja
(Source: NewAfrica.com)

Figure 2. Ethnic and Religious Diversity
(Source: Atlas of Nigeria)
Similar nationalistic sentiments are frequently expressed in everyday life and at many fora by individuals, groups and the government. Achebe, internationally renowned for his insightful fiction which includes a series of novels on the problems of contemporary Nigeria¹, speaks in his non-fictional critique “The Trouble With Nigeria” of a dream-Nigeria. Though it is arguable whether this dream-Nigeria existed or can still be attained, it is undeniable that as he observed “…it never fully faded from our consciousness…” (Achebe 1983, p6).

The setting up of the new Capital was seen as a medium to meet some of the ideals for national unity and Abuja is still being expected to attain that goal of ethnic neutrality in reality. It may be useful to mention here that in the course of Nigeria’s history various governments have set up specific programmes and policies to achieve this same aim, especially in the period just after the civil war. Examples of such unification programmes have been the Federal Government Colleges² and the National Youth Service Corps³.

The Master Planning Of the Capital City

The Federal Government Decree No 6 which established the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), also provided for the constitution of the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), and charged the agency with the responsibility of planning, designing and developing the FCT.

The FCDA first initiated a number of research/technical studies and planning exercises aimed at providing the requisite information for the Master Plan for Abuja. Then in June 1977, following an international competition, it commissioned Messrs International Planning Associates (IPA) - a consortium of architects, city planners and engineers based in the United States - to prepare the Master Plan for the development of the Capital City and its region. According to the terms of reference, the master planning process was to include a review and analysis of all available and relevant data. It was also to tackle:

- The selection of a suitable Capital City site from out of the extensive land area of the FCT (8,000 square kilometres⁴)
- The preparation of general outline plans (i.e. Regional and City Plans) with accompanying design and development standards manual
- The development of guidelines for subsequent studies and more detailed development plans.

(FCDA 1979)

The Master Plan was ready in February 1979. Subsequently, a Central Area Urban Design Team was appointed to articulate the elements of the Central Area Plan further. The Team was made up of three Nigerian firms (namely: Benna Associates, Olumuyiwa Associates and Nsiegbe Associates) and one international firm (Kenzo Tange & Urtec of Japan). They submitted their Final Report in 1981. A third plan was later carried out by Doxiades Associates (Nig.) Ltd., the Nigerian subsidiary of Doxiades Associates International, based in Athens, Greece. The final report of this study was submitted in January 1983. These different studies together constitute the Abuja Master Plan (Kalgo and Ayileka 2001).

The Master Plan took the declared nationalistic aspirations of the decree and expounded on them. Consequently some seven principles, explicit and implicit, can be identified in the philosophy that underpinned the planning of the new Capital City. These are:

1. The principle of ‘equal access’
2. The principle of ‘equal citizenship’
3. The principle of environmental conservation
4. The principle of ‘city beautiful’
5. The principle of ‘functional city’
6. The principle of effective regional development
7. The principle of rapid national economic growth

Mabogunje has classified these seven principles into three broad categories which I have termed thus: first - national inclusion and egalitarianism, second - exemplary physical environment and third - economic development (Mabogunje in Kalgo and Ayileka 2001). It can be argued that the second and the third categories are implicit in any planning exercise, be it of a new town, city, capital or sections thereof, as well as the regeneration of existing ones. This thus leaves the first category (i.e. national inclusion and egalitarianism) standing out as a unique ideal, clearly differentiated from the other two and specific to an end. It particularly emphasises the ‘City as Public Space’.

¹ No Longer at Ease, A Man of the People and Anthills in the Savannah
² The Federal Government Colleges (also called Unity Schools), were established by the Gowon government in the early 1970s. There are two of these colleges in every state. Their acceptance and success is attested to by the establishment of new ones in the states subsequently created after the initial batch of colleges. Admission is on state basis to ensure nation-wide representation. At inception the schools were exclusively boarding even for those students who lived within commuting distance. This policy was to foster maximum interaction between the students.
³ The National Youth Service Corps, also of Gowon’s administration, is a programme where every graduate serves the nation in a state other than that of their origin or residence or education. Initially it took on graduates from every tertiary institution. But from the mid-1980s because of dwindling resources the intake has been systematically curtailed.
⁴ For size comparison the FCT is larger than some countries and would fit in between Singapore (6,927 sq m) and Cyprus (9,250 sq m) on the world table of country sizes by land area.
In 1999 (twenty years after the making of the Master Plan and at the expiration of its lifespan), a workshop was held in preparation towards its review. After examining all aspects of the philosophy, objectives and implementation of the Master Plan so far, the over-500 workshop participants, made up of various stakeholders (government, professionals, private sector and the general public) concluded in their final communiqué that “the philosophy and objective for the creation of Abuja remained valid” (Kalgo and Ayileka 2001, pix).

**Urban Design of the Central Area**

Though expressed in very broad terms the vital role of urban design is to “establish long-term spatial or physical ‘vision’ for localities, by means of a master plan or urban design framework” (Carmona, Heath et al. 2003, pp16-17). The Master Plan of Abuja recognized the importance of the Central Area (i.e. the city centre) in the design concept defining it as:

The hub of both the city as well as the nation itself. This is true not only in a symbolic sense but in physical actuality as well. All affairs in the city and the nation will focus on it. It will also be the centre to which representatives of other nations will come. Therefore, it will symbolize Nigeria to the world, thus reaching beyond national concerns alone.

(FCDA 1979, p79)

To further this symbolism of the Central Area of the Capital City as the hub of the nation, the Master Plan set forth certain guiding objectives towards its design organization, inter alia:

- To define the Central Area as a unique and special place so that it may be the symbolic and actual Seat of Government of Nigeria
- To organize the principal elements of both its natural and built environments to emphasize the symbolic aspects
- To take advantage of the special views, vistas and axes inherent in the selected site of the Central Area (FCDA 1979)

These design objectives encapsulate aspects of the seven guiding principles, which underpin the grand philosophy of the Master Plan.

The public spaces proposed within the Central Area were sequentially arranged to create an areal axis thus:

1. National Arboretum and National Monument at the Aso Hill end of the axis
2. Central Park in between the National Assembly Complex and the Mall
3. Mall flanked by ministerial buildings on its two longer sides
4. Presidential Gardens next to the Mall with the Presidential Residence in its midst
5. Central Square or National Square at the opposite end of the axis, terminating the series of open spaces and the two diagonal parkways

Dispersed within the Central Area were four adjacent minor squares to serve as nucleus for future public buildings. The several block-long Mall visually connected the Legislature (i.e. National Assembly Complex) and the Executive function (i.e. Presidential Palace and Municipal Administration Centre). The Judiciary (i.e. Supreme Court) was located further along the axis, beside the Central Square. This grouping of buildings was so arranged to emphasise the Seat of Government.

**The Deviations from the Central Area Plan**

As built, the National Assembly Complex is situated in its proposed location on a knoll overlooking the rest of the Central Area. It is the terminus of the axis centring on Aso Hill, symbolising the Legislature as the place where the nation’s laws are made, by focusing all other functions in the Central Area, and implicitly the nation, on it.

The rest of the composition of the Central Area has changed considerably. The Executive (Presidential Villa Complex) and the Judiciary (Supreme Court Complex) have been relocated to two knolls next to the Legislature.
(National Assembly Complex). The road network has
Figure 5. The Presidential Villa Complex, National Assembly Complex and Supreme Court within the Three Arms Zone with Aso Hill in the background, August 2001 (Source: author)

Figure 4. The Central Area Plan (Source: Master Plan of Abuja)
been altered encircling all three arms of government in one location, hence the name The Three Arms Zone. This arrangement is propitious in that it consolidates the Aso Hill terminus of the axis and amplifies the symbolism of The Three Arms Zone as the focus and centre of the nation.

The other changes however are not as auspicious. The Mall and the four minor squares are no more. The site of the Central Square remains, though it is yet to be built. However another national square, variously called Eagle Square or Festival Ground, has been built. It is located where the Central Park was proposed and has an adjoining Memorial Arcade jutting into The Three Arms Zone.

The Politics of Building the Capital City

Having set in motion the relocation of the Federal Capital and all the necessary action towards its design, planning and implementation, General Murtala Mohammed was assassinated in a bloody coup in February 1976. The mantle of Head of State fell on General Olusegun Obasanjo, the erstwhile second-in-command. He basically followed up on the programmes of his predecessor; the master planning of the Capital City continued. During his tenure the underbelly agitations for a return to civil rule gained momentum and he was prevailed upon to institute a political transition programme, which produced Alhaji Shehu Shagari as the new civilian president, after 13 years of military rule. Abuja’s Master Plan was ready in February 1979 just before the transition. In his electioneering campaigns Alhaji Shagari had promised to accelerate the movement of the capital from Lagos to Abuja. On assumption of office, he proceeded to make good his promise. And so began what many commentators have called “the mad rush to Abuja”.

The Capital City was still under construction, and in fact had been dubbed “the largest construction site on earth” (AFRICA 1983) when an elaborate 22nd Independence celebration was held there on October 1, 1982. It was the first time it would take place outside Lagos. This marked a symbolic rather than actual movement to the new Capital. Barely a year later, Alhaji Shehu Shagari’s government was overthrown in a coup led by General Muhammadu Buhari and his dynamic second-in-command, General Tunde Idiagbon. They did not pursue many of the programmes of the former civilian administration, which they portrayed as being extravagant and wasteful. So the construction of the Capital City came to a virtual standstill. Five years later, in 1988, General Ibrahim Babangida, who was very visible in the Buhari-Idiagbon government, ousted them in a palace coup. He re-invigorated the construction of the Capital City and by December 12 1991 formally transferred the seat of government from Lagos to Abuja, effectively establishing government presence there. A very brief civilian interlude followed when General Babangida instituted an interim civilian government and ‘stepped aside’. Shonekan’s government lasted only a few weeks before the military re-intervened. The succeeding regime of General Sani Abacha continued vigorously the building of the capital and in 1995 gave directive that all remaining ministries and also foreign missions should move to Abuja by the end of 1996 (TSM 1995). General Abacha died in office on June 8 1998. He was replaced by General Abdulsalam Abubakar whom the international community prevailed upon to bring to a positive conclusion the political transition programme Generals Babangida and Abacha had aborted. On May 29, 1999, his regime ushered in the third civilian administration since Independence. Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, retired army General and former Head of State who had facilitated the construction of Abuja, emerged as civilian president. He is currently serving another four-year term as president having been re-elected in the April 2003 elections.

Modified Schedule of Construction and Accelerated Development

Because of the magnitude of development involved in the construction of the Capital City, the Master Plan had adopted a phased development programme to formally accommodate and provide for orderly urban growth from 1980-2000. But with every new government came a change in attitude to the relocation of the Federal Capital which translated to either a slowing down or acceleration of the construction schedule. The change could also be perceived in the different focus and priority in development. And so within the twenty-year period proposed the schedule had been altered drastically.

The accelerated growth of the city in the 1980s has been attributed to concerted effort by various government administrations to establish full presence there ahead of the 1986 initial occupancy date. The 1990s witnessed a steadily increasing tempo of physical development by private individuals and corporate bodies.

The Central Area has been rapidly developing. It accommodates the major government, institutional and commercial buildings as well as public and open spaces. The residential districts and the major roadways beyond the city centre are in place. In summary, the city infrastructure has been laid out and land use patterns established. As at now, Phase 1 comprising the Central Area (essentially the Seat of Government and Commercial Core) and some residential districts (Garki, Wuse, Asokoro and Maitama) is nearing completion, though 17 years behind schedule. The other phases are yet to commence and so the influx is crammed into this portion of the Capital City, which has already exceeded the population target (FCDA 1979; NPC 1992; LesEditionsJ.A. 2002).

Access to Public Space in the Central Area

Most definitions of public space emphasize the necessity of access which can include access to the place as well as to the activity within it (Carr, Francis et al. 1992; Madanipour 1999; Moughtin 1999; Carmona, Heath et al.
The Three Arms Zone is the principal node in the urban fabric of the Capital City. Its aesthetic as well as symbolic meaning as Seat of Government had been thoughtfully designed. This node lies within the Central Area which is the hub of the nation, the centre of a gigantic, multi-cultural community.

It soon becomes apparent to a visitor or even a newly arrived citizen in Abuja that the Seat of Government, though impressively located and inviting exploration, is inaccessible. In capital cities the world over, some portion of the Seat of Government is always open to the general public, tourists especially. When the Seat of Government was in Lagos, the State House and its vicinity (Tafewa Balewa Square, the Supreme Court etc) were reasonably accessible. Not so in Abuja; no part of the Three Arms Zone is accessible to the public. Undoubtedly capital cities are always subject to security concerns, more so since the September 11 attack on the Pentagon in the United States of America. In its aftermath most governments have tightened security in sections of their capital cities. The situation in Abuja however is not in response to the global implications of the American catastrophe. The Three Arms Zone has always had this defensive ambience.

Of the numerous public spaces proposed for the Central Area, which would have given a sense of belonging to the citizenry, only one has been built while several have been eliminated. As Mabogunje points out regarding the elimination of the Mall: “The idea behind the Mall, of course, was to make the City a lot more pedestrian-friendly such that people can move around and enjoy their Capital City between discharging their business with various government ministries.” (Kalgo and Ayileka 2001, p6).

Eagle Square, the only public space which exists, and the most important national public space, is adversely limited in its role and function. It is a 5,300-seat capacity arena, built to provide a befitting outdoor venue in Abuja for the hosting of state functions. It was designed and constructed in a few months by a company better known for road works. Since then the ceremonial parades on Independence Day (October 1), Worker’s Day (May 1) and Armed Forces Remembrance Day (January 15) now take place there. Political rallies are frequently held there, including the very obnoxious ones by ABN during the regime of General Sani Abacha. Those ABN rallies gave the Eagle Square a negative image it has not yet shaken off, just as Tiananmen Square in Beijing carries the stigma of the student massacre (Hershkovitz 1993). The swearing-in of former General Obasanjo as civilian president on May 1999 was held there. On some rare occasions Eagle Square has been used for national prayers.

The square is enclosed with barbed wire fencing, so no one can enter except during those state functions mentioned above. At the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, in the adjoining Memorial Arcade, “a sentry guard from the Brigade of Guards keeps watch 24 hours with a ceremonial change of guards” (newafrica 2002). Partly because of this and the surrounding military developments, The Three Arms Zone and its periphery are a high security area and access here is restricted. Eagle Square and the other (proposed) public spaces fall within this restricted area.

The literature on accessibility and exclusion centre around the prevention and exclusion of undesirable/undesired social behaviour, restriction of democratic gatherings and alienation of part or all of the public (see among others Zukin 1991; Yeoh 1996; Bentley 1999; Low 2000; Madanipour 2003). The situation in Eagle Square is a classic case of alienation, by government appropriation of a public space that was meant for the legitimate use of the citizenry. By its present use pattern Eagle Square is, to borrow a phrase, “where city inhabitants gather to pay respect to authorities” as it is “meant to serve a public institution rather than the public” (Chua 1992, p56).

Scored on the three forms of access set out by Carr et al, this is how Eagle Square fares:

1. Visual access – people can see into the square but are not allowed to use it if they wanted; neither do they feel that they would be comfortable, safe and welcome in it because of the intimidating atmosphere.
2. Symbolic access – the animate objects (soldiers) as well as inanimate objects (keep-off signs, barbed wire fencing) and the fortified Three Arms Zone complex in close proximity are rather menacing than inviting.
3. Physical access – Very rarely if at all is it available to the general public. During its use for state functions it is the political elite and not the citizenry who enjoy its facilities.

Interestingly in Nigerian common parlance inaccessibility to a place is symbolised by Aso Rock. If a Nigerian compares a building or place to Aso Rock he/she means that it is inaccessible because it is either strongly fortified

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1 Except of course the visitor has come here on the prior invitation of the government, for instance state visitors and journalists.

2 Westminster Abbey in London, the Reichstag in Berlin, the Whitehouse in Washington, DC to mention a very few examples.

3 ABN is an acronym for Association for Better Nigeria, a youth organisation set up by Senator Arthur Nzeribe to transmute General Sani Abacha to a civilian president and perpetrate him in office.

4 Aso Rock in this jocular context is a nickname for the Presidential Villa and could refer to The Three Arms Zone as a whole.
or requires a tedious procedure to gain access. This expression, coined from the impenetrable character of Aso Hill, has now been reinforced by the impenetrable nature of the Aso Rock complex.

Figure 6. Eagle Square with its pavilion in the background and barbed wire fencing supported with concrete stand in the foreground, August 2002 (Source: Author)

Plurality of Activities in the Capital City’s public spaces

To buttress the point that inaccessibility is a peculiar characteristic of Eagle Square, investigation into the Capital City’s public spaces beyond the Central Area revealed a very different ambience. Although the activities in each public space are diverse and dependent on several factors, some general conclusions can be reached. Some of the activities are universal while others are more peculiar to Nigerian attitudes, a fact established in an earlier study. They can also be classified into three main categories: socio-cultural, commercial and political.

The socio-cultural include: socializing (e.g. meeting old friends, making new ones, unwinding after work); eating and drinking; having a family outing; participating in some light sports (like table tennis, snooker, football, jogging); dancing, singing etc. Religious activities (prayers and evangelistic congregations) can also be included under this category.

The commercial include: buying and selling in shopping centres, markets, plant gardens and informal open spaces.

The political include: State/civic receptions; ceremonial parades; rallies and demonstrations.

The survey showed that while the public spaces in the wider city were used for a variety of activities, the Eagle Square (the only public space in the Central Area) was used almost exclusively for political purposes.

Yet it is possible that Eagle Square could fulfil the socio-cultural as well as political role if it was more accessible. Certainly it is well equipped for the staging of outdoor musical shows, cultural festivals and some sport events, all of which are very popular uses of similar public spaces in other towns (Ikoku 2001). This would inject liveliness into the public realm in the Central Area and enhance the functioning of the Capital City as Public Space, the very aim of the urban design plan.

Drawing on Gehl’s categorisation of activities in public spaces three categories can be discerned: necessary, optional and social. He further demonstrates how the quality of the physical environment influences which of these activities occur, arguing that moving along a spectrum from poor to high quality public space, more and more of the optional and social activities will take place (Gehl 1996).

Examined from another perspective, the socio-cultural activities are carried out by individuals of their own volition while the political are state orchestrated.

Availability of public spaces in the Capital City

In the earlier section - Politics of Building the Capital City - the effect of the numerous interventions by successive governments on physical development through the 1980s and 1990s (coinciding with the Master Plan period) was established. As the situation in the Capital City is now revealing, the frenetic rush to move into the new Capital City has resulted in what many commentators agree to be devastating consequences on the city layout. (Mabogunje, Olomola, Abumere and others in Kalgo and Ayileka 2001). The gravity of the situation is such that within the Central Area and at a city-wide level, Abuja suffers from a scarcity of public spaces and other facilities for leisure and recreation as several proposals are yet to be implemented. The situation is further aggravated as sites designated for public facilities in the Master Plan have been converted to other purposes. Taking into consideration its status as Capital City and comparing Abuja with other towns and cities, it has very little public space at present.

In addition to the austerity of public spaces, not much use is made of the street. In all the other towns and cities, (whether the newer ones like Lagos, Kaduna and Aba or the more traditional ones like Arochukwu, Zaria and Benin) a lot of activities – social, political, commercial - are carried out in open spaces and streets. The favourable climate of tropical sunshine and high temperatures all year round are suited to outdoor living. Also in the Capital City, as in other urban centres, household units tend to be rather large, comprising the nuclear as well as extended family and often times non-family members (Peil 1981). Added

1 Public spaces in the Capital City and two other case study towns were used in both the 2001 and 2002 surveys.

2 This was one of the emerging issues from the qualitative surveys of 2001 and 2002 earlier mentioned.

3 The nuclear family might include more than one wife, while the extended family might include siblings of the husband and in-laws. The
to this housing is in short supply, like other towns and cities (Osondu 1992). Housing is also most expensive in Abuja than any other, so sometimes more than one family have to share (Ikejiofor 1997). In such a setting there is need to spend time outdoors especially in the evenings. People usually do, making use of the few formal public spaces or improvising in informal spaces in their absence (Ikoku 2001).

Conclusion
This paper has argued that a well-articulated public space development within Abuja’s Central Area is required. Such a plan ought to take cognizance of the grand philosophy of its Master Plan while addressing the consequences of the various political interventions and the resultant deviations from the original plan.

The Capital City at its conception was envisaged as the public space of the Nigerian people. The Master Plan well articulated this philosophy in formulating the design objectives for the Central Area mainly through its composition and the location of public spaces within it. Some of these locations have been depleted in size or number. Of the sites unaffected, only a few have been developed.

The non-implementation of the public space proposals of the Master Plan has adversely affected the effective realization of the planning concept of the ‘City as Public Space’ envisaged for Abuja. Furthermore, the militarization of the environs of the Three Arms Zone and the condoning off from public access of Eagle Square has created a fortress atmosphere in parts of the Central Area aggravating the situation. These developments continue to hamper the actualization of the grand philosophy of national inclusion and egalitarianism laid down at the inception of the Capital City.

The recreational needs of the citizens of Abuja are diverse requiring different types of public spaces as well as multiple use of those already available. Without the existence of places for social, cultural, religious and political interaction then the goal of cohesion within society cannot be realised.

In advocating a return to the Master Plan vision, the argument is not for environmental determinism, claiming that the physical environment of the Central Area alone has created the state of affairs vis-à-vis public space in the city centre. Rather this paper has asserted that human behaviour and perception are inherently situational, embedded in the physical as well as social, cultural, political and economic contexts and settings.

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non-family members could be paid help or apprentices in the trade/business of the householder. Also a newly-arrived person in the city would invariably stay with friends or family until they found their own accommodation.
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Zoning for Difference: Rethinking Iris’ Ideal for City Life

The Case of Prostitution

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Abstract
This paper is a reflection on and supplement to Iris Young’s discussion about city life as a normative ideal. It starts with a review of the Western debate on communitarianism, which contextualizes the emergence of Young’s ideal of city life. While Young advocates the replacement of homogenous communities with diversified cities in order to assert the politics of difference, I argue that a city of difference is unavoidably built on the tolerance of different and even conflicting “homogenous communities.” Specifically, I point out that either requiring every community to accommodate prostitution or eradicating its legitimacy thoroughly from a city is against the principle of difference. As such, I conclude with a normative model of “zoning for difference,” which is built on the embodiment of participatory procedure and justified exclusion.

Introduction
Zoning is a crucial instrument for urban planning to regulate and differentiate land use. As such, it is criticized for reinforcing exclusiveness, separation and injustice (Frug 2001; Mitchell 2003); or, from a political-economic perspective, reconciling class conflict embedded in a capitalist society (Lake 1993). Using the regulation of prostitution as an example, however, I contend that zoning might be a compromised but the only feasible way to embody the politics of difference. It is the only approach that allows both the supporters and opponents of prostitution to be represented in the same city. In other words, zoning should be viewed as a pragmatic way to mediate the irreconcilable conflict in a city through spatial differentiation.

Community versus the city
Communitarianism has emerged as an alternative political ideal to liberal individualism in the past three decades. The Enlightenment assumption underlying liberal political philosophy of “an incoherent and impoverished concept of the human self” (Benhabib, 1992, p71) was questioned in the broader postmodernist epistemology. Many critical theorists therefore turn to the ideal of community for their normative version of a society free from domination and oppression. Nevertheless, Communitarianism has come under attack recently, notably by feminists, for its exclusive and totalitarian implications. In particular, Young (1990) proposes ‘city life’ as an ideal alternative to Communitarianism so as to defend ‘the politics of differences’.

This paper proposes to dialogize with and supplement Iris Young’s discussion about city life as a normative ideal. I start with a review of the Western debate on communitarianism, which contextualizes the emergence of the ideal of city life. While Young advocates the replacement of homogenous communities with diversified cities in order to assert the politics of difference, I argue that a city of difference is inevitably built on the tolerance of different and even conflicting ‘homogenous communities’. Specifically, I point out that either requiring every community to accommodate prostitution or eradicating its legitimacy thoroughly from a city is against the principle of difference. As such, I conclude with a normative model of ‘zoning for difference’, which is built on the embodiment of participatory procedure and justified exclusion.

In her notable essay “City Life and Difference” Young refuses to take community as an alternative vision of a democratic polity as opposed to welfare capitalist liberal polity. Although she shares the communitarian criticisms of liberal capitalist society “for being atomistic, depoliticized, fostering self-regarding interest-group pluralism and bureaucratic domination” (1990, p226), she argues that the ideal of community also fails to offer an appropriate, progressive alternative.

Specifically, Young points out that communitarianism entails a denial of difference just like liberalism does, though in opposing ways. While liberal individualism denies differences by “positing the self as a solid, self-sufficient unity, not defined by anything or anyone other than itself…[and] bringing all such separated individuals under a common measure of rights,” communitarianism denies difference by “positing fusion rather than separation as the social ideal” (p229). In other words, the
ideal of community endorses and values homogeneity. Young thus refuses to fall into the dualistic dilemma between liberalism and communitarianism. On the contrary, she proposes a third alternative—the ‘ideal of city life’—as the normative version of social relation. By ‘city life’ she refers to:

…a form of social relations which I define as the being together of strangers. In the city persons and groups interact within spaces and institutions they all experience themselves as belonging to, but without those interactions dissolving into unity or communness. City life is composed of clusters of people of affinities—families, social groups networks, voluntary associations, neighbourhood networks, a vast array of small “communities”. (Young, 1990, p237, emphasis added)

Young contends that “social justice in the city requires the realization of a politics of differences” (1990, p240). Her ideal city life is thus characterized by social differentiation without exclusion, while being full of variety, eroticism and publicity (pp238-240). Young is among the first who advocate for a feminist theory of social justice that goes beyond distributive equality, but voices concerns about multiple forms of oppression and domination. She pluralizes the Marxist category of oppression, and develops an account of “five faces of oppression” by including exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence in her criteria of determining oppression (pp48-63). In this way, Young successfully redefines the question of justice away from the purely redistributive mode of welfare state capitalism, while asserting the politics of difference.

Young’s criticism of the exclusive character of community is evident in many empirical studies. The Not-In-Backyard-Yard (NIMBY) syndrome against human service facilities such as AIDS patients’ shelters reflects the homeowners’ homophobia and property concern. The story of the Tompkins Square Park in New York City, as vividly represented by Harvey (1993), also illustrates how neighbourhood associations are united to eradicate homeless people that are “other” to them. The case of the xenophobic political movement emerging in Western Europe (Fainstein and Hirst, 1995) is another example of the exclusiveness of identity-based communities.

Nevertheless, retreating from ‘community’ is neither possible nor desirable. It is not possible because, as Garber (1995) points out, city and community are not only conterminous, but also overlapping and interdependent. Young also recognizes that cities are composed by “a vast array of small communities.” If these small communities are still oppressive to its members, the ideal city life that is “free from domination” could hardly be attained in practice.

Retreating from community is not desirable, moreover, because it takes the situation of today’s communities as given. It neglects, as Garber reminds, that many women “participate daily in ongoing ideological conflict over the meaning of place”. Issues like environmental decay, violence against and by children, sexual assault, lack of transportation, economic ghettoization etc. are mostly locally located, and the struggles within communities thus have profound implication in the whole society:

The intimate connections between the daily lives of women and the life of the city suggest that political activities by coalitions of women aimed specifically at defining inclusive, “good” communities might result in localities that are less marginalizing, hierarchical, and dangerous (Garber 1995, p41).

Most fundamental of all, the exclusiveness of small, homogenous communities does not preclude the building of an inclusive, heterogeneous city. Rather, I believe that a certain degree of exclusiveness is the foundation of an ideal city that reduces assimilation. Gerald Frug describes how many who live in poor African American neighbourhoods feel comfortable “only with people like themselves” (1999:138). Although it is ideal that a community is inclusive per se, to criticize an exclusive community as oppressive without referring to its context would be too simplistic. In other words, a universalistic critique of exclusiveness and endorsement of difference is itself exclusive and against the principle of difference.

What matters is, I believe, whether different people/communities have equal access to a city, and whether the exclusion of difference is justifiable. In this regard, a deliberation of the politics of difference is required.

**Differentiated politics of difference**

The problem that arises from the ideal of difference politics is its universalistic tendency. Nancy Fraser (1997) argues that Young’s wholesale endorsement of the politics of difference is not globally applicable. She questions, for example, how we should treat the neo-Nazi skinheads, who are certainly oppressed according to Young since they suffer from marginalization and cultural imperialism. Can we affirm their different claims just as our affirmations of a different race or sexuality?

In “Planning for a different voice” Fainstein also raises a similar question, and argues that feminist recognition of differences must be based on rational assessment. For example, the feminist revaluation and embrace of connectedness and natural obligation can be very conservative, since it exactly corresponds to the claims of traditional opponents of equality, who demand legitimacy based on natural bonds. Hence, Fainstein contends that feminist planning should avoid “accept[ing] too uncritically the premise of postmodernist thought, [which] can easily result in a loss of the progressive values that inspired feminism at its inception” (1992, p458).
What Fraser and Fainstein point out is the potential danger of postmodernist relativism, a concern that is shared by other critical theorists. David Harvey, for example, sufficiently expresses such worry in “The Condition of Postmodernity”, in which he emphasizes that the postmodernist deconstruction of all basic propositions deserves critical scrutiny:

In challenging all consensual standards of truth and justice, of ethics, and meaning, and in pursuing the dissolution of all narratives and meta-theories into a diffuse universe of language games, deconstructionism ended up, in spite of the best intentions of its more radical practitioners, by reducing knowledge and meaning to a rubble of signifiers. It thereby produced a condition of nihilism that prepared the ground for the re-emergence of a charismatic politics and even more simplistic propositions than those which were deconstructed (1990, p350).

In this sense, Fraser argues for a ‘differentiated politics of difference’. That is, some differences, such as gendered practices, should be eliminated; others, such as the Native–American connection to the land, merits universalization; still others could be just affirmed as variations. In other words, a differentiated deliberation of differences could prevent postmodernist relativism, and find a balance between difference and social justice.

The challenge always lies in distinguishing between justifiable and unjustifiable differences. The examples of homeless people, AIDS patients, and new immigrants, for example, would mostly be treated as justifiable differences from a critical perspective. That is, these minorities are stigmatized by the mainstream public, and have little power or access to contest against the stigma. In this sense, the marginalization and exclusion of them constitute oppression, and should not be tolerated morally as well as politically. I would add, however, that the oppression should not be easily attributed to the “selfish communities” that expel them. Rather, we should address the exclusion at the level of a city/society, and reflect upon the reasons as to why the general public stigmatizes and fears these people.

The ‘difference’ of prostitution, however, is more controversial. There is hardly any consensus on this issue, even in critical perspectives. It is in this sense that I propose to use zoning as a way to assert the conflicting voices.

**Prostitution: can it (not) exist legally?**

Prostitution is an issue that splits public opinion in most parts of the world. Unlike the stigmatized minorities like homeless or AIDS patients, however, the proponents and opponents of this business are both (in a sense) powerful. The opponents of prostitution might have more legitimacy in the political arena, and hence are able to criminalize it in the US (except some counties in Nevada) and many countries in the world. Nevertheless, the hidden forces that support prostitution are usually able to make it exist de facto.

Philosopher Lars Ericsson (1980) lists several charges against prostitution that oppose its legitimatization. The charges are: 1) Conventional moralist, which ‘senses’ or ‘sees’ prostitution as intrinsically immoral for the society and future generations; 2) sentimentalist, which believes that mercenary sex without love is of poor quality and thus ‘bad’; 3) paternalistic, which argues that prostitutes would easily get physically and mentally hurt in the process, and thus should be forbidden from engaging in it; 4) Marxist, which argues that prostitution is a form of class oppression; 5) feminist, specifically, radical feminist, who sees prostitution as the most direct form of gender oppression and discrimination.

On the other hand, there are also powerful while diverse claims to legitimize prostitution, including the: 1) Socio-biological or functionalist claim, which argues that prostitution is necessary for the male’s natural drive, and/or serve certain societal functions (Truong 1990); 2) liberal, which believes the state should not intervene in, and especially criminalize, consensual sexual behaviour (Feinberg 1984); 3) pragmatic, which recognizes the impossibility of eradicating prostitution, thus support its legalization (Ong 1993); 4) utilitarian, which argues that the legalization of prostitution would be beneficial for public health (AIDS and STD prevention) and reduce governmental cost (Weitzer 2000); and 5) feminist, specifically, liberal or post-modernist feminists, who recognize the prostitutes’ right to work (Chapkis 1997).

Arguably, part of and only part of the claims from each camp is justifiable based on the principle of social justice. The rest is probably not. This is why prostitution is controversial in the first place. At any rate, as a growing number of research has revealed the “different kinds of workers’ experiences and varying degrees of victimization, exploitation, agency, and choice” (Weitzer 2000:3), prostitution should be read “in more complex ways than simply as a confirmation of male domination” (Chapkis 1997:29).

Hubbard (1998) contends that contemporary state and the civil society intertwine in excluding prostitution and defining appropriate and inappropriate sexual practices, which is crucial to the reproduction and maintenance of Western heterosexual family values. Granted this argument is critically sound, it does not mean that prostitution should be allowed everywhere so as to be “progressive.” A critical geo-political analysis tends to criticize the mainstream moral perspective without any compromise, and fails to establish a dialogue with those who, for various reasons, do find commercial sex offensive. In this regard, it also fails to assert the politics of differences.
In dealing with such ‘irreconcilable conflict’, neither the liberal nor the republican model of democracy is expected to solve the conflict without eliminating differences. As Habermas (1996) illustrates, in the liberal model, the task of democratic politics is to assert private interests by means of elections and the formation of a government. Different interests compete and are aggregated into a political will that influences the administration. In the republican model, on the other hand, politics provides an inclusive opinion-formation process in which free and equal citizens reach an understanding of a ‘common good’ for all. Both models, in short, eventually refer to ‘majority rule’ in reaching consensus, and the (politically and morally) marginalized claims for prostitution would unavoidably be repressed.

The proceduralist-deliberative model of politics that Habermas (1996) and Young (2000) advocate, on the other hand, does provide a normative direction to work in provided that the policy impasse lies in different peoples misunderstanding or ignorance about each other. The process of intersubjective communication might help reconcile certain conflicts and embody differences. However, it might not be applicable to conflicting issues like prostitution, in which the impasse does not lie in misunderstanding, but rather disagreement. In this regard, I agree with Mansbridge that political theorists should “[face] squarely the role of conflicting interests, and consequently coercion, in any democratic polity” (1996, p48).

Following the representative ‘radical pluralists’ Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Mansbridge also advocates for an agonistic model of democracy, which views democracy as “the incessant contestation over such ethical and cultural questions” (in Banhabib, 1996, p9). When conflict remains after “good deliberation,” Mansbridge states, a democracy has two choices: either to remain at the status quo, or to coerce some to go along the others. Again, however, this dualistic situation may be true in many cases, but the idea of ‘zoning for differences’ provides a third alternative to accommodate conflicting voices without “coerce[ing] one to go along with the others.” People of irreconcilable conflicting values and/or interests are mediated through spatial differentiation, and hence are compatible in the same city.

Zoning for differences

Jane Jacobs proposed the idea of “zoning for diversity” early in the 1960s, by which she intended using zoning laws and tax incentives to “attract the greatest possible variety of people into every district in the city, that would promote a continuous network of local streets capable of ‘handling strangers so they are an asset rather than a menace’” (Frug, 1999, p149). Thirty years later, a number of architects and urban planners have begun embodying the idea advocated by Jacob, and promote the ideal of ‘New Urbanism’ that aims to create “neighbourhoods of housing, parks, and schools placed within walking distance of shops, civic services, jobs, and transit” (Frug, p150).

While the idea of Jacob and the New Urbanism use zoning power as a positive intervention for building a city of difference, the model that I am proposing in this paper resembles negative intervention, i.e. using zoning power to prevent differences from being eliminated. Note, however, that “difference” can never be totally eliminated by the State. The Foucauldian contention of omnipresent resistance illustrates why prostitution still exists in every American city—and cities all over the world—that claims to criminalize it. The recognition of the limited influence of and inconsistency within the state, however, should not stop us from transforming it to be more inclusive in terms of formal policy making.

My proposition of ‘zoning for difference’ is identical to that one advocated by Robert Ellickson in the essay “Controlling chronic misconduct in city spaces.” ‘Chronic misconduct’ describes a person regularly behaving in a public space “in a way that annoys—but no more than annoys—most other users, and persists in doing so over a protracted period” (Ellickson, 2001, p20). While in recent years most American cities are expected to adopt ordinances that authorize their police to curb street misconduct thoroughly, Ellickson argues that a city’s codes of conduct should be allowed to vary spatially.

As such, Ellickson proposes a hypothetical division of city public space into Red, Yellow and Green zones. In Red zones, according to his proposal, normal standards for conduct in public spaces would be significantly relaxed. These zones tolerate “more noise, public drunkenness, soliciting by prostitutes, and so forth” (Ellickson, p28). But these zones make up only 5% of a city’s downtown area. In the equally 5% Green zones, by contrast, social controls would be tailored to create places “for the unusually sensitive,” and the code is strict even in regulating mildly disruptive activities like dog walking and radio playing. Finally, most of the city fall under Yellow zones, which are designed to be a lively mixing bowl. Therefore, episodic panhandling and bench squatting would be permitted in these areas, whereas chronic panhandling and bench squatting would be prohibited.

A question that one would raise immediately, which Ellickson oddly ignores but I find most critical is, who designates the different zones? Without considering the question of designation politics, the proposal of ‘zoning for difference’ will mostly become the justification for gentrification and for unjust planning that serves only the privileged communities’ interests/values. In fact, this is arguably the most serious problem of zoning that causes many people to suspect it. Young (1990), for example, points out that land use decisions in most cities or townships are made in a semiprivate process involving only city bureaucrats, elected officials, and capitalist
developers. As a result, the decisions usually contribute to increasing inequalities.

I believe the suspicions about zoning can be reduced (though not totally resolved) through a more participatory and egalitarian process of designation. That is, the process of designating zones should be open to all concerned communities, and each and every community should have an equal say in the final decision. In this way, the decision will be less dominated by capitalist or rich people’s interests, and the question of distributive (in)justice - that locally unwanted land uses are (not) randomly distributed throughout the population - shall also be more addressed. Nevertheless, we should also be aware that ‘procedural justice’ could not eliminate all forms of oppression and exclusion, given that the very ideal of ‘nonexclusive public sphere’ is utopian. In this regard, I agree with Mouffe that instead of trying to erase the traces of power and exclusion, “democratic politics requires bringing them to the fore, making them visible so that they can enter the terrain of contestation” (1996, p255).

A concrete example can be mentioned here for illustration. In Taiwan, a variety of ‘special businesses’ with sexual implication (yet excluding prostitution) are legal, but have been restricted to certain heavy commercial districts. That is, people of different attitudes toward ‘special businesses’ can have their own territory without interrupting the other. Yet there were occasionally residents of heavy commercial districts organizing themselves to reject ‘special businesses’ operating in their communities. To express its respect for participatory democracy, as a result, the Taipei City Government demanded ‘community approval’ as a new precondition for operating ‘special businesses’ in these commercial districts since 1999. In this way, the ‘special businesses’ could legitimately exist in the city, while residents of heavy commercial areas could also have a final say about their living environment. This is a possible model of zoning for difference that embodies both tolerance and democracy, and I contend that prostitution should also be legalized and regulated as such.

One may reasonably doubt that any community would reach a ‘consensus’ to accommodate prostitution, where the quality of life is estimated to be low. I would point out, however, that such a suspicion is built on a biased value per se—arguably the bourgeois value, and neglects that some communities are more open and tolerant (to prostitution) than others. Existing empirical studies in Taiwan about different people’s perception of prostitution already show that gender, age, education, economic status, personal network and life experience are all valid variables that influence residents’ tolerance of prostitution ‘in their back yard’ (Tang 2000; Hou 2001). Takahashi and Dear (1997) also show that communities’ tolerance of NIMBY facilities can be changed through more communication and information. In other words, it is arguably possible that residents of heavy commercial districts, after deliberation, reach a ‘consensus’ to accept prostitution. When different positions in a community clash, nevertheless, certain exclusion would be inevitable. That is, certain people might need to ‘tolerate’ the decision that they disapprove or have to move. In this case, critical planners may ask further whether these ‘sacrificed’ people are of less resource and power, so as to deliberate whether the exclusion is justifiable.

A final remark
This paper has no intention to wholeheartedly advocate for zoning. After all, the need of zoning implies that different people in our city tolerate the ‘Other’ only because of spatial segregation, but not of spontaneous respect. However, faced with the irreconcilable conflict of values, identities and interests, I take zoning as a temporary, compromised alternative to assert the politics of difference. It is at least a better proposal than totally excluding one group from the city—which is how prostitution is treated nowadays in many places. Hopefully, through the equally legitimate coexistence of the confronting communities in the same city, people can really “recognize social group difference as a given, something they must live with” (Young 1990:238). Planners, in the process, should not only facilitate the ideal situation for inclusive communication, but also make exclusions visible for contestation. In this way, the ideals of procedualist-deliberative and antagonistic democracy might not be exclusive or contradictory, but rather supplementary to each other, especially in asserting the politics of differences.

References


The State’s Role in Popular Housing Programmes in Shanghai: From Provider to Enabler to Facilitator?
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Abstract
This paper deals with the shifting emphasis in housing policies of developing countries since the 1970s and subsequent changes in the role of the state to address complicated issues of housing choice, numbers, affordability and finance in the context of increasingly liberalized economic environment. It is argued that the debate on whether the government should act as an ‘enabler’ or ‘provider’ is not of much significance given the enormous need to scale up and diversify housing production in developing countries. Successful housing programmes in Shanghai reflect a unique collaboration of enabler and provider roles of the state generating a ‘hybrid strategy’ involving active but different roles for the public and private sectors. The lesson to be learned is that the enabler and provider oriented policies may signify two separate ways of housing provision but are intrinsically linked and mutually reinforcing. Since the outcome of the new strategy remains uncertain, countries will need to continue to exploit new opportunities and multiple possibilities.

Introduction
The last few decades are marked with strategic shifts in the public sector urban housing policies in developing countries. The earlier approach of housing delivery where government is the producer and provider of urban housing in the form of public housing; sites and services and; in-situ slum upgrading projects mainly targeting to enhance the living condition of the poor, has its own value in revealing the problems of low income housing. However, those strategies were deemed ineffective due to the level of subsidy involved using the limited state funds, inadequate supplies in the face of burgeoning population. The enabler approach adopted since the 1980s as a substitute for prevalent provider approach has also been criticized for not creating a well functioning market-led housing delivery system as originally intended. The enabling oriented approaches have failed to meet the housing need of some 50% of the urban population who are unable to obtain land tenure through the formal or informal market, and cannot therefore begin the process of progressively improving their housing conditions, either through self-help or mutual help (Choguill, 1994; Jones and Ward, 1994).

The answer to the popular question whether the state should be a provider or enabler has been elusive. This debate however stems largely from the less than expected outcomes of these different approaches adopted over the last two decades. Housing policies in developing countries have generally been seen failing to generate a sustainable housing production, distribution and acquiring processes to meet the demand for housing, particularly for the urban poor and the underprivileged. This paper examines motivations for recent changes in housing policies and subsequent roles of the state. The paper aims at:

A retrospective evaluation of ‘Enabler’ and ‘Provider’ approaches to understand the underlying forces instrumental in the shift in approach in housing policies in developing countries.

Recent Changes in Urban Sector Public Housing Policies: A Retrospective Evaluation
Public housing policies have gone through a gradual evolution process since its inception after World War II. Regardless of the merits of different strategies, new rhetoric and definition are given to different strategies with the changing political realities. But throughout the past decades the core ideology of ‘shelter for all’ has remained the same.
Past prophecies that enabler approach would give higher wages to low income groups, increase productivity and investments, accelerating total speed of development and eliminating particularly incompetent or thieving government agents such that the enhanced capacity of the poor would enable them to compete in the market in acquiring adequate housing, have not been realized. When the performance of housing market is evaluated in terms of numbers, their nature and the extent of diversification as per the differential housing needs, it does not look very optimistic, especially when assessed in terms of housing to lower half of the urban population. Existing literatures have raved broadly about two areas of constraints affecting outcomes of enabling approach. One, those related to the ability of the state responsible for creating a favourable institutional framework for housing markets to balance the profit-driven pursuits of the market forces (Burgess et. al, 1997; Islam, 2001; Jones and Ward, 1995) and the other, those corresponding to the ability of the user to make use of new finance arrangements (Datta and Jones, 1999). The degree at which land and housing markets is deregulated has caused increase in land prices both from inflationary effect as well as land speculation (Strassman, 1996; Keivani and Werna, 2001; Islam, 2001) beside generating a mortgage finance system that disqualifies even the relatively better income families (Datta and Jones, 1999, p.5). Another implication of government (de)regulated free market in diversifying housing provision, has been the mismatch in the units supplied and the type of units required, leading to higher vacancy rates of luxury apartments (Lai, 1998).

Enabler approach in housing cannot be assessed without putting it in the context. As such opportunity that enabler approach offered were significant, particularly to the governments in developing countries that lacked resources, were heavily indebted and suffered from large subsidy and financial outlay constraints (Datta and Jones, 1999). With the debt crisis in 1982 came a recognition of improving domestic resource mobilization capabilities: a new strategy in housing finance as a part of new economic liberalism and market dynamism and efficiency of various sectors of national economy thereby basing this on World Bank's principle of raising income to help acquire housing (Pugh, 1997). The main emphasis was on the housing finance sector so that investments are efficient, effective (both in terms of cost and target group) and have a high rate of return, in line with broader financial sector objectives in sharp contrast to the incremental ‘project-based’ type of approach. The new shift in onus of the government from directly constructing shelter to reforming the legislative and regulatory framework, and providing institutional support emphasized on creating a positive ambiance for tapping the private sector resources.

The earlier provider approach of housing delivery was criticized in the legal and economic sphere due to the level of subsidy involved using the dwindling state-funds in the developing countries. Two distinct strands of criticism can be found in the literature. The first is that the outcome of provider strategies in terms of scale of production may not be as significant in the context where a large proportion of housing is produced through private initiatives (Keivani & Werna, 2000). It is argued that apart from the self-help housing these strategies are essentially public provider policies and made at best only a little impact on housing problem (Ogu and Ogbuozobe, 2001; Tipple, 1994). It was estimated that in the 10 year period of 1972-1981, the combined output of project based programmes was only 10% of the actual requirement in developing countries (Burgess, 1992 in Keivani & Werna, 2000). Understandably, the outcome of provider strategies in terms of numbers of permanent construction units or housing units is far too small, but it is also an undeniable fact that of all the housing strategies, public housing schemes have been the most elaborately pursued public policy for low income group. The second criticism is that weak, inefficient, inflexible and unaccountable government led to budget deficit, short-termism (Burgess et. al, 1997). Often excessive regulation restricts individual to get into free competition, creating a monopolistic environment controlled by few, thus increasing the cost and holding back growth.

It appears both enabler and provider approaches have failed to stop further deterioration of housing condition in developing countries and this is likely to continue, unless countries restructure policies in a direction, first, to scale up housing production and second, to increase the affordability and accessibility of the low income families. This calls for a stronger role of the state with an innovative approach as a requisite, to strike a balance for an effective housing supply and delivery system embracing hybrid kind of strategies, in between, that are possible and desirable. The following section explains how public-private collaboration and a more proactive role of the state have resulted in increased supply of housing in Shanghai. Changes in policies related to finance, land, building materials and technology and mechanisms for channeling both private and public sector resources to enhance housing accessibility are discussed. The focus of the analysis is however, on the strategy than institutional framework or role of involved stakeholders.

Case Studies: Shanghai

Shanghai, with the population of approximately 13.2 million and an attractive per capita GDP of US$ 4169, highest in the country, is a pioneer in orchestrating different housing reforms (Hong Kong Trade Development Council, 2001, p.4). Dramatic changes in housing sector were achieved through huge investments from both public and the private sector and an extensive restructuring of policies related to land and finance principally. Central to housing reform in Shanghai is the finance sector deregulation, in terms of accumulating capital for both investment and consumption.

Until 1979, the city has seen the Chinese socialist model dominating housing policies, when state was the sole agent.
for housing production and distribution, administered through work units, while private home purchase was not allowed. Housing investment was seen as a drain in government resources as it was almost impossible to recoup the investment from the nominal rent alone (Wu, 1996). In the post reform period, however, as it appears, there would be series of reforms and massive investments in the housing sector in Shanghai.

Diverse Housing initiatives by Public-private Collaboration

Shanghai has been initiating a hierarchical type of housing policy tapping resources from both the public and private sectors. Since the beginning of the reform in 1978, the scale of housing investment in Shanghai has been huge and rapid. The City’s investment in the real estate sector had reached a 63 billion Yuan from 1 billion Yuan in 1990, according to official statistics. Over the next few years, investment is expected to stay at an annual 65 billion to 75 billion Yuan, with 17-18 million square metres of housing to be sold (China Business Monitor, 2003). The government has been continuously revising guidelines that would enhance private sector participation, boost housing production and consumption. The three-level system of housing adopted apparently let affluent buyers buy large apartments or villas; low and middle-income families a more modest apartment; and impoverished urban residents rent houses with government subsidies. Private sector housing constituted 62.8% of the total housing by 1995 in Shanghai while state owned and collective-owned housing accounted for meagre 4.3% and 32.9% respectively (Wong et al, 1998, p.35) signifying a drastic reversal of allocation of housing in terms of choice and numbers. Understandably, commercial housing for sale dominated housing construction given more than two-third space equivalent to 58.74 million sq. m. under construction in the year 1996 was in this category (Ganesan, 2000). Nonetheless, it can be safely inferred that a third of the total housing produced was for low to middle income group. Despite the lower state-owned housing production, the total housing produced was for low to middle income families. In the construction sector, to encourage traditional home-builders who are increasingly dissociating from different housing programmes due to low profit cap (3-15%) (Rosen and Ross, 2000; Wang, 2001) and higher administrative and ancillary charges, government accordingly lowered transaction taxes, simplified housing approval system and stepped up its supervision of real estate developers. These state supported low-cost commercial housing schemes have, not only enhanced government’s credibility especially in this transitional phase but also helped ward off externalities and monopoly pricing. Shanghai has been successful in capturing private sector resources in increasing its productive efficiency, but at the same time monitoring the allocating efficiency to hold off increasing inequality in society which is often the offshoot of rapid privatization.

The recent major programmes such as Jingji shiyong feng (Economic Liveable Housing Programmes) and weilii feng (Low-profit Housing Programme) have led government’s new drive for public-private partnership. Zhang (2002) confirms that in aiju programme the state provides seed money up to 40 percent of the total cost of the project in the form of loans other than land and tax relief. Apart from that a massive injection of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the real estate sector has obviated local enterprises from relying too much on state funds. Government nonetheless is constantly looking into the option of extending fiscal concessions to developers, in order to entice commercial housing builders towards building more homes for middle and low income families. In the construction sector, to encourage traditional home-builders who are increasingly dissociating from different housing programmes due to low profit cap (3-15%) (Rosen and Ross, 2000; Wang, 2001) and higher administrative and ancillary charges, government accordingly lowered transaction taxes, simplified housing approval system and stepped up its supervision of real estate developers. These state supported low-cost commercial housing schemes have, not only enhanced government’s credibility especially in this transitional phase but also helped ward off externalities and monopoly pricing. Shanghai has been successful in capturing private sector resources in increasing its productive efficiency, but at the same time monitoring the allocating efficiency to hold off increasing inequality in society which is often the offshoot of rapid privatization.
Housing Finance and Affordability

Shanghai is the first major Chinese city to establish Housing Reserve Funds (HRF) in 1991. The Shanghai Provident Fund is not only China's oldest, but also its largest and most successful HRF. By 1998, the Shanghai Fund topped 18 billion Yuan and had more than 4 million participants accounting for almost half the HRF Funds in the nation (Rosen et al, 2000, p.85). This compulsory provident fund for housing aimed to accumulate capital for housing production such that loans made available to the private developers would enable more housing units to be built. There are however, criticisms that many struggling firms have had difficulties in establishing HRF. But we cannot also undermine government's bid to create an institutional lending system which is a prerequisite for many working population to enhance their credibility and to use the new finance arrangements. As a result Banks are increasingly insisting on having individual mortgage some connection (a form of guarantee) with their employer. Arguably, with increased privatization drive the onus of HRF has already begun to shift to the private sector.

As such housing reform in Shanghai accelerated with the Shanghai Plan, officially titled "Implementation Plan for Housing System Reform in Shanghai" in 1991, under which provident fund for housing was made mandatory, public housing rent increased and pay rise replaced coupons with some 4.54 million staff from over 30,000 work units participating in the scheme, which constituted 98% of the total staff by 1996 (Wong et al, 1998). This plan instituted large deposit requirement by new tenants of public housing but introduced provision of discount for prospective home buyers. As a result by 1993 Shanghai government commenced a programme to sell public housing under which over 31 million public housing space was sold and 0.62 million households purchased. While the investment of the state owned work units decreased from 17.9 billion Yuan in 1994 to 12.3 billion Yuan 1995, the floor space actually increased from 5.3 million sq. m. to 7.02 sq. m. (Wong, et al, 1998, p. 34). This was due to the loans made available during the period that enabled more housing units to be built.

To help residents buy homes, Shanghai increased public housing fund loans ever since. The city had issued some 16.5 billion Yuan in public housing fund loans by the end of November 1999 enabling some 223,700 families to buy 17.12 million sq. m. of housing space while commercial banks had issued 18.3 billion Yuan commercial housing loans (China Daily, 2000). As home mortgage arrangements inherently require large down payments and high monthly instalments that few workers could afford, recently the government has started helping the consumers in the lower bracket of income by offering mortgage loans so that they can afford to buy in housing in the market. As noted by Zhang (2002), up to 70 percent of the housing prices are provided to low-income households in Jiangji Shiyong feng (Economic Liveable Housing Programme). The commercial banks have extended mortgage loan terms from 20 years to 30 years and dropped down payments from 30% to 20% of the housing cost (China Daily, 2000). The government is further looking into ways of improving the mortgage market to make housing more affordable to its urban residents.

Land, Building Materials and Technology

Land-use systems in Shanghai have gradually evolved over the last two decades. After the open door policy of China in 1979, a massive change emanated in land administration and regulation with the land leasehold system, land-use rights, taxation and user fees issues. Shanghai floated global tender to lease out its first piece of land, in the Hongqiao Economic Development Zone in 1988 which marked the beginning of the modern real estate industry in the city.

Land development, the condition of use, amount and location of land release and the principles adopted for valuing land etc. are methodically designed such as to strike a balance between interests of the private investor and to minimize the adverse effects of increasingly liberating land market on the low income family. The state administrated land release has basically two parallel approaches. First, few plots were being sold through open bidding under a strictly monitored land disposal system and secondly, releasing some prime lands for subsidized housing. A requirement to have 25% of total investment on development prior to any transfer of land use rights to the private developers has resulted in absence of a secondary real estate market (Li, 1997, p. 333). Market land prices are more or less under the control of the conveyance mechanism such that a developer has to bear the costs of resettling the original residents and the provision of basic infrastructure for the land to be developed besides the conveyance fee, which is often far smaller thereby linking land use rights to infrastructure investment in Shanghai. Besides, as observed by Zhang (2002) the government provides incentives such as land supply for commercial housing developers when a certain amount (say around 20%) of the housing they have developed is low-profit housing.

Urban Land, as it appears has been principal tool for State’s aggressive policy to maximize foreign investments and a way to encourage state enterprises so that they also don’t take back seat in housing and infrastructure development due to budget constraints. Overall, the government has benefited substantially from these (de)regulated operation of the land market. Sales of land-use rights generated billions annually, enabling the local government to develop and supply land for housing and infrastructure construction. Li (1997, p.329) views the mixed 'planned -privatization' operation of the land market, as is happening in China, may not be absolutely undesirable. At the beginning of economic reform, control may be necessary in the pricing and transfer of a unique resource like land.
Shanghai has come a long way in building materials and construction technology know how and benefited a lot from different collaboration. Prices of building materials depend primarily on demand and, in the case of individual clients, on supplies from state quotas. Shortages of raw materials are a potential problem for local production units. Materials commonly used for subsidized housing and construction are manufactured in Shanghai, or in the adjoining regions, the only exception being timber (Ganesan, 2000). To overcome shortages of building materials and improve the quality of construction, Shanghai adopted two strategies: large scale imports, and the use of FDI to upgrade the domestic building materials and equipment production sectors. Because of cheap labour, the JVs are able to manufacture and market products comparable to imported items at lower prices. With the massive inflow of FDI, the local building materials industries are now forced to compete globally, both in terms of quality, technologies and also in management and marketing level. Building materials like ceramic tiles, door/window frames, plumbing, sanitary and lighting fixtures, glass panels etc. from JVs are used extensively in Shanghai today, which have maximized choice; assured quality; and minimized costs through market competition, demonstrating the importance of favourable market conditions and state’s support for successful breakthroughs in construction industry.

Conclusion

Successful housing programmes in Shanghai reflect a unique collaboration of enabler and provider roles of the state. This paper has reviewed recent changes in housing strategies in Shanghai adopted to scale up production; increase choice, quality and innovation; widen ownership and a reduction in state responsibility as direct provider of housing as a significant component of new housing policies. Since a consensus for privatization of the housing market has been reached, the government, in order to fend off possible negative externalities of the market on the low income households, especially during the transition phase, would have to continue to provide safety nets by initiating policies to enhance affordability. This stems from the argument that the gains from hasty privatization are often offset by the social costs of speed of privatization.

The housing renaissance in Shanghai demonstrates a need for deregulating the finance sector as a way to extend its coverage and regulating land and housing prices for curbing inflationary effects and to tackle mismatch in supply in the housing market. Expansion of building materials manufacturing, infrastructure development, design and construction services, mostly through joint ventures between local and foreign parties has also benefited directly and indirectly, the mass housing construction both in terms of volume and quality. In all cases, the state is involved to varying degrees in organization of subsidy for land, infrastructure and finance, or in simply promulgating necessary regulations to realize these advances. Summing up, the enabler and provider policies regarded as two separate ways of housing provision are intrinsically linked and mutually reinforced processes. The new process could best be described as a hybrid strategy involving active but different roles for the public and private sectors. Since the outcome of the new strategy remains uncertain, countries will need to hedge their best. They should continue to exploit new opportunities but should also take prudent steps to tailor already existing options to suit the changing context whether or not the new possibilities are more successful.

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